Evolutionism in Eighteenth Century French Thought

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EVOLUTIONISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT
MARY EFROSINI GREGORY received her B.A. and M.A. in French

from Queens College and her M.Phil. in French from Columbia
University. She is the author of Diderot and the Metamorphosis
of Species (2007) and An Eastern Orthodox View of Pascal
(2008). Two other books, one on the Orthodox Church and the
other on Christianity and twenty-first century science, are in the
prepublication stage.
Mary Efrosini Gregory
This book examines how eight eighteenth-century French

theoristsMaillet, Montesquieu, La Mettrie, Buffon, Maupertuis,
Diderot, Rousseau, and Voltaireaddressed evolutionism. Each
thinker laid down a building block that would eventually open
the door to the mutability of species and a departure from the
long-held belief that the chain of beings is fixed. This book
describes how the philosophes established a triune relationship among contemporary scientific discoveries, random creationism propelled by the motive and conscious properties of
matter, and the notion of the chain of being, along with its
corollaries, plenitude and continuity. Also addressed is the contemporary debate over whether apes could ever be taught to
speak as well as the issue of race and the family of man.
EVOLUTIONISM
IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY
FRENCH THOUGHT
Peter Lang
Currents in Comparative
Romance Languages and Literatures
GregoryMary9781433103735:PaulsonDD.qxd
1/16/2013
4:51 PM
Page 1
166
WWW.PETERLANG.COM
EVOLUTIONISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT
MARY EFROSINI GREGORY received her B.A. and M.A. in French

from Queens College and her M.Phil. in French from Columbia
University. She is the author of Diderot and the Metamorphosis
of Species (2007) and An Eastern Orthodox View of Pascal
(2008). Two other books, one on the Orthodox Church and the
other on Christianity and twenty-first century science, are in the
prepublication stage.
This book examines how eight eighteenth-century French

theoristsMaillet, Montesquieu, La Mettrie, Buffon, Maupertuis,
Diderot, Rousseau, and Voltaireaddressed evolutionism. Each
thinker laid down a building block that would eventually open
the door to the mutability of species and a departure from the
long-held belief that the chain of beings is fixed. This book
describes how the philosophes established a triune relationship among contemporary scientific discoveries, random creationism propelled by the motive and conscious properties of
matter, and the notion of the chain of being, along with its
corollaries, plenitude and continuity. Also addressed is the contemporary debate over whether apes could ever be taught to
speak as well as the issue of race and the family of man.
EVOLUTIONISM
IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY
FRENCH THOUGHT
Peter Lang
EVOLUTIONISM IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
FRENCH THOUGHT
Currents in Comparative Romance

Languages and Literatures
Tamara Alvarez-Detrell and Michael G. Paulson
General Editors
Vol. 166
PETER LANG
New York y Washington, D.C./Baltimore y Bern

Frankfurt am Main y Berlin y Brussels y Vienna y Oxford
EVOLUTIONISM IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
FRENCH THOUGHT
PETER LANG
New York y Washington, D.C./Baltimore y Bern

Frankfurt am Main y Berlin y Brussels y Vienna y Oxford
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Contents
Introduction..................................................................................................... 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Maillet .............................................................................................. 19
Montesquieu..................................................................................... 33
La Mettrie......................................................................................... 45
Buffon .............................................................................................. 69
Maupertuis........................................................................................ 93
Diderot ........................................................................................... 119
Rousseau ........................................................................................ 143
Voltaire........................................................................................... 167
The Controversy over whether Apes Can Be Taught to Speak...... 195
Race................................................................................................ 217
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 247

Notes ........................................................................................................... 253
Bibliography ............................................................................................... 321
Index ........................................................................................................... 335
Introduction
Nature proceeds from the inanimate to the animals by such small steps that, because
of continuity, we fail to see to which side the boundary and the middle between them
belongs.1
Aristotle, History of Animals (350 BC)
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the chain of beings as a conception

of the universe as a continuous series or gradation of types of being in order
of perfection, stretching from God as the infinite down through a hierarchy
of finite beings to nothingness.2 This theory of the hierarchical arrangement
of nature is a straight line or two dimensional, ranging from the most complex to the simplest creature.
Two features of the universe that are associated with the chain of beings
are plenitude and continuity. The principle of plenitude states that the universe is full, exhibiting the maximum diversity of kinds of beings; everything possible (ie: not self-contradictory) is eventuated. The principle of
continuity asserts that the universe is comprised of an infinite series of forms,
each of which shares with its neighbor at least one attribute.
Aristotle rejected the notion of plenitude: he did not think that the Unmoved Mover (God) was under any obligation to create every imaginable
variation of living thing.3 Aristotle refutes the principle of plenitude in Metaphysics: the causes of things are not infinitely many either in a direct sequence or in kind. For the material generation of one thing from another
cannot go on in an infinite progressionnor can the source of motion be
moved (e.g. man be moved by air, air by the sun, the sun by Strife, with no
limit to the series). In the same way neither can the Final Cause recede to
Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought
infinity,4 In both cases progression to infinity is impossible,5 and for that

which has a potentiality may not actualize it.6
Although Aristotle rejected the principle of plenitude, he did promote the
idea of continuity. In History of Animals, he declared that nature passes from
the inanimate to the plant kingdom and from the plant to the animal, in infinitely minute, indistinguishable gradations. Lovejoy translates Aristotle thus:
Nature passes so gradually from the inanimate to the animals that their continuity renders the boundary between them indistinguishable; and there is a
middle kind that belongs to both orders. For plants come immediately after
inanimate things; and plants differ from one another in the degree in which
they appear to participate in life. For the class taken as a whole seems, in
comparison with other bodies, to be clearly animate; but compared with animals to be inanimate. And the transition from plants to animals is continuous; for one might question whether some marine forms are animals or
plants, since many of them are attached to the rock and perish if they are separated from it.7
In Parts of Animals, Aristotle continues to expound on the principle of
continuity. Seals and bats are in intermediary positions on the chain: seals
are land and water animals in one; bats are animals that live on the ground
and also fly and so one might say that they belong to both groups or to neither; some mammals are bipeds and others are quadrupeds and so mammals,
too, belong to both groups or to neither.8
The great chain of beings and its corollaries, plenitude and continuity,
were declared and frequently reiterated by Buffon in his epic 44 volume
Natural History, General and Particular. Buffon made a statement as to the
plenitude of the chain of beings: All that can be, is [tout ce qui peut tre,
est]. This was accepted as true by Maupertuis, Diderot, and the materialists
and it had far reaching consequences, shaping the thought of eighteenthcentury biology.
In 1749 Buffon defined the chain of being as a straight line comprised of
infinitely minute gradations: if man, methodically and in succession,
glances through the different objects that comprise the Universe, and places
himself at the head of all created beings, he will see with astonishment that
one can descend by almost imperceptible degrees, from the most perfect
creature to the most unformed matter, from the most organized animal to the
crudest matter9 Buffon proposed a two-dimensional straight line extending from God down to inanimate matter).
Introduction
That year Buffon also criticized Linnaeus efforts to categorize living

things according to their physical characteristics and declared that it is nearly
impossible to confine beings to categories because characteristics frequently
overlap: But Nature works in unknown degrees, and consequently, it cannot
totally lend itself to all these divisions, since it passes from one species to
another species, and often from one genus to another genus, in imperceptible
nuances; so that there are found a great number of species that are midway
and half-way objects that one does not know where to place, and which necessarily skews the general system: this truth is too important to ignore everything that renders it clear and evident.10
In 1765 Buffon reiterated the gray areas between species and affirmed
the fact that characteristics overlap among species. His chain of being was
no longer two dimensional, but had become three dimensional or conical:
The apes make a near approach to man. The bats are the apes of birds,
which they imitate in their flight. The porcupines and hedge-hogs, by the
quills with which they are covered, seem to indicate that feathers are not confined to birds. The armadillos, by their scaly shells, approach the turtle and
the crustaceous animals. The beavers, by the scales on their tails, resemble
the fishes. The ant-eaters, by their beak or trunk without teeth, and the
length of the tongue, claim an affinity to the fishes.11
Eighteenth-century thinkers recognized that Buffons observation that
physical characteristics overlap among species was undoubtedly true. What
the polemicists did with this information was largely contingent upon their
theological and biological belief systems. Viewpoints ran the gamut and
were as diverse and imaginative as the philosophes themselves. For example, the deist Voltaire used Buffons observation of the vast heterogeneity of
forms to substantiate the beneficence of God and the magnificence of His
Creation. Conversely, the atheist materialists parted company with Buffon
and posited that this vast heterogeneity of living things is an iconic representation of the random motive property of atoms and the random flux that nature delivers.
The first issue was final causes (Gods purpose) vs. random chance. The
deist Voltaire believed that God had a purpose in mind when he created everything and that it would be sheer arrogance for man, whose intelligence is
finite, to try to comprehend Gods infinite wisdom. On the other hand, Diderot and the materialists rejected the existence of God and final causes and
maintained that everything in the universe is a result of the random motive
property of atoms. Adhering to the ancients, they believed that atoms are
perpetually in motion and continually colliding; hence, every possible combination is tested for viability. Given an infinite amount of time, every possible combination will eventuate. This is the foundation of the study of
games of chance (probability theory): as the number of throws increases,
more combinations are realized. Given an eternal time frame, nothing is impossible and every outcome is possible. The materialists held that man
should not make the mistake of reading final causes into unlikely patterns:
what we interpret as organized patterns are merely events that flux delivers.
The materialists thesis of random creation was fueled by recent discoveries of giant fossils in Siberia and the New World. There are several articles
in the great Encyclopedia, of which Diderot and dAlembert were the chief
editors, that describe these fossils. The articles Mammoth, Fossil and
Ivory Fossil indicate that eighteenth-century France was well aware of the
huge mammoth bones and ivory tusks discovered in Siberia and that it also
knew that a 40 day Noachian flood was much too short to account for the
massive upheavals of marine fossils and seashells that had been discovered
on mountaintops and far from water. Geological and fossil evidence caused
naturalists to consider that the earth was much older than 6,000 years as
theologians claimed and that sequences of animal and plant populations
came and disappeared one after the other.
The eighteenth century was also confronted with travelers stories about
the great apes in Africa, orangutans and pongos, that seemed much more intelligent than other animals, and that, perhaps, were a species of man. The
century was forced to consider the notion that perhaps there were multiple
species of man. Travelers such as Buffon, Prvost, Green, and Purchas, traveled to Africa and saw these great apes, which had an anthropomorphic form
and seemed to have an intelligence midway between men and animals. Stories came back to France about how similar to man these apes were. They
were reported to have a mans face, to have a body proportioned exactly like
a man, to bury their dead, to kidnap people, to be attracted to campfires
abandoned by men, and to put roofs on their houses.
In the article Pongo (1755) in the Encyclopedia, Jaucourt discusses the
fact that pongos bury their dead and that the local populations of men regard
the mounds of leaves and branches formed by the apes as a sort of sepulcher. Recounting Andrew Battells account of the travels of Samuel Purchas, Jaucourt says that the pongo is more than five feet high, has the height
Introduction
of an ordinary man, but is twice as heavy, has no hair on his face and resembles a man. Furthermore, pongos build their own shelters, live on fruits and
plants, and cover their dead with leaves and branches (Africans regard the
pile as a kind of sepulcher). Pongos approach campfires abandoned by men
and seem to be pleased with them; however, they cannot conceive of throwing wood into them to keep the embers burning. Africans assure travelers
that pongos have no language or intelligence that can cause them to be considered superior to other animals.
Hence, the notion of the chain of being became more and more problematic for eighteenth-century thinkers with every successive biological discovery. They were confronted with the task of examining the problem posed by
the great apes, who looked much like men did, had the intelligence to bury
their dead and put roofs on their houses, and appeared to be cheered and delighted by campfires, but who had no language and who were more like animals than man.
In the Sequel to the Conversation (1769) Diderot makes a joke about
baptizing an orangutan. The character Bordeu asks, Have you seen in the
Kings Garden, in a glass cage, an orangutan that looks like Saint John
preaching in the wilderness?Cardinal Polignac said to him one day,
Speak, and I will baptize you.12 Diderot raises the question of exactly
how highly organized a being must be before it is endowed with a soul that
requires forgiveness of sin and salvation. It also implies that animals are
conscious, a notion that he ardently defends in the article Animal.
The orangutan suggested that perhaps the insurmountable chasm between man and the animals is not so unbridgeable after all, and that perhaps
1) there are intermediary beings all over the world that need to be discovered
and studied and/or 2) there may be multiple varieties of the species of man,
much like there are varieties of species of flowers.
In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), Note 10, Rousseau
suggested that the way to resolve the question is 1) to have brilliant minds of
the caliber of Montesquieu, Buffon, and Diderot to travel around the world
and record their observations of the apes and 2) to conduct crossbreeding
experiments to ascertain whether apes and humans can produce together fertile offspring. This would resolve the question of species once and for all.
This study will examine how various thinkers in eighteenth-century
France approached the problem of the origin of man and specifically, the
transformist hypothesis. It will be divided into ten chapters that will address
Maillet, Montesquieu, La Mettrie, Buffon, Maupertuis, Diderot, Rousseau,

Voltaire, the debate over whether apes can be taught to speak, and the issue
of race. Taken together, these ten chapters will show the great wealth, originality, and diversity of thought in eighteenth-century France. There were the
deists (Voltaire), who defended Creationism, the atheist materialists (Maupertuis and Diderot), who posited random creation propelled by the motive
and conscious properties of matter, the panspermists (Maillet and La Mettrie), who thought that preexistent seeds fertilized the land, sea, and air, and
that the sea brought forth human eggs that were beached on shores, and
Rousseau, who envisaged the anthropological transformism of man as he left
his natural, solitary state in the woods and joined with others to form societies.
OVERVIEW
Chapter One examines the work of Benot de Maillet, who wrote the Telliamed c. 1700, and who held geological and biological theses that were considered quite revolutionary in his day. His consular positions permitted him
to travel extensively in the Mediterranean region and to observe, first hand,
strata of fossil beds and sedimentary rock. He believed that the earth had
been covered with water during a time in the distant past and that the waters
had receded, exposing land surface and mountains. He also held that if we
know the depth of rock and can estimate how long it takes to form, then we
can calculate the age of each layer. He undertook the project of measuring
the rate of sea level decline and concluded that the earth must be 2 billion
years old. Although his assumptions often contained errors, his legacy was
that the age of the earth can be ascertained by scientific observation, measurement, and mathematical calculations, rather than by biblical chronology.
Maillet was a contemporary of Fontenelle and so he relied on the authority of the ancients. In the Telliamed (although written c. 1700, it was not
published until 1748), he sets forth a theory of panspermia, holding that the
sea carried human eggs to land where they were beached and they hatched.
He posited that there are preexistent seeds everywhere-in the air, water and
land-and that they have always existed. His panspermist views placed him in
the camp of Epicurus, Lucretius and La Mettrie (who would cite him in
1750).
Introduction
Since he embraced the retreating ocean theory, he thought that life must
have originated in the sea and that the first members of each species were
aquatic. Terrestrial creatures must have metamorphosed from aquatic beings
as the waters receded. His character, Telliamed, says that fish developed
wings and fins that helped them to walk on the ocean floor and later on land.
He also tells the tale of a Dutch cabin boy who fell overboard and reappeared
years later as a merman with scales and a fish tail. Hence, Maillets great
contributions to the eighteenth century were the notions that species metamorphose from sea creatures to land creatures and vice versa, and that the
physical characteristics of living beings adapt to changes in their environment.
Chapter Two demonstrates that Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu also surmised that man must have metamorphosed from animals in the
distant past. In the Persian Letters (1721), he describes the animal-like ancestors of the savage/hunter Troglodytes, those Troglodytes of former times,
who were deformed, hairy like bears, and who hissed. He derives his imagery from the ancients, most notably, Aristotle, Herodotus, Pomponius Mela, and Pliny the Elder, who wrote about mans monstrous ancestors, that
could only squeak like bats and hiss. For example, Pomponius Mela described the Blemians, who did not have heads, and whose mouths and eyes
were situated in their chests. This notion was also promulgated by Lucretius,
who declared that in the beginning nature created many monsters and only
those without significant self-contradictions survived. Classical texts held
great weight during the eighteenth century and Lucretius De rerum natura,
which posited that when life emerged on the earth, nature created every imaginable deformed creature and only those beings without major defects survived and proliferated, provided the schema of the origin of living beings for
Montesquieu, Diderot, and La Mettrie, to name a few.
In the Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu elaborates further on the impermanence of nature and the flux that it delivers. He hypothesizes that a
relationship exists between climate and human physiology and also between
climate and government. Climate, geography, topography, and soil all affect
mans body and temperament and contribute to an array of tendencies that a
nation has. Physiology, temperament, intellect, societal customs and forms
of government are influenced by, but not absolutely determined by climate.
Man has the power to progress beyond the influence of climate and improve
his life through legislation.
Chapter Three examines the thought of the physician Julien Offray de La

Mettrie, who was a panspermist, and held views similar to those of Epicurus,
Lucretius, and Maillet. He believed that the germs of all living things-plants,
insects, animals, and men-came from the air and seeded the earth. He was
influenced by Maillets Telliamed and in The System of Epicurus (1750),
Chapter 32, he refers the reader to it. La Mettrie hypothesized that at one
time the ocean covered the whole earth and as the waters receded, human
eggs were beached on the shores, incubated beneath the suns warmth, and
hatched human beings. He, too, was influenced by Lucretius, and thought
that the flux of nature produced every imaginable monster and only those
beings without serious defects survived, reproduced, and proliferated.
Even though he was a panspermist, La Mettrie made many significant
contributions to Enlightenment thought. First, as a monist, he declared that
physical matter is the only reality through which all phenomena can be explained. Secondly, he dispensed with the notion of the immortal soul, and
declared that consciousness is solely contingent upon the functioning of the
brain, central nervous system, and the five senses. Furthermore, consciousness is influenced by food, age, learning, inheritance, climate, and the environment. Thirdly, like Buffon he observed that physical characteristics
overlap among species and noted the plenitude and continuity of the chain of
beings: there is a seamless continuity between species as well as between
kingdoms. Because he was a materialist, he felt that all life is the result of
random chance and random molecular collisions: flux+time=dispersion of
chaos. Hence, he held that the motive property of atoms, not God, created
everything. Atoms are continually colliding and eventually form every viable organized being that exists. He rejected final causes and attributed all
events to the random flux of nature.
Chapter Four discusses the great impact that George-Louis Leclerc de
Buffon had on his century, even though the philosophes did not always agree
with him. Buffon believed that all species left the Creators hands in perfect
condition at the time of Creation and that since then, they have kept their
general form. He allowed for the degeneration of species, but this constituted minor changes and not a significant change in form, and he proposed it
only for a limited number of species that had been domesticated by man or
taken out of their native lands of origin. Voltaire and Rousseau concurred
with his non-transformist point of view. Voltaire used it as propaganda in
his defense of deism; Rousseau accepted it because science had not proven
Introduction
that man had ever been a quadruped. Diderot and Maupertuis were transformists and so they totally rejected his view of the fixity of species.
Among the vast panoply of Buffons contributions to biology was his
observation all that can be, is {tout ce qui peut tre, est]. He observed that
nature produces every imaginable variation in each species. Furthermore, he
observed that physical characteristics are shared among species. Hence, he
developed the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional cone. The materialists Maupertuis and Diderot pondered this observation of the plenitude and continuity of the chain of beings and the fact that
characteristics overlap among species. They added the fourth dimension,
time, and posited the metamorphosis of species over great length of time.
Chapter Five addresses the great contributions that Pierre-Louis Moreau
de Maupertuis made to the notion of the metamorphosis of species. Maupertuis great legacy to the eighteenth century is two-fold: 1) he posited that inherited errors explain the vast diversity that the flux of nature delivers and 2)
he proposed that an emergent consciousness arises when conscious particles
unite. Maupertuis study of polydactyly in a Berlinese family caused him to
arrive at some landmark conclusions in biology. He identified birth anomalies as traits and noted that they were carried by either parent. He also
noted that birth defects often skip a generation or two and reappear further
down the family tree. In addition, he was able to calculate the statistical
probability that polydactyly would recur in a given population. His great
influence on Diderots thought was his hypothesis that errors occur in the
arrangement or pattern of parental elements. These errors are inherited and
could explain how the vast variety of living beings that we see today many
have developed from a single prototype.
Maupertuis other great contribution to Diderot was an emergent consciousness: when particles unite, each particle loses its consciousness of self
and acquires the consciousness of the larger body to which it belongs. It loses its individual memory and consciousness and acquires that of the whole.
This explains why man is conscious of his existence and of the presence of
others, but not of every molecule that constitutes his body.
In chapter Six we will see that Diderot seized upon this notion, cited
Maupertuis in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), and adopted
his two main contributions to biology, namely, 1) that inherited errors in the
arrangement of parental elements could explain how all living beings developed from a single prototype and 2) emergent consciousness (that all matter
10
is conscious and that when particles combine, they lose their memory and
consciousness of self and acquire the consciousness of the larger body that
they form).
Diderots originality lies in the fact that he viewed species as mutable,
not static, and that he posited the appearance, lifespan and extinction of species over time. He surmised that microscopic animalcules, species, star systems, and perhaps the universe itself, randomly come into existence via the
motive and conscious properties of atoms, exist for a time, and then fall out
of existence. Diderots transformism rested on a fulcrum of three pivotal
points: probability theory, the motive property of atoms, and the conscious
property of matter.
His biology was based on William Harveys definition of epigenesis
which was the theory that the germ is brought into existence by the addition
of parts that bud out of one another or by successive accretions (partium superexorientum additamentum) and not merely developed from a preformed
seed. Because the developing embryo is formed by successive accretions
and is not an exact duplicate of either parent, it is a unique new entity, different from either parent, subject to errors and accidents in the generative process. It is errors in the arrangement of parental elements supported by both
parents, that are inherited, that explain how all living things arose from a single prototype. Hence, Divine agency is unnecessary. The motive and conscious properties of matter suffice to randomly create order out of chaos.
Chapter Seven will examine the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who
was not a transformist. He embraced anthropological (intraspecies) metamorphosis and sociological change, but not biological (interspecies) transformism, as Diderot and the materialists did. In the Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality (1755) he argues that there is no scientific evidence that man
ever walked on all fours. In Note 3(2) he articulates six reasons why he rejects the notion that man metamorphosed from quadrupeds. First, possibility
is not enough: probability must be shown and no one has proven the probability that man has ever been a quadruped. Hence, he cleverly takes the
probability theory employed by the materialists and uses it against them.
Secondly, if man had ever been a quadruped, because of the way that his
head is attached to his body, his gaze would have been directed towards the
ground. This would limit his perceptions, make him vulnerable to predators,
and reduce his chances of survival in the world. Thirdly, quadrupeds have
tails and man does not have a tail. Fourthly, the position of a womans breast
Introduction
11
is perfect for carrying a child in her arms, but would be ill placed in a quadruped. Fifthly, mans hindquarters is high in relation to his forelegs, so that
he would have to crawl about if he were on all fours. This is antithetical to
survival and makes man vulnerable to prey. Sixthly, if man had ever been a
quadruped, he would be able to place his feet flat on the ground the way animals do, when he crawls about on all fours. Rousseau concludes that man
must have been created a biped, not a quadruped and accepts Buffons nontransformist views on the subject.
Rousseaus legacy is that he posited anthropological (intraspecies)
change. He applied Buffons theory of the physical degeneration of species
to the dissolution of mans morality. Rousseau borrowed many of Buffons
observations regarding the physical bodies of creatures, and ingeniously followed a parallel route, applying them to hypothesize a psychic and moral
dissolution that occurred during mans anthropological (intraspecies) metamorphosis from his natural state to his civilized. Rousseau posited that before man joined with other men to form small groups or societies, he lived a
solitary existence, roaming through the woods, living in the present moment.
This natural man was neither good, nor evil, but a tabula rasa, on which
his experiences would imprint. Hence, all of the vices that exist in society
today, most notably war, slavery, theft, the notion of honor, pride, and greed,
were unknown to natural man. It was not until natural man left his solitary
state and joined civilization that every imaginable evil developed. Man consents to being unequal and to be enslaved by other men. Natural man is
equal. Hence, Rousseaus Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, with its
statement of mans journey from innocence to moral corruption, was intended to be a scathing criticism of civilized Europe and its vices, and not an
essay on biological transformism.
Rousseau also noted the great similarities between man and the great
apes, who also appeared to be conscious, thinking, intelligent animals. In
Note 10 he suggested widening the umbrella of the human species to include
the great apes and accepted the notion that perhaps there are multiple varieties of the human species. This was a political statement: he opposed racism,
slavery and subjugation of people living in extremely primitive conditions in
Africa and Asia. He declared the human dignity and basic human rights of
all men, even apes, who if experimentation could show had perfectibility and
could be taught language, deserved the compassion and esteem accorded to
all men. His proposal to include apes in the human species was not a state-
12
ment as to biological transformism, which he denied, but rather, a scathing

criticism of civilized Europe in which men consent to inequality and to valuing some people more than others according to the artifices of social class.
Chapter Eight will address the thought of Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, who spent the last thirteen years of his life denouncing contemporary
science. Voltaire recognized that scientific discoveries posed a threat to deism: random creationism challenged the need for a Prime Mover and fossils
provided evidence that species do metamorphose over long periods of time.
Furthermore, the determinism of the motive property of atoms obviated the
power of Gods will. Therefore, Voltaire denied scientific discoveries and
their implications, the veracity of the chain of beings, the suspected antiquity
of fossils, the theory of the metamorphosis of species, random creationism,
microscopic animalcules, spontaneous generation, and the geological implications to the discovery of seashells on mountaintops and far from water.
Chapter Nine will explore a debate that existed among the philosophes:
whether or not apes could ever be taught to speak. The battle lines were
drawn along Cartesianism: Cartesians, embracing the dual nature of man
(body and soul), held that apes can never be taught to speak because language requires intellect, intellect is a function of the soul, and only man has a
soul. Conversely, the materialists Diderot and La Mettrie observed the similarities of the brains and vocal apparatus of man and apes and thought that
with proper instruction, apes could learn to speak. Rousseau observed that
animals that work together, such as beavers, ants, and bees, have a gestured
language that speaks only to the eyes, but because they have limited intelligence, they can never be taught to speak. He also recognized that chimpanzees belong to a different species than man, that they have limited
intelligence, and that they cannot be taught to speak. However, he was open
to the notion that great apes such as orangutans might be a variety of the species of man. He found their intelligent behavior to be significant (they build
roofs on their shelters, exhibit pleasure at the sight of a campfire, and cover
their dead with leaves and branches) and he hypothesized that if orangutans
are a species of man, they may be intelligent enough to be taught language.
The question as to whether apes can be taught language is significant because it challenges mans unique place at the head of all animals on the great
chain of beings. It also raises questions as to the length of the distance between man and the next most intelligent animal on the chain, whether there
are multiple varieties of the human species, whether man can propagate with
Introduction
13
the great apes, and exactly how intelligent these apes are. If just one ape can
be taught to speak, Cartesians have myriad problems to solve: Do apes have
a soul that requires a Redeemer and forgiveness of Original Sin? Do other
animals have souls, too? Can animals have everlasting life? How intelligent
does an animal have to be before it can be considered to have a soul? What
if the materialists are right and intellect is merely a function of physiological
activity? If that is true, are they also right about the idea that all life is the
result of the random motive property of matter?
Chapter Ten will examine the genealogy of the concept of race and the
philosophes vociferous opposition to the exploitation of dark skinned peoples in the transatlantic slave trade. Naturalists understood that by classifying similar entities, they could readily identify similarities in structures,
retrieve information about relationships that exists, analyze the information,
and draw conclusions. Bernier, Buffon, Diderot, and Linnaeus classified the
various races of man according to distinguishing physical characteristics,
perceived intelligence, personality, customs, climate, and geographical location. Buffon, Diderot, and Maupertuis were monogenecists: they held that
all of the races of man could be traced back to a single ancestral pair. Voltaire, on the other hand, was a polygenecist: he believed that the different
races are derived from different prototypes. Despite their biological views,
the French philosophes defended the right of all humankind to selfdetermination as a basic tenet of natural law. The philosophes were passionate abolitionists and wrote prolifically against slavery and racial injustice. In
addition, they used the virtues and vices of dark skinned people as a foil to
criticize the moral turpitude of civilized Europe. Their lifelong struggle to
make certain basic rights available to all people culminated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen [La Dclaration des droits de
lhomme et du citoyen] on August 26, 1789.
WHAT CRITICS HAVE WRITTEN ON

EVOLUTIONISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
FRENCH THOUGHT
To date, there exists a scarcity of material that traces the influence that probability theory, the motive property of atoms, and the hypothesis that matter is
conscious had on evolutionism in eighteenth-century France. The notable
14
exception is Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species, which demonstrates

how Diderot combined probability theory with the motive and conscious
properties of matter to hypothesize tranformism.13 Furthermore, there is not
too much of an overview of how the eighteenth century collectively approached the problem of the chain of being when confronted with modern
discoveries, or how successive thinkers modified the chain of being (ie: Buffon transformed Aristotles two-dimensional, linear chain of being into a
three dimensional cone in which physical characteristics overlap, and Diderot added the fourth dimension, time, to show that species are born, exist for
a period of time, and then fall out of existence). A notable exception is Arthur O. Lovejoys justly celebrated and highly influential work, The Great
Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea, that follows the chain of
being from Plato to modern times.14
There are a few noteworthy overviews of eighteenth-century transformism. First, there is Jacques Rogers seminal volume, The Life Sciences in
Eighteenth-Century French Thought.15 Secondly, there is the anthology,
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al, which
contains excellent articles on fossils, Buffon, Maupertuis, and Diderot. The
articles are entitled, Fossils and the Idea of a Process of Time in Natural
History, by Francis Haber,16 Buffon and the Problem of Species, by Arthur O. Lovejoy,17 Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution, by Bentley Glass,18 and Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism, by
Lester Crocker.19 These articles, when taken together, provide a very fine
overview of transformism during the century.
For example, in Fossils and the Idea of a Process of Time in Natural
History, Francis Haber provides an excellent overview of how the discovery
of marine shells on mountaintops and in areas far from water caused the
eighteenth century to move away from the concept of plastic forces and the
Noachian flood. Haber chronicles the century beginning with Maillets efforts to date the earth by measuring the rate of retreating sea level, and follows the philosophes right up to Voltaire, who spent the last thirteen years of
his life exhibiting a vehement antipathy towards the new science. Haber
mentions how Voltaire was opposed to creating a new system of earth history to explain marine fossils; Voltaire rejected the notion that land and sea
had changed places several times and that the earth was much older than had
previously been thought. Haber also shows that the geological processes that
Buffon describes in his Theory of the Earth resembled Maillets account in
Introduction
15
the Telliamed, especially the part of the formative effects of the flux and reflux of the ocean tide on mountain formations beneath the sea.
In addition, Arthur O. Lovejoys article, Buffon and the Problem of
Species addresses the three stages that Buffon passed through as he tried to
determine whether or not species are mutable. From 17461756 Buffon
agreed with Linnaeus that species are immutable; from 17611766 he explored the possibility of variability; after 1766 he decided to accept the notion of the permanence of the essential features of species and the variability
of minor details. Buffon concluded that species retain their general form
because of the interior molding force, but can degenerate in minor ways, due
to domestication or removal from their lands of origin. Haber also discusses
Buffons treatment of the great chain of beings.
Furthermore, Bentley Glass, in his article, Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution, discusses examines Maupertuis contributions to heredity and transformist biology. Maupertuis studied polydactyly through
several generation of a Berlinese family and discovered that it was possible
to predict the probability that member of a family would be born with the
anomaly. Maupertuis showed that parental elements contributed to the fetus
by both the father and mother, statistical probability, and birth anomalies,
were intimately intertwined. Glass notes that not only did Maupertuis demonstrate that birth defects could be predicted, but that too many or conversely, missing, parental elements caused monsters with deficiencies
[monstres par dfaut] and monsters with extra parts [monstres par exces].
Glass also addresses the role that random chance plays in Maupertuis explanation of heredity. Maupertuis hypothesized that inherited errors could explain how all living things may have, over time, arisen from a single
prototype.
Lastly, Lester Crockers Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism addresses the development of Diderots thoughts about transformism during the years 17461769. In thirty pages Crocker outlines the salient
points in the contributions that Leibniz, La Mettrie, Maillet, Buffon, Maupertuis, Robinet, and Bordeu, made to Diderots transformism.
Regarding the rarely mentioned author, Maillet, it is especially difficult
to find criticism of his work or a study of his influence on Enlightenment
thought. A notable exception is Jacques Rogers The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, in which the author explains that Maillet was
a panspermist, not a transformismist.20 Otis E. Fellows and Stephen F. Mil-
16
liken, in Buffon, mention that Maillets far flung tales of mermen, panspermia, and transformism caused him to be the object of scorn and that Buffons
critics mentioned Maillet and Buffon together in order to ridicule the latter
by association.21
Regarding Buffon, Jacques Roger explains that it was Buffons concept
of species that caused him to reject transformism, rather than fear of censorship. See Jacques Rogers book, Buffon: A Life in Natural History, and The
Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought. Otis E. Fellows and
Stephen F. Milliken, in Buffon, also explain that it was Buffons concept of
an interior molding force that was the reason that he rejected the transmutation of species. For more specialized material on the subject of Buffon and
species, see John H. Eddy, Jr..s Ph.D dissertation, Buffon, Organic Change,
and the Races of Man,22 Eddys article, Buffon, Organic Alterations, and
Man,23 Paul Lawrence Farbers Ph.D dissertation, Buffons Concept of
Species,24 Farbers article, Buffon and the Concept of Species,25 and Phillip R. Sloan, The Idea of Racial Degeneracy in Buffons Histoire naturelle.26
Excellent articles and books that address Diderots transformism and
how Buffon influenced his thought include articles by Michle Duchet,
Lanthropologie de Diderot,27 Jean Ehrard, Diderot, lEncyclopdie, et
lHistoire et thorie de la Terre,28 Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the
Problem of Species,29 Jacques Rogers book, Buffon: A Life in Natural History,30 his article, Diderot et Buffon en 1749,31 and Rogers seminal volume, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought,32 and Aram
Vartanians article, Buffon et Diderot.33
Several articles have also been written on La Mettries influence on Diderot: Jean E. Perkins, Diderot and La Mettrie,34 Ann Thomson, La Mettrie et Diderot35 and Lunit matrielle de lhomme chez La Mettrie et
Diderot,36 Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: An Intertextual Encounter37 and Trembleys Polyp, La Mettrie, and EighteenthCentury French Materialism,38 and Marx W. Wartofsky, Diderot and the
Development of Materialist Monism.39
Critics argue that Rousseaus Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is
not a statement of biological transformism (interspecies), which Rousseau
rejected, but rather, a statement of anthropological development (intraspecies), a political statement, and a criticism of class difference in civilized Europe. The following authors cautiously point out that Rousseau was not an
Introduction
17
advocate of biological transformism: Otis Fellows, Buffon and Rousseau:

Aspects of a Relationship,40 and Francis Moran, Of Pongos and Men:
Orangs-Outang in Rousseaus Discourse on Inequality,41 and Leonard Sorenson, Natural Inequality and Rousseaus Political Philosophy in his Discourse on Inequality.42
This study is significantly different from that of antecedent criticism because it is devoted to showing how eight theorists in eighteenth-century
France addressed the issue of transformism. It examines the subject from the
perspective of each subsequent thinker laid down additional building blocks
that led to transformism and a rethinking of the chain of beings. This book
will examine how the philosophes established a triune relationship among
contemporary scientific discoveries, random creationism propelled by the
motive and conscious properties of matter, and the notion of the chain of being, along with its corollaries, plenitude and continuity. Maupertuis deduced
that inherited errors in the arrangement of parental elements are passed along
from generation to generation and can explain how all living things arose
from a single prototype. Diderot recognized Maupertuis genius and the truth
in his statement and made it the basis of his transformism. Others, like Buffon and Rousseau, were aware of the random creationist hypothesis, but rejected it-Buffon, because he embraced the notion that an interior molding
force fixes the general form of species, and Rousseau, because transformism
was unproven and unlikely. Then there was Voltaire, who recognized that
science posed a threat to deism because it could replace God.
ChapterOne
Maillet
The little Wings they had under their Belly, and which like their Fins helped them to
walk in the Sea, became Feet, and served them to walk on Land.1
Maillet, Telliamed (c. 1700)
Benot de Maillet (16561738) held several consular positions that gave him
the opportunity to travel extensively throughout the Mediterranean region,
observe geographical phenomena, and arrive at some astute conclusions
about the age of the earth. Beginning in 1692, he served as the French Consul-General to Egypt, then as Consul to Leghorn, and finally, as Inspector of
the French Establishments in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon) and the Barbary Coast (Egypt to the Atlantic Ocean).2 During his various consular tenures, his travels in Mediterranean countries permitted him to observe first
hand strata of fossil beds and sedimentary rock. He surmised that these phenomena provided evidence of the gradual recession of water away from
beaches that had left coastal towns at a high elevation. Because he was not
only a diplomat, but also a scholar, he devised a method for calculating the
age of the earth by measuring the rate at which water recedes from the
beaches and extrapolating how long it must take for strata of fossils or sedimentary rock to form. He set forth his ideas in a fiction work entitled, Telliamed: Or, Discourses between an Indian Philosopher, and a French
Missionary, on the Diminution of the Sea, the Formation of the Earth, the
Origin of Men and Animals, and other Curious Subjects, relating to Natural
History and Philosophy. His work was highly innovative during the period
in which he lived (he was a contemporary of Fontenelle); because he ante-
20
ceded Buffon, he did not have the Natural History (17491767) or the Supplement (17741789) as reference tools to gauge the accuracy of his hypotheses.
James Powell explains that Maillet used the hourglass method to calculate the age of the earth. The basic premise of the hourglass method is that if
we know how much sand is in the top half of the hourglass, how much sand
is in the bottom portion, and the rate at which it passes through the stricture,
we can calculate how much time has elapsed since the process began.3
When Maillet was alive, scientists began to observe layers of sedimentary
rock and they concluded that perhaps the layers could reveal the age of the
earth.4 If we know the depth of the rock and can estimate how long it takes
to form, then we can calculate the age of each layer.5 Powell advises that
Maillet had relied upon this method of reckoning (the rate of decline or erosion): Instead of measuring how rapidly something builds up, one can
measure how rapidly something else declines. If one knew how much erosion had lowered the land surface, and if one knew the rate, a simple calculation would reveal how long the erosion had been going on.6
Maillet hypothesized that the earth was once entirely covered with water
and that the water gradually evaporated into outer space, causing land masses
to appear. Powell says, De Maillet assumed that a universal sea had once
covered the earth but had since shrunk, stranding formerly coastal towns
high above sea level. He estimated the rate of sea level decline at 3 feet in
1,000 years. At that rate, to perch a formerly seaside town at 6,000 feet
would take 2 million years. But since the earth is obviously much older than
its towns, de Maillet arbitrarily raised his estimate for its age to 2 billion
years. Well aware that such an immense figure would incur the wrath of the
Church, de Maillet presented his conclusions in the guise of a dialogue between a French missionary and as Eastern mystic named Telliamed (de Maillet spelled backwards). The manuscript remained unpublished until a decade
after de Maillets deathThough his assumptions were wrong, de Maillet
did show that, starting from observation and measurement rather than from
the Bible, one could calculate an age for the earth. That age might be measured not in the scores of years by which a human lifetime is counted, nor
even in the thousands of years of Ussher, but in millions and billions of
years.7
In order to avoid charges of heresy, Maillet relied on several techniques.
First, he placed his speculation on the metamorphosis of the earths topogra-
Maillet
21
phy and its creatures within the context of an oriental fantasy: the work is a
dialogue between a Christian missionary and an Indian sage who is simply
articulating Hindu philosophy. The transformist material is filtered through
the voice of the Christian missionary, who identifies the Hindu in the third
person: he told me, he said. This reminds the reader that it is a Hindu
who is articulating the material and that the Christian missionary is simply
repeating what he has heard. Secondly, the book is dedicated to Cyrano de
Bergerac, who, a century earlier, had written a couple of science fiction stories entitled, History of the States and Empires of the Moon [Histoire comique: contenant les tats et empires de la Lune], written in 1649, published
posthumously in 1657, and History of the States and Empires of the Sun
[Histoire comiques: contenant les tats et empires du Soleil], written in 1650,
published posthumously in 1662. Maillet hoped that his work, too would be
regarded in the vein of science fiction. Thirdly, he remained an anonymous
author, and cloaked his authorship by spelling his name backwards and making the word Telliamed both the name of the Hindu sage and the title of the
book. The author was not the only one who remained anonymous: the publisher, the Abb Jean-Baptiste Le Mascrier, did not identify himself, either.
Although the book was set in print in 1735, it was not published until 1748,
three years after Maillets death. Fourthly, Maillet intersperses many mythological creatures and monsters borrowed from Plinys Natural History (he
mentions Pliny in Chapter 6) in order to make it obvious that the work is a
fantasy. However, beneath the orientalism, the monsters taken from antiquity, the extraordinary mermen and mermaids (a Dutch cabin boy who falls
overboard at the age of eight reappears twenty years later as a merman),
there is a constant thread of science: water has retreated away from coastal
towns; high hills show strata of seashells embedded in them; multiple layers
of seashells of different colors indicate that they could not all have come
from a single Flood; observation shows that the world cannot possibly be
6,000 years old; species have overlapping physical characteristics that suggest a common origin; life originated in the sea; fish moved from the water
to the air by developing wings; birds moved to land by developing feet. The
six days of Creation are mirrored in the six chapters (days) of the book.
Another innovative notion that Maillet sets forth is that the earth is two
billion years old. Here he breaks with Creationism and the dating of Bishop
Ussher, who had set the creation of the world at 4004 BC. Two billion years
provides plenty of time for species to metamorphose from sea creatures into
22
the present day wealth of species that populate the sea, earth, and air. This is
innovative, as he arrives at his figures before Buffon comes along.
Maillet maintains that it is observation and experimentation that show us
that the sea has receded and left strata of fossil beds. In the first chapter, entitled, First Day. Proofs of the Diminution of the Sea, the Hindu sage says,
An Observation which my Grandfather madein his Youth observd, that
in the greatest Calm, the Sea always remained above the Rock, and coverd it
with Water: Twenty-two Years, however, before his Death, the Surface of
the Rock appeared dry and began to rise.8 The grandfather inspected the
ground carefully and found Sea-shells adhering to, and inserted in their Surfaces. He found twenty Kinds of Petrifications which had no Resemblance
to each otherThe Origin of this so great Variety of Soils, joind to the Strata or Beds different in Substance, Thickness and Colour, of which most of
these Quarries were composed, strangely perplexed his Reason9 The solution to the mystery would be to measure the recession of the ocean over
time.
At the end of Chapter 3 Telliamed surmises, based on estimations that he
has made, that the diminution of the sea approximates a foot every three centuries, and three feet four inches every thousand years.10 From this data, he
must necessarily conclude that this diminution has gone on for 2 billion
years; the human race has existed for at least 500,000 years; mermaids are
creatures that require more time to become fully human.
In the chapter entitled, Sixth Day. Of the Origin of Man and Animals,
and of the Propagation of the Species by Seeds, Maillet proffers much transformist material. He comments on how life began in the sea, the interrelatedness of all species, and how flying fish left the water and over time, were
transformed into land creatures: In a word do not Herbs, Plants, Roots,
Grains, and all of this Kind, that the Earth produces and nourishes, come
from the Sea? Is it not at least natural to think so, since we are certain that
all our habitable Lands came originally from the Sea?11; As for the Origin
of terrestrial Animals, I observe that there are none of them, whether walking, flying, or creeping, the similar species of which are not contained in the
Sea; and the Passage of which from one of these Elements to another, is not
only possible and probable, but even supported by a prodigious Number of
Examples.12; The resemblance in Figure, and even Inclination, observable
between certain Fish and some Land-Animals, is highly worthy of our Attention; and it is surprising that no one has laboured to find out the Reasons of
Maillet
23
this Conformity.13; There are in the Sea, Fish of almost all the Figures of
Land-Animals, and even of Birds. She includes Plants, Flowers, and some
Fruits; the Nettle, the Rose, the Pink, the Melon, and the Grape, are to be
found there,14 and for it may happen, as it often does, that winged or
flying Fish, either chasing, or being chased, in the Sea, stimulated by the Desire of Prey, or the Fear of Death, or pushed near the shore by the Billows,
have fallen among Reeds or Herbage, whence it was not possible for them to
resume their Flight to the Sea, by which Means they have contracted a greater Facility of flying. Then their Fins being no longer bathed in the SeaWater, were split and became warped by their Dryness. While they found
among the Reeds and Herbage among which they fell, any Aliments to support them, the Vessels of their Fins being separated were lengthened and
cloathed with Beards, or to speak more justly, the Membranes which before
kept them adherent to each other, were metamorphosed. The Beard formed
of these warped Membranes was lengthened. The Skin of these Animals was
insensibly covered with a Down of the same Colour with the Skin, and this
Down gradually increased. The little Wings they had under their Belly, and
which like their Fins helped them to walk in the Sea, became Feet, and
served them to walk on Land. There were also other small Changes in their
Figure. The Beak and Neck of some were lengthened, and those of others
shortened. The Conformity, however, of the first Figure subsists in the
Whole, and it will be always easy to know it.15
Maillet also imagines that quadrupeds have analogous counterparts in the
ocean: As for Quadrupeds, we not only find in the Sea, Species of the same
Figure and Inclinations, and in the Waves living on the same Aliments by
which they are nourished on Land, but we have also Examples of these Species living equally in the Air and in the Water. Have not the Sea-Apes precisely the same Figure with those of the Land? There are also several
Species of them,16 and The Lion, the Horse, the Ox, the Hog, the Wolf, the
Camel, the Cat, the Goat, the Sheep, have also Fish in the Sea similar to
them17
The terrestrial counterparts metamorphosed on land from their marine
counterparts: Tis thus certainly that all terrestrial Animals have passed from
the Waters to the Respiration of the Air, and have contrasted the Faculty of
lowing, howling, and making themselves understood, which they had not, or
which they had but very imperfectly in the Sea.18
24
Intermediary species between men and fish (mermen and mermaids)

have been sighted by seafarers and the Telliamed recounts many such events.
For example, a merman, followed by his female, was seen in one of the
towns of the Delta or lower Egypt.19 Also, a Dutch cabin boy, at the age of
eight, fell into the sea and disappeared, only to have reappeared more than
twenty years later as a merman, substantiating the notion that humans are
transformed into fish.
Furthermore, there were a multitude of different species of men on land,
some with tails and some without. When the sea receded, it beached eggs
that produced every imaginable variety of human being. Chapter 6 has subchapters on savages [Des hommes sauvages], men with tails [Des hommes
queu], beardless men [Des hommes sans barbe], one-legged men and onearmed men [Des hommes dune jambe, & dune seule main], giants [Des Gants], and dwarves [Des Nains]. There were wild men of the woods that did
not talk. In Chapter 6 Maillet cites Pliny as a source of these species of wild
men. Mermen are still metamorphosing into land-men and they can be seen
in the polar regions where there are dwarves and giants. This happened in
New Guinea: Nothing is more common than those Savage-men; in
1702the Dutch seized two Male Animals, which they brought to Batavia,
and which, in the Language of the Country where they were taken, they
called Orangs-outangs, that is, Men who live in the Woods. They had the
whole of the human Form, and like us walkd upon two Legs. Their Legs
and Arms were very small, and thick-covered with HairThese Orangoutangs had the Nails of their Fingers and Toes very long, and somewhat
crooked.20
Maillet asks the ultimate question as to whether men could have metamorphosed from apes with tails: To return to the different Species of Men.
Can those who have Tails, be the Sons of them who have none? As Apes
with Tails do not certainly descend from those which have none, is it not also
natural to think, that Men born with Tails are of a different Species from
those who have never had any?21
At this juncture it is important to note that Maillet was not a transformist,
but a panspermist. The Oxford English Dictionary defines panspermia as
Originally (now hist.) the theory that there are everywhere minute germs
which develop on finding a favourable environment.22 Maillet held that the
seeds to all living things originated in the sea and species metamorphosed
after that, according to their environment. He agrees with Lucretius that an-
Maillet
25
imals cannot have dropped down from the heavens, but must have undergone
a variety of processes. In a footnote Maillet cites Lucretius statement For
animals cannot have fallen from the sky, nor can creatures of the land have
come out of the salt pools (De rerum natura, 5.79394).23
Now that Maillet reveals that his source is Lucretius, one needs only to
read the preceding verses in De rerum natura to see the impact that Lucretius
had on his panspermist view of creation. In 5.79192, Lucretius says, so
then the new-born earth put forth herbage and saplings first, and in the next
place created the generations of mortal creatures, arising in many kinds and
in many ways by different processes.24 Lucretius metaphorized the earth as
a giant uterus that gave birth to all living things, both vegetable and animal.
Maillet modifies this and hypothesizes that the receding sea beached human
eggs on its shores.
Although Maillet wrote around 1700 and was a contemporary of Fontenelle, his notions about the age of the earth, panspermia, and the metamorphosis of species were at the same time, so absurd and preposterous, yet
perceptive and incisive, that he posthumously became embroiled in the polemics of the mid-eighteenth century. The panspermist La Mettrie used
Maillet as propaganda in his battle to sustain random creation and deny Creationism; the deist Voltaire found his panspermist and transformist statements
useful as vehicles to ridicule, by association, the contemporary science of
Buffon, Needham, and Maupertuis. Jacques Roger advises that Maillets
cosmogony was antichristian and antibiblical: he believed in preexistent
seeds that had existed eternally and had seeded life throughout the water, air
and land of the earth, all the planets, and across the entire universe.25 Maillet
posited that matter had always existed and hence, there was no need for a
Creation. As a polemical tool, he was just as useful to the panspermist La
Mettrie as was Lucretius: while Lucretius believed that living matter arises
from the inanimate all the time, Maillet hypothesized that eternally preexistent seeds are everywhere and so, life is no miracle.
Maillets panspermist cosmogony was used as propaganda by La Mettrie. In the System of Epicurus (1750), Chapter 32, La Mettrie points out that
Maillets panspermia was in complete agreement with Lucretius On the Nature of Things, and he defends both Maillet and Lucretius notion of seeding:
Could all Animals, and therefore man, which no sensible Man would ever
think of removing from their Category, truly be sons of the Earth, as Legend
says of Giants? As the Sea perhaps originally covered the surface of our
26
Globe, would it not have itself been the floating cradle of all the Beings eternally enclosed in its breast? That is the system of the author of the Telliamed, which comes pretty near to that of Lucretius; for it is still necessary for
the sea, absorbed by the pores of the Earth, consumed little by little by the
warmth of the Sun and the infinite lapse of time, to have been forced, while
receding, to leave the human egg, as it sometimes does the fish, high and dry
on the shore. As a result of which, without any other incubation than that of
the Sun, man and every other animal would come out of its shell, as certain
ones still hatch today in warm countries, and also as Chickens do in warm
dung through the skill of the Naturalist.26
La Mettrie thought that panspermia was quite plausible, since experiments in spontaneous generation indicated that animalcules are perpetually
arising from nonliving matter. John Turberville Needhams An Account of
Some Microscopical Discoveries (1745) related experiments that appeared to
prove the veracity of spontaneous generation.; his book was translated into
French in 1747 and then underwent a number of revisions. During his experiments, Needham saw animalcules develop after 1020 days in an infused
grain. He concluded, It seems plain therefore, that there is a vegetative
Force in every microscopical Point of Matter, and every visible Filament of
which the whole animal and vegetative Texture consists: And notably this
Force extends much farther; for not only in all my Observations, the whole
Substance, after a certain Separation of Salts and volatile Parts, divided into
Filaments, and vegetated into numberless Zoophytes, which yielded all the
several Species of common microscopical Animals; but these very Animals
also, after a certain time, subsided to the Bottom, became motionless, resolvd again into a gelatinous filamentous Substance, and gave Zoophytes
and Animals of a lesser Species. Animal and vegetable seeds were created
in an exalted matter, which is to say a matter rich in this vegetative
force.27 Because he saw animalcules present in his infusions of grain, he
hypothesized that there exists a vegetative force that causes inanimate matter to spring to life.
Another reason that La Mettrie embraced panspermia was Trembleys
polyp, whose body parts regenerated after having been cut off. In Man a
Machine (1747), La Mettrie declares, We do not know nature; causes hidden in her breast might have produced everything. In your turn, observe the
polyp of Trembley: does it not contain in itself the causes which bring about
regeneration?28 La Mettrie used panspermia to explain the regenerative
Maillet
27
powers of Trembleys polyp, and so he found Maillet useful because he

thought that the sea produces the germs of all living things.
La Mettrie thought that germs come from the air. Jacques Roger advises,
Man came from the worm as the butterfly came from the caterpillarplants
and insects are born from germs coming from the air; likewise the germs of
men had first been prepared by the air29 Like Lucretius, La Mettrie asserts that in the beginning, nature produced every variety of living thing and
that only those without self-contradictions survived, regenerated, and proliferated. Since La Mettrie held Lucretius panspermist belief system, he reiterated, in The System of Epicurus, Chapter 32, Maillets statement that the
receding sea carried human eggs to the shoreline and beached them, where
they subsequently hatched.
Voltaire, on the other hand, who was not a random creationist like La
Mettrie, but a deist, had a different agenda: he satirized Maillet, and, in The
Man of Forty Ecus, Chapter 6, used the Telliamed as propaganda to deride
materialism, panspermia, and transformism. Maillets book provided an excellent vehicle to ridicule the science of contemporary naturalists-Buffon,
Needham, and Maupertuis-which he heaped all together. The fact that Maillet was not a transformist, but believed that the ocean carried human eggs to
land where they hatched (this made him a panspermist), was irrelevant:
transformism and panspermia were both dangerous and now was the time to
expose modern science for the lie that it was. Voltaire mocks Telliamed,
who taught me that mountains and men are made by sea waters. First, there
were handsome mermen that later became amphibians. Their beautiful
forked tail transformed itself into buttocks and legs. I was full of Ovids Metamorphoses, and a book where it was shown that the human race was the
bastard of a race of baboons. I liked descending from a fish about as much
as from a monkey. With time I had a few doubts about this genealogy, and
even about the formation of mountains.30
Voltaire devotes The Man of Forty Ecus, Chapter 6, to a dialogue between an old hermit and Telliamed. Voltaires chapter is a mirror of Maillets work: while Maillet proffers a dialogue between a Hindu sage and a
Christian missionary, Voltaires chapter is a dialogue between the same Hindu sage and an old deist, who, unlike Maillets Christian missionary, gives
Telliamed a piece of his mind and argues with him about every point he
makes. It is the fulfillment of any deists wish list of arguments that Maillets Christian missionary should have used against Telliameds fantastic
28
mutterings, but did not. Voltaire has a catharsis: scientists and naturalists are
vain and dare to put themselves in Gods place-they have created a universe
with their pen as God did once with His Word. The first naturalist who presents himself to be worshipped is Telliamed. He spins yarns about handsome
mermen who metamorphose into amphibians. He points out that seashells
have been discovered atop high mountains and claims that this proves that
the earth was once covered with water. Unlike the Christian missionary in
Maillets work, Voltaires Je starts arguing and promotes the deistic point
of view. Point by point, he refutes Maillets hypotheses. When Voltaire is
through refuting Maillet, he brings out the next puppet in the show, Needham
with his eels, and then, after him, the Lapp, Maupertuis, who proposes digging a hole to Patagonia. It becomes obvious that not only does Voltaire not
take Maillet seriously, he merely uses him as an entre to the real dish, which
is his archenemy, Maupertuis. The enmity between Voltaire and Maupertuis
goes deeper than Maupertuis random creationism, it also has to do with the
feud over who was the real author of the Principle of Least Action. Hence,
in Chapter 6, Maillet is only a stop on the road on which Voltaire is driving:
his destination is actually Maupertuis.
Otis Fellows makes the astute observation that Voltaire uses Maillet as a
tool whenever he wants to ridicule someone. Since Voltaire was on a vendetta against science, one of his favorite targets was the famous Buffon.
Voltaire was at odds with Buffon because of his Theory of the Earth (in
which he hypothesizes that a comet collided with the sun and sent matter
hurling through space that later cooled and became the planets), and his organic molecules (that fell to earth and seeded the planet with life). Voltaire
denied both, and so, since he wanted to ridicule Buffon, one way to demean
him was to associate him with Maillet and portray him as his disciple. In this
instance, Maillet is simply a vehicle to insult another by association. Another way to demean Buffon was to associate him with his fellow experimenter in spontaneous generation, the eel man himself, Needham. As the
saying goes, Noscitur a sociis [literally, he is known by his associates;
idiomatically, a man is know by the company he keeps], and so, what better
way to issue a double blow to Buffon, than to associate him with both Maillet and the eel man?
Fellows says, In almost all of Voltaires pieces in which Needhams
connection with Buffon is more or less openly hinted at, there appears as
well a second Buffonian surrogate: the much ridiculed French cosmogonist
Maillet
29
Benot de MailletVoltaire, in adding a second bizarre personage to his satires, was simply expanding the device to include both of the two great areas
of science in which Buffon had proposed major original theoretical systems.
Without being obliged to mention Buffon by name, Voltaire was thus able to
attack, within a single framework, both the Buffonian cosmogony and the
Buffonian theory of organic molecules.31
Peter J. Bowler, in his criticism of Maillets Telliamed, emphasizes the
fact that during the eighteenth century, the work was considered to be highly
innovative because it completely dispensed with the Flood and the book of
Genesis and relied solely upon observation of layers of sedimentary rock and
strata of fossils to arrive at the age of the earth: This theory made no reference to the deluge and took it for granted that the earth was enormously
oldhe ignored the idea of a cooling earth and assumed that the planet originally had been covered by a great ocean. The sedimentary rocks were laid
down when the surface was covered with water, and since had been exposed
by a decline in sea level. This retreating-ocean theory would become popular in the eighteenth century, but seldom in so explicitly an antibiblical form.
De Maillet even speculated about a natural origin for life and a process by
which aquatic creatures could adapt to the emerging dry landThe planetshistory had to be read not from the Bible but from the rocks themselves. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the rocks were formed by
natural processes such as sedimentation under water. Unless these deposits
could all be attributed to the great flood, this would mean that natural processes-almost certainly acting over a long period of time-had shaped the
earths surface since its original formation.32
Bowler also discusses Maillets panspermist view that the ocean deposited human eggs on dry land there they incubated and hatched: If life was
the product of natural forces, it need not exhibit the designing hand of the
Creatorhe adopted a version of the theory of preexisting germs in which
the miniatures existed independently of parent bodies and were found scattered throughout naturein the earths early history, the great ancient ocean
might have provided an environment in which germs could develop without
parents. The first living things thus appeared by a natural rather than a supernatural process; once formed, they began to reproduce in the normal
way.33
Bowler also explains Maillets metamorphosis of species: De Maillet
also accepted the idea that change occurred within the species thus produced.
30
As an exponent of the retreating-ocean theory, he assumed that when life

first appeared, the earth was completely covered by water. The first members of each species must have been aquatic. Each terrestrial species would
have been produced by the transformation of its aquatic forebear as soon as
dry land began to appear. De Maillet accepted sailors stories of mermaids
as evidence that the aquatic form of the human species still existed, and he
thought that flying fish had been transformed into birds. Such ideas seemed
ridiculous even to many of his contemporaries, but they show that de Maillet
appreciated the need for life to adapt to changes in the earths physical environment.34
Bowler notes that although Maillet embraced preexisting germs that originated in the sea, he dispensed with their divine origin: De Maillet eliminated miracles and partly circumvented the argument from design by
supposing the germs adapted to different conditions as they grew. He
avoided postulating a supernatural origin for the terms by supposing that they
had always existed throughout the universe.35
Jacques Roger maintains that Maillet cannot be regarded as a transformist for several reasons. First, he was a contemporary of Fontenelle, not of
Buffon or Maupertuis.36 His ideas were based on his time, around 1700, and
it just happens that his book was published in 1748, a year before the first
volume of Buffons Natural History appeared. Secondly, he was a panspermist, not a transformist, and held that the sea carried human eggs to land
where they were beached and they hatched. This places him in the camp of
Epicurus, Lucretius and La Mettrie, rather than that of the Diderot of 1769.
Roger points out that Maillet embraced the notion that preexistent seeds are
everywhere-in the air, water and land, even on other planets and throughout
the universe, and that they have existed through all eternity.37 Preexistent
seeds have always existed because matter has always existed, and hence,
Maillet flatly denies the Creation.
Roger observes that the Telliamed is basically antichristian. It denies the
veracity of the Bible and denies that the universe was created (matter always
existed). Roger points out that the notions that life originated in the sea, that
the first men were barbarians, and that there is a great diversity of the human
species, are contrary to the biblical viw that God created man in His image.38
Roger declares that Maillet was an anachronism at the time in which he
wrote, totally out of step with Newton, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Locke.39
Maillet
31
Nevertheless, Maillet gave the eighteenth century a lot to think about,

even though, as Fellows observes, he was an object of ridicule and mentioned with Buffon in order to ridicule the latter by analogy. Maillets legacy
was that life originated in the sea. He asserted that the body parts of all living things slowly metamorphose over time, according to their environment.
He provided the literary device of the dialogue between an easterner and a
westerner of different religions and belief systems. He broke with tradition
and suggested that the earth is at least two billion years old and that man
must be at least 500,000 years old. He depicted the plenitude and continuity
of the chain of being by drawing from Pliny and contemporary legends and
enumerating every imaginable variation of living thing. He certainly left an
impressive legacy, although he was a contemporary of Fontenelle and the
science of the eighteenth century was foreign to him.
Chapter2
Montesquieu
those Troglodytes of former timeswere more like animals than men.1

Montesquieu, Persian Letters, Letter 11 (1721)
Montesquieus writing captures the impermanence and mutability of the

physical form, its transition from animal to human, as well as the inconstancy and cyclical nature of governments. As a scientist, Montesquieu focused on the flux that nature delivers and the fact that man must accept the
fact that nothing is permanent.
In the Persian Letters, Letters 1114, he outlines three stages of human
history: that of the savage/hunter, that of the barbarian/herdsman, and civilization. He begins with the stage of the savage/hunter, a period of development that is so primitive, men are indistinguishable from animals in
appearance and behavior. Letter 11 recounts the history of a prehistoric tribe
of cave dwellers called the Troglodytes. It is to Montesquieus credit that he
draws from classical historians to hypothesize that the first men were indistinguishable from animals:
There was in Arabia a small nation of people called Troglodytes, descended from
those Troglodytes of former times who, if we are to believe the historians, were
more like animals than men. Ours were not so deformed as that: they were not hairy
like bears, they did not hiss, they had two eyes; but they were so wicked and ferocious that there were no principles of equity or justice among them.2
34
Troglodyte is derived from the Greek, , from , hole

+ , to enter, via the Latin, trglodyta. Hence, a Troglodyte was a cave
dweller or, literally, one who enters holes. Montesquieu cedes to the authority of classical historians when he interjects, if we are to believe the historians. There is a long list of historians who have written about these
prehistoric cave dwellers: Aristotle, Herodotus, Titus-Livy, Thucydides,
Pomponius Mela, Pliny the Elder, Aulus Gellius, and Gaius Julius Solinus.
Aristotle had declared that it was true that small people had once lived in
caves in the land above Egypt: Some make their moves from nearby places,
but others from practically the farthest, as the cranes do: for they move from
the Scythian plains to the marshes above Egypt from where the Nile flows;
this is the region whereabouts the pygmies live (for they are no myth, but
there truly exists a kind that is small, as reported-both the people and their
horses-and they spend their lives in caves).3 Aristotle used the term Troglodytes () to identify this race of cave dwelling Pygmies
( ).
Herodotus also spoke of the cave dwelling Troglodytes ()
while embellishing upon Aristotles account: they were such fast runners, the
Garamantes needed chariots to chase them and they emitted sounds that were
squeaks: These Garamantes go in their four-horse chariots chasing the cave
dwelling Ethiopians: for the Ethiopian cave dwellers are swifter of foot than
any men of whom tales are brought to us. They live on snakes, and lizards,
and such-like creeping things. Their speech is like none other in the world; it
is the squeaking of bats.4
Paul Vernire and Antoine Adam, who have each annotated their own
editions of the Persian Letters, believe that Montesquieu derived his prehistoric Troglodytes from Pomponius Mela. Vernire mentions that Montesquieu had a copy of Melas Geography (De orbis situ) at La Brde.5 Mela
wrote, in 43 or 44 AD, To the east are:the TroglodytesTo the interiorif it is to be believed-and with difficulty-the half wild Egyptians, the
BlemiansAll dwelling without walls, they have no fixed seats of habitation
and possess only the land.6 Four chapters later, Mela adds, The Troglodytes, owning no domestic goods, can only hiss and squeak in their speaking;
they occupy caverns below the ground, and live on serpentsThe Blemians
seem to be without heads; their faces are near the breastbone.7 Vernire and
Adam believe that this is where Montesquieu derived they did not hiss, they
had two eyes in his description of the latter Troglodytes. Vernire notes,
Montesquieu
35
The geographer said: The Troglodytes, owning no domestic goods, can

only hiss and squeak in their speaking; Herodotus had them utter sharp cries
like bats: it is the squeaking of bats.8 Adam advises, Montesquieu read
Pomponius Mela. The latter wrote: The Troglodytes, owning no domestic
goods, can only hiss and squeak in their speaking, and this word explains
Montesquieus: they did not hiss. Then he adds: they had two eyes, he is
thinking of the same passage in which Pomponius Mela said about a people
neighboring the Troglodytes: The Blemians are without heads; their faces
are in their chests, or perhaps of Pliny the Elder: Blemians have no head,
their mouths and eyes are situated in their chests.9
It is to Montesquieus credit that he seized upon the ancients stories
about cave dwellers that resembled animals more than they did men, were
hairy like bears, and that hissed. He demonstrated that in ancient times, the
boundaries between men and animals were obscure, in appearance, sounds,
and living quarters. A metamorphosis occurred and subsequent Troglodytes
were not as deformed, they were not hairy like bears, they did not hiss, and
they had two eyes. The fact that Montesquieu implies that the prehistoric
Troglodytes did not have two eyes indicates that he may also have been influenced by Lucretius. In De rerum natura Lucretius declares that in the beginning nature created many monsters and only those that were not selfcontradictory survived.10 Montesquieu concurs with Lucretius and incorporates the notion of the extinction of self-contradictory beings into his first
stage of human history, that of the savage/hunter: the first cave dwellers were
deformed, they resembled animals, they did not have two eyes which indicates that they were monsters, and they became extinct; their extinction was
succeeded by Troglodytes who were not as deformed.
Having provided a brief sketch of the caveman, Montesquieu proceeds to
the next stage of human history, that of the barbarian/herdsman. Montesquieu specifies that the subsequent Troglodytes were farmers/herdsmen.
This period of herding/barbarism lies between the hunting/savagery part of
human history and that of civilized society. By Letter 12, Montesquieu tells
us that the barbarian/herdsman Troglodytes perished because of their wickedness and only two virtuous families remained. This was the birth of civilization.
In the sketch of the barbarian/herdsman, Montesquieu shows that the
human brain had developed to the point where the Troglodytes began to have
a sense of self. The pronouns je, me, and moi indicate that a con-
36
sciousness of self had arisen. Furthermore, the negative I will not worry
(Je ne me soucie point), what does it matter to me if the others are? (que
mimporte que les autres le soient?), and if all the other Troglodytes are
miserable (que tous les autres Troglodytes soient misrables) indicate that
differentiation between self and others has arisen, as well as a sense of self
interest and indifference to the needs of others.
During the barbarian/herdsman era, men appointed kings to rule them.
The fact that they had a foreign king who ruled them indicates that they had
divided themselves into countries and they could differentiate their own
country from those of foreigners. However, vestiges of their animal nature
were present. They were half way between animals and civilization: they
had a king and a royal family, but they killed them. They were advanced
enough to hold a meeting to choose a government and elect ministers, but
they killed them, too. They were semi-savage, semi-civilized-hence, they
were barbarians. Vestiges of animal instincts were present: they grabbed the
territories of others and were willing to fight to the death to secure them;
they stole the mates of others and were willing to kill or be killed to keep
them.
This period of the barbarian/herdsman ended in disaster and only two
virtuous families survived. These two honest, moral families were anomalies
among the wicked: They were humane; they understood what justice was;
they loved virtue.11 This, too, is amazingly prescient: only a very few, who
were radically different from all the rest, had developed a quality that permitted them to survive and proliferate; this tiny group of radically different people marked the beginning of modern civilization
Montesquieus prescience lies in the fact that he recognized that a tiny,
anomalous subset within a larger group might have qualities that permit it to
survive, proliferate and reproduce. The idea is not new, as Lucretius also
posited that in the beginning creatures that had no self-contradictions survived, prospered, and reproduced. However, Montesquieu is applying the
principle to human behavior rather than physical characteristics. The wickedness and treachery of the evil Troglodytes were self-contradictory and led
to their extinction. It is precisely the absence of this self-contradiction that
led to the survival of the virtuous Troglodytes.
The virtuous Troglodytes practice a perfect form of communism-they
have a desire to share with each other and this willingness to share is born of
the natural virtue of the human heart and is not taught by any written code.
Montesquieu
37
Montesquieu portrays these herdsman idyllically: In the evenings, as the

herds came in from the fields and the tired oxen brought in the plows, they
would gather togetherThey described the delights of the pastoral life and
the happiness of a situation that was always adorned by innocence. In this
happy land, cupidity was alien. They would give each other presents, and
the giver always thought that the advantage was his. The Troglodyte nation
regarded themselves as a single family; the herds were almost always mixed
up together, and the only task that was usually neglected was that of sorting
them out.12
Paul Vernire believes that Montesquieu, who published the Persian Letters in 1721, was influenced by Fnelons Telemachus (1719). Alluding to
the proximate publication dates, Vernire discusses the similarities between
Montesquieus virtuous Troglodytes and Fnelons shepherds:
The memory of Fnelon constantly remains here. It is the Btique of Telemachus

(Wetstein, 1719, book VIII, p. 170), with all of the fabulous themes of the Golden
Age. The Troglodytes, virtuous like the people of Btique, are shepherds: The innocence of morality, good faith, obedience and the horror of vice dwell in this blissful land. All property is communal, the fruit of the trees, the milk of the flocks
are of such abundant riches that such well-balanced, moderate people do not need to
share them. Communism and fraternity. They love another with a brotherly love
that nothing can destroy. The same Arcadian ideal that excludes money, commerce, urban life, conquests and war. Montesquieus same style imitates Fnelons
smooth speech.
Religion is not revealed to the Troglodytes. It is natural and arises spontaneously from virtuous hearts.13
Otis Fellows finds that Montesquieu had shown that a sense of justice is
essential to all political organization and that without it, the survival of civilization is not possible. Fellows believes that the fable illustrates M.s belief that a sense of justice, the supreme political virtue, is essential to the
organization and maintenance of human society. His pessimism is revealed
in the last letter when he portrays the republic founded on virtue giving way
to a monarchy based on the theoretically less desirable principle of honor.
These ideas will be further clarified in De lesprit des lois (Book III, 37).14
J. Robert Loy points out that Montesquieu had observed a recurring, cyclical evolution from order to chaos, to order to chaos, ad infinitum, in gov-
38
ernments. The Troglodyte story indicates that even these ancient men progressed through all forms of government. Loy observes:
The Troglodytes he had invented theoretically for The Persian Letters now become
an actual moment in history, where he can study the evolutions and mutations from
chaos to republic to monarchy to despotism to chaos. To judge of the function of a
particular law, the law must be comprehended in its historical context, in the particular moment of the history of a particular people.15
Montesquieu sketches here for the first time his important discovery of the natural
and historical cycle of governments. The parable supposes a tribe of cavedwellers16
The cycle has come full circle and one senses that the prince will, in the absence of
individual responsibility in the citizenry, become despot, then tyrant. There will be
eventual revolt, disorder, small republic, large republic, monarchy; and again the
cycle. The parable announces Montesquieus theory of governments; there are three
basic types: despotic, monarchic, and republican (the latter divided into oligarchy
and democracy). Each government has come into existence and continues to exist
because of a certain set of circumstances and therefore has a peculiar guiding principle. Virtue is the principle of republics and when it grows too burdensome to the
citizens, the republic is corrupted and heading for the eternal cycle: chaos, order,
chaos.17
The episode of the Troglodytes is instructive. Social existence is cyclical and never
constant. If Montesquieu at first thought natural virtue (contrary to Hobbes state of
war) was the regulator of social order, he later realized that in other positions along
the cycle, a more sophisticated and artificial form of virtue-honor-must take over the
job of regulating.18
In The Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu continues to explore flux and

the events that nature delivers: in his book he captures the impermanence of
the forms of governments that have arisen from the moment that man had
developed a sense of self and others. He begins by observing that a nexus
exists between climate and human physiology and temperament.19 He extrapolates that it is appropriate that nations situated in different climates each
use forms of government suited to the physiology and temperaments of their
inhabitants. In Books 1417, he contends that mens physiology and temperament are influenced by the nature of the climate; in Book 18, he examines how the nature of the soil affects mans body and temperament. In these
Montesquieu
39
five books, he posits a general spirit or array of tendencies that a nation has
because of its climate, geography, topography, and soil. By Book 19, Chapter 14, he calls climate the first of all empires: the metaphor suggests the
strong influence that climate has on the body and mind. This metaphor also
implies that climate, like government, is a structure that has loose control in
which individuals can act, but it is not absolutely determinist; legislators can
pass laws to promote virtue and discourage vice.
Montesquieu describes in detail the physiology intrinsic to natives of
various latitudes. J. Ehrard says, he arms himself with a microscope to
give to this common ground of the knowledge of nations a solid scientific
foundation.20 In Book 14, Chapter 1, Montesquieu capsulizes his thesis
thus: the character of the spirit and the passions of the heart are extremely
different in the various climates21 In Book 14, Chapter 2, he begins by
establishing a causality between air temperature and physiology: Cold air
contracts the extremities of the bodys surface fibers; this increases their
spring and favors the return of blood from the extremities of the heart. It
shortens these same fibers; therefore, it increases their strength in this way
too. Hot air, by contrast, relaxes these extremities of the fibers and lengthens
them; therefore, it decreases their strength and their spring.22 Then he observes a relationship between the physiology of people residing in cold climates and superior physical strength: Therefore, men are more vigorous in
cold climates. The action of the heart and the reaction of the extremities of
the fibers are in closer accord, the fluids are in a better equilibrium, the blood
is pushed harder toward the heart and, reciprocally, the heart has more power.23
Having established that warm weather and cold weather have observable
and measurable effects on the human body, Montesquieu proceeds to demonstrate that these physiological effects, in turn, affect intellect and temperament. Montesquieu posited that cold climates produce people who are
physically superior and hence, more self-confident: This greater strength
should produce many effects: for example, more confidence in oneself, that
is, more courage; better knowledge of ones superiority, that is, less desire
for vengeance; a higher opinion of ones security, that is, more frankness and
fewer suspicions, maneuvers, and tricks. Finally, it should make very different characters.24
Montesquieu observes of hot climates: As you move toward the countries of the south, you will believe you have moved away from morality it-
40
self: the liveliest passions will increase crime; each will seek to take from
others all the advantages that can favor these same passions.25 People living
in tropical climates have the tendency to be hot tempered and less in control
their passions; conversely, people in cold climates tend to be more rational
and less disposed to crimes of passion. Hence, a cold climate > the heart has
more power > more vigorous people and superiority of strength > greater
boldness and more courage, greater sense of superiority, greater selfconfidence and less desire for revenge. Conversely, hot weather causes
faintness and people who avoid bold enterprises.
It is significant that Montesquieu uses the metaphor machine (machine) several times to identify the human body. In Book 14, Chapter 2, he
says: In northern countries, a healthy and well-constituted but heavy machine finds its pleasures in all that can start the spirits in motion again: hunting, travels, war, and wine.26
In the eighteenth century the primary definition of machine was Engine,
instrument good for moving, pulling, raising, dragging, launching something.
Great machine. Admirable machine, marvelous, new machine, very ingenious machine. War machine. Ballet machine. Machine that casts bulky
stone bricks, that discharges a hundred bolts at a time. Machine to draw
water. Machine to raise stones to the top of a building. Hydraulic engine,
or for water. To invent a machine. To set a machine in motion. This machine works well, runs well. Power transmitted by machinery. The pieces,
the springs of a machine.27
The tertiary definition of machine was: A certain assembly of springs
whose motion and power are self-contained. The clock is a fine machine.
Robots are very ingenious machines.28
The fourth definition of machine was : It is said fig. That man is an admirable machine. Ancient poets called the Universe, the round machine.29
Montesquieu is clearly using machine in the mechanist sense: just as the
universe is a finely tuned machine whose cogs, wheels, springs, and pulleys
are interdependent upon one another, so is mans body a finely tuned machine largely influenced by climate and mans temperament is contingent
upon his physiology. In the man-machine metaphor, man is part of a larger
structure, the earths environment, that influences his body and mind. Visibly absent from the text is any mention of a soul. Montesquieu is a scientist
here. His study of man is based on empiricism, the scientific method, ex-
Montesquieu
41
perimentation, and observation. He collates observations of nations in many

latitudes and arrives at hypotheses.
However, Montesquieu is very cautious. Critics call him the libral conservateur (which can mean liberal conservative or conservative liberal) because of his prudence, although his caution did not prevent him from getting
censored by the Church. Montesquieu, while using the term machine, did
not go as far as La Mettrie, who, the year before, had written in the next to
the last paragraph of Man-Machine, Let us then conclude boldly that man is
a machine, and that in the whole universe there is but a single substance differently modified.30 Although he was a mechanist, Montesquieu did not
articulate a monistic materialist cosmology. Significantly absent from the
libral conservateurs book is any statement that the physical world is all
that there is: he presents his ethnographic analysis and the reader must extrapolate his own conclusions. Montesquieu demonstrates that man is a machine whose physiology is greatly influenced by the temperature of the
environment and the food that the soil produces. This, in turn, affects his
state of mind, outlook in life, and personality characteristics. The Church
censored his work because if man is a machine whose temperament and state
of mind are influenced by the environment, free will and therefore, sin are
jeopardized. To undercut free will and sin is to negate the need for a Savior
to die vicariously for mans sin.
In Book 14, Chapter 12, Montesquieu employs machine twice again.
Regarding suicide among the English, Montesquieu observes that among
the English, it is the effect of an illness; it comes from the physical state of
the machine and is independent of any other cause.31 Then again in the next
sentence, Montesquieu uses the term machine once more as a metaphor for
the body: It is likely that there is a failure in the filtering of the nervous
juice; the machine, when the forces that give it motion stay inactive, wearies
of itself; it is not pain the soul feels but a certain difficulty in existence.32
There are religious implications to explaining suicide by the effect of climate
on the machine (body and mind): if man is a machine influenced by climate,
then free will is gone and suicide is no longer a sin. Suicide becomes a metaphor for any action resulting from physiology and hence, the more general
notion of all sin is negated.
By Book 19, Chapter 14, Montesquieu declares, Climate is the first of
all empires. In this sentence, he metaphorized climate as a governing body
with a complex system of laws that is an iconic representation of the mecha-
42
nistic laws of the universe. These laws are not deterministic, but rather, man,
with the help of wise legislators, can set up laws and governments that will
promote virtue and discourage vice. The fact that climate is the first of all
empires indicates that others must follow.
Most critics concur that Montesquieu was not an absolute determinist. It
would be incorrect to posit that he promulgated geographical and environmental determinism. Ehrard states, far from establishing a unilateral determinism, he believes that the legislator can and must fight the climates
vices (Chap. 5 to 9).33 As an example, Ehrard points out to Book 14, Chapter 5, that is entitled, That Bad Legislators are Those Who have Favored the
Climates Vices and Good Ones are Those Who have Opposed Them.
C.P. Courtney agrees that Montesquieu was not a determinist:
Significantly, chapter 5 of Book XIV is entitled, That those are bad legislators who
favour the vices of the climate, and good legislators who oppose those vices, a useful reminder that, while Montesquieu believed that the various factors that make up
the general spirit have an enormous influence on our lives, he was not an environmental determinist, if by this one means that human beings have absolutely no
freedom of choice. His considered view on such factors is that environmental factors, particularly the basic ones of climate and geographical situation, are most influential on primitive and unenlightened peoples. It is in this sense that he writes in
chapter 14 of Book XIX: the empire of climate is the first of all empires.34
Courtney goes on to say, Awareness of the factors that shape our life in society enables us to act in such a way that we can manipulate these factors or
even oppose them.35
Courtney concludes that Montesquieu was opposed to slavery and he
viewed slavery as contrary to natural law. Courtney points out that Montesquieus approach to the problem, which involved taking into account environmental factors, convinced him that it was possible to find a logical
explanation for the existence of slavery. It is natural in the sense that there
is a necessary relation between slavery and the form of government (despotism) and climate (in hot countries). It is unnatural, however, for intelligent beings to allow themselves to be dominated by the influence of climate
or to be the instruments of the immoral power of a despot. In this sense slav-
Montesquieu
43
ery is contrary to natural law and cannot therefore be condoned even though
it can be explained by natural causes:
But, as all men are born equal, slavery must be accounted unnatural, though, in
some countries, it be founded on natural reason; and a wide difference ought to be
made between such countries and those in which even natural reason rejects it, as in
Europe, where it has been so happily abolished (XV, 8).36
Courtney contends that Montesquieu did not embrace an absolute geographic or environmental determinism, but rather, merely observed tendencies based on climate that should be negated by legislation if they are
contrary to natural law. In this sense, The Spirit of Laws is an extension of
the Troglodyte story: the universe is in continual flux and nothing stays the
same forever. The earliest Troglodytes were indistinguishable from animals
and they metamorphosed into less deformed creatures who eventually looked
like modern man; climate is the first empire and formed the temperament of
the earliest men; modern man, and legislators in particular, have the power
and duty to correct the climates vices.
Montesquieus universe is characterized by flux: the events are species
and governments. Nature continuously delivers events and the events can be
improvements in physiological structures, as in the case of the Troglodytes,
or in customs, manners, and laws. If climate is the first empire,37 man can
overcome the vices of climate by using his mind. Customs, manners and
laws are events that change. Henri Coulet observes that during the eighteenth century, man grew accustomed to the anxiety that results from a perpetually changing universe. Coulet says that in the eighteenth century, men
were ready to tolerate contradictions and accept the fact that they have
been immersed in the changing flux of phenomena and the inexhaustible
chain of causes and effects.38 Coulet mentions that Fontenelle had declared
that the apparent permanence of the universe is illusory.39
Robert Shackleton is also of the mind that Montesquieu was not an absolute determinist:
It is not a rigorous and systematic doctrine. Certain effects on mens minds are in
part caused by the climate, and as mens minds influence the forms of government
under which they live, so climate, vicariously, influences those forms of govern-
44

ment. This is a moderate and limited doctrine. It is only a part, and even a small
part, of the doctrine of LEsprit des lois; and the first impression one ought to retain
of the theory of climate in Montesquieus work is of the narrowness of the limits it
occupies.40
Shackleton goes on to say:
The imputation of determinism or of fatalism has often been made against the author
of LEsprit des lois on the strength of his theory of climate. A reply to this charge
can be based on the instruction which Montesquieu gives to the legislator when confronted with a people climatically disposed in a certain way. The good legislator, he
says, must resist the vices of the climate. The bad legislator will accept them. In
hot lands, for example, in order to overcome the idleness engendered by the climate,
laws should seek to remove all possibility of living without work.41
In summation, Montesquieu painted a universe that is in continual flux:

he presciently posited that the events that flux delivers are physiological
structures in living beings, as well as customs, manners, laws, and governments. He established that there were three stages of human history: that of
the savage/hunter, that of the barbarian/herdsman, and civilization. Montesquieu drew from ancient historians to posit that in the far past, men were indistinguishable from animals. As time progressed, men became less
deformed and approached their current form. Physiology, temperament, intellect, societal customs such as polygamy and slavery, and forms of government from democracy to despotism, are largely influenced by, but not
absolutely determined by, climate, topography, and soil. Man has the power
to progress beyond the first empire, which is climate, and move on to laws
and customs that are more in line with natural law. The vices of climate are
no more static than anything else in the physical universe and man can improve his lot in life through legislation.
Chapter3
LaMettrie
In those days, he did not consider himself king over the other animals, nor was he
distinguished from the ape1
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine (1747)
Throughout his literary career La Mettrie observed that the chain of beings is
comprised of an infinite variety of beings. However, unlike his compatriot
and friend in Holland, Maupertuis, who had articulated a transformist point
of view in the Essai sur la formation des corps organiss (1745), La Mettrie
did not consider that one species may have arisen from an antecedent species. This is surprising because he and Maupertuis were friends, they both
lived in Holland, and La Mettrie dedicated The Natural History of the Soul
(1745) to his friend. La Mettrie developed his own ideas, and as Jacques
Roger observed, he followed his own path.2 Nevertheless, La Mettrie contributed many innovative ideas to the French Enlightenment that paved the
way for transformism.
For example, in The Natural History of the Soul (1745) he establishes
that consciousness is contingent solely upon the physiology of the brain and
central nervous system: all psychic phenomena (emotions, thoughts, passions, and perceptions) can be fully explained by physiology alone (the condition of the body, inheritance, the kind and amount of food that is ingested,
and age), and also other environmental factors such as education and learning, and climate and the environment. Hence, he dismisses the notion of the
immortal soul as fictive.
46
Having established that consciousness is solely contingent upon physiology, La Mettrie goes on, in Man a Machine (1747), to explore in great detail
the physical similarities between man and other animals. He declares that
the transition from animals to man is not violent, that the apes are the animals that are closest to man in the physiology and functioning of the brain
and central nervous system, and that there was a time in the distant past, before man had developed language, when he was indistinguishable from the
apes.
The following year, in Man a Plant (1748), he examines in great detail
the physical similarities and divergences between man and the vegetable
kingdom.
By 1750, in The System of Epicurus, La Mettrie borrows Diderots language of games of chance to show that infinite collisions of atoms, like
throws of dice, will eventually yield patterns, and over an infinite amount of
time, they will give rise to living beings. As Diderot had done in Philosophic Thoughts (1746), Thought 21, La Mettrie defends Epicurus view that
atoms, which have the property of motion, are continually colliding with
each other: these collisions are random events, and over an infinite amount of
time, they will randomly combine to form beings of increasing organizational complexity. The formula here is flux+time=the dispersion of chaos.
La Mettrie derives his language and ideas pertinent to games of chance from
Diderot: La Mettrie employs the phrases random chance, lucky combinations, an infinite number of combinations, and a chance arrangement.
Taken as a whole, these four books attempt to explain man by taking, as
a starting point, man himself. In 1745 La Mettrie dispenses with the notion
of the soul: he scrutinizes the physiology of the human body to show that
consciousness can be fully explained by the functioning of the brain, nervous
system and sensory organs; in 1747 he observes the great similarity between
the organs of man and those of the ape; in 1748 he proceeds down the chain
of being and observes similarities between animals and vegetables, and finally, in 1750, he returns to the origin of things and the creation of the universe from the random collision of atoms. However, in 1750 he was a
panspermist, not a transformist. He was searching to identify the origin of
man. He died in 1751; had he lived, he would have likely responded to the
transformist concepts presented in Diderots Thoughts on the Interpretation
of Nature (1753), as he and Diderot reacted to each others ideas in their
La Mettrie
47
works. This chapter will follow La Mettries journey, from 1745 to 1750, as
he investigated the origin of man.
La Mettrie was a materialist and a monist, or one who admits that the universe is comprised of only one substance, matter. In the eighteenth century
materialist was defined as one who allows only for matter;3 materialism was defined as the opinion of those who do not allow for any substance other than matter.4 Websters defines materialism as a doctrine,
theory, or principle according to which physical matter is the only reality and
the reality through which all being and processes and phenomena can be explained.5
Notably absent from the definition of materialism is any attribution of
reality to spirit or soul. As a physician, La Mettrie held that consciousness is
purely the result of physiological activity or more specifically, the functioning of the brain and nervous system. Ironically enough, he owes his monist
view of man to Descartes, who had posited that animals, but not men, are
merely machines. A century earlier, Descartes had written in a letter to the
Marquis of Newcastle, that our body is not just a self-moving machine.6
Employing the watch metaphor again in the Treatise on Man, Descartes reiterated that the body is self-moving and hence, it may be compared to
clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and other such machines which, although
only man-made, have the power to move of their own accord in many
ways.7 From Descartes The Passions of the Soul, La Mettrie gleaned that
all of mans motions, including involuntary movements associated with
breathing, walking and eating, depend on the brain, nerves and muscles.
This occurs in the same way as the movement of a watch is produced merely
by the strength of its spring and the configuration of its wheels.8
Although Descartes had held that animals are automatons and men are
more than that, because they have spirit, La Mettrie extended the automaton
notion to man. La Mettrie rejected the notion that a spiritual realm exists and
his thesis was that everything in the universe is merely the result of the organization of matter. His starting point, then, in the Natural History of the
Soul (1745), is to disprove the existence of the immortal soul. He does this
by painstakingly examining the intricacies of the human body and demonstrating that consciousness can be satisfactorily explained solely with biology. The title itself, Histoire naturelle de lme, is a pun. Natural histories
of all kinds have dated back to Pliny the Elders Natural History. Instead of
an Histoire naturelle de lhomme, La Mettrie decided to cleverly title his
work, Histoire naturelle de lme. From the very first sentence in the work,
48
however, it becomes clear that the work is decidedly not about a nonexistent
entity, but rather, an essay extolling the intricacies of human physiology. In
the first sentence he advises the reader, Neither Aristotle, nor Plato, nor
Descartes, nor Malebranche will teach you what your soul is. You will torture yourself in vain to learn its nature and, however much it affronts your
vanity and insubordination, you will have to submit to ignorance and faith.9
Ernst Cassirer observes the emphasis that La Mettrie places on the study
of human physiology: it is the surest way to acquire a knowledge of man:
Therefore the conclusion which alone can assure us of the truth of nature is not deductive, logical, or mathematical; it is an inference from the part to the whole. The
essence of nature as a whole can be deciphered and determined only if we take the
nature of man as our starting point. Accordingly, the physiology of man becomes
the point of departure and they key for the study of natureLamettrie begins with
medical observationsLamettries first book is entitled The Natural History of the
Soul. He points out that such a history can only be written by following strictly the
physical processes and taking no step not demanded and justified by exact observations. It was such observations made during an attack of fever-when he became
emphatically aware that his whole emotional and intellectual life was undergoing a
complete revolution-which, as he says himself, determined the nature of his studies
and the tendency of his whole philosophy. Sensory, corporeal experience was to be
his only guide from now on; he used to say of his senses: Here are my philosophers (Voil mes philosophes).10
Therefore, what is stated to be a treatise on the soul in the works title, is

actually an essay on the physical body. La Mettrie declares, I open my eyes
and I see about me only matter or extension.11 The OED defines extension in physics and metaphysics as the property of being extended or of
occupying space; spatial magnitude.12 La Mettrie explains that extension is
a property of all matter: all matter has length, breadth, and depth. A proponent of Lockian epistemology, he declares that all knowledge comes from
our senses and the senses conceive of all matter as having three dimensions.
To extension, he adds Epicurus view that all matter has the property of motion: matter has the power to move and to be moved (kinetic and potential
energy). Kinetic energy is when the movement or work is occurring; potential energy is when the movement or work is waiting to be done.
Having established that all matter has extension and motion, he goes on
to establish that there exists a third property: consciousness. He bows to the
La Mettrie
49
authority of the ancients who acknowledged that all matter is conscious. He

proves that consciousness exists all along the chain of beings. For example,
animals are conscious and we know that they are because they speak the
language of feeling, such as moans, cries, caresses, flight, sighs, song, in a
word all the expressions of pain, sadness, aversion, fear, daring, submission,
anger13 These emotions are displayed by animals as well as man. There
is a perfect resemblance between man and animals: for here it is only a
question of the similarities between sense organs which, a few modifications
apart, are completely the same and obviously indicate the same uses.14 He
criticizes Descartes for not noticing the similarity between mans sense organs and those of animals and includes a footnote praising Boerhaave who
did and who had applied himself to comparative anatomy. La Mettries purpose is to show that the only difference between man and other animals is the
complexity of organization.
In order to solidify his case that man is a highly organized animal (actually, an ape that can speak), La Mettrie goes on to examine Platos tripartite
soul-the vegetative, the animal and the rational parts; he provides definitions
of each and demonstrates that both man and animals exhibit, to varying degrees, all three aspects. The vegetative soul controls generation, nutrition
and growth in living beings; it has the power or faculty of growth. The animal soul or the conscious soul has the function of sensation or sense perception and it is characteristic of animals. The rational soul has the faculty of
reason.
The notion that living beings have three essential functions is articulated
in Platos Republic (), where Plato posits a tripartite soul ()
comprised of the separate vegetative (generative), animal (conscious), and
rational parts. Plato was amazingly prescient and it is to La Mettries credit
that he seized upon the three functions requisite for life: today scientists
agree that the brain is comprised of a vegetative core that controls physical
functions such as appetite, heartbeat and kidney functioning, an animal layer
on top of that which is linked to emotions, passions and fears, and a rational
layer on top of that containing the thinking and reasoning faculties. It took
the genius of Plato to hypothesize this in 360 BC, and the genius of La Mettrie to reach across the ages, resurrect it, and make it the foundation of mans
psychophysiology.
La Mettrie methodically proves that these three functions, which Plato
explained by a tripartite soul, are purely the result of brain activity. He
shows that animals, like man, exhibit the vegetative, animal and rational
50
functions of their brains, some to a greater degree, others to a lesser degree.

Both humans and animals depend on the five senses in order to feel, discern
and know. It is the brain that is the center to which and from which all perceptions travel: Many experiments have taught us that it is actually in the
brain that the soul is affected by the sensations specific to animals. For when
this part is seriously wounded, the animal no longer possesses feeling, discernment or knowledge.15 Man and animals are both machines dependent
on the functioning of the brain. La Mettrie remarks that many authors place
the seat of the soul in the corpus callosum part of the brain, from which, as
from a throne, it governs all the parts of the body.16
The salient feature of La Mettries discussion is that he describes the
process of consciousness in purely physical terms. Whenever he uses the
term soul, the reader understands that he is talking either about consciousness or the brain. Hearing carries the sensation of noise to the soul (brain);
the images that come before ones eyes are carried to the soul (brain); the
soul (brain) receives sensations from the senses of smell and taste; touch is
universally spread over the whole of the body and heat, cold, hardness, softness, etc., are transmitted to the soul(brain). The sensations are carried via
the nervous system; since the motor nerves alone carry the idea of movements to the souleach nerve is apt to give rise to different sensations.17
In chapter 10 he discusses the five senses in great detail and proves that
consciousness is based solely on physiological changes that take place. He
employs highly technical terms to prove that science is fully capable of explaining every aspect of consciousness that had formally been attributed to
the soul. As an example he recommends, Take an oxs eye, carefully remove the sclerotic and choroid and, in the place of the first of these membranes, put a piece of paper whose concavity fits exactly the eyes convexity.
Then put any object at all in front of the hole of the pupil and you will see
very clearly the image of this object at the back of the eye.18 The sense of
sight is based purely upon the relaying of images along nerves to the brain.
La Mettrie reiterates that consciousness is based purely on the physical
body: The ideas of size, hardness, etc. are determined only by our organs.
If we have other senses, we would have other ideas of the same attributes,
and if we had other ideas, we would think differently from the way we think
about whatever is called a work of genius or feelingIn addition, feelings
change with organs. In some jaundices, everything appears yellow. Change
your axis of vision with your finger and you will multiply objects and vary
La Mettrie
51
their place and attitude at will. Chilblains, etc. remove the sense of touch.
The slightest blockage in the Eustachian tube is enough to make one deaf.19
He also explains memory in purely physiological terms and declares that
the cause of memory is completely mechanical, like memory itself; it seems
to depend on the fact that the physical impressions on the brain, which are
the traces of successive ideas, are close together and on the fact that the soul
is unable to discover one trace or one idea without recalling the others which
habitually went with them.20
He demystifies the imagination, as well, by relying solely upon biology:
The imagination merges the different incomplete sensations which the
memory recalls to the brain and makes images or pictures out of them, representing objectswhich are different from the precise sensations previously
received through the senses.21 He also elucidates upon the passions-love,
hate, fear, audacity, pity, ferocity, anger, gentleness, etc.,-long held to be
contingent upon the animal soul-by engaging in purely scientific analyses.
In summation, La Mettries starting point in his study of man is to refute
to notion of the soul. He demonstrates that all consciousness can be attributed to matter alone (the functioning of the brain, central nervous system and
the five senses), and hence, there is no need for an immortal soul. He mentions that if, indeed, the soul did exist, it would have to have extension in
order to have any impact on the body or perceptions. He takes exception to
Descartes, who thought that extension is not necessary for a substance to
have an impact on extended bodies. La Mettrie concludes that the soul must
necessarily not be unextended itself (chapter 10, part 8); the reader infers that
since its extension is undetected by medicine, it does not exist. Hence, La
Mettrie engages in an astute observation of the physical body and dismisses
unextended entities as nonexistent.
In his next work, Man a Machine (1747), La Mettrie begins by returning
to a subject that he had taken up in The Natural History of the Soul, namely,
the fictive nature of unextended entries, such as the immortal soul and God.
He criticizes Descartes and the Cartesians for having made the same mistake. They have taken for granted two distinct substances in man, as if they
had seen them, and positively counted them.22 Aram Vartanian remarks,
The thesis of La Mettries principal work springs from the persuasion that
all prior efforts to clarify metaphysically the nature of mind have failed. The
dualism of Descartes and Malebranche, the Leibnizian monadology, and
even Lockes conjecture that God might have superadded thought to matter,
52
all seem to him to be mere verbalizings rather than rational explanations of

the mystery of mental phenomena.23
Vartanian also points out that La Mettrie denied the existence of God: he
directly refuted the deistic stance that Diderot had taken in 1746. Vartanian
observes that in 1746, while Diderot was still a deist, he had defended deism
and the existence of a Prime Mover. In Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 18,
Diderot had written that atheism receives it greatest blows from observations
of the wonders of nature, such as in the evidence shown by Marcello Malpighi, Isaac Newton, Pieter van Musschenbroek, Nicholas Hartsoeker, and
Bernard Nieuwentyt. The following year, La Mettrie directly refuted this
statement in LHomme-machine: the Fnelons, the Nieuwentyts, the Abbadies, the Derhams, the Rays, Malpighi, teach us nothing, their works are
the boring repetitions of zealous writers, their wonders of nature prove nothing. Thus, a direct dialogue between the two materialists began. Hence, La
Mettrie relied solely upon the physical universe and what the five senses
could perceive of it, and he dispensed with metaphysical hypotheses.
As a physician, La Mettrie based his hypotheses on empiricism and the
scientific method: Experience and observation should therefore be our only
guides here. Both are to be found throughout the records of the physicians
who were philosophers, and not in the works of the philosophers who were
not physicians. The former have traveled through and illuminated the labyrinth of man; they alone have laid bare those springs [of life] hidden under
the external integument which conceals so many wonders from our eyes.24
As he had stated in The Natural History of the Soul, everything in the universe is derived from the inherent motion of matter. Therefore, nature (matter) is self-contained; nature does not require a Prime Mover to set it into
motion and organize it because molecules, which have the property of motion, set themselves into motion. La Mettrie employs the watch metaphor to
illustrate that the human body is self-contained: The human body is a machine which winds its own springs. It is the living image of perpetual
movement. Nourishment keeps up the movement which fever excites.
Without food, the soul pines away, goes mad, and dies exhausted.25 La
Mettrie begins by establishing that man is a self-moving machine because
later he will demonstrate that man has this characteristic in common with
other animals. The fact that all man needs is food and heat to keep the mechanism going, is also something that he shares with the rest of the animal
kingdom.
La Mettrie
53
The self-moving phenomenon of the human body was a mystery inherent

in nature that needed to be explained. There were two phenomena that
pointed to the fact that nature is self-starting: Trembleys polyp and the irritability of muscles. Polyps were a subject that had been hotly debated in
academic circles since Trembleys discovery of the freshwater hydra in 1740.
Trembley had discovered a freshwater hydra on the shores of Lake Geneva
that regenerated itself after being cut into pieces.26 La Mettrie examines the
polyp in detail because 1) it is a bridge between the animal and vegetable
kingdoms and hence, it shows the seamless continuity between the chain of
beings, 2) the polyps ability to regenerate (as well as that of starfish and
earthworms) presents problems for preformation: how many preexisting
germs are needed and where are they located?, and 3) where does the polyps
consciousness go when it becomes two, four, and eight complete animals?27
La Mettrie discussed the polyp in 1745, 1747, 1748, and 1750 because it
was an iconic representation of natures inherent ability to start itself. In addition, there was another phenomenon that indicated that nature has a hidden,
self-starting force: the irritability of muscles. La Mettrie pointed to the fact
that a frogs heart continues to beat for over an hour after it has been removed from the body, and that muscles, when extracted from a body, contracted when stimulated. These two phenomena, the fact that the polyp could
regenerate after having been cut to pieces and the continued activity of muscles after excision from the body, proved that there must be more to nature
than simply Lucretius atoms in motion and random chance. There must be
something else in a mindless, chaotic, random universe. Lester Crocker observes that the regeneration of Trembleys polyp taught La Mettire that matter contains within itself the power that produces its activity and-most
important-its organization and that matter, and living organisms in particular, possess a self-organizing power or impulse.28
Crocker cites the passage in LHomme-machine in which La Mettrie declares that there must exist something else in matter that causes polyps to
regenerate.29 Crocker observes that that something else was supplied by
Leibniz: it was Leibniz who had provided La Mettrie with several significant
characteristics of matter: simple substances have a certain self-sufficiency
which makes them the sources of their internal activities, matter, too, is
undergoing constant modification, perpetual change, and every present
state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state,
in such a way that its present is big with its future.30 Hence, what Leibniz
brought to La Mettries thought is the fact that Nature had to be conceived
54
of as a self-creating, self-patterning force, as an experimenting-and a blindly

experimenting-force.31
Jacques Roger also observes La Mettries focus on an innate force in
matter that animates it: A muscle taken from a body contracted when stimulated; a frogs heart continued to beat for more than an hour; a piece of polyp
reconstituted an entire polyp. Therefore, each little fiber or part of organized bodies is moved by a principle of its own.32 He adds, It was therefore clearly demonstratedthat matter is moved by itself, not just when it is
organized, as in a complete heart for example, but even when this organization is destroyed.33
There is a property of nature that causes it to reorganize and we do not
know what it is: nature is self-organizing. Roger cites La Mettries explanation: We really do not know nature: causes hidden in her bosom may have
produced everything. Take your own look at Trembleys polyp: does it not
contain in itself the causes that give rise to its regeneration?they may be
something else that would be neither chance nor God; what I mean is nature34
Aram Vartanian also comments that La Mettries legacy is his contribution regarding the irritability concept. Vartanian says, the heart offered a
much more dramatic proof of autonomous energy because, when resected
and divided, it could contract even without the benefit of artificial stimulation-a fact that made it possible to derive the automaticity of the organism as
a whole from that of the heart, which became the mainspring in the network
of internal stimuli that maintained the body in a continuous state of vital activity.35
Vartanian goes on to say, La Mettrie affirms that each tiny fiber, or
part of an organized body, moves by a principle which belongs to it, and
whose activity does not depend in any way on the nerves. With respect to
the functional mode of the irritable reaction, he observes further: The motive principle of the whole body, and even of its parts cut into pieces, is such
that it produces not irregular movements, as some have thought, but very
regular ones. The seat of this innate force is placed by him in the living
tissues themselves.36
Vartanian concludes, In the final analysis, the chief merit of La Mettries discussion is that it views the phenomenon of irritability as the key to
the mystery of life itself, and proposes to erect the mechanistic theory of
mind on this firm biological foundation.37
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55
La Mettrie also explores a gamut of factors that influence consciousness:

food, age, learning, inheritance, and climate and the environment. At each
juncture he shows that other animals, who are also conscious, are also influenced by the same factors. He begins by examining the need for food, which
is the most basic need that man and other animals have in common. Because
consciousness is contingent only upon physiology, food ingredients, the
manner in which food is prepared (whether it is cooked or raw), and the
quantity of food ingested, cause certain physiological changes, which in turn,
affect temperament and mood). He acknowledges the impact that food has
on the chemistry of the brain: What power there is in a meal! Joy revives in
a sad heart, and infects the souls of comrades, who express their delight in
the friendly songs38 People eating heartily at a banquet have a joyful disposition; melancholy people (he describes the melancholy as those who prefer to be alone) and studious people would be out of place at a banquet (he
implies that the melancholy and studious have different temperaments because they do not regularly engage in gluttonous episodes).
As an example of the causality between food and temperament, he points
to the relationship between eating raw meat and a savage disposition. In this,
men and animals are similarly affected by eating raw meat. La Mettrie says,
Raw meat makes animals fierce, and it would have the same effect on
man.39 Conversely, heavy food promotes laziness and indolence. Hence,
cause and effect relationships exist between food and temperament and food
and aggression among nations that eat raw meat.
Temperament is also influenced by the amount of food we eat. As an
example he cites a Swiss judge who, when hearing cases on an empty stomach, was indulgent and merciful towards the defendant, but when he ate a
large dinner, his personality changed and he was capable of sending the innocent like the guilty to the gallows.40 La Mettrie concludes, everything
depends on the way our machine is running.41
Because man and animals have similar body structures, the factors that
influence mans behavior also influences that of animals. He hyperbolizes
the commonality between man and animals by pointing out that cannibalism
exists both in men and animals: To what excesses cruel hunger can bring
us! We no longer regard even our own parents and children. We tear them
to pieces eagerly and make horrible banquets of them42
If eating raw meat can make man ferocious, the absence of food can
cause man to viciously attack his own kind for survival. He utilizes hyperbole to paint a brutal portrait of mans animal characteristics: to what ex-
56
cesses, cruel hunger, we tear them to shreds by the teeth, we make

horrible banquets, and carried away with fury. These phrases hyperbolize
mans similarity to the other species on the chain of beings. Among man, as
among other species, the weakest is always the prey of the strongest.43
He also analyzes the influence that an aging body, education, inheritance, and climate and the environment, have on the mind: One needs only
eyes to see the necessary influence of old age on reason. The soul follows
the progress of the body, as it does the progress of education.44 Here soul
is a metaphor for consciousness. It is brain function that deteriorates with
age and hence, consciousness is compromised. Similarly, education promotes a reasonable temperament. Even ethnic differences in wit are purely
physiological: one nation has a heavy and stupid wit, and another, a quick,
light and penetrating wit. La Mettrie asks, Whence comes this difference, if
not in part from the difference in foods, and difference in inheritance45
It is interesting that La Mettrie attributes ethnic humor to inheritance.
Maupertuis had studied polydactyly and had shown that the birth anomaly is
not only inherited, but it could also be predicted with mathematical precision.46 La Mettrie goes a step further and posits that psychological phenomena, such as appreciation of a certain kind of humor, is inherited. La Mettrie
also mentions that cannibalism and a penchant for criminal behavior, such as
theft, are inherited. To defend this point he refers to cases from medical history such as that of the woman who used to steal when she was pregnant and
whose children inherited the vice, and the daughter of a thief and cannibal
who inherited her parents proclivities even though she had been orphaned
when she was a year old and raised by honest people.
He also observes the influence that climate and the environment have on
physiology and the mind. When a man travels from one country to another,
he thinks and acts differently: just as plants and animals improve or degenerate in a new climate, so does man. In addition, when relocated to a different
country, we learn from one another and copy the gestures and accents of others. This can also be said of parrots, capable of replicating words, and monkeys, that mimic the actions of humans.
The impact of climate and learning sets the stage for a physiological
comparison of man and other animals: La Mettrie compares the human brain
with that of animals. He observes that the form and structure of the human
brain is the same as that of other quadrupeds; it has the same shape and arrangement except that it is larger and more convoluted. He observes that of
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57
all the animals, mans brain is the largest, followed by that of the monkey,
the beaver, the elephant, the dog, the fox, the cat, the bird, the fish, and the
insect. Fish have no corpus callosum, and very little brain, while insects
have no brain. La Mettrie demonstrates that it is the size of the brain that
determines consciousness, intelligence, and placement on the chain of beings. He surmises that it is the size of mans brain that differentiates him
from the rest of the animal kingdom.
La Mettrie draws conclusions about ferocity versus gentleness from the
size of the brain. The less brain an animal has, the more fierce it is; the gentleness of the animal appears to increase in size and proportion to the size of
the brain. Also, the more intelligence, the less instinct. Intelligence is solely
contingent upon the brain; a flaw in a tiny, microscopic fiber could have
made Erasmus and Fontenelle two idiots. Hence, he embraces Maupertuis
observation that birth anomalies are due to errors in the arrangement of parental elements, and expands it to include flaws in intelligence.
Having established a causality between brain size and intelligence, he is
able to portray man as an ape that can speak. He compares the size of the
brains of men and animals and finds that because animals have brains, they
can be taught to do things: Among animals, some learn to speak and sing;
they remember tunes, and strike the notes as exactly as a musician.47 He
asks, In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the ape a language? I do not think so.48 He believes that apes can be taught language.
He observes, The ape resembles us so strongly that naturalists have called it
wild man or man of the woods.49 He believes that monkeys can be
taught the sign language of the deaf and dumb. He asks, Why then should
the education of monkeys be impossible? Why might not the monkey, by
dint of great pains, at last imitate after the manner of deaf mutes, the motions
necessary for pronunciation. I do not dare decide whether the monkeys organs of speech, however trained, would be incapable of articulation. But,
because of the great analogy between ape and man and because there is no
known animal whose external and internal organs so strikingly resemble
mans, it would surprise me if speech were absolutely impossible to the
ape.50 He believes that monkeys and apes are capable of conversation, at
the very least, of the sign language of the deaf and dumb. It is to La Mettries credit that in 1747 he presciently foresaw the attempt to teach sign language to monkeys, a task that was undertaken by the Yerkes Institute on
Washoe the monkey, in the 1970s.
58
La Mettrie visualizes a gray area between man and the ape that occurred
in the distant past and he articulates that man distinguished himself from the
ape when he learned language:
The transition from animals to man is not violent, as true philosophers will admit.
What was man before the invention of words and the knowledge of language? An
animal of his own species with much less instinct than the others. In those days, he
did not consider himself king over the other animals, nor was he distinguished from
the ape, and from the rest, except as the ape itself differs from the other animals, i.e.,
by a more intelligent fact. Reduced to the bare intuitive knowledge of the Leibnizians he saw only shapes and colors, without being able to distinguish between
them: the same, old as young, child at all ages, he lisped out his sensations and his
needs, as a dog that is hungry or tired of sleeping, asks for something to eat or for a
walk.
Words, languages, laws, sciences, and the fine arts have come, and by them finally the rough diamond of our mind has been polished. Man has been trained in
the same way as animals.51
La Mettrie notes that man has less instinct than do animals: it takes longer for a child to mature than an animal; animals can swim, but babies cannot:
children do not know the foods suitable for them, that water can drown them,
or that fire can reduce them to ashes.
Narrowing the divide between man and animals even more, La Mettrie
maintains that animals experience remorse: a dog that bit his master seemed
to repent a minute afterwards: it crouched low and appeared to be sad,
ashamed, afraid to show itself, and sullen; a lion would not devour a man
that he recognized as his benefactor. La Mettrie declares that it would be
absurd to think that animals, who have much of the same physiology as man,
do not understand and feel.
Conversely, while animals are ferocious and vicious, so is man: there are
criminals, warriors and cannibals. Significantly, he ties criminal behavior to
inheritance. Citing medical history as his authority, he hyperbolizes mans
animal nature by reiterating his ability to engage in cannibalism: there is the
case of the cruel maiden of Chalons who ate her sister; Gaston of Orleans
was a compulsive kleptomaniac; there was a woman who stole while she was
pregnant and whose children inherited her vice; there was a pregnant woman
who ate her husband; there have been cases of women who killed their children, salted their bodies, and ate pieces of them every day; there was the
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59
daughter of a thief and cannibal who followed in his steps, although she never knew her parents and had been raised by honest people. La Mettrie further
hyperbolizes the atrocities by declaring that medical records contain a thousand examples of vices and virtues that are transmitted from parents to children. Hence, man is a highly organized animal and he inherits vicious
behavior from his ancestors.
It is also to La Mettries credit that he believes that life is the result of
random chance [hasard]: Perhaps he was thrown by chance on some spot
on the earths surface, nobody knows how nor why, but simply that he must
live and die, like the mushrooms which appear from day to day, or like those
flowers which border the ditches and cover the walls.52 This foreshadows
the panspermia that he will embrace in 1750.
La Mettrie sums up by reiterating that all of nature is self-contained and
that therefore, man is a self-contained animal: Is more neededto prove
that man is but an animal, or a collection of springs which wind each other
up, without or being able to tell at what point in this human circle, nature
has begun?53 Man, therefore, is merely a highly organized ape. He makes
an analogy between man-ape relationship and that of Huygens planetary
pendulum-Julien Leroys watch. More instruments, more wheels and more
springs were necessary to mark the movements of the planets than to mark or
strike the hours.54 Men are these proud and vain beings who are at the
bottom only animals and machines, which, though upright, go on all fours.55
La Mettrie cites many examples to illustrate that the gestation of man is
similar to that of other animals, such as that of the transformation of the caterpillar into the butterfly. He describes the development of the embryo at 4,
6, 8 or 15 days: first the head alone is visible, and it is a little round egg with
two black points which mark the eyes. Before that, everything is formless
and one sees only a pulp, which is the brain, and in which are formed the
roots of the nerves and the heart.
As William Harvey had done in 1651, he mentions the rising point
(punctum saliens) or when the heart first begins to beat.56 Then one sees the
head lengthen from the neck. In the same way, man develops during gestation in increments, just as animals do. La Mettrie observes, Such is the uniformity of nature, which we are beginning to realize; and the analogy of the
animal with the vegetable kingdom, of man with the plant. Perhaps there
even are animal plants, which in vegetating, either fight as polyps do, or perform other functions characteristic of animals.57 Hence, the process of generation is the same between man and animals.
60
La Mettrie concludes, in the next to the last paragraph, Let us then conclude boldly that man is a machine, and that in the whole universe there is
but a single substance differently modified.58
In Man a Plant (1748) La Mettrie magnifies and examines the similarities between the physical structures and their functions of the animal and
plant kingdoms. In Chapter 1 he describes human organization in terms of
the parts of plants: both man and plants have a main root and capillary roots;
the main root in man is comprised of the lumbar region and thoracic canal,
and that of plants, by the lacteal veins. Man has lungs with which to breathe,
while plants breathe through their leaves. Mans lungs contain branches and
plant leaves also contain tiny branches; more branches in the lungs and
leaves permit more comfortable breathing. Man has a circulatory system;
plants also have fluid circulating through their tubes. He goes on to expound
in great detail on the similarities of the reproductive systems in man and
plants.
Having examined the similarities between the animal and plant kingdoms, he devotes Chapter 2 to addressing their differences. In this chapter
he comments that nature produces organs to satisfy the needs of its creations:
First, the more needs an organism has, the more nature gives it means for
satisfying them. These means are diverse degrees of sagacity known as instinct in animals and soul in man.59 While La Mettrie wrote this in 1748, in
1769 Diderot would echo, Organs produce needs and likewise, needs produce organs.60 Nature has given animals instinct which they need to survive, while it has given it to man in a much lesser degree; man does not
require instinct as much as other animal do, because he has intelligence or
reason. He goes on to say Second, the fewer needs an organized body has,
the less difficult it is to nourish and raise, and the less its share of intelligence.61
He observes that in the chain of beings, after the mineral and vegetable
kingdoms, come creatures which begin to be animate, namely, polyps and
animal-plants that have the body parts and functions of both the vegetable
and animal kingdoms. He observes that when one progresses up the chain of
beings to creatures that are more highly organized than are vegetables, instinct and intelligence appear. One of the salient features of the polyp is that
it shows sign of both intelligence and instinct.
In Chapter 3 he declares that the chain of beings is comprised of a continuum of infinite gradations: a ladder so imperceptually graduated that
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61
nature climbs it without ever missing a step through all its diverse creationsOne goes from white to black through an infinite number of nuances
or degrees62
Crocker points out that La Mettries discussion of Trembleys polyp was
an important contribution to eighteenth-century biology because he placed it
in an intermediary position on the chain of beings between the vegetable and
animal kingdoms; subsequent thinkers could take it from there, but at least he
showed that animals that bridge kingdoms, do, indeed, exist.63 However,
Crocker concludes that it was for others to determine the concluding step: La
Mettrie, himself, was not a transformist. La Mettrie observed the infinite
variety in nature and that one can proceed up the chain of beings with seamless continuity, but nowhere does he articulate that one species was transformed into another species.
Jacques Roger observes that La Mettrie was not a transformist, but rather
a panspermist; he agrees that La Mettries view of the chain of being as a
continuum of infinite gradations paved the way for transformism, even
thought he, himself, was not a transformist.64 Hence, both Roger and Crocker observe a visible absence of any tranformist basis for La Mettries chain of
beings: there is no notion that species depend on antecedents for their forms
and functions; rather, La Mettrie merely observes the infinite variety of
forms and the fact that all forms have organs to meet their needs.
Ascending the chain of beings past the vegetable kingdom, he reiterates,
as he had done the year before, the great similarity between man and the ape.
He declares, The ape obviously resembles man in many other ways than
toothwise. Comparative anatomy is proof of this, although teeth were what
led Linnaeus to rank man with the quadrupeds, indeed, at their very head.65
While the ape may be docile, man shows a much greater aptitude for education. He deems that the differences between man and the apes obviously
result from mans constitution.66 It is mans superior intelligence that ranks
him as the king of the animals and the only one apt for society. What differentiates man from the apes is that he invented language, laws, and customs.
La Mettrie reiterates that while animals have a lot of instinct and little intelligence, man has a superior intelligence that distinguishes him from other animals, but very little instinct.
In The System of Epicurus (1750) La Mettrie embraces the philosophy of
Epicurus expounded upon by Lucretius in De rerum natura. He contemplates what the origin of man might have been like millennia ago and, in
Chapter 10, metaphorizes the earth as a giant uterus that gave birth to human
62
beings: that it must have opened its breast to human germs, already prepared, so that this superb Animal, given certain laws, could hatch.67 He
asks, why would the Earth, this common Mother & nursemaid of all entities, have refused to animal seeds, what it granted to the meanest, most useless, most pernicious vegetables?68
In Chapter 11 he metaphorizes the earth, which no longer produces human beings, as an old hen that no longer lays eggs and an old woman who no
longer has children. In Chapter 13 he echoes Diderots famous passages on
Lucretian monsters in the Letter on the Blind (1749). Like Diderot, La Mettrie says, The first Generations must have been very imperfect. Here the
Esophagus would have been missing; there, the Stomachthe only animals
which would have been able to live, survive, & perpetuate their species,
would have been those that would have been found to be provided with all
the necessary Parts for generation, & in which, in a word, no essential part
was missing.69 Those that lacked essential parts died after birth without
leaving progeny. As Diderot had done in Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21
and the Letter on the Blind, La Mettrie observes that nature is in continual
flux, and, given an infinite amount of time, randomly and haphazardly produces events that are viable combinations. Again we have the formula
flux+time=dispersion of chaos. La Mettrie presciently states, Perfection has
not been accomplished in one day for Nature, any more than it has been for
Art.70 Perfection took a long time, continual flux, and after innumerable
events, mans current physical form was achieved.
As Diderot had done in the Letter on the Blind, La Mettrie also introduces the reader to a present day monster in his narrative as an iconic representation of the mindless, random flux that nature delivers: in Chapter 14 we
meet a woman without any reproductive organs. La Mettrie puts a human
face on the tragedy of birth anomalies and enumerates every organ that the
woman was lacking which makes the pathos of her situation all the more
striking. She was married for ten years and her husband, a nave, ignorant,
and uneducated peasant, was not capable of informing his wife of what she
lacked. Plans for reconstructive surgery had to be abandoned and her marriage was annulled after ten years. She is a tragic figure, just as tragic as
Diderots Saunderson who cries, Look at me, Mr. Holmes. I have no eyes.
What have we done, you and I, to God, that one of us has this organ while
the other has not?71 As in games of chance, nature delivers flux and given
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63
enough time, all outcomes will eventually occur. Hence, nature is mindless
and there is no one to blame for birth defects.
In Chapter 15 La Mettrie surmises that if such deformities occur today,
there were many more in the past. This echoes Lucretius De rerum natura
and Diderots Letter on the Blind. In Chapter 16 he reiterates, Through
what an infinite number of combinations must nature have passed, before
arriving at the only one which could result in a perfect Animal!72 Again we
have chaos, flux, time, and probability: given an infinite amount of time and
the random motion of atoms, organized beings will eventually form.
Flux+time dispel chaos. In 1750 La Mettrie echoed Diderots Philosophic
Thoughts (1746), Thought 21, in which the latter demonstrated that given an
infinite number of atomic collisions, life would eventually form: the atheist
professor asks whether random keystrokes on a printing press would eventually produce Voltaires La Henriade or Virgils neid. Diderot would, in
turn, echo La Mettrie in 1753 when he would discuss the infinite variations
in nature (Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12).
In Chapter 17 La Mettrie discusses lucky combinations (combinaisons
fortuites). Again, this echoes Diderots Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21: it
is purely random chance or lucky combinations that produced eyes, ears, and
the five senses. In Chapter 18 he reiterates the notions of random chance
and the mindlessness of nature: Nature no more dreamt of creating the eye
to see, than water, to serve as a mirror for the simple Shepherdess.73 Nature
has no purpose: over an infinite amount of time, there is an infinite flux of
events that some may interpret as purposeful, but, nevertheless, outcomes
resulting in organization are merely lucky combinations.
In Chapter 19 we have chance again: Chance often goes farther than
Prudence.74 Here a painter haphazardly throws his brush against a canvas
and creates beautiful foam. The striking of the brush against the canvas becomes a metaphor for the random collision of atoms that creates life. Random collisions can form things of beauty.
In Chapter 22 consciousness is contingent upon physiology: if there is a
grain of sand in the Eustachian tubes, we cannot hear, if the optic nerve is
obstructed, we see nothing. Consciousness is the result of physiology, which
is the result of the random collision of atoms. As in Diderots Philosophic
Letters, we have the same sequence of events in La Mettrie: atomic collisions>living beings>consciousness.
In Chapter 23 we have natures trial and error again and a flux of events:
Arts fumblings to imitate nature give us an idea of what natures were like.
64
The painter struggling to create a realistic piece of art must use trial and error
to see what works best. This reiterates Chapter 19 where the painter throws
the brush at the canvas. The artist uses a stream of events and selects what
he likes best. Nature, however, is totally blind and creates every possible
variation through trial and error. Chapter 23 emphasizes random chance;
nature fumbles by a throw of the dice; there is no Intelligent Designer.
In Chapter 24 La Mettrie employs Diderotian verbiage,chance arrangement, again. Nature works by the laws of movement. Hence, it is
the motive property of atoms that randomly collide and chance arrangements
that have created the things we see in nature.
There are numerous instances in which La Mettrie borrows Diderotian
language: infinite number of combinations (ch 16), lucky combinations (ch
17), chance (ch 19), chance arrangement (ch 24), blind cause (ch 28), and
natures blindness (ch 29).
In Chapter 32 La Mettrie draws a conclusion as to mans origins. He
suggests that perhaps all life came from the sea and refers the reader to Maillets Telliamed. He surmises that once the ocean covered the whole planet
and that as the waters receded, human eggs were beached on the shores, incubated beneath the suns warmth, and hatched human beings.
Historically, panspermia has been defined as the theory that there are
everywhere minute germs which developed on finding a favourable environment.75 Roger observes that La Mettrie promulgated the notion that the
seeds of all living things came from the air and landed on earth.76 Roger observes that La Mettrie, in the manner of Lucretius, embraced the notion that
the first generations had been imperfect and only those without significant
self-contradictions survived. Roger studies the following sentence in its context: Through what an infinite number of combinations matter had to pass
before arriving at the lone combination that might produce a perfect animal.77 Rogers conclusion is that La Mettrie is emphasizing that nature is
continually producing new combinations and not that man has metamorphosed from beings of lesser organization. Roger holds that La Mettrie
adopted his panspermist ideas from Maillets Telliamed: La Mettrie accepted
Maillets notion that the human egg had been left by the sea in its retreat
and hatched in the sun.78
Roger finds that La Mettrie has made at least three valuable contributions, based upon Lucretius, to the study of mans origins: 1) like Lucretius,
he rejected the notion of final causes and observed the disorder and blindness
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65
of nature, 2) he posited a determinism based on the physical laws of nature,

and 3) he held that it is not a divine intelligence, but rather, the motive principle of nature that created everything.79 Roger concludes that although La
Mettrie knew of Maupertuis and Diderot, he followed his own path.80
Lester Crocker agrees with Aram Vartanian and Jacques Roger that La
Mettrie derived his ideology from Maillet: he declared that seeds came from
the air; when the oceans receded, they beached human eggs on the shores
where they incubated and hatched; from Diderot and Lucretius, he gleaned
that the first generations of men were imperfect and that only those without
self-contradictions survived.81
The critics note that La Mettrie and Diderot engaged in a conversation
with one another via their books. Aram Vartanian observes that La Mettrie
and Diderot had a great influence on each others thought, even though there
is little evidence that they knew each other personally.82 He cites studies
done by Jean E. Perkins, Leo Spitzer, Jean-Pierre Seguin, and annotated editions of Diderots works by Jean Mayer and Paul Vernire, which examine
the points of convergence and divergence between the two materialists.83
Even though Diderot lived in France and La Mettrie, in Holland and then in
Prussia, they read each others works and responded to one anothers ideas in
their books.
Vartanian points out that both men had their books shredded and burned
by the public executioner in 1746. The Parlement de Paris condemned Diderots Philosophic Thoughts and La Mettries Natural History of the Soul.
Because the books had been written anonymously, it was believed that La
Mettrie was the author of Diderots Philosophic Thoughts. In 1750 La Mettrie praised the work, but denied that he had written it. He modestly, but
eloquently said, No, Sir, I am not the author of Philosophic Thoughts. Perhaps my grounds have never borne such beautiful fruit.84
In 1746, while Diderot was still a deist, he had defended deism and the
existence of a Prime Mover: in Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 18, he wrote
that atheism receives it greatest blows from observations of the wonders of
nature, such as in the evidence shown by scientists. Vartanian points out that
in 1747 La Mettrie directly refuted this statement in LHomme-machine: scientists teach us nothing, their works are the boring repetitions of zealous
writers, their wonders of nature prove nothing. Thus, a direct dialogue between the two materialists began.
Vartanian also observes that La Mettrie copied Diderot: in 1749 in the
Letter on the Blind, Diderot surmised that in the first instants of the forma-
66
tion of animals, some beings had no head, some had no feet, some had no
intestines, some had no lungs; only the ones that were not significantly selfcontradictory survived and left progeny; in 1750 La Mettrie, in The System of
Epicurus, speculated that the first generations must have been imperfect:
some lacked an esophagus, others a stomach, others intestines. The only
ones that survived were those that did not lack essential parts. Vartanian
scrutinizes Lucretius On the Nature of Things, 5.83552, and extrapolates
that Diderot and La Mettrie resemble each other a good deal more than either resembles the Lucretian version.85
Like Vartanian, Crocker examines the influence that the Lucretian passage in Diderots Letter on the Blind (1749) had on La Mettries System of
Epicurus (1750). As Vartanian does, Crocker cites La Mettries passage in
which he states that the first generation must have been imperfect and that
some beings lacked an esophagus, while others lacked intestines; only the
viable survived. La Mettrie explains that matter had to pass through many
different combinations before the perfect generations that we have today
arose.
Crocker contends that La Mettrie was not a transformist because what is
significantly lacking in his writing is the notion that current forms depend on
antecedent forms: when he speaks of animals being produced before men,
because it requires more time to make a man than an imperfect being, he is
referring to the idea that nature reworked the same matter into various combinations. The essential elements of transformism, that present forms depend
on earlier forms, is lacking in La Mettrie.86
In summation, La Mettrie contributed many valuable and innovative
stepping stones to eighteenth-century transformism, even though he, himself,
was not a transformist. He established that 1) physical matter is the only reality through which all phenomena can be explained, 2) consciousness is
solely contingent upon the brain, nervous system and the five senses, 3) he
observed the similarities in the physiology and functions among creatures in
the chain of beings and that there is a seamless continuity between kingdoms
as well as between species, 4) he observed that given an infinite amount of
time, flux delivers all possible outcomes and organized beings are bound to
arise (flux+time=dispersion of chaos), 5) he posited that the human body is a
self-moving machine that does not require an outside source to set it into motion, 6) that psychophysiology is comprised of vegetative, sensory, and rational functions, 7) he held that consciousness is influenced by food, age,
La Mettrie
67
learning, inheritance, climate, and the environment, 8) he rejected final causes and observed the random chaos in nature, 9) he posited a determinism
based on the physical laws of nature, and 10) he held that the motive property of atoms, not God, created everything.
Chapter4
Buffon
we should regard nothing as impossible, but believe that everything which can
have existence, really exists. Ambiguous species, and irregular productions, would
not then excite surprise1
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Hog, the Hog of Siam, and the Wild Boar
(1755)
In the Natural History (44 quarto volumes 17491804), Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon escorts the reader on a vast ethnographic tour of six continents. He describes the physical characteristics and customs of various races
across the globe, as well as the animals indigenous to those regions. His
work is a landmark in biology not only because it is a repository of facts and
it propelled Enlightenment Europe forward in the fields of anthropology and
embryology, but it also provided observations that Buffons materialist contemporaries would use to hypothesize that species metamorphose over time.
Three definitive texts on Buffons contributions to the eighteenth century are
Jacques Rogers Buffon: A Life in Natural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), the chapter on Buffon in Jacques Rogers The Life Sciences
in Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1997), pp. 42674, and Otis E. Fellows and Stephen F. Millikens Buffon
(New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1972). In a noteworthy article, Arthur
O. Lovejoy examines Buffons contribution to the definition of species and
why the boundaries of species precluded him from embracing transformism
in Buffon and the Problem of Species in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745
70
1859, edited by Bentley Glass et al (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1959), pp. 84113.
Buffon left a legacy of terms and concepts that gave the eighteenth century the notion that living things are not static, but that they metamorphose
over time (due to their environment, climate, food, and soil). However, as
innovative as he was, he believed that the changes in physical characteristics
are minor, that species retain their essential character throughout time, and
that they do not metamorphose into new species. Although Buffon had a
fixed notion of species, the atheist materialists of his time (ie: Diderot and
Maupertuis) used his ideas as building blocks to form their own hypotheses
that species metamorphose into new species over time and that all living
things could have originated from a single prototype.
EPIGENESIS
The first area in which Buffon moved the eighteenth century forward was in
the fledgling science of embryology. By 1762 embryologie appeared in the
French dictionary; it was defined as Medical Term. The study of the fetus
during its stay in the womb.2 In the field of embryology, Buffon rejected
preformation and embraced epigenesis, William Harveys theory that the
embryo is newly formed at the time of conception and develops by the successive accretions of parts that bud out from one another. Because the theory
says that the embryo is newly formed and not a replica of either parent, it can
explain birth anomalies, resemblance to either or both parents, to grandparents or distant relatives, and hybrids. Otis Fellows explains, Only epigenesis, Buffon felt, could satisfactorily explain monstrous births, cases in which
the reproductive process has gone awry, such as the stillborn calf he himself
had displayed before the Acadmie Royale des Sciences in 1744. And only
epigenesis could explain the piecemeal nature of the resemblance the offspring bears to both parents, in evidence, he noted, whenever one is led to
remark that a child has its fathers eyes and its mothers mouth (H.N. II, p.
68), and most particularly in evidence in the cases of hybrid animals like the
mule and in people of mixed race.3 Unlike preformation, epigenesis opened
the door to change: the offspring was not an exact copy of the parent, but
rather, something newly formed, unique among all other individuals in its
species, and different from its parents, grandparents, and all its ancestors.
Buffon
71
Epigenesis was the eighteenth centurys first step in the direction of the
metamorphosis of species.
Arthur O. Lovejoy points out that Buffon was a pangenesist.4 Pangenesis is the theory that the offspring is derived from particles originating from
all parts of the bodies of its parents; those particles circulate throughout the
bloodstream of the parents and go on to form the fetus. When they do form
the fetus, they reproduce the body parts from which they originate. Diderot
and Maupertuis also held this theory. In 1749 Buffon proposed that these
particles are organic molecules that circulate through the bloodstream of the
parents and eventually take on the form of the body parts from which they
are derived. Buffon devotes On the Generation of Animals, Volume 2, Chapter 4 and the Recapitulation to explaining how this process occurs. He
summarizes it thus: There is, therefore, in Nature, a matter common to both,
which serves for the growth and nourishment of every living thing that lives
or vegetatesreproduction is an effect of the same matter,when it superabounds in the body of an animal or vegetable. Every part of organized bodies sends off to proper reservoirs the organic particles which are
superabundant for its nourishment: these particles are perfectly similar to the
different parts from which they are detached, because they were destined for
the nourishment of these parts. Hence, when the whole particles sent off
from every part of the body are assembled, they must necessarily form a
small body similar to the original, because every particle is similar to the part
from which it was detached. It is in this manner that every species of reproductionis effectedThere are, therefore, no preexisting germs, or germs
infinitely contained within each other. But there is an organic matter diffused through all animated nature, which is always active, always tending to
form, to assimilate, and to produce beings similar to those which receive it.
The species of animals and vegetables, therefore, can never be exhausted: As
long as individuals subsist, the different species will be constantly new; they
are the same now that they were three thousand years ago5
ORGANIC MOLECULES
In Volume 2 Buffon reduces all living things to their smallest componentsorganic molecules. He observed that cows eat grass and then people eat
cows and can subsist on plants and animals. He wondered whether there is a
72
life force in the grass that is transferred to the cow and then to humans.
Jacques Roger explains that Buffon posited that organic molecules, the seeds
of all living things, fell to earth when the earth was formed; Otis Fellows
clarifies what happened to Buffons organic molecules after they fell to
earth: As the body of one living creature may be reduced to minute particles
and these particles may become a part of the body of another creature, there
must be, he reasoned, one single, divisible substance out of which the bodies
of all living things, animal and plant alike, are formed. And, as the particles
into which this substance divides, these organic molecules, can sometimes
be shaped into a living creature simply by bringing them together, to judge
from well-known instances of spontaneous generation, some elemental form
of life must actually reside in each one of the particles. Life itself, then, must
be regarded as nothing other than a physical property of matter (H.N. II, p.
17), probably closely also to gravitation, magnetism, electricity, and chemical affinity.6 Buffon deduced that the number of these organic molecules
must be fixed, otherwise they would take over the universe. Fellows continues, Buffon also stated, in the earliest version of the theory, that the number
of organic molecules was fixed, and that they were in the normal course of
events neither created nor destroyed (H.N. II, p. 44). If this were not the
case, if every act of reproduction could directly increase the numbers of organic molecules, within a little more than a century, he calculated, selecting a
convenient example, a single elm seed could give rise to a quantity of wood
equal in bulk to the earth itself.7
The organic molecule is another important building block that Diderot
and Maupertuis would use in the metamorphosis of species. Buffon hypothesizes that there is a living force inherent in all matter: and, lastly,
that animation, or the principle of life, instead of a metaphysical step in the
scale of being, is a physical property common to all matter.8 Diderot and
Maupertuis would carry the idea further and posit that this living force is
consciousness and that consciousness is a property common to all matter.
INTERIOR MOLD
Buffon hypothesized that living things must contain a force that permits
these organic molecules to organize into life forms. Fellows explains, Buffon concluded that each living body, every living creature, must possess the
power to reshape the molecules and transform their patterns of activity to
Buffon
73
whatever extent this might be necessary in order to adapt them to its own
purposes. In fact, each organ of every living body must possess such power.
Confronted with the need for a new label, Buffon gave this remarkable assimilating power the deliberately equivocal name of moule intrieur, which
may be translated as interior mold or, better, interior molding forceThe
moule of one individual creature, which was a sort of composite of the
moules of all of its organs, was itself merely a particular exemplar of the
moule of a species. The original exemplar of the moule of a species, Buffon
was willing to concede, possibly for want of a better explanation, must have
come into existence at the time of Creation (H.N. II, p. 426).9
PROTOTYPE
In The Horse (1753), Buffon hypothesizes that there exists in nature a general prototype of each species on which every individual is modeled, but
which undergoes minor changes due to environment. He believed that God
created species perfectly at the time of Creation, and that each species left
the Creators hands in perfect condition: There is in Nature a general prototype of every species, upon which each individual is modeled, but which
seems, in its actual production, to be depraved or improved by circumstances; so that, with regard to certain qualities, there appears to be an unaccountable variation in the succession of individuals, and, at the same time, an
admirable uniformity in the entire species. The first animal, the first horse,
for example, has been the external and internal model, upon which all the
horses that have existed, or shall exist, have been formed. But this model, of
which we know only copies, has had, in communicating and multiplying its
form, the power of adulterating or of improving itself. The original impression is preserved in each individual.10 Because it was healthy, strong, and
agile, it was able to protect itself from its enemies and live long enough to
reproduce. Subsequent to Creation, metamorphoses began to occur within
each species. Species began to degenerate when they were taken to a climate
other than that of their land of origin. However, Buffon did not believe that
one species can metamorphose into a new and different species. Hence, Buffon envisaged intraspecies metamorphoses, but not interspecies progressions.
Diderot and Maupertuis were able to make the connection and figure out that
the similarities in the physical structures among species indicate that body
74
parts may become longer or shorter and metamorphose into different species.
However, Buffons legacy is that he made some very sharp observations
about the similarities between body parts of different species.
In the same passage Buffon goes on to observe that each individual within a species has unique peculiarities that render it unique from all other individuals within that species: individuals within a species are not identical, but
they are each different in some particular way: but although there are millions of them, not one of these individuals entirely resembles any other, nor
the model from which it is born: this difference, which proves how far removed Nature is from doing anything in an absolute way, and how much it
nuances its works in infinite gradations, is found in the human species, in all
animals, all vegetables, in fact, in all beings that are brought forth11
Jacques Roger points out that it is precisely this notion of an interior
mold of each species, that was formed at the time of Creation,, that prevented
Buffon from entertaining the thought that perhaps species metamorphose into
other species, and kingdoms into other kingdoms, over time. The interior
mold or patterning life force is fixed and therefore, major metamorphosis is
not possible. However, because he observed that species change when they
are taken out of their natural climates, he allowed for minor metamorphoses,
or degeneration.
LAND OF ORIGIN
In 1753 Buffon observed that each species appears to be indigenous to a certain geographical location. He called the territory where each species is
found its land of origin. Because the finest horses in the world were found
in Arabia, he hypothesized that Arabia must be the land of origin of horses.
Horses in other climates are not as fine as those found in Arabia, so they
must have degenerated when they left their natural climate and land of origin. Speaking of the relationship between Arabia and the Arabian horse, he
surmised that Arabia, being a dry and warm country, appears to be the original climate of the horse, as it is the most conformable to its nature.
In 1761 Buffon again observed a causality between climate and the
physical characteristics of animals: The lion never inhabited the northern
regions; the rein-deer was never found in the south; and perhaps no other
species but that of man is generally diffused over the whole surface of the
Buffon
75
globe. Each has its peculiar country, to which it is confined by a physical

necessity; each is a genuine son of the country it inhabits; and it is in this
sense alone, that particular animals ought to be called natives of a particular
climate.12
In 1764 he reiterated that the camel was perfectly adapted to Arabia, and
so Arabia must be the land of origin of the camel: It seems to be an original
native of Arabia; for this is not only the country where they are most numerous, but where they thrive best. Arabia is the driest country in the world, and
where water is most rare. The camel is the most sober of all animals, and
can pass several days without drink. The soil is almost everywhere dry and
sandy. The feet of the camel are adapted for walking on sands, and the animal cannot support itself on moist and slippery ground. This soil produces
no pasture; the ox is also wanting; and the camel supplies his place. When
we consider the nature and structure of these animals, we cannot be deceived
with regard to their native country, which must be conformed to their frame
and temperament, especially when these are not modified by the influence of
other climates. In vain have attempts been made to multiply them in Spain;
in vain have they been transported to America. They have neither succeeded
in the one country nor in the other; and, in the East Indies, they are not found
beyond Surat and Ormus.13
It is significant that in this passage on the camel, Buffon uses a form of
conforme (in harmony with, adapted) three times: conforme (adapted), conformit (adaptation), and conforme (adapted); he also uses se modifier (to be
transformed, to change). Buffon observed the causality that exists between
climate and environment and the adaptation of the physical characteristics of
animals: the camels hump permits it to store water and its feet are perfectly
made for walking on sand.
UNITY OF PLAN
Buffon observed similarities in the structures of the parts and organs of different animals. The idea was not new: Aristotle, in the History of Animals,
Book 1, Part 1, points out that some animals resemble others in all their
parts, and in other cases, their body parts are different in way of excess or
defect.14 Aristotle calls our attention to analogous parts that exist among
animals of different species: bone is analogous to fishbone, nail to hoof, hand
76
to claw, scale to feather; he observes that what the feather is for a bird, the
scale is to a fish.15
Leonardo da Vinci also observed the similarities in the skeletal structures
of various species. He laid out the leg of a man and that of a horse and
pointed out how alike the two are. Likewise, in 1555, the French naturalist
Pierre Belon laid out a human skeleton and a bird skeleton and showed the
similarities between the two. The similarities in structures of different species were also pointed out by Marco Aurelio Severino, Claude Perrault, Jan
Swammerdam, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Pierre-Louis Moreau de
Maupertuis. Pierre Daubenton also decided to lay out the skeletons of a
horse and that of a man and examine the similarities between the two.
Buffon, for his part, compared the skeletons of a horse and donkey to
that of a man. In The Ass (1753) Buffon point out the similarities between a
mans hand and a horses foot; he also compares the skeleton of the man and
the horse and can turn one into the other by modifying the length of a few
bones; he notes that the ribcage is present in a lot of different speciesquadrupeds, birds, fish, and even in the turtle (there are furrows under its
shell). Hence, Buffon extrapolates that physical characteristics are graduated to infinity. This would be very helpful to Maupertuis and Diderot who
would take this information and extrapolate the metamorphosis of all beings
from a single prototype. Buffon called this general schematic that all species
seem to have in common the principle of the unity of the plan of composition and maintained that it was devised by God Himself. Buffon concludes
by asking whether this constant uniformity of design, to be traced from men
to quadrupeds, from quadrupeds to the cetaceous animals, from the cetaceous
animals to birds, from birds to reptiles, from reptiles to fishesdoes not indicate, that the Supreme Being, in creating animals, employed only one idea,
and, at the same time, diversified it in every possible manner, to give men an
opportunity of admiring equally the magnificence of the execution and the
simplicity of the design?16
THE TWO DIMENSIONAL

LINEAR CHAIN OF BEINGS
In the First Discourse (1749), Buffon viewed the chain of beings as a
straight line comprised of infinitely minute gradations: if man, methodically
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77
and in succession, glances through the different objects that comprise the
Universe, and places himself at the head of all created beings, he will see
with astonishment that one can descend by almost imperceptible degrees,
from the most perfect creature to the most unformed matter, from the most
organized animal to the crudest matter17 Here the chain of being is a
straight line extending from God down to inanimate matter (the mineral
kingdom).
BUFFONS THREE DIMENSIONAL MATRIX

In 1749 Buffon also observed that different species share many of the same
characteristics. Because physical characteristics overlap among species, any
classification of living things must necessarily be arbitrary-the classifier must
select the characteristics that he will use in his classification and he must ignore others. This makes all classification subjective and that is why in 1749
Buffon opposed Linnaeus method of classifying living things according to
their physical characteristics: one clearly sees that it is impossible to give
a general system, a perfect method, not only for the entire Natural History,
but even for one of its branches; for to make a system, an arrangement, in a
word, a general method, everything must be included in it; it is necessary to
divide this entirety into different classes, divide these classes into genuses,
subdivide these genuses into species, and all this following an order in which
it must enter into the arbitrary. But Nature works in unknown degrees, and
consequently, it cannot totally lend itself to all these divisions, since it passes
from one species to another species, and often from one genus to another
genus, in imperceptible nuances; so that there are found a great number of
species that are midway and half-way objects that one does not know where
to place, and which necessarily skews the general system: this truth is too
important to ignore everything that renders it clear and evident.18
By 1765, his chain of being was no longer two dimensional, but became
three dimensional or conical: he observed that it is impossible to segregate
quadrupeds into groupings by physical characteristics because traits overlap:
Let us assemble, for a moment, all the quadrupeds into one group, and let
the intervals or ranks represent the proximity or distance between each species. Let us place in the centre, the most numerous genera, and on the flanks
those which are the least numerous. Let us confine the whole within narrow
78
bounds, that we may have the more distinct view of them; and we shall find,
that it is impossible to round this enclosure. Though all quadrupeds are more
closely connected together than to any other being; yet several of them make
prominent points, and seem to fly off in order to join other classes of animated nature. The apes make a near approach to man. The bats are the apes
of birds, which they imitate in their flight. The porcupines and hedge-hogs,
by the quills with which they are covered, seem to indicate that feathers are
not confined to birds. The armadillos, by their scaly shells, approach the turtle and the crustaceous animals. The beavers, by the scales on their tails,
resemble the fishes. The ant-eaters, by their beak or trunk without teeth, and
the length of the tongue, claim an affinity to the fishes. In fine, the seal, the
walrus, and the manati, are a separate corps, and make a great projection,
with a view to arrive at the cetaceous tribes.19
Buffon believed that even though species share overlapping characteristics, each species was created by God at the time of Creation and no new
species have arisen since then. However, the paradigm of the three dimensional cone would be further developed by the materialists Maupertuis and
Diderot. Maupertuis would hypothesize that the multitudes of species that
we see came about by errors in the generative process that were passed on
from generation to generation and that through these errors, perhaps all living things have arisen from a single prototype. Diderot would seize upon
this notion and add the fourth dimension, time, and posit that it took millions
of years for all beings to arise from a single prototype. What Buffon did
was to develop the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional cone in which physical characteristics overlap; contemporary materialists would take it from there to new territory.
The question arises as to whether Buffon believed that one kingdom
could, with time, metamorphose into another kingdom, one of a higher organization. The answer is that he did not embrace the homogeneity of kingdoms and felt that the kingdoms were created separately by God at the time
of Creation. However, he did let his imagination survey this topic, he did
speculate about the gray areas between kingdoms. There are implications to
his statement of 1749 in which he said that if man looked down the chain of
beings he would see with astonishment that one can descend by almost imperceptible degrees, from the most perfect creature to the most unformed
matter, from the most organized animal to the crudest matter. This statement erases the delineations between kingdoms and implies that there are
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79
organized stones (asbestos), lithophytes (stone-plants), and zoophytes (animal-plants such as the sponge).
Furthermore, an online word search in the text of the Histoire naturelle
(http://www.buffon.cnrs.fr/?lang=fr) indicates that Buffon discusses asbestos
(4:7892), zoophytes (2:304, 2:322, 4:29), and polyps (2:8, 2:2021, 2:47,
2:82, 2:26162, 7:10). In addition, his experiments on spontaneous generation with John Turberville Needham appeared to confirm the theory that tiny
animalcules are born from infusions of grain (vegetable kingdom), thus reinforcing the notion that one can go from the vegetable to the animal kingdom
in the twinkling of an eye. So then, a reader would logically ask whether
Buffon believed in the metamorphosis of one kingdom into another. It turns
out that Buffon flatly denied the notion. Jacques Roger explains that although Buffon had declared that the chain of beings is comprised of a continuum of imperceptible gradations, the fact is that species that span
kingdoms, such as lithophytes and zoophytes, do not exist. Therefore, there
are definitly lines of demarcation between kingdoms.20 Buffon had a rigid
view of species: an interior molding force determines the general characteristics of a species and while climate can make minor changes, the species does
not greatly change over time.
Otis Fellows agrees with Jacques Roger that Buffon believed that God
created species and kingdoms as separate entities. Fellow shows that Buffons hypothesis that organic molecules seeded the earth with life at the time
of Creation led to the notion of the interior mold, which in turn, necessitates
that each species is a distinct entity with an interior molding force that forms
it. Organic molecules fell to earth and grouped themselves into species, each
species having its own interior molding force.21
Although Buffon accepted the separation of kingdoms, his speculations
left quite a legacy to the eighteenth century. He was forced to part company
with Maupertuis and Diderot on this issue, as they did erase all boundaries
between kingdoms and argued that all livings things developed from a single
prototype. Diderot mentions Buffons denial that intermediaries exist that
bridge kingdoms and adds that more experimentation must be done. In
Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), Thought 12, Diderot says,
When we observe the successive outward metamorphoses which take place
in this prototype, whatever it may be, pushing one realm of life closer to another by imperceptible stages, and populating the regions where these two
realms border on each other (if they can be referred to as borders in the absence of any true divisions); and, populating, as I said, the border regions of
80
the two realms with vague, unidentifiable beings, largely devoid of the
forms, qualities and functions of one region and assuming the forms, qualities and functions of the other; who, then, would not be persuaded that there
had never been more than one single prototype for every being? But,
whether this philosophic conjecture is admitted as true with Doctor Bauman
[Maupertuis] or rejected as false with M. de Buffon, we will not deny that it
must be adopted as a hypothesis that is essential to the progress of experimental physical science22
TO DEGENERATE [DEGENERER] AND

TO PERFECT [PERFECTIONNER]
In The Lion (1761), Buffon observes a causality between climate and the
physical characteristics of animals: each animal has a natural homeland in
which it prospers and proliferates; each one is truly the son of the earth
that it inhabits, to which it is totally adapted: Among the other animalsthe
influence of climate is stronger, and marked by sensible characters; because
they differed in species, and their nature is less perfect, and less diffused than
that of man. The varieties of each species are not only more numerous, and
more strongly marked, but even the differences of species themselves seem
to depend upon the differences of climate. Some are unable to propagate but
in warm, and others cannot subsist but in cold countries. The lion never inhabited the northern regions; the rein-deer was never found in the south; and
perhaps no other species but that of man is generally diffused over the whole
surface of the globe. Each has its peculiar country, to which it is confined by
a physical necessity; each is a genuine son of the country it inhabits; and it is
in this sense alone, that particular animals ought to be called natives of a particular climate.23
Conversely, when animals are domesticated or moved from their natural
homelands, they suffer degeneration-they become smaller, paler, sickly,
weaker, less active. As an example, Buffon uses the breeding of the French
horse. The finest horses in the world are in Arabia and hence, one must necessarily extrapolate that Arabia is their land of origin. When horses are
shipped from Arabia to France for breeding, they suffer degeneration. Climate, environment, food, and soil are crucial factors that contribute to degeneration.
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81
For Buffon, this opened the door to the concept of the minor modification of species: he believed that species can degenerate, but not to the extent
that they can metamorphose into a new and different species. However, the
atheist materialists with whom Buffon differed would carry the notion to its
extreme, namely, the mutability of species, and then kingdoms.
Buffon also points out that the solution to the problem of degeneration is
to mate varieties of the same species from various climates. By doing this,
the best qualities of animals of various regions can be expressed: In order,
therefore, to obtain good grain, beautiful flowers, &c. the seeds must be
changed, and never sown in the same soil that produced themWithout this
precaution, all grain, flowers, and animals degenerate, or rather receive an
impression from the climate so strong as to deform and adulterate the speciesby mixing races, on the contrary, or by crossing the breed of different
climates, beauty of form, and every other useful quality, are brought to perfection; Nature recovers her spring, and exhibits her best productions.We
know by experience, that animals or vegetables, transported from distant
climates, often degenerate, and sometimes come to perfection, in a few generations. This effect, it is obvious, is produced by the difference of climate
and of foodThe operation of these two causes must, in process of time,
render such animals exempt from, or susceptiblecertain diseases. Their
temperament must suffer a gradual change. Of course, their form, which
partly depends on foodmust also, in the course of generations, suffer an
alteration.24
In 1755 Buffon considered the possibility that perhaps species can be
perfected through mans care and breeding (an idea that he would later abandon). He entertained the notion that perhaps sheep might be perfected goats
and that horses might be perfected asses. By 1764 he understood that species
cannot be perfected through domestication: domestication can only destroy
what nature has made perfect. He examined various kinds of sheep and concluded that all sheep have been degenerated at the hands of man. He observed that no sheep are strong enough, agile enough or lively enough to
escape predators; they all need to be protected by man. Therefore, somewhere, there must exist a strong, wild, carnivorous sheep which is their prototype, and which has not yet been discovered.25 By 1764 Buffon concluded
that perfection can occur only in the wild. Domestication can bring only degeneration. The camels callosities and hump are imprints of servitude and
stigmata of pain.26 Animals degenerate at the hands of man because men
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treat them badly, feed them poorly, mistreat them, and force them to work
very hard.
CLIMATE, GEOGRAPHY, FOOD, AND WAY OF

LIFE
Buffon believed that minor intraspecies changes can occur due to climate,
geography, food, and way of life. As far as interspecies changes are concerned, he did not believe that one species can metamorphose into another
species over time: he held that God created all species perfectly at the time of
Creation and that no new species have arisen since then. Furthermore, all of
his unsuccessful attempts at crossbreeding failed to create any new species.
He concluded that species must be static, although minor changes (degeneration) can and do occur due to climate.
Buffon points out that certain species are found only in certain climates
and that in those climates they are the healthiest and the most numerous;
therefore, those regions must be their land of origin. The healthiest and most
numerous horses are found in Arabia; therefore, one must necessary extrapolate that Arabia is the horses land of origin. The healthiest and most numerous camels are found in Arabia; their physical characteristics are adapted to
their environment (he uses adapted three times: conforme, conformit, conforme); therefore, the desert must be the land of origin of camels.
Buffon maintained that climate, food and way of life are the causes of
human diversity, as well. Jacques Roger explains, Food does a lot for the
[physical shape]: all peoples who live miserably are ugly and badly built,
and that was true in the French countryside as well as elsewhere. Air and
soil also played a large role. On the hillsides and hilltops, the countrymen
were agile, full of energy, well built, spirited, andthe women there are
generally pretty; while in the plains, where the earth is crude, the air thick,
and the water less pure, the countrymen are coarse, heavy, badly built, stupid, and the countrywomen are almost all ugly. This was valid for animals
and plants as well as for men. As for the manner of life, it was enough to
compare the Tartars with the Chinese in order to see its importance. The
Tartars are always exposed to air and live in a hard and wild way. The
Chinese were whiter because they lived in cities, because they are civilized,
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because they have all the means to protect themselves from the injuries of the
air and earth.27
However, climate does not cause degeneration in humans as it does in
animals. Humans are much more resilient than are animals and more immune to the influences of climate: The influence of climate, in the human
species, is only marked by slight varieties; because this species is single, and
extremely distinct from every other. Man, white in Europe, black in Africa,
yellow is Asia, and red in America, is the same animal, tinctured with the
colour peculiar to the climate. As he is formed to exercise dominion over the
earth, and, as he has the whole globe for his habitation, his nature seems to
be accommodated to every situation. Under the fervors of the south, or the
frozen regions of the north, he lives, multiplies, and is so universally and so
anciently diffused over every country, that he appears to have no peculiar
climate. Among the other animals, on the contrary, the influence of climate
is stronger28
THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE

Buffon takes the reader on a tour of the world, arranging his itinerary by latitudes and climate zones. As we tour the world, he points out that the skin
color of people is a continuum of infinitely minute gradations and not either
black or white. Roger explains that Buffon had shown that men are more or
less tanned than one another and that skin color is a continuum comprised
of gradations; there are white people who have naturally frizzy hair; there are
no sharp distinctions among the races.29
Hence, skin color was a continuum, comprised of infinite gradations, like
the chain of being itself. The differences in body build, strength, and health
were determined by climate: in big cities, life is easier and people have a certain comfort. The inhabitants of cities are sheltered from misery and for that
reason they are stronger and better looking than those who are forced to fight
for survival every day.30 Hence, climate, food, soil, and way of life influence
physical characteristics and health, but do not cause degeneration of the human species. Buffon believed that if a white European were to move to Africa, after seven or eight generations, his progeny would turn black.
Similarly, if an African moved to Denmark, his progeny would eventually
turn white, but it would take several centuries.
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Buffon concludes On the Varieties of the Human Species (1749) by affirming the unity of the human race. He declares that there is only one human race that originally multiplied and spread throughout the earth: Upon
the whole, every circumstance concurs in proving, that mankind is not composed of species essentially different from each other; that, on the contrary,
there was originally but one species, who, after multiplying and spreading
over the whole surface of the earth, have undergone various changes by the
influence of climate, food, mode of living, epidemic diseases, and the mixture of dissimilar individuals; that, at first, these changes were not so conspicuous, and produced only individual varieties; that these varieties became
afterwards specific, because they were rendered more general, more strongly
marked, and more permanent, by the continual action of the same causes;
that they are transmitted from generation to generation, as deformities or diseases pass from parents to children; and that, lastly, as they were originally
produced by a train of external and accidental causes, and have only been
perpetuated by time and the constant operation of these causes, it is probable
that they will gradually disappear, or, at least, that they will differ from what
they are at present, if the causes which produce them should cease, or if their
operation should be varied by other circumstances and combinations.31
In 1765 Diderot copied Buffons declaration of the unity of the human
race when he cited Buffons text in the Encyclopedia. In the article Human
Species (Nat. Hist.) [Humaine espece (Hist. nat.)], Diderot retraces Buffons itinerary as he escorts the reader on a tour of the world. Relying upon
the authority of Buffons On the Varieties of the Human Species, Diderot
distinguishes among the different physical characteristics, customs, and belief systems of people on different continents. It is significant that after
Diderot enumerates the differences among nations, he concludes that these
differences are minor in view of the fact that there is only one human race
that consists of people that are more or less tanned: From the preceding
material it follows that in the entire new continent that we have just traversed, there is only one and the same human race, more or less tanned.
Americans come from the same source. Europeans come from the same
source. From north to south we see the same varieties in one hemisphere and
the other. Therefore, everything goes to prove that humankind is not comprised of essentially different species. The difference between whites and
browns arises from food, morals, customs, climate; the difference between
browns and blacks has the same cause. Therefore, originally, there was only
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85
one race of humans, which, having multiplied and spread out over the surface of the earth, resulted in all the varieties that we have just mentioned.
Varieties that would disappear in time, if we suppose that people would suddenly move and find themselves subjected, either by necessity or voluntarily,
to the same causes that will act on them in their newly occupied regions.32
CROSSBREEDING
In 1749 Buffon defined species thus: two animals are of the same species if
they can produce fertile offspring together.33 In 1753 he reiterated this definition and added that all human beings are of the same species because they
can all, regardless of race, produce fertile offspring together.34 The horse
and the ass are of different species because their offspring, the mule, is infertile.35
Buffon experimented with crossbreeding because he wanted to know the
extent of its limitations. In 1755 he humbly admits that more experimentation needs to be done: We know not whether the zebra can produce with the
horse or ass, or the broad-tailed Barbary ram with the common ewe; whether
the chamois goat be only the common goat in a wild state, and whether an
intermediate race might not be formed by their mixture; whether the monkeys really differ in species, or whether they form but one species, diversified, like that of the dog, by a great number of different races; whether the
dog can produce with the fox and the wolf, the stag with the cow, &c. Our
ignorance of all these facts is almost invincible; for the experiments necessary to ascertain them would require more time, attention, and expense, than
the life or fortune of most men can permit. I employed several years in making trials of this kind, of which an account shall be given when I treat of
mules. But, in the mean time, I acknowledge, that they afforded me very
little information, and that most of my experiments were abortive.36
Buffon relentlessly and unceasingly conducted numerous experiments
trying to mate animals of different species because he wanted to ascertain
whether transformism is a scientific fact. If he could succeed in creating just
one new species, then perhaps there was some validity to the assertion of his
materialist contemporaries that all species metamorphosed from a single prototype. After repeated attempts over years, Buffon was unsuccessful in creating a new species and this failure confirmed 1) his definition of species, 2)
86
his belief that transformism is impossible. In 1765 Buffon reiterated his

definition of species. Arthur O. Lovejoy summarizes Buffons conclusions
thus: In the infertility of hybrids he imagined that he had found a proof that
species are objective and fundamental realities-are, indeed, les seuls tres de
la Nature, as ancient and as permanent as Nature herself, while an individual, of whatever species, is nothing in the universe. A species is a whole
independent of number, independent of time; a whole always living, always
the same; a whole which was counted as one among the works of the creation, and therefore constitutes a single unit in the creation.37
It was Buffons inability to create a new species through crossbreeding,
after repeated attempts, that caused him to conclude that species are immutable: it appeared that a species is truly an entity unto itself and that it could
not be created by engendering individuals that can yield only infertile offspring.
BUFFON TAKES A STAND

AGAINST TRANSFORMISM
In 1753 Maupertuis asserted that errors occur in the generative process and
that over time, these errors could explain how all living things arose from a
single prototype. He asked, Could we not explain from that how from two
single individuals, the multiplication of the most dissimilar species could
have resulted?38 This notion was echoed by Diderot in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, that same year. In The Ass (1753), Buffon responded to the transformist hypothesis by flatly denying that one
species can metamorphose into another; he reiterated this belief in 1755,
1758, and 1765.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, in his article, Buffon and the Problem of Species,
examines how Buffon methodically refutes the transformism of the atheist
materialists, who, in 1753 had posited a common origin of all living things
based on the observation of homologous parts. Lovejoy carefully follows
Buffons reasoning as the latter begins by admitting that homologies do exist
in nature. In The Ass Buffon observes, Ifwe select a single animal, or
even the human body, as a standard, and compare all other organized beings
with it, we shall find thatthere exists, at the same time, a primitive and
general designWhen, for example, the parts constituting the body of a
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87
horse, which seems to differ so widely from that of man, are compared in
detail with the human frame, instead of being struck with the difference, we
are astonished at the singular and almost perfect resemblanceLet us next
consider, that the foot of a horse, so seemingly different from the hand of a
man, is, however, composed of the same bones, and that, at the extremity of
each finger, we have the same small bone, resembling a horse-shoe, which
bounds the foot of that animal.39
Because he is a naturalist in search of the truth, Buffon concedes that
homologies do exist among different species. He then asks, as if speaking
directly to the atheist materialists, whether these homologies prove that apes
are degenerate men or that men and apes have a common origin: And, if it
be once admittedthat the ass belongs to the family of the horse, and differs
from him only by degeneration; with equal propriety may it be concluded,
that the monkey belongs to the family of man; that the monkey is a man degenerated; that man and the monkey have sprung from a common stock, like
the horse and ass; that each family, either among animals or vegetables, has
been derived from the same origin; and even that all animated beings have
proceeded from a single species, which, in the course of ages, has produced,
by improving and degenerating, all the different races that now exist.40
Having articulated the question as to whether homologies provide evidence that all beings have originated from a single prototype, Buffon then
denies the mutability of species. He answers the question from two different
angles. First, he answers it according to the revelation that God gives in the
Bible. He begins by emphatically and vehemently declaring, But no
[Mais non]. Then he continues, We are assured by the authority of revelation, that all animals have participated equally of the favours of creation;
that the two first of each species were formed by the hands of the Almighty;
and we ought to believe that they were then nearly what their descendants are
at present.41
In the pages that follow this declaration, Buffon enumerates several reasons, based on observation and scientific experimentation, why he does not
believe the materialists hypothesis that all living things metamorphosed
from a single prototype. Lovejoy calls the readers attention to the fact his
biblical repudiation is followed by a series of formidable scientific arguments. Lovejoy points out that if Buffon had offered only a cursory biblical
injunction against transformism, one could argue that he was being ironic.
However, that was not the case. Lovejoy reiterates the three arguments that
Buffon provides as a response to the materialists:
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1. since the days of Aristotle to those of our own, no new species
have appeared, notwithstanding the rapid movements which break
down and dissipate the parts of matter, notwithstanding the infinite
variety of combinations which must have taken place during these
twenty centuries, notwithstanding those fortuitous or forced commixtures between animals of different species, from which nothing is
produced but barren and vitiated individuals, totally incapable of
transmitting their monstrous kinds to posterity.42 Buffon recognizes
the materialists argument that flux+time=dispersion of chaos. He
articulates the notion that nature is in perpetual flux (the infinite variety of combinations)[le nombre infini de combinaisons], but
points out that despite the infinite number of combinations (that connotes a continuous throws of the dice, the perpetual movement of
atoms), no new species have appeared in twenty centuries.
2. After years of trying to create a new species, Buffon observed that
hybrids are sterile and that infertile individuals can never engender a
new species. Hence, species must be fixed, rather than mutable.
Buffon comments that it is extremely improbable that the requisite
factors would come together so that degenerated animals could reproduce: But, what an amazing number of combinations are included in the supposition, that two animals, a male and a female, of a
particular species, should degenerate so much as to form a new species, and to lose the faculty of producing with any other of the kind
but themselves?43
3. Buffon observes that there are no missing links: For, if one species
could be produced by the degeneration of another, if the ass actually
originated from the horse, this metamorphosis could only have been
effected by a long succession of almost imperceptible degrees. Between the horse and ass, there must have been many intermediate animalsWhat is become of these intermediate beings? Why are their
representatives and descendants now extinguished? Why should the
two extremes alone exist?44
Lovejoy calls the readers attention to the fact that one of Buffons arguments for rejecting transformism was based on mathematical probability:
it is highly improbable that animals degenerate in increments because there
are no intermediaries between the horse and the ass that exist in nature. Buf-
Buffon
89
fon concluded, Though, therefore, we cannot demonstrate, that the formation of a new species, by means of degeneration, exceeds the powers of Nature; yet the number of improbabilities attending such a supposition, renders
it totally incredible45 Lovejoy extrapolates that Buffon knew about the
hypothesis of transformism, and recognized that there was some probable
evidence in its favor, he then seriously believed that the preponderance of the
probability was enormously against it. It is certain that contemporary readers
must have understood this to be his position.46
In several instances after 1753 Buffon reiterated the permanent and immutable boundaries separating species from one another. In 1755 Buffon
declared, Though the species of animals are separated from each other by an
interval, which Nature cannot overleap; yet some species approach so near to
others, and their mutual relations are so numerous, that space is only left for
a bare line of distinction.47 Buffon maintains that there is an intervale that
Nature cannot broach [intervalle que la Nature ne peut franchir] and there
also exists the space that is necessary to draw the line of separation between species [lespace ncessaire pour tirer la ligne de sparation].
In 1758 Buffon wrote that nature is attentive to conserving each species
and preserving the distinct lines of demarcation between them: Nature, by
descending gradually from great to small, from strong to weak, counterbalances every part of her works. Attentive solely to the preservation of each
species, she creates a profusion of individuals, and supports by numbers the
small and the feeble, whom she hath left unprovided with arms or wit courage. She has not only put those inferior animals in a condition to perpetuate
and to resist by their own numbers, but she seems, at the same time, to have
afforded a supply to each by multiplying the neighbouring species. The rat,
the mouseform so many distinct and separate species48 Here, nature
has a propensity for preserving each species by providing an ample supply of
prey for each species; there are numerous distinct and separate species. Buffon held firm to his theory that the essential character of each species is constant and inalterable.
In 1765 Buffon again reiterated the immutability of species: Individuals, whatever their kind or number may be, are of no value in the universe.
Species are the only existences in Nature; for they are equally ancient and
permanent with herself. To form a distinct idea of this subject, we shall not
consider species as a collection or succession of similar individuals, but as a
whole, independent of number and of time, always active and always the
same; a whole, which has been reckoned on in the works of creation, and,
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therefore, constitutes only a unit in NatureA day, a year, an age, or any

given portion of time, constitutes no part of her duration. Time itself relates
only to individuals, to beings whole existence is fugitive. But the existence
of species is constant; their permanence produces duration, and their differences give rise to number. Let us consider species in this light; let us give to
each an equal right to the indulgence and support of Nature. To her they are
all equally dear; for, on each of them, she has bestowed the means of subsisting, and of lasting as long as herself.49
Jacques Roger agrees with Lovejoy that Buffon discounted the metamorphosis of species. Roger explains that Buffon rejected the notion that the
interior molding force is plastic; the opposite is true, the interior mold defines species forever; furthermore, no new species have appeared since Aristotle.50 Roger cites the arguments presented in The Ass, namely, that a mule
and a female of a species must degenerate to the exact same degree that they
can create a fertile offspring and also, that there are no intermediary species
between the ass and the horse.51
In The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, Roger again
examines Buffons view that the fixity of species is evident in the sterility of
hybrids. The ass and the horse are two different species because their offspring, the mule, is sterile.52 Roger cites Buffons unsuccessful attempts at
trying to cross a dog with a wolf and a fox and numerous other failed experiments with hybridization as the experiences that reinforced his belief that
species are static.53
In summation, Buffons lifelong exploration of nature opened the door to
the metamorphosis of species, even though he, himself, held that species are
immutable. First, Buffon embraced epigenesis, which allowed for the creation of an offspring that is uniquely different from either parent and also
from any other individual in its species. Secondly, he posited that organic
molecules, which rained down from Heaven at the time of Creation, are the
substance of all living things; after the cooling of the earth, they came together to form all species. Since they have the ability to form life as soon as
they come together, as evidenced by Buffon and Needhams flawed experiments with spontaneous generation, there must be life in them. Hence, life is
a property inherent in all matter. The materialists, Diderot and Maupertuis,
would take this a step further: all molecules are conscious-they have desire,
aversion, memory, and intelligence.54
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Buffon also held that there is a molding force inherent in every living
thing that shapes the organic molecules and causes them to organize their
activity to the purpose of the life form. Furthermore, each individual organ
has a molding force, as well. The materialists would take this notion of an
interior molding force that is inherent in each body part as well as in the entire body and extrapolate that an emergent consciousness arises when matter
combines: consciousness exists at every level of organization and when particles combine to form a more complex structure, the latter has a consciousness of its own that is greater than that of the sum of its parts.55
Buffons astute observations regarding homologies existing among the
body parts of various species opened the door to the metamorphosis of species. He commented on the infinite number of gradations in the chain of beings and the great variety that exists in nature-All that can be is. The
materialists would use these homologies as evidence that all living things
metamorphosed from a single prototype.
Buffon and Needhams experiments with spontaneous generation appeared to confirm the theory. The materialists would use this as evidence
that the animal kingdom (animalcules) can arise from the vegetable kingdom
(infusions of grain) or from nonliving matter in the twinkling of the eye, and
therefore, there is no need for God.
Buffons theory of the gradual degeneration of species also opened the
door to the metamorphosis of species. While he staunchly defended the immutability of species, he conceded that minor changes do occur due to environmental factors (ie: climate, soil, food, and way of life). He copiously
documented the adaptation that various species have to their environment in
their land of origin (ie: the camel has the ability to store water and easily
walk on sand) and what he thought was degeneration when they are taken to
less favorable climates (in which they are treated poorly, fed poorly, and
overworked). The materialists would not limit metamorphosis to individuals
within a species: because of homologies, they would extend it and declare
that species and kingdoms change over time and that all things in the chain
of beings arose from a single prototype. Thus Buffon, a conservative naturalist who consistently denied the mutability of species, who tried and failed
to create a new species via crossbreeding and concluded that species are forever fixed, unwittingly supplied the building blocks for the transformism of
his atheist materialist contemporaries. His fairness, attention to detail, and
tireless observation of nature, propelled the Enlightenment forward into hith-
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erto uncharted territory, despite his adherence to his conception of species

and an unchanging interior molding force.
Chapter5
Maupertuis
each degree of error would have made a new species; and by virtue of repeated
digressions there would have risen the infinite diversity of animals that we see today.1
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies
(1754)
Maupertuis conducted extensive research on the inheritance of polydactylism

and concluded that birth anomalies are due to errors that occur in the parental
elements supplied by either parent. Over time, these errors lead to the appearance of new species and can thus explain how all living things, in their
great diversity, may have arisen from a single prototype. Maupertuis reiterated this hypothesis throughout his literary career: in the Physical Dissertation on the Origin of the White Negro (1744, reprinted as part of Physical
Venus, 1745), the Essay on Cosmology (1750), the Inaugural Dissertation on
Metaphysics (in Latin, 1751, translated into French as the System of Nature,
1751, and again as the Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies, 1754),
and his Letters (1752).
Physical Venus (1745) is comprised of two parts: Part 1 is entitled, Dissertation on the Origin of Men and Animals, and Part 2, Dissertation on the
Origin of Blacks. The second part had already been published the previous
year under the title, Physical Dissertation on the Origin of the White Negro
(Leyden, 1744).
In Physical Venus, Maupertuis sets out to prove two hypotheses. First,
he engages in a detailed defense of epigenesis at a time when Europe was
94
embroiled in the preformation vs. epigenesis debate (Part 1). Having established that both the father and mother equally contribute to the formation of a
new product that is brought into existence by successive accretions, he observes that errors in the generative process randomly occur; he then extrapolates that these errors could explain how all races, all species and the three
kingdoms, may have been derived from a single prototype (Part 2).
In his preface to Physical Venus, Maupertuis declares that the objective
of his work is to explain the origin of white Negroes (Negre-Blancs), as well
as that of the variety of different races that exist around the world. He entices the reader to continue the investigation by asking why the inhabitants of
the Torrid Zone are black, why the most numerous populations are found in
the Temperate Zones, and why the glacial zones are inhabited only by deformed nations. He asks how such a variety of different races could have
arisen from two original parents through preformation.2
Maupertuis devotes Part 1 to an in-depth examination of epigenesis. He
discusses the work of William Harvey, who, in the Anatomical Exercitations
Concerning the Generation of Animals (1651), had demonstrated that all living things are derived from the egg. In 1651 Harvey had declared the famous phrase, everything comes from the egg [ex ovo omnia], which
appeared on the title page of various editions of the Exercitations. Harvey
was uncertain as to how fertilization was accomplished, but he concurred
with Aristotles theory of the gradual formation of the embryo, part by part,
as opposed to the preformed homunculus. Harvey had used the term epigenesis, which he defined as partium superexorientium additamentum,
holding that the germ is brought into existence by the addition of parts that
bud out of one another or by successive accretions.3 Maupertuis points out
that successive accretions allow room for the introduction of errors in the
arrangement of parental elements, and that therefore, it is epigenesis, and not
preformation, that can fully explain heredity, teratisms, and hybrids.
Chapter 13 is entitled, Reasons that Prove Why the Foetus Proceeds
Equally from the Father and Mother. Maupertuis cites the offspring of interracial marriages as proof of epigenesis: When a black man marries a
white woman, it appears that the two colors are mixed together; the child is
born olive, and is equally divided between its mothers traits and those of its
father.4 The child is not a perfect copy of either parent (as preformation
would hold), but rather, a composite of traits supplied by each parent.
Maupertuis
95
Maupertuis observes that dissimilarities between the offspring and parents are even more pronounced in the union of two different species. The ass
and the mare produce an animal that is neither a horse, nor a donkey, but that
has traits of both. The dissimilarity between elements contributed by each
parent is so great, the offspring is sterile. Hence, mulattos and sterile hybrids
constitute proof that the embryo is formed part by part, by succession accretions: Maupertuis concludes that offspring so dissimilar from their parents
could not possibly have been encased, as homunculi, within their ancestors
going back to Adam and Eve.
To further strengthen his case, he devotes Chapter 14 to a discussion on
monsters. He distinguishes between monsters by default [monstres par
dfaut], or offspring that are missing body parts, and monsters by excess
[monstres par excs], or offspring that have superfluous body parts. These
teratisms are evidence of epigenesis, not preformation, since most of them do
not resemble either of their parents. Maupertuis hypothesizes that at some
time during gestation, some parts are destroyed in the egg by some error and
that this creates a monster by default, or a mutilated child. Conversely, the
union or jumbling of two eggs, or two germs in the same egg, produces a
monster by excess, or a child having superfluous parts. In the case of Siamese twins, which adhere to one another, no principle part of the egg has
been destroyed. Some superficial parts of the foetus are torn away in some
particular place, and mend together, and cause the adherence of two bodies.
Monsters having two heads on one body, or those with two bodies with one
head, are like Siamese twins, except that more parts in one of the eggs have
been destroyed: in one, those that formed one of the bodies, in the other,
those that formed one of the heads. Finally, a child that has an extra finger
or toe is a monster that has been produced by two eggs, and in one of the
eggs, all of the parts, with the exception of the extra digit, have been destroyed. In this way, Maupertuis demonstrates that epigenesis succeeds in
explaining a variety of phenomena, a feat that preformation has been unable
to accomplish.
In Chapter 15 Maupertuis ridicules the notion that teratisms are caused
by the mothers imagination, fear, admiration or desire; neither does a sudden fright experienced by the mother cause a birth defect in the offspring.
Physical processes alone, taking place in the fetus, account for birth anomalies.
Maupertuis devotes Part 2 of Physical Venus to explaining the origin of
the diverse races in the world. He takes the reader on an ethnographic tour
96
of the world, emphasizing that people on different continents have different

skin color, facial characteristics, language, and customs. Maupertuis highlights the variations that exist among different races: he enumerates the physical differences between blacks and whites; from the Tropic of Cancer to the
Tropic of Capricorn, Africa has only the black race; as we leave the Equator
and approach Antarctica, the inhabitants skin lightens; as we draw near to
the Orient, facial characteristics become less pronounced, but skin color remains dark; in America the natives have red skin; on the tip of South America there are giants; the people at the poles and the Lapps are very small; in
Panama the whitest people in the world live; their hair resembles the whitest
wool, their eyes are too feeble to bear the light of day, and they open them
only in the obscurity of night.
In his passage describing the albino Indians in Panama, Maupertuis provides a footnote in which he refers the reader to Wafers voyage, description of the isthmus of America.5 An investigation of this little footnote
yields surprising and significant results: in his work entitled, A New Voyage
and Description of the Isthmus of America, Lionel Wafers description of the
anomaly of the albino Indian would one day provide information that Maupertuis would use to posit that inherited errors could explain how all life metamorphosed from a single prototype. Because Wafers contribution to
Maupertuis is significant, it would be appropriate to examine it more fully.
LIONEL WAFERS LEGACY TO MAUPERTUIS

In 1680 the British explorer and surgeon Lionel Wafer crossed Panama, then
called the Isthmus of Darien. His journey back across the isthmus from the
Pacific side to the Caribbean was interrupted by an accident that he suffered:
one of the men in his exploratory party was drying gunpowder and mismanaged his task. The gunpowder exploded and the flesh on Wafers leg was
completely torn away, leaving the bare bone exposed. To make matters
worse, the slave that was assigned to him escaped with his medical bag containing all of his salves and ointments. Fortunately for Wafer, he still had
some small medical instruments, such as his surgical lancet, that he had been
carrying in his pocket. The exploratory party was forced to return to the Caribbean without him, leaving him behind with the resident natives, the Cunas
or San Blas people, to recover from his wounds.
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Wafer befriended the Cuna Indians and they undertook the task of curing
him of his ailment. They selected certain herbs, chewed them to the consistency of a paste, put the substance on plantain leaf, and laid it on his wounds.
Each day they applied a fresh poultice; much to his delight, in twenty days he
was well. To return the favor that they had done for him, Wafer shared his
knowledge of surgery with them. During this time he mingled among both
the tribes that dwelt in the hills as well as with the seafaring branch of the
population on the Archipelago de San Blas. Because he had surgical experience aboard vessels on the high seas as well as in his practice in Port-Royal,
Jamaica, the natives welcomed his medical expertise.
What surprised Wafer the most during his stay with the Cunas was his
discovery of blond haired children among the dark skinned natives. This
intrigued him greatly and he carefully recorded his observations thus:
There is one complexion so singularthey are whitetis a milk-white lighter than

the colour of any EuropeansTheir seeing so clear as they do on a moon shiny
night, we usd to call them moon-eyd. For they see not very well in the suntheir
eyes being but weak and running with water if the sun shines towards themwhen
the moon shiny nights come, they are all life and activityneither is the child
ofthese white Indians whitebut copper-coloured as their parents were.6
Today we know that this narrative describes oculocutaneous albinism.

The three salient points in Wafers description are albinism, photophobia,
and the fact that the offspring are normal (recessive inheritance). It is fortunate indeed for posterity that Wafer was a seafaring surgeon with a keen interest in human physiology and all kinds of ailments. The astute
observations that he made in this simple narrative would ultimately provide
vital new information to Maupertuis, who would use it to posit that errors in
the arrangement of parental traits could explain how all life may have arisen
from a single prototype.
Maupertuis seized upon this passage in Wafers book. He gave a great
deal of thought to the interrelatedness of albinism, photophobia, and the
skipping of a generation. He used the connection among these three characteristics to buttress two arguments: 1) epigenesis or the hypothesis that both
the father and mother equally contribute to the formation of a new product,
that, as Harvey had posited, is brought into existence by successive accretions and 2) the notion that errors in the arrangement of parental elements
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occur, that these errors are random, and that they are passed on from one
generation to the next. These errors in the generative process could explain
how, over time, all races, all species, and all three kingdoms, may have
originated from a single prototype. He thought that this hypothesis might
also explain why another anomaly, polydactyly (a birth with many fingers or
toes), also skips generations.
After Maupertuis refers the reader to Wafers Voyage, description of
the American isthmus in a footnote, he devotes three pages to expanding
upon the albinism that exists in Panama. Maupertuis passages describing
Wafers discovery are not only a scientific treatise, but also constitute a lovely poetic essay. Note that the North Sea here is the Caribbean:
On this isthmus that separates the North Sea from the Pacific Ocean, it is said that
men, whiter than any we know of, are found: their hair resembles the whitest wool;
their eyes, too weak for the light of day, open only in the obscurity of night. They
are, among men, what bats and owls are among birds. When the star of daylight has
vanished, and leaves nature in gloom and silence, when all the other inhabitants of
the earth, overcome by their work, or exhausted by their pleasures, surrender to
sleep, the Darien awakens, extols his Gods, rejoices in the absence of unbearable
light, and comes to fill natures void. He listens to the screech-owls cries with as
much pleasure as the shepherd of our regions listens to the larks song at the first
sight of dawn: out of view from the sparrow-hawk, it seems to go search in the
cloud the daylight that is not yet on earth; it marks by the flapping of its wings, the
rhythm of its warbling; it ascends and is lost in the cloud, it is no longer seen, yet it
is still heard: its sounds are no longer distinct, inspire tenderness and reverie; this
moment reunites the tranquility of night with the pleasures of the day. The Sun appears: it is coming to bring motion and life back to the earth, to mark the hours, and
determine mens different labors. The Dariens have not waited for this moment:
they have already retired.7
Maupertuis added this freakish people to his toolbox of assorted anomalies-the albino Negro, the dwarfs of the polar regions, Siamese twins, polydactylous individuals, and the interesting breeds of eighteenth-century
canines that Pierre Lyonnet concocted, the harlequin (a small, dappled Dane)
and the mopse (a pug-dog or miniature bull-dog)-to buttress two hypotheses
that he held, epigenesis and the inheritance of random errors that occur in the
generative process.
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99
First, the moon-eyd children of the Central American isthmus provided

excellent proof of epigenesis. At a time when a war was raging between the
preformationists and the epigenesists, Maupertuis held up the Cunas, who
did not resemble their parents at all, as evidence that offspring are not little
Russian dolls contained one inside the other going all the way back to Adam
and Eve. Cunas are decidedly unlike their parents-as are the albino Negro,
Siamese twins, those blind from birth, and other anomalies. The existence of
photophobic Panamanian Indians indicates that William Harvey must have
been right about the germ developing by successive accretions.
The notion that the embryo grows by the addition of parts that bud out of
one another was revolutionary because it allowed for the introduction of errors in the birth process. Maupertuis pointed out that this gradual process
allows the time and opportunity for mistakes to occur and that unlike preformation, these errors can fully explain heredity, teratisms, and hybrids.
In Part 2, Chapter 2, Maupertuis undertakes the task of explaining how
the multitude of varied races in the world could have arisen from a single
prototype. He declares his belief that all of humanity, despite its great diversity, came from a single being. His task will be to prove how, from a single
individual, so many different races could have arisen.
Maupertuis hypothesizes that it is random chance [le hasard] that causes
new races to arise: Nature contains the basis of all these varieties: but
chance or art sets them in motion. It is in this way that those whose industry
applies itself to satisfying the taste of the curious, are, so to speak, the creators of new species. We see the appearance of species of dogs, pigeons, canaries, which did not exist before in nature. In the beginning they were just
fortuitous individuals; art and repeated generations made them species.
Every year the famous Lyonnet creates some new species, & then destroys
those that are no longer in style. He corrects forms, & varies colors: he has
invented the Harlequin, the Mopse species, etc.8 Pierre (Pieter) Lyonnet, a
Dutch naturalist and engraver best known for his dissections and illustrations
of insect anatomy, experimented with the hybridization of dogs. Diderots
Encyclopdie defines the harlequin as a variety of small Dane; but unlike
Danes, that are nearly all in one color, harlequins are dappled, some white
and black, others white and cinnamon, others of another color.9 The mopsy
was a pug-dog (a dwarf breed resembling a bull-dog in miniature).
Maupertuis asks why the art of hybridization should be limited to animals. He suggests that sultans, who keep women of every known race in
their seraglios, should experiment and see whether they can create a new race
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of woman.10 He points out that Frederick William of Prussia had bred tall,
good looking men in order to have an army of giant soldiers and puns, A
King of the north managed to elevate his nation in stature and to beautify
it.11
Maupertuis devotes Part 2, Chapters 4 and 5, to hypothesizing how the
origin of the white Negro may have come about. The albino Negro was a
current topic of conversation ever since a child of 4 or 5, a white Negro, had
been paraded around the salons of Paris. Maupertuis recalls that the child
had the facial characteristics of blacks, white skin, reddish white, woolly
hair, and large, awkward hands. His clear blue eyes seemed to be hurt by the
light of day. Maupertuis attributes this phenomenon to an accident or error
in the arrangement of parental elements (la production des varits accidentelles).12 It is pure chance or a scarcity of family traits that sometimes causes
a white child to be born of black parents or a black child, of white parents.13
These productions are at first accidental. Throughout his work, Maupertuis
reiterates that all variations are the products of random chance: he uses the
words and phrases, combinaisons fortuites des parties des semences, le hasard, accidentel, and erreur. In addition to random errors in the arrangement
of parental elements, he also believes that climate and food influence physical traits.
In Part 2, Chapter 6, Maupertuis hypothesizes that white was the original color of man and that black was a variety that occurred later and became
hereditary after many centuries. His theory that one race is older than another race and that the younger race is derived from errors in the arrangement
of parental elements that were passed on from generation to generation over
centuries or millennia, is, indeed, amazingly prescient. Today science acknowledges that the oldest race is the black race, followed by the white race,
and that they youngest race on earth is the yellow race.
Maupertuis devotes Chapter 7 to explaining why blacks are found only
in the Torrid Zone, and dwarves and giants, towards the poles. He believes
that as soon as dwarves, giants, and blacks began to randomly appear, they
were chased to the poles and to the Equator by others because of fear or
pride. Hence, dwarves populated the Arctic pole, giants migrated to the
Straits of Magellan, and blacks moved to the Torrid Zone.
In summation, Physical Venus is an extraordinary work in that by using
epigenesis as a template for the introduction of new physical traits via errors
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101
in the generative process, Maupertuis was able to hypothesize that all life has
been derived from a single prototype.
Another important biological work that Maupertuis wrote was the Essay
on Cosmology (1750). Although this book was published in 1750, there is
evidence that it was written many years earlier. On August 10, 1741, Voltaire wrote to Maupertuis, If you were to be generous enough to send me
your Cosmology, I would truly swear, by Newton and by you, not to make a
copy of it, and to send it back to you after I have read it.14 Voltaire asked
for a copy so that he could unstitch himself from the cosmology of Johann
Christian von Wolf.15 Jacques Roger points out that Maupertuis placed the
Essay on Cosmology at the beginning of his 1756 Works, ahead of the Discourse on the Different Shapes of Heavenly Bodies, that had been published
in 1732, proving at least the fundamental importance of the Essai in Maupertuiss own eyes.16
In the Essay on Cosmology, Maupertuis assumes a mechanist stance and
argues against teleology at a time when the mechanism vs. teleology debate
was raging in Europe. Websters defines teleology as 1a: the philosophical study of evidence of design in nature b: the doctrine or belief that ends
are immanent in nature c: the metaphysical doctrine explaining phenomena
and events by final causes 2: the fact or the character of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose-used of natural processes or of nature as
a whole conceived as determined by final causes or by the design of a divine
Providence and opposed to purely mechanical determinism or causation exclusively by what is temporarily antecedent 3: the use of design, purpose, or
utility as an explanation of any natural phenomenon.17 Leibniz provides an
example of teleological reasoning in the following statement: In order to
explain a machine, the best way would be to state what it is intended to do,
and to show how all its parts serve this intention.18 Another example that
Leibniz offers is: If God is the Author of things, and if he is sovereignly
wise, it is not possible to reason effectively on the structure of the Universe,
without bringing in the intentions of his wisdom, just as it is not possible to
effectively reason on the structure of a building, without bringing in the intentions of the Architect.19
Teleology may be contrasted to mechanism, which Websters defines at
3a: nature or a natural process conceived as like a machine or as functioning
purely in accordance with mechanical laws b: a philosophical doctrine that
holds that natural processes and esp. the process of life are mechanically de-
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termined and capable of complete explanation by the laws of physics and

chemistry.20
In the Essay on Cosmology, Maupertuis maintains that arguments that
prove the existence of God by the wonders of nature can be easily refuted.
He attacks Newtons thesis that Divine Intelligence is evidenced by the fact
that the six known planets all travel in the same direction around the sun and
in more or less concentric orbits. Maupertuis counters that this fact does not
prove choice in the choice vs. chance debate. Maupertuis observes that
Newton might have also noticed that the planets move in almost the same
axis. He points out that there is no wonder in the fact that the planets move
around the sun in nearly the same plane: if the planets had moved around the
sun in exactly the same plane, that might be striking, but nearly the same
plane is not convincing.
Maupertuis also finds that the near uniformity in the course of the planets
is not impossible to achieve by chance, and since it is not impossible, one
cannot say that it is the result of choice. Maupertuis argues that the only reason that choice vs. chance is an issue is because Newton was unable to explain the reason for the uniformity. Some thinkers posit that the planets
reside in a fluid that moves them along, and so for them, they do not have to
rely on the explanation of Divine Intelligence. Jacques Roger advises that
Maupertuis concluded that the motion of matter does not prove the existence
of God: In other words, an explanation based upon chance was not necessarily absurd-here one sees the emergence of the calculus of probabilities
whose role was to be so important in later developments21
Having shown that the uniformity of the planets could well be the product of random chance, Maupertuis went on to address biology and to argue
that the great diversity in nature and the way that organs conform to the need
for survival are also the results of random chance. Maupertuis reiterates Lucretius argument (in De rerum natura) that the random collision of molecules created everything in the universe and that the first beings were
imperfect and lacked various organs; only those that were not selfcontradictory survived. However, it is significant that Maupertuis ingeniously uses the term conformity [convenance] to identify the traits that surviving beings had that permitted them to live, reproduce, and proliferate.
Use of the term conformity distinguishes Maupertuis from his contemporaries, Diderot and La Mettrie, who also relied upon Lucretius, but who did
not use the term in their works.
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103
Maupertuis speculates, Could we not say that in the random combination of Natures productions, since only those in whom were found a certain
affinity for conformity could survive, it is not marvelous that this conformity
is found in all species that actually exist? Chance, one would say, had produced a multitude of countless individuals; a small number were found to be
made in a way that the animals parts could satisfy its needs; in another, infinitely greater number, there was neither conformity, nor order: all these latter
ones perished; animals without a mouth could not live, others that lacked
reproductive organs could not perpetuate themselves: the only ones left were
those in which order and conformity were found; and these species, that we
see today, are only the smallest portion of what blind destiny had produced.22
In this passage, Maupertuis employs the terms conformity [convenance] (4x), fortuitous combination [la combinaison fortuite] (1x),
chance [le hasard] (1x), and blind destiny [un destin aveugle] (1x).
In the eighteenth century, the primary definition of convenance was Relation, conformity. Those things have no relation to one another. What is
the relationship between such different things? In order to conduct a discourse on things well, it is necessary to observe the similarities and differences among them.23
The Dictionary of the French Academy (1694) begins its definition of
convenance by providing two synonyms for the term: rapport and conformit. Rapport was defined as Relation, likeness, conformity. The Italian
language was a great likeness to the Latin language. There is a great likeness in the temperaments of these two men. This mans face has a great
likeness to the other mans. What you are saying has no connection to what
you said yesterday.24 Therefore, connotations include affinity, analogy, resemblance, conformity, correspondence, harmony, agreement, relation, connection.
Conformit was defined as, The relationship that exists between similar
things. Similar inclinations. Similar feelings. Similar temperaments. Similar
minds. Similar court decisions, discourses.25 Connotations include likeness, agreement, consistency, conformity, analogy, and compliance.
In Maupertuis passage, surviving species were found to have a certain
affinity for conformity [certaines rapports de convenance]; this conformity
is found in all species that actually exist [cette convenance se trouve dans
toutes les espces qui actuellement existent]; there was neither conformity,
nor order [il ny avait ni convenance, ni ordre]; in which order and con-
104
formity were found [o se trouvaient lordre et la convenance]. From the

context of these four phrases, one must extrapolate that convenance means
conformity or compliance.
Bentley Glass points out that Maupertuis passage, Could we not
saythat it is not marvelous that this conformity is found in all species that
actually exist?the only ones left were those in which order and conformity
were found, is a statement that biology has no need of teleological explanations. Hence, he casts doubt on the belief that there is an ultimate purpose to
life, and in fact, on the existence of God.
Maupertuis also points out the absurdity in seeing Gods design in the
creation of the fly: he asks what the purpose of creating a fly could be: flies
are troublesome to humans, they are devoured by the first bird that comes by,
and they fall into spiders webs. Maupertuis argues that the cleverness of
execution is not enough, the motive must be reasonable. He fails to see the
motive in creating the fly: since there is no evidence of a motive, there is no
evidence of choice.
Maupertuis stance against teleology was one of many reasons that he
had a falling out with Voltaire. Voltaire, who was a fervent deist, was offended by the Essay on Cosmology and engaged in diatribes against Maupertuis. Thus, the two men, who had formerly enjoyed a close friendship,
became enemies. Jacques Roger advises, In a long review published in the
Bibliothque raisonne, he hammered at Maupertuis, while maintaining an
even tone. He reproached Maupertuiss Essai de cosmologie with having
tried to destroy the proof of the existence of God through final causes, by use
of the argument that spiders ate flies and the earth was covered with seas or
uninhabitable mountains. But flies were made in order to be eaten, the seas
and the mountains were made to make water circulate and to fertilize the
earth.26
Voltaire believed that God created and arranged everything freely.27
God bestowed gravitation and motion to matter, and consciousness to certain
beings. Voltaire declared, If the planets turn in one direction rather than in
another, in unresisting space, the hand of the Creator therefore directed their
course in this direction with absolute freedom.28
Another reason that Voltaire opposed Maupertuis was because Voltaire
embraced preformation and the notion that all species left the hands of the
Creator perfectly at the time of Creation. Conversely, Maupertuis not only
promulgated epigenesis, he used it to hypothesize that all beings arose from a
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105
single prototype. Hence, when Voltaire wrote a review of Charles Bonnets

Considerations on Organized Bodies in 1764, he used it as an opportunity to
attack the epigenesis set forth in Physical Venus and declared that it was necessary to return to the ancient opinion that all germs were formed at the
same time by the hand that arranged the universe.29 Maupertuis had posited
that parental elements from the mother and father are attracted to each other
and arrange themselves in specific patterns. He did not know exactly why
they are attracted to each other, but the laws of Newtonian attraction suggested that particles may have an affinity for one another or relationships of
union. Voltaire made fun of this and quipped that children are formed by
attraction in their mothers bellies and that the left eye attracts the right leg.30
Aside from the differences that Voltaire and Maupertuis had regarding
final causes vs. mechanism and preformation vs. epigenesis, there was another reason for the enmity between the two men. In 1744 Maupertuis had
articulated what he called the principle of least action, which was published in 1750 in the Essay on Cosmology. The principle of least action
states, When some change occurs in nature, the quantity of action used for
this change is always the smallest possible.31 The principle of least action
also posits that in all the changes that take place in the universe, the sum of
the products of each body multiplied by the distance it moves, and by the
speed with which it moves, is the least that is possible.
Maupertuis observed that the universe obeys certain laws of motion and
one of them is the principle of least action. He declared that all things have
been so arranged that a blind and necessary mathematics executes all the activity in the universe, including the movement of animals, the vegetation of
plants, and the revolutions of heavenly bodies; the laws of motion are beautiful and simple and bring about all the phenomena of the visible world. Voltaire clearly understood Maupertuis point: the universe operates according
to the laws of motion that obviate the need for Gods will. If all of biology,
chemistry, and physics are dictated by the principle of least action, then it is
the motive property of matter that has set the universe into motion and continues to drive it. What infuriated Voltaire was that the determinism of the
principle of least action negates the free will of God: it demonstrates that
God is not free to act, that He is limited by the laws of motion. This is why
when Voltaire refuted the principle of least action, he said, What is necessary excludes a choice. It is in the choice of means that the great geometrician Newton found one of the most striking points of conviction for the
existence of the creative and governing Being.32
106
Voltaire used his satirical pen to attack Maupertuis relentlessly. Jacques

Roger describes Voltaires satire of Maupertuis thus: Maupertuis, the native of Saint-Malo, would henceforth be the leading character in Voltaires
puppet show. He would always reappear escorted by his Patagonians and
Laplanders.33 Voltaires mention of Laplanders was a reference to the fact
that in 1736 Maupertuis had led an expedition to Lapland to measure the
length of a degree along the meridian. His measurements verified Newtons
theory that the earth is an oblate sphere (a sphere flattened at the poles).
Maupertuis brought back with him two native girls from Finland and was
painted in a famous portrait, wearing a fur hat and fur collar, leaning on a
globe of the earth, flattening it with his hand. Voltaire called him the earth
flattener and made fun of him for having had himself painted in a thick, furry cap.
In the History of Doctor Akakia and the Native of Saint-Malo (1752
1753), Voltaire satirizes Maupertuis as the native of Saint-Malo, who, suffering from a chronic case of philotimy (the love of ambition or honor) and
acute philocracy (love of power), wrote against doctors and against the
proofs of the existence of God; he acquired revelations about the soul while
dissecting monkeys; he imagined himself to be as great as the giant of the
past century, Leibniz, even though he was not even five feet high; this admirable philosopher discovered that nature always acts according to the simplest laws, and so wisely adds that nature always moves towards economy,
should have certainly spared the small number of readers capable of reading
his works the trouble of reading the same thing twice in his Works and Letters: one third of one volume is copied word for word in the other; he dissected two toads; he had himself painted in a thick, furry cap; he wrote that
there are stars made like millstones; he declared that children are formed by
attraction in their mothers bellies and that the left eye attracts the right leg;
he imagined the nature of the soul by means of opium; he dissected the heads
of giants.34
In the article Atheism in the Philosophical Dictionary (1764) Voltaire
constructs a dialogue between worshippers of God and modern atheists. He
attacks Maupertuis directly, not just by mentioning him by name, but by
making him one of the interlocutors of the dialogue; he subtitles sections of
his work New Objections of a Modern Atheist and Maupertuis Objections. Voltaire begins the article by articulating the classic deistic argument: when we see a beautiful machine, we say that there is a good engineer
Maupertuis
107
and that this engineer uses excellent judgment; by analogy, the functioning
of all living bodies and the movement of heavenly bodies also demonstrate
that there is an intelligent engineer or an Eternal Geometer. Voltaire refutes the atheists argument that given an eternal time frame, random molecular movement will eventually form the world. Voltaire, on the contrary,
contends that it is the existence of intelligent beings in the universe that refutes the atheists arguments: atheist scientists are unable to prove how random molecular motion alone can bring about consciousness and intelligence.
Because they do not know how this happens, they cannot claim that their
hypothesis is correct. For the purpose of satire, as is his style, Voltaire focuses on a detail in an issue, magnifies it, and ridicules its proponent. He
does not address the fact that in the Essay on the Formation of Organized
Bodies Maupertuis states that it is precisely because random molecular motion alone is insufficient to explain consciousness and intelligence, that it is
necessary to hypothesize that in addition to motion, molecules also have the
property of consciousness (aversion, desire, memory, and intelligence).
Voltaire directly responds to Maupertuis argument that the reason that
parts of animals conform to their needs is because all organisms whose organs did not conform to their needs have perished. Voltaires reply is, This
objection, timeworn since Lucretius, is sufficiently refuted by consciousness
given to animals, and intelligence given to man. How could combinations,
that chance has produced, produce this consciousness and this intelligence...35 Voltaire also argues that the limbs of animals are made for their
needs with incomprehensible art, and so, the disposition of a flys wing, a
snails organs brings you to the ground (you is Maupertuis).36
In the dialogue the interlocutor Maupertuis contends that if deists have
found God in the folds of the skin of the rhinoceros, one could with equal
reason, deny His existence because of the tortoises shell. Voltaires reply to
this statement is that the tortoise, the rhinoceros, and all the different species, prove equally, in their infinite variety, the same cause, the same design,
the same goal, which are preservation, generation and death. There is unity
in this infinite variety; the shell and the skin bear witness equally.37
Voltaire excoriates Maupertuis in the following: And you be silent too,
since you cannot conceive its utility any more than I can,38 Some are venomous, you have been so yourself,39 You ask why the snake does harm?
And you, why have you done harm so many times? Why have you been a
persecutor, which is the greatest of all crimes for a philosopher?40 and But
frauds! What are they? frauds.41 Voltaire uses the term fripon, which, in
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the eighteenth century was defined as Deceiver, who has neither honor, nor
faith, nor integrity.42 An adjective for fripon was fourbe, which meant
deceiver.43 Therefore, fripon connoted a fraud, deceiver or swindler.
Hence, Maupertuis drew a violent reaction from Voltaire because he epitomized modern sciences position that random chance brought about the universe and because the principle of least action obviates Gods will.
In Letter 14 of his Letters (1752), Maupertuis recounts his case study of
the inheritance of polydactyly in the Ruhe family in Berlin. Jacob Ruhe, a
surgeon in Berlin, had been born with six fingers on each hand and six toes
on each foot. He inherited this anomaly from his mother, Elisabeth Ruhe,
who had inherited it from her mother, Elisabeth Horstmann, of Rostock. Jacobs parents, Elisabeth Ruhe (polydactylous mother) and Jean Christian
Ruhe (normal father) had eight children: of these eight, four were polydactylous and four were normal. Jacob (polydactylous) married Sophie-Louise de
Thngen, a normal woman, and they had six children: of these six, two were
polydactylous and four were normal. One of them, Jacob Ernest, had six
toes on the left foot and five on the right; he had six fingers on his right hand,
one of which was amputated, and on his left hand he had only a wart instead
of a sixth finger.44
Maupertuis concludes that errors in the generative process such as those
in polydactyly may explain how all species arose from a single prototype: I
truly want to believe that these supernumerary digits were originally merely
accidental varieties, whose production I have tried to show in Physical Venus: but these varieties, once confirmed by a sufficient number of generations in which both sexes had them, create species; and perhaps it is thus that
all species have arisen.45
Maupertuis extrapolates that polydactyly is equally transmitted by both
the father and the mother. He posited that eventually, after repeated matings,
the trait will disappear. Conversely, it will be perpetuated by marriages in
which both parents have the trait. Maupertuis concluded that continual matings with normal people will cause the trait to disappear from the family.
Maupertuis applied mathematics to predict the statistical probability that
polydactyly would occur in a given population: But if we wanted to regard
the continuation of sexdigitism as an effect of pure chance, we would have to
see what the probability is that this accidental variety in a first parent would
not be repeated in his descendants. After a search that I made in a city with
100,000 inhabitants, I found two men who had this anomaly. Let us suppose,
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109
which is hard to do, that three others escaped me; and that for every 20,000
men one could reckon one sexdigitary person: the probability that his son or
daughter would not be born with sexdigitism is 20,000 to 1: and that his son
and his grandson not be sexdigitary is 20,000 x 20,000, or 400,000,000 to 1:
finally, the probability that this anomaly would not last three consecutive
generations would be 8,000,000,000,000 to 1; numbers so great that the certainty of best proven things in physics do not approach these probabilities.46
David Beeson explains that the issue before Maupertuis was to decide
whether the appearance of polydactyly was due to chance or heredity. Beeson says that Maupertuis decided to settle the issue by setting up what is today called a null hypothesis. Websters defines null hypothesis as a
statistical hypothesis to be tested and accepted or rejected in favor of an alternative; specif: the hypothesis that an observed differenceis due to
chance alone and not due to a systematic cause.47 Beeson advises that
Maupertuis null hypothesis was that polydactyly is not hereditary. Beeson
says, If the null hypothesis were true, the probability against the trait appearing so often in the Ruhe family would be massive. He therefore concluded that he could, with what we would now call a high degree of
confidence, reject the null hypothesis as false. His statistical analysis was
sound.48 Hence, Maupertuis concluded that it is unlikely that the anomaly
would appear in the third generation of the family by chance alone, and
therefore, because it did, it was hereditary.
Bentley Glass credits Maupertuis for having accomplished a long list of
impressive achievements that distinguished him from his peers. Glass enumerates Maupertuis legacy to biology thus: 1) he recorded and interpreted
the inheritance of a human trait through several generations, 2) he applied
the laws of probability to the study of heredity, 3) he was led by the facts he
had uncovered to develop a theorythat heredity must be due to particles
derived both from the mother and from the father, that similar particles have
an affinity for each other that makes them pair, and that for each pair either
the particle from the mother or the one from the father may dominate over
the other, so that a trait may seemingly be inherited from distant ancestors by
passing through parents who are unaffected. From an accidental deficiency
of certain particles there might arise embryos with certain parts missing, and
from an excess of certain particles could come embryos with extra parts, like
the six-fingered persons or the giant with an extra lumbar vertebra whom
Maupertuis studied. There might even be complete alterations of parti-
110
clesand these fortuitous changes might be the beginning of new species49

Glass also points out that Maupertuis was able to distinguish between
strong traits and weak traits. Glass remarks, Maupertuis was quite struck by
this apparent weakening of the trait with time, and it led him to the conclusion that through repeated matings with normal individuals the trait might in
time disappear.50
Glass observes that Maupertuis had acknowledged that polydactyly occurs frequently from affected parents, whereas albinism occurs sporadically
among blacks: Maupertuis also arrived though vaguely, at the idea of dominanceMaupertuis was therefore aware that whereas polydactyly descends
regularly from affected persons, married to normals, to some but not all of
the offspring, albinism, on the other hand, seemed to appear sporadically
among negroes, albino negroes being born of parents both of whom were
blackMaupertuisconcluded: There could be, on the other hand, arrangements so tenacious that from the first generation they dominate
(lemporte) over all the previous arrangements, and efface the habitude of
these.51
Maupertuis Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies (1754) was
reputedly his doctoral dissertation. He had written it in Latin and published
it in 1751 under the pseudonym Dr. Baumann, under the title, Inaugural
Dissertation on Metaphysics.52 The Dissertation was translated into French
and published under the titles, System of Nature (1751) and Essay on the
Formation of Organized Bodies (1754). Diderot recognized Maupertuis
genius and praised his work profusely in Thoughts on the Interpretation of
Nature (1753). Maupertuis, in turn, was delighted to have the acknowledgement of the great Diderot, and printed portions of Diderots kudos in the
preface of his 1754 edition of the Essay.
Maupertuis Essay is a also landmark document in that it presents two
innovative ideas that were to influence contemporaries such as Diderot.
First, Maupertuis reiterated that heredity is based on the arrangement or order of parental elements. When the memory of the patterns or arrangement
of parental elements is preserved and there are no errors, offspring resemble
their parents. When errors occur in these arrangements, the errors are transmitted from generation to generation; they can result in birth defects (such as
six fingers on one hand) and, ultimately, the appearance of new species can
be explained by these errors. Maupertuis carries this logic to the limit: these
Maupertuis
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errors in the arrangement of parental elements can explain how all living
things arose from a single prototype. Hence, he posited that the animal kingdom arose from the vegetable kingdom, and the vegetable kingdom, from the
mineral kingdom. Secondly, Maupertuis hypothesized an emergent consciousness: molecules have the property of consciousness, and when they
combine, the newly organized entity has its own consciousness, which is better and superior to that of the sum of its constituent parts.
Maupertuis begins the Essay by affirming that all biological hypotheses
must be solidly grounded in physical, verifiable phenomena. He extols empiricism and the scientific method, as well as Lockian epistemology that all
knowledge is acquired through the five senses. His first step, then, is to debunk the myths of his time, such as preformation and unextended entities (ie:
plastic natures and intelligent substances). He dismisses plastic natures,
which, without intelligence & without matter, are imagined to exert all of
the influence on the universe that matter and intelligence can exert. He
equally dismisses the power of intelligent substances to move stars and
oversee the production of animals, plants & all organized bodies. He ridicules philosophers who, not wanting to resort to plastic natures and intelligent natures to explain the formation of organized bodies, have resorted to
the preformation myth. He humorously refers to homunculi as inexhaustible warehouses of individuals. Preformation posed problems for its adherents: They were at a loss to know where to place these inexhaustible
warehouses of individuals53 Some held that the preformed homunculus
resides in the mother (ovists), others, in the father (animalculists), and each
was content for a long time in his ideas.54 Maupertuis replaces preformation with the experimental method (lexprience). Experimentation and observation, such as that which he had performed on polydactylous members of
the Ruhe family in Berlin, has proven that one cannot accept that an infinite
succession of beings has arisen from either one parent or the other.55
Maupertuis embraced the notion that particles residing throughout the
body settle in the reproductive organs and reproduce the part of the body
from which they came. The theory was not new: he merely resurrected it and
gave it new life. Hippocrates, Empedocles, Democritus, Almaeon, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and Galen believed that elements circulating throughout the
bloodstream of the father eventually form the offspring. Maupertuis expanded the theory to include both parents.
He believed that the reason that particles, spread throughout the body arrange themselves in an orderly fashion, some to form an eye, and others an
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ear, is because molecules are conscious and have the properties of desire,
aversion, memory, and intelligence.56 He defends this hypothesis by pointing out that animals exhibit intelligence: they see, understand, desire, fear,
and remember. Since animals behave as if they were conscious, one must
necessarily extrapolate that they are, indeed, conscious. Therefore, it would
not be illogical to accord consciousness to even the smallest particles of matter. He declares that intelligence resides in the tiniest grains of sand as well
as in elephants and monkeys.
Maupertuis explains the necessity of according the properties of intelligence, desire, aversion and memory to matter in order to explain reproduction. He says, I believe I see the necessity in it. One will never explain the
formation of any organized body, by the physical properties of matter
alone57 Thus, Maupertuis embarked upon new ground. He attempted to
explain reproduction, something that he claimed that philosophers from Epicurus to Descartes had been unable to do by the motive property of atoms
alone. He argued that more than motion is required: it is necessary to either
allow for new properties or else acknowledge properties that do exist.58
As he had done in Physical Venus, Maupertuis reiterates that epigenesis
is fully capable of explaining many phenomena that preformation cannot:
resemblance to parents, teratisms lacking body parts (i.e., Cyclops), teratisms
with too many body parts (i.e., polydactylous births), teratisms whose organs
are reversed (i.e., the heart and stomach are on the right, the liver on the left),
hybrids, and the sterility of hybrids (i.e., the mule). Parental elements that
will form the offspring circulate throughout the body and finally settle in the
reproductive organs of the mother and father. Each parental element is derived from the part of the body that it will form, retains a memory of its former situation, and reproduces itself as many times as it can, to form an
identical part in the offspring. From this arises the conservation of the species and resemblance to parents. If some parental elements are lacking, or if
they cannot unite, teratisms arise that lack some part. If some parental elements are found in too great a quantity, or if after their ordinary union, an
extra particle allows another to join itself to it, there arises a teratism with
extra parts.
In the case of hybrids, if the parental elements are derived from animals
of different species, but there still remains a rapport among the elements,
some are more attached to the fathers form, other to the mothers form, there
will arise hybrid animals.
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If the parental elements are derived from animals that lack a sufficient
analogy between them, these parental elements cannot arrive at an adequate
arrangement, and generation becomes impossible. This explains sterility in
the offspring of hybrids. Repeated experimentation and observation show
that no animal, born from the coupling of different species, reproduces.
Conversely, if there are elements so susceptible to arrangement or in
which the memory is confused, they will arrange with the greatest facility
and new animals will arise as one sees in spontaneous generation with moistened flour and with other animalcules that liqueurs form. Maupertuis, like
many eighteenth-century thinkers (Diderot, Buffon, Needham) believed in
spontaneous generation. Since Maupertuis believed that all molecules are
conscious and that all life resulted from a single prototype through the
transmission of errors in the arrangement of parental elements (originally
from the mineral kingdom), he did not view spontaneous generation as an
impossibility.
We can also explain certain phenomena with epigenesis that cannot be
explained by other theories. Sometimes resemblance skips a generation and
offspring resemble grandparents more than they do parents. The elements
that form certain traits may have better preserved the habit of their situation
in the grandparent than in the parent.
A total forgetfulness or memory lapse of the first situation will give rise
to a teratism with reversed organs.
Maupertuis asks, Could one not explain by this how from two individuals alone, the multiplication of the most dissimilar species could have followed? They would only have owed their origin to some fortuitous
productions in which elementary parts would not have retained the order they
had in the father and mother animals: each degree of error would have made
a new species; and by virtue of repeated digressions there would have arisen
the infinite diversity of animals that we see today, which will increase still
more perhaps with time, but to which perhaps the succession of centuries
carries only imperceptible growths.59 This statement constitutes a landmark
in the history of biology. Maupertuis is emphasizing arrangement, pattern,
and order in elements contributed by both the father and mother. When the
memory of the original pattern is retained, the offspring resembles the parent
who contributed the element. When the memory of the original arrangement
is lost, an error occurs, and the offspring has a birth defect. These errors explain the existence of the innumerable species in the world. Further, they
explain how all beings arose from a single prototype. The implications are
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immense: he will go on to discuss consciousness. If all beings arose from a

single prototype (i.e., in the mineral kingdom), then consciousness resides, to
varying degrees, in all three kingdoms.
Maupertuis hypothesizes an emergent consciousness: when particles unite, each particle loses its consciousness of self and acquires the consciousness of the larger body to which it belongs. It loses the memory and
consciousness of itself and, upon uniting with other particles, acquires the
consciousness of the whole. He asks, But each element, in losing its form,
& combining with the body that it is going to form, would it also lose its perception? Would it lose, would it lessen the small degree of consciousness
that it had, or would it strengthen it by its union with the others, for the benefit of all?60 He answers the question thus: it seems that from all of the
perceptions of the elements having been gathered together, there results a
single perception that is much stronger, much more perfect than any of the
constituent perceptions and which is perhaps analogous to each of these perceptions as the organized body is to the component part. Each element, in its
union with others, having mingled its perception with theirs, and having lost
its consciousness of self, we have lost the memory of the original state of the
elements, and our origin must be entirely lost for us.61 Hence, man is conscious of himself and others, but he is not aware of each molecule that constitutes his body.
Maupertuis was highly regarded by his contemporaries, Buffon and Diderot. Buffon stated that the problems inherent in the competing theories of
the ovists and the animalculists were intuited by a man of intellect, who
seems to me to have reasoned better than all those who had written on this
matter before him, I am talking about the author of Physical Venus, published in 1745; this treatise, although very short, assembles more philosophical ideas than there are in several big volumes on generationthis author is
the first to have begun to approach the truth, from which we were farther
than ever since we had imagined that eggs exist and animalcules were discovered.62
Diderot also recognized Maupertuis genius, praised him profusely, and
adopted his hypothesis that all life is derived from a single prototype. In
Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, Diderot asks the
reader whether, considering the fact that characteristics among species overlap, and also that there are beings that have the functions and body parts of
two kingdoms, one would be persuaded to believe that there has only ever
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been a single prototype for all beings. Diderot credits Dr. Baumann (Maupertuis pseudonym) with this hypothesis, adding that this theory should be
examined more fully: we will not deny that it should be embraced as an
essential hypothesis for the advancement of experimental physics, rationalist
philosophy, and the discovery and explanation of phenomena that depend on
organization.63 In a footnote in Thought 12, Diderot refers the reader to Dr.
Baumanns Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics.
In Thought 50, Diderot praises Maupertuis again and prints passages
verbatim from the Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics. Diderots laudatory words include the doctor of Erlangen, whose book, filled with odd
and new ideasHis subject matter is the greatest to which human intelligence can apply itselfDr. Baumanns hypothesis will explain, if you will,
the most incomprehensible mystery of naturea subject that the foremost
individuals throughout the centuries have taken upthe fruit of deep meditation, the endeavour of a great philosopher.64
In Thought 50, Diderot meticulously follows Maupertuis sequence of
ideas as he had presented them in the Inaugural Dissertation: first, he mentions that Maupertuis had denied unverifiable hypotheses and the belief in
unextended entities; he refuted the theories of plastic natures, subordinate
intelligent substances, and preformation. Rather, he chose to explain life
with the hypothesis that all molecules are conscious and that they have the
properties of desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence. Diderot cites Maupertuis passage on emergent consciousness in the original Latin in order to
avoid the accusation that he misinterpreted him: when molecules combine to
form larger entities, each molecule loses its memory of self and acquires the
consciousness of the larger body that it forms. Each successive organization
has its own consciousness. Diderot carries this notion to the limit and asks
whether the universe, which is the composite of all nature, might be God.
Maupertuis, who was not a pantheist, had no choice but to vehemently deny
Diderots conclusion.
David Beeson examines Maupertuis reaction to Diderots conclusion:
What most interested Diderot was the suggestion that elementary particles
of matter might be assigned an elementary consciousness, and by their fusion
form a whole whose consciousness would be more than the sum of its constituents and would form a mind or soulDiderot sets out to push Maupertuiss ideas as far as he can.65 In the Interpretation of Nature, Diderot
pushes the notion of an emergent consciousness to the limit, positing, I will
ask him, then, if the universe, or the general collection of all conscious and
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thinking molecules, form a wholethe world could be infinite, this world

soul, I am not saying, is, but may be, an infinite system of perceptions, and
the world may be God.66
Beeson points out that Maupertuis was to deny this charge of neoSpinozism when he was to prepare the Systme de la nature for inclusion in
his 1756 Complete Works. In the Response to the Objections of Mr. Diderot,
Maupertuis refutes Diderot by arguing against systematic reasoning, or reasoning that the universe, organisms and particles can be integrated into a single system: Our mind, as limited as it is, will it ever find a system in which
all consequences are in harmonyAll our systems, even the greatest ones,
embrace only a small part of the plan that the Supreme Intelligence follows;
we see neither the relationship that parts have to one another, nor their relationship to the whole67
Maupertuis, as Beeson points out, goes on not to merely attack systematic reasoning in general terms; Diderots fundamental methodology is itself,
he claims, false.68 Beeson quotes from Maupertuis, This method of reasoning, that Mr. Diderot calls the act of generalization, and which he regards
as the touchstone of systems, is merely a kind of analogy, that we can take
where we want; incapable of proving either the falseness or the truth of a
system.69
Beeson advises that Maupertuis considered materialism, like Cartesianism, to be in error because both depend on statements concerning the nature
of the universe as a whole, and consequently on systematic reasoning. Such
reasoning is indefensible because the human intellect is incapable of handling universal truths. Diderots attack on Maupertuis depends on the systematic application of reasoning by analogy; Maupertuis replies by denying
the possibility of applying analogy systematically, insists that we are authorized to take such arguments just as far as suits us. Diderot had explicitly declared his intention to force Maupertuiss reasoning to its logical conclusion;
Maupertuis refused to be forced and denied that the conclusion was logical.70 Hence, Maupertuis, who was an atheist, refuted Diderots pantheist
conclusion by asserting 1) the impossibility of ever understanding universal
truths or the nature of the universe as a whole and 2) the impossibility of ever
finding one system that fully explains the relationship that parts of the universe have to one another or to the whole.
In summation, Maupertuis study of the recurrence of polydactly in four
generations of the Ruhe family led him to arrive at some landmark conclu-
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sions in biology. First, he observed that the trait could be transmitted by either parent who had the anomaly. Secondly, he hypothesized that birth defects first come about due to an error in the arrangement or pattern of
parental elements. This error is passed down from generation to generation
and eventually, over time, can create new species. In this way, it is possible
to explain the creation of all living things from a single prototype. Maupertuis believed that climate and nutrition can influence heredity.
Maupertuis must also be credited with devising a mathematical means
(which is today called the null hypothesis) of predicting the statistical
probability that an anomaly will not recur in a familys future offspring.
Maupertuis refuted preformation and adopted Pythagoras notion that the
offspring acquires particles drawn from all over the body of its father; Maupertuis broadened the hypothesis to include particles from the bodies of both
parents. The elements retain the memory of their former situation and take it
up again in the offspring, thus recreating the body part from which they are
derived.
In order for this to work, Maupertuis hypothesized an emergent consciousness: he posited that all molecules have the property of desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence. When molecules combine, each one loses its
memory of self and acquires the consciousness of the larger entity that it
forms. This explains why we are not aware of each individual molecule or
organ in our body. His hypotheses were to form the basis of Diderots transformism in 1753 and 1769.
Chapter6
Diderot
When we see successive metamorphosesapproach one kingdom from another

kingdom by gradual degrees and populate the borders of these two kingdomswho
would not be led to believe that there was not ever only one first prototype for all
beings?1
Denis Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12 (1753)
This chapter will provide an overview of the salient points of Diderot and the
Metamorphosis of Species (New York and London: Routledge, 2007). That
book discusses Diderots radical view that species metamorphose over millennia and shows how that hypothesis was influenced by contemporary
sources (Buffon, Maupertuis, and La Mettrie), Encyclopedia articles on
probability theory and fossils, Lucretius, and Needhams experiments with
spontaneous generation. The material in that work is presented in six chapters that attempt to cover the expansiveness of Diderots thought: Chaos,
Time, Flux, and Probability, Embryology, Epigenesis, and the Metamorphosis of Species, Spontaneous Generation, The Chain of Beings, The
Mutability of Species, and The Ascent of Consciousness. The most important points of each chapter will be mentioned here.
There are at least seven significant factors that contributed to Diderots
transformism:
1. the Greeks hypothesis that atoms are in perpetual motion, continually colliding with one another, and randomly forming new combina-
120
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
tions; therefore, the universe and everything in it are the results of

the motive property of atoms and random chance
epigenesis-William Harveys theory that the germ is brought into existence by successive accretions and not developed from a preformed
seed; this hypothesis allows for the birth of individuals that are uniquely different from either of their parents and explains the appearance of offspring that do not resemble either parent, birth anomalies,
and hybrids.
Buffon observed that physical characteristics overlap among species:
different species have similar body parts (correspondences in types
of structures are called homologies). Diderot surmised that homologies provided evidence that all beings arose from a single prototype.
Buffon developed the two dimensional chain of beings into a three
dimensional cone in which characteristics are shared; Diderot added
the fourth dimension, time, to show that physical characteristics
change over millennia.
Buffon believed that species degenerate when they are taken out of
their lands of origin and are domesticated by men. Geography, climate, food, domestication, and working an animal very hard cause
minor changes in a species, but do not create new and different species. Diderot considered Buffons idea of degeneration, and, parting
company with him, concluded that these factors do, indeed, create
new species.
Maupertuis theorized that errors occur in the arrangement of parental
elements during the generative process and that these errors are
transmitted from generation to generation; these errors could explain
how all living things may have arose from a single prototype. Diderot seized upon this idea and made it the foundation of his transformism for the rest of his literary career.
Maupertuis hypothesized that consciousness, like motion, is a property of atoms. Consciousness is inherent in all matter, at every level
of organization, and this consciousness causes threads to organize into bundle of fibers, and bundles of fibers to form organs. When matter combines to form something new, the new consciousness that
arises is greater than that of the sum of its parts. Hence, Maupertuis
envisaged an emergent consciousness. Diderot embraced this notion
and made it one of the three pivotal points on which the fulcrum of
Diderot
121
his transformism rested (the other two being the motive property of
atoms and probability theory).
As chief editor of the Encyclopedia, Denis Diderot was perpetually on

the vanguard of science and privy to a wealth of information that, collectively, caused him to conclude that transformism is a certainty. He published
articles on fossil discoveries that suggested that the earth was much older
than previously thought. He was well aware that there were layers of beds of
seashell fossils situated far from water that indicated that Europe was once
covered with water. Moreover, they suggested that the earth and sea had
changed places several times. Discoveries of intact mammoths in northern
Siberia and the New World indicated that animals were once much larger
than they presently were.
The Encyclopedia also had articles on probability theory, many of which
Diderot, himself, authored, and others of which, the mathematician
dAlembert wrote. Diderot knew that studies of games of chance (ie: cards,
dice) indicate that given enough time, every possible permutation will eventuate. He applied this mathematical principle to his transformist biology.
Molecules have the property of motion; because molecules are in perpetual
motion and are continually randomly colliding, eventually, every possible
combination will come up. Given an infinite amount of time, a universe will
gradually emerge, as will stars, planets, the mineral kingdom, the vegetable,
the animal, and man.
Diderots transformism was intertwined with the polemics of atheism. In
1746, while he was still a deist, he declared that the magnificence and beneficence of God could be readily discerned by observing the wonders of
nature (ie: the complexity of the insect, the harmonious paths of celestial
bodies, in Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 18). By 1749, Diderot had migrated from deism to pantheism to atheism. In his article, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism, Lester Crocker examines how
Diderot came about to journey from deism to pantheism to atheism in three
short years.2 By 1749 Diderot had moved away from the deistic notion of a
beneficent God as he was painfully aware of the human misery that is born
of birth defects such as blindness. In the Letter on the Blind (1749), the
reader experiences the pathos in Saundersons cry, Look at me, Mr.
Holmes. I have no eyes. What have we done, you and I, to God, that one of
us has this organ while the other has not?3 Nature, which is perpetually in
flux, is continually creating monsters, as it has done since the time of Lu-
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cretius. What we perceive to be nature, is merely the outcome of a series of

random events, and hence, nature, by definition, is oblivious to human suffering.
In 1749 Diderot embraced the philosophy of Epicurus, the fullest extant
version of which is articulated in Lucretius De rerum natura: random molecular motion, given an infinite length of time, will eventually yield life, and
this includes anomalies. Because motion is a property of matter, nature is
continuously creating new varieties, many of which are defective. Diderot
takes Lucretius stance that at the time of creation, many monsters were born
and only those beings without serious self-contradictions survived and perpetuated their kind. Nature is still creating monsters, as there are Siamese
twins, blind people, stillborn births, and false conceptions.
By 1753 Diderot had gathered more information on biology from the
writings of Buffon and Maupertuis. Buffon had published the first four volumes of the Natural History, in which he described homologies that he had
observed among the body parts of various species. Diderot understood that
the chain of being is not a two dimensional line extending from God down to
inanimate matter, but rather, a three dimensional cone in which physical characteristics overlap among species. Maupertuis, on the other hand, hypothesized that errors occur in the generative process and that these errors are
passed on from generation to generation; this could explain how, over time,
all living beings may have arisen from a single prototype. Diderot took Buffons observations of homologies and Maupertuis theory that inherited errors can eventually bring about new species, and extrapolated that
homologies are proof that all beings, indeed, the three kingdoms, have arisen
from a single prototype [Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753)].
By 1769 Diderot adds a fourth dimension to the three dimensional cone:
time. The universe is in perpetual flux, and given an infinite time frame,
species come into existence and then fall out of existence. Everything is in
flux: animalcules that materialize and then die under microscopic magnification, species, planets, stars, and perhaps, even the universe itself, are all born,
exist for a certain length of time, and then fall out of existence [the trilogy,
Conversation between dAlembert and Diderot (1769), DAlemberts Dream
(1769), and the Sequel to the Conversation (1769)].
In 1746 Diderot was still a deist, but he was just beginning to entertain
atheism. In Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 18, Diderot affirms that it is the
work of Marcello Malpighi, Isaac Newton, Pieter van Musschenbroek, Ni-
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123
cholas Hartsoeker and Bernard Nieuwentyt that has provided satisfactory

proofs of the existence of a reign of sovereign intelligence.4 Because of
their work, the world is no longer a god, in the tradition of Spinoza, but rather, a machine with its wheels, its cords, its pulleys, its springs, and its
weights as in the convention of Newton.5 These scientists demonstrate that
there is a difference between the created and the Creator. The created universe is not a god, as in Spinozas work, but rather, announces the existence
of a Creator, as in deism.
In Thought 19, Diderot again proclaims deism and denies spontaneous
generation. He reiterates, it was reserved for the knowledge of nature to
make true deists.6 He takes the classic Newtonian deistic stance that the
marvels of the universe proclaim the beneficence and magnificence of God.
Because only God can create life, spontaneous generation must clearly be
false. He alludes to the experiments of Redi when he adds, all experiments agree in proving to me that putrefaction alone never produced any organism.7 Spontaneous generation was a powerful polemical tool: atheists,
relying on the experiments of John Turberville Needham, argued that living
things arise from nonliving matter all the time, in the twinkling of an eye,
and therefore, divine agency is not needed; the materialists cited the authority of Lucretius, who in On the Nature of Things, declares that random molecular motion creates everything in the universe, as is evidenced by
spontaneous generation. Conversely, deists argued that God created all living things at the time of Creation and that therefore, the generative process is
required from living beings to create new life. In 1746 Diderot still argued
the latter: only God can create life and scientific experimentation (by Redi)
shows that spontaneous generation is false.
However, although Diderot was still a deist in 1746, he was beginning to
toy with atheism. He begins Thought 21 by stating, I open the notebooks of
a celebrated professor8 Paul Vernire advises that critics hold that this
celebrated professor is Dominique Franois Rivard (16971778), who had
taught philosophy and mathematics at the collge de Beauvais.9 Vernire
also notes that he introduced mathematics to the University of Paris and that
Diderot was his student.10 Notebooks in the phrase I open the notebooks connotes authority, truth, and importance; it builds suspense by
attributing these qualities to something that will follow. Celebrated and
professor doubly hyperbolizes the authority connoted by books and doubly builds suspense by announcing that what will follow is even more important and has even more authority; it will carry the weight of the authority of
124
the notebooks of a celebrated professor. This is the celebrated professor who

introduced Diderot to the science of mathematics and hence, showed him the
path to certainty and fact. Rivard also taught philosophy: therefore, he was
able to make connections between philosophical speculation and mathematical certainty. He taught Diderot that philosophy and mathematics are not
distinct entities, but that they overlap. The central thesis of Thought 21 will
be that probability theory sheds light on the origin of the universe. Because
probability theory is mathematical in nature, it is certain and cannot be disproven.
In Thought 21 a deist and an atheist have an argument as to whether the
world is the fortuitous result of the collision of atoms. The theory was not
new: it dates back to Thales (6th century BC), Leucippus (5th century BC),
Democritus (460370 BC), and Epicurus (341270 BC). Lucretius On the
Nature of Things (first century BC) is the most complete statement that we
have of Epicurus work. In Thought 21 the atheist clearly wins the argument
that he has with the deist. At the beginning of the argument, the deist concedes that motion is an essential property of matter. The moment he concedes this point, he loses the argument. Motion is an inherent property of
molecules that cause them to perpetually collide with one another. Probability theory shows that given an infinite time frame, every eventuality will
arise (the universe, stars, planets, the three kingdoms, and man).
The language that Diderot employs is the language of games of chance
and probability theory: to agree upon [accorder], to bring about [amener],
analysis [analyse], mathematical permutations (2x) [arrangements], to occur
[arriver], advantage or advantageous (3x) [avantage or avantageuse], mutual
agreements [aveux rciproques], printers type (2x) [caractres], 100,00 dice
[cent mille ds], 100,00 sixes [cent mille six], chaos [chaos], possible combinations [combinaisons possibles], compensated (2x) [compense], throws
[coups], contradict oneself [se dmener], difficulty (2x) [difficult], duration
[dure], create (2x) [engendrer], to follow [ensuivre], eternity (2x) [ternit],
event (2x) [vnement], all at once [ la fois], fortuitous (2x) [fortuit], fortuitously (2x) [fortuitement], to bet [gager], hypothetical [hypothtique], infinite (6x) [infinie], throw or throws (6x) [jet or jets], game [jeu], laws [lois],
multitude (3x) [multitude], multitude of those [multitude de ceux], multitude
of throws [multitude de jets], number (2x) [nombre], order [ordre], small
[petit], no limits [point de bornes], possible [possible], possibility [possibilit], to propose [proposer], proposition [proposition], quantity (3x) [quan-
Diderot
125
tit], quantity of throws (3x) [quantit des jets], real [relle], result [rsultat],
definite number (2x) [somme finie], infinite number [somme infinie], chances
[sorts], and supposition [supposition].11
The atheist in the argument relies on the certainty of the science of mathematics to understand the origin of the world. Atoms are metaphorized as
dice. Just as dice are thrown and randomly yield new permutations, atoms,
too, collide and form new combinations. A basic premise of probability theory is that as the number of tosses grows larger, all possible combinations
eventuate. Given an eternal time frame, nothing is impossible.
Diderot employs three metaphors: atoms [atomes] (that perpetually collide and form new objects), printers type [caractres] (given enough time,
random strokes of printers type can result in a literary masterpiece), and dice
[ds] (the continual roll of dice will eventually yield the most unlikely patterns). The deist tells the atheist that he might as well argue that Voltaires
La Henriade or Homers Iliad were produced by random keystrokes on printers type; this appears, at first glance, to be a good argument that intelligence is required to produce order from chaos. However, the atheist uses the
science of mathematics to prove that given an eternal time frame and random
molecular motion, intelligence is not required to produce order from chaos:
every possible permutation will eventuate without will or intelligence. Here,
physics predominates and Divine Will is obviated.
In the conclusion to Thought 21, Diderot asserts, Therefore the mind
ought to be more astonished at the hypothetical duration of chaos than at the
actual birth of the universe.12 In this statement, Diderot surmises that chaos
has never existed because the motive property of atoms dispels it. Hence, he
takes exception to the biblical notion that God called the world into being out
of chaos with His Word. The fact that the universe exists is an iconic representation of the truth of the mathematical principle that flux (of
events)+time=patterns.
This is an overview of two crucial points in the fulcrum of Diderots
transformism (probability theory and the motive property of matter). A more
in depth analysis, an explication de texte of the mathematical terminology
that Diderot employs, and an enumeration of articles on probability theory
that appeared in the Encyclopedia (17511765, source material for his later
works), appears in my first book, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species,
Chapter 1, Chaos, Flux, Time, and Probability.13
Three years later, in the Letter on the Blind (1749), Diderot again employs probability theory to show that flux+time dispels chaos. Again the
126
speaker is a mathematician, this time, Nicholaus Saunderson, who was in

fact, Lucasian professor of mathematics at Cambridge and who lost his vision due to smallpox at the age of one. In Diderots work, however, he is
blind from birth. It is significant that the protagonists in Thought 21 and the
Letter on the Blind are both mathematics professors. Mathematics is the science of certainty. Theories can be proven to be true or false and there is no
doubt. Hence, when mathematics is applied to philosophy (ie: speculations
about the origin of the universe), it can be held up as a benchmark against
which truth can be measured.
Saunderson is chosen to be the protagonist for another reason, as well: he
is blind and therefore, one of the anomalies that flux has been eternally producing. He, himself, is an event, and an iconic representation of the proven
mathematical fact that flux, given time, will produce monsters, birth anomalies, beings that can survive only a few hours before they die, beings that nature itself aborts because they are even more seriously defective than those
that survive until birth. Saunderson, himself an anomaly, is emblematic of
the fact that life is merely the result of the motive property of matter. He
declares, if we were to return to the birth of things and times, and we perceived matter move and chaos unfold, we would encounter a multitude of
formless beings for a few well organized beings.14
He continues, For instance, I may ask you and Leibniz and Clarke and
Newton, who told you that in the first instances of the formation of animals
some were not headless and others footless? I might affirm that such an one
had no stomach, another no intestines, that some which seemed to deserve a
long duration from their possession of a stomach, palate, and teeth came to
an end owing to some defect in the heart or lungs; that monsters mutually
destroyed one another; that all the defective combinations of matter disappeared, and that those only survived whose mechanism was not defective in
any important particular and who were able to support and perpetuate themselves.15
The terminology is the same in 1749 as it was in 1746, which indicates
that Diderot is focusing on the problem of the origin of the universe from the
same perspective, namely, that of probability theory. The language connotes
the continual flux of events, randomness, an infinite time frame, and the
eventual appearance of all permutations. He uses birth to connote the beginning of a string of throws: the real birth of the universe (1746, Thought
21) and the birth of things and times (1749, Letter on the Blind). He em-
Diderot
127
ploys admirable to describe what we interpret to be a pattern in a string of

throws: admirable arrangements (2x, 1746) and an admirable order
(1749). He employs chaos in both works: the hypothetical duration of
chaos (1746) and chaos unfold (1749). Permutations from probability
theory [arrangements and combinaisons] recur: the infinite number of possible combinations (1746) and all the defective combinations of matter
have disappeared (1749). Flux recurs in the form of a continual, unceasing
strings of events (multitude): the multitude of throws (1746) and a multitude of formless beings (1749). In 1746 and 1749 we have all of the components of probability theory: patterns that emerge (admirable arrangements,
admirable order), the absence of patterns (chaos), permutations (combinations), the beginning of a string of throws (birth). In 1746 the events were
atomic collisions; in 1749 the events are living beings, many of them deformed creatures. Hence, Diderot returned to the probability theory that he
was considering in 1746, but this time, as an atheist who has concluded that
the random flux of atoms (due to the motive property of matter) has dispersed chaos and eventuated living beings.
In 1746 Diderot was a deist and Newton was his authority; in 1749 Diderot is an atheist and he relies on the authority of the ancients. Lucretius, in
On the Nature of Things, 5.418425, hypothesizes that random molecular
motion created everything in the universe. Diderot derives from Lucretius
both the notion of flux (that the continual random collision of molecules has
brought about the universe) and monsters (some of the events are malformed
humans). Saunderson discounts Newtons admirable order: it is merely the
result of fortuitous throws. Jusqu ce quils aient obtenu quelque arrangement dans lequel ils puissent persvrer is reminiscent of Lucretius statement that multitudes of atoms moving through multitudes of courses through
infinite time eventuate combinations that form the earth, sea, sky, and living
creatures.16 The events are random combinations of atoms that sometimes
take the form of living things: many of these living things are malformed and
monstrous. Saunderson concedes that Newtons admirable order exists.
This is ironic: Saunderson, himself, is not an example of any admirable order, he is defective (blind) and hence, he is an iconic representation of natures flawed random events. What man interprets to be admirable, is, in
fact, a fortuitous string of events.
Because Lucretius is his authority, Diderot asserts that in the beginning,
nature tested every possible combination until they obtained a permutation
in which they could survive [jusquils aient obtenu quelque arrangement
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dans lequel ils puissent persvrer]. Again, we have a fortuitous permutation [arrangement] in a string of events. The language in the Letter on the
Blind, like that in Thought 21, is the language of probability theory: permutations [combinaisons], number of mere possibilities [nombre des possibles],
fortuitous string [order], to appear [paratre], occasionally [de temps en
temps], the start of a string of throws [commencement], a string of repetitious
events [mes semblables taient fort communs], quantity [combien], flux [le
mouvment continue et continuera], time [jusqu], permutation [arrangement], a fortuitous, random permutation [arrangement dans lequel ils puissent persvrer], a string of throws [une succession rapide dtres], a pattern
[une symtrie passagre, un ordre momentan], fortuitous string [la perfection des choses], and time [tout lheure, la dure, vos jours, phmre(s)
(2x), ternel (2x), instant, ternit, temps prcis, durer].17
Diderot observes that given flux (arising from the motive property of atoms), patterns randomly emerge at different levels of magnification: there is
symmetry and self-similarity. The notion that symmetry and self-similarity
are phenomena that arise from chaos would one day be articulated by chaos
theory. While Diderot demonstrates that there must be a succession of monsters in order for a few viable creatures to arise that can survive, similarly,
there are defective worlds among those that do survive. He asks how many
malformed worlds in outer space (where I do not touch and you do not see)
must come into existence, last for a short period of time (because they are
defective), and then disappear. Planets and stars are metaphorized to be
animals (they are malformed) that can subsist only if they have no inherent
self-contradictions. Diderot observes a truth that one day fractal theory
would articulate: symmetry and self-similarity of parts. In the Letter on the
Blind, he observes birth, existence and death at the magnification level of
living beings [animaux] and planets [mondes estropis]. In 1769, in
DAlemberts Dream, he would also observe birth, existence, and death of
animalcules, stars, and the universe itself, as well. Hence, the universe has
symmetry and self-similarity of its parts: the microscopic, living beings, and
the macroscopic are all merely events the flux delivers and furthermore, they
all have a beginning, a term of existence, and an end. Even the whole (the
universe itself) is subject to birth, life, and death, as are its constituent parts.
In addition, Diderot made another astute observation of events arising
from chaos: a single event may have far reaching consequences, like the butterfly effect. Saunderson asks what would have happened to the human race
Diderot
129
if the first man had had serious self-contradictions: what would have been
the fate of the human race? It would have been still merged in the general
depuration of the universe, and that proud being who calls himself man, dissolved and dispersed among the molecules of mater, would have remained
perhaps forever hidden among the number of mere possibilities.18 Diderot
recognizes that one random event can spawn a series of random events: humanity may never have proceeded past the first man if he had been seriously
defective.
Henri Coulet observes that during the eighteenth century, men came to
terms with flux, change, impermanence, and uncertainty as to what will happen next. Coulet finds that men were ready to tolerate contradictions and
accept the fact that they have been immersed in the changing flux of phenomena and the inexhaustible chain of causes and effects.19 Hence, the
eighteenth century addressed mortality, unpredictability and uncertainty as it
realized that man is merely an event in an eternal stream of random events.
Coulet also comments on the monsters in Diderots writings. Coulet
finds that for Diderot, the difference between monsters and normality is
purely statistical-monsters appear less frequently than do normal beings. In
DAlemberts Dream Julie and Bordeu discuss many of the things that could
go wrong in a developing embryo. Julie is surprised that the fibers that comprise the developing fetus do not get tangled more often, like the silk threads
on her weaving loom, and form birth anomalies more often than they do.
Coulet notes that in the section Ftus in the Elements of Physiology, Diderot asserts that if monsters are defined as beings that do not last, then everyone is a monster because no one is immortal.20
Lester Crocker says that in the Letter on the Blind Diderot demonstrates
that the universe is not an orderly clock-mechanism, but a chaotic force in
which everything is the result of blind randomness plus necessity. There is a
cosmic order, but it is the transient outcome of trial and error in an endless
process devoid of final causes.21
While in 1749 Diderot was armed with probability theory and the motive
property of atoms, it would not be until 1753 that he would have the crucial
third factor that would make transformism work: the conscious property of
atoms. Maupertuis had devised a system that explains the transmission of
inherited traits from generation to generation based on the conscious property of matter. He believed that this could explain how all living beings
arose from a single source. Maupertuis first published his book in Latin in
1751 under the title Inaugural Dissertation in Metaphysics. Diderot cites
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Maupertuis book in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753),

Thought 12, footnote 2, and mentions that it was brought to France in
1753. Diderot used Maupertuis work as the foundation of his own ideas
from 1753 on.
In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, Diderot begins
his explanation of transformism by commenting on homologies. He borrows
from Buffons observation that species share homologous parts, but he carries the notion much farther than Buffon had done: he shares Maupertuis
view that the fact that physical characteristics overlap among species is evidence that all beings arose from a single prototype. He wrote, When we
observe the successive outward metamorphoses which take place in this prototype, whatever it may be, pushing one realm of life closer to another by
imperceptible stages, and populating the regions where these two realms
border on each other (if they can be referred to as borders in the absence of
any true divisions); and, populating, as I said, the border regions of the two
realms with vague, unidentifiable beings, largely devoid of the forms, qualities and functions of one region and assuming the forms, qualities and functions of the other; who, then, would not be persuaded that there had never
been more than one single prototype for every being?22 Hence, he takes
Buffons observation of homologies that exist among species and expands it
to include the shared characteristics between kingdoms. The idea that one
kingdom metamorphosed into another kingdom has far reaching implications: if all of nature arose from a single entity, then consciousness, too, must
have developed from a single source.
While the issue of consciousness rising up through the chain of beings
from a single source is not mentioned, but implied in Thought 12, the mechanics for it are explained in Thought 50. In Thought 50 Diderot explains
Maupertuis hypothesis that consciousness is a property of matter. All atoms have the properties of desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence. Furthermore, as atoms combine to form more highly organized entities, the new
objects that are created possess desire, aversion, memory and intelligence at
their level of organization, as well. In Thought 50, Diderot reiterates Maupertuis assertion that when parental elements combine to form a composite,
each element forgets its memory of self and acquires the consciousness and
memory of the whole. Diderot quotes from Chapter 52 from Maupertuis
Inaugural Dissertation in Metaphysics in the original Latin: It seems that
from all of the perceptions of the elements having been gathered together,
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there results a single perception that is much stronger, much more perfect
than any of the constituent perceptions and which is perhaps analogous to
each of these perceptions as the organized body is to the component part.
Each element, in its union with others, having mingled its perception with
theirs, and having lost its consciousness of self, we have lost the memory of
the original state of the elements, and our origin must be entirely lost for
us.23
A single perception that is much stronger and much more perfect [Unam fortiorem et magis perfectam perceptionem] is Diderots statement of
emergent consciousness: as elements unite, something radically new and different emerges, different from any of its components. This made Diderot a
pioneer in his time: he recognized that a random, emergent consciousness
arises and that this new consciousness is not equal to the sum of its components; it is stronger and more perfect than the sum of its constituents.
Diderot and Maupertuis were pangenesists: they believed that each organ
produces superfluous particles that it does not need. These particles circulate
throughout the bloodstream of each parent and eventually go on to form the
conceptus. When they do, they retain the memory of their former situation
and go on to form the organ from which they came. When these tiny particles, which are conscious and thinking, retain the memory of their original
position, the offspring resembles his parents. When these parental elements
cannot unite because of a lapse of memory (ne puisse sunir par oubli) of
their original arrangement, birth anomalies result.
Diderot uses the term memory [mmoire] five times in Thought 50.
Repetition of memory hyperbolizes the conscious property of matter. It
reminds the reader that all matter is conscious, from the atom to organized
matter and that this memory is responsible for heredity [ressemblance]. On
the other hand, the absence of the memory of the arrangement of parental
elements (this is an error in the generative process) is responsible for all the
diversity that we see in nature. This lapse of memory creates something different from the original and could explain how all beings, in fact, even the
three kingdoms, arose from a single prototype. Parental elements are like
bees on a branch, each having the memory of a single position. If they retain
their memory of their original position, the offspring resembles his parents.
If they have a lapse of memory, a teratism results. These errors are passed
on from generation to generation and sometimes skip a generation. Over
time, they can create a new species or a new kingdom. Maupertuiss work
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had taught Diderot the terms arrangement [arrangements] and traits

[traits].
Diderot recognized Maupertuis genius and made his hypothesis his own.
He was able to use it to fill a gap in the Newtonian explanation of heredity:
the motive property of atoms alone does not explain resemblance to parents.
The conscious property of matter does.
Furthermore, the hypothesis that each constituent element loses the
memory of its former self and becomes conscious only of the new entity that
is formed solves another problem: that of contiguity vs. continuity. In Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species the solution to the problem is summarized thus: Diderot is exploring contiguity vs. continuity, unity vs.
heterogeneity, the particular vs. the general. By proposing a mechanical assimilation of molecular consciousness, he is resolving the conflict between
contiguity and continuity. Particles may be contiguous, but they lose their
sense of self and their consciousness becomes continuous. Once their consciousness becomes one, then their physical parts work as one, as well. Diderot is proposing a random, emergent ascent of conscious matter that
culminates in human consciousness.
He is positing that consciousness
emerges in a way underivable from its constituent parts, just as the property
of wetness cannot be derived from the hydrogen and oxygen alone. Diderot
had a holistic view of consciousness: the conscious whole is very different
from any of its constituents. This is because when conscious molecules
combine, they lose memory of their former state and acquire the consciousness of the new composite that is formed. What Diderot is positing is a series of chronological events that culminate in the creation of conscious
entities unlike their constituent parts. The series of events may be illustrated
in the following paradigm: random motion of conscious atoms>organized
matter> life>human thought.24
CLIMATE, GEOGRAPHY, FOOD AND

WAY OF LIFE
In 1769 Diderot clearly articulates a theory of transformism (in the trilogy,
the Conversation between dAlembert and Diderot, DAlemberts Dream,
Diderot
133
and the Sequel to the Conversation). Diderot parted company with Buffon
on the question of how much influence environmental factors have on species. Buffon believed that environmental factors can cause minor changes in
a species, but not create a new species because the essential character of each
species is locked in by an interior molding force. Diderot, on the other hand,
discarded the interior molding force. When, in DAlemberts Dream, he declares that needs create organs, he is declaring adaptation to environment.
He reiterates that given millions of years, climate can make a species larger,
smaller, extinct, transform it into a new and different species, or even cause
it to cross over into another kingdom. Furthermore, in DAlemberts Dream,
dAlembert declares that if a few thousand leagues can change us into another species, then the difference of several times the earths diameter will
create even greater differences. He wonders whether beings on Saturn have
more senses than we do.
DAlembert asks why he is the way he is and he answers his own question: I had to be like this25 This immediate answer hyperbolizes the determinism of geography. There is no doubt, the answer comes right away.
The quick response is an iconic representation of the certainty of science.
There is a scientific basis for the physical characteristics of dAlembert and it
is indisputable. He wonders what he would have looked like if he had resided elsewhere-the North Pole, the equator, Saturn, the distance of a few
thousand earth diameters. Diderot places species in the space continuum.
The universe is vast and species are contingent upon location.
Then Diderot adds the fourth dimension, time: quelques millions de
sicles. Time itself is subject to flux. Diderot compartmentalizes time into
parcels (centuries) and each parcel becomes an event. We have the language
of games of chance and it is applied to time: a number of throws (millions)
and events (centuries). As the number of packets of time approaches infinity, every possible outcome will occur. DAlembert asks what his species
will look like in a few million centuries.26 Nature is continually trying out
new combinations-those without serious self-contradictions will survive. We
do not know what the wild polar man will look like with time. Buffon
thought that the wild polar man is an example of degeneration. For Buffon,
God created species perfectly at the time of Creation, and therefore, they can
only degenerate, not ameliorate. However, for Diderot, nature randomly and
blindly creates variations. If anything is created perfectly, it is by chance.
Therefore, it may be that the wild polar man is on his way to perfection, rather than to extinction. One should not make the mistake of Fontenelles
134
roses and draw erroneous conclusions about what happens over an eternal
time frame. In his sleep dAlembert warns against the fallacy of the ephemeral, alluding to the error that Fontenelles roses made in thinking that their
gardener is immortal.27 The character Bordeu explains that the fallacy of the
ephemeral is made by an ephemeral being who believes in the immortality of
things.28 Diderot is instructing the reader that we, who, like Fontenelles
roses, have a limited lifespan, cannot tell what happens over an infinite
length of time.
DEGENERATION AND PERFECTION

Buffon thought that animals degenerate when taken out of their lands of origin, are poorly fed and overworked by men. He believed that the deleterious
effects that a harsh climate and domestication have on a species could be
reversed by crossbreeding varieties of the same species from different locations in order to introduce healthy new characteristics. Diderot carried the
idea of degeneration and perfection much farther, to its utter extreme. In
DAlemberts Dream, Bordeu states that the tiny worm that grovels in the
dirt may be on its way to becoming a large elephant and that the large elephant, that frightens us by its enormous size, may be on its way to becoming
a tiny worm. Animals were not in the past what they are at present. We
have no idea what they will become with time. Degeneration and perfection
have no meaning for Diderot-they are useless, judgmental terms. Nature is
in continual flux and we should not conclude that nature is taking a direction,
either towards perfection or degeneration. There is no design in nature. Nature improves itself haphazardly, only to undo the improvements.
The fact that living beings randomly come into and out of existence is
evidenced by the spontaneous generation of animalcules under microscopic
magnification. Diderot engaged the theory of spontaneous generation to
prove the veracity of transformism. Buffon and Needham had conducted
experiments (albeit flawed) that showed spontaneous generation to be a fact,
and he used them as his authority. Hence, he reversed his opinion of 1746
when he argued that experimentation has shown that putrefaction alone produces nothing (Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 18), relying upon the work of
Redi. During the eighteenth century the issue was not clear cut, as there
were experiments that proved both sides of the controversy. Diderot added
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135
spontaneous generation to his arsenal and argued that since it proves that life
arises from inanimate matter all the time, divine agency is unnecessary. Furthermore, animalcules form from Buffon and Needhams infusions of vegetable broth, showing that the animal kingdom arises from the vegetable
kingdom.
Animalcules come into existence in the twinkling of an eye, endure a
short time, and fall out of existence. They are an iconic representation of the
flux that nature delivers. Species are like animalcules: species, too, emerge,
last for a duration, and fall out of existence. Entire worlds, planets, stars, the
universe itself, are like animalcules-they, too, are born, last for a length of
time, and disappear. Since the universe is comprised of molecules in motion,
it, too, may have a finite duration and then disappear. Diderot returns to
symmetry and self-similarity, phenomena arising from chaos, that would one
day be articulated by chaos theory. Animalcules, animals, species, planets,
stars, the universe, are events in an endless continuum of flux. Each is
hatched (clore), lives, and dies. Even planets and stars are hatched, as are
animals. The universe is hatched [clore]: I conjecture, then, that in the
beginning, when matter in a state of ferment brought this world into being,
creatures like myself were of very common occurrence.29 Each succeeding
level of magnification reveals that objects at that level metamorphose into
other objects over time; many of them are defective, at every level of organization. There are defective worlds as there are defective animals. Those
without serious self contradictions survive, and those are the ones that we
presently observe. The flux of events is observed at the microscopic, visible
and macroscopic levels. Animalcules pass in and out of existence in the
twinkling of an eye. Species take centuries or millennia. At the macroscopic
level, entire star systems and planets pass in and out of existence. Our sun
would not be the first star to lose its light.
Symmetry and self-similarity (the whole resembles its parts) is implied
in the metaphorization of earth as an atom: Endless succession of animalcules in the fermenting atom, the same endless succession of animalcules in
the other atom that we call Earth.30 During the eighteenth century, the primary definition of atome was a Body that is considered to be indivisible
because of its smallness. Democritus and Epicurus claimed that the world
was comprised of atoms, that the body was formed by the fortuitous convergence of atoms.31 The secondary definition was that tiny dust that is seen
flying in the air in the rays of the sun.32 Hence, atome is a clever play on
words: the earth is metaphorized as a speck of dust that flies through space in
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the rays of the sun. The sentence, Endless succession of animalcules,

shows that flux exists at the level of the microscopic (animalcules), the visible (species are events), and the macroscopic (the earth is an event). The
parcels of time here are the twinkling of an eye and centuries. Elsewhere
Diderot shows that flux exists at the level of the macroscopic, as well. In the
Conversation between dAlembert and Diderot, the character Diderot asks,
Do you consent to my extinguishing our sun?33 The character dAlembert
replies, The more readily, since it will not be the first to have gone out.34
The sun undergoes the processes of birth, life, and death, and thus, it is established that the formation of stars is an event in a continual stream, just as are
molecules and living beings. The extinction and reillumination of the sun is
representative of flux at the level of stars. This concurs with fractal theory:
the larger body resembles its components. For Diderot, the larger and smaller undergo the same processes and are comprised of ever smaller, similar,
constituent parts. This is a reiteration of Saundersons statement in Letter on
the Blind: How many faulty and incomplete worlds have been dispersed and
perhaps form again, and are dispersed at every instant in remote regions of
space which I cannot touch35 Since the random collision of molecules
can bring about life on this planet, it probably can on others, as well. Diderot
considers the metamorphosis, over millennia, of star systems, planets, species, and animalcules.
HEREDITY [RESSEMBLANCE]
In DAlemberts Dream (1769) Diderot reiterates Maupertuis theory of heredity that he had discussed in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature
(1753). He holds epigenesis, not preformation, to be the correct explanation
of the generative process. Both the father and mother contribute particles
that circulate in the bloodstream of each parent. The offspring is formed by
epigenesis, a process that William Harvey defined as partium superexorientium additamentum, holding that the germ is brought into existence
by the addition of parts that bud out of one another or by successive accretions.36 This allows for the formation of a unique new entity that is different
from either parent. In the Conversation between dAlembert and Diderot,
Diderot explains dAlemberts origins this way: the molecules that were
necessary to form the first rudiments of my geometer were scattered
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137
throughout the young and frail machines of one and the other.37 Epigenesis
can explain self-replication: because it shows how a unique being is formed,
different from either parent, it can explain teratisms and hybrids.
Heredity is transmitted because each parental element retains its memory
of its former situation that it had in the parent and takes it up again to form
the same part from whence it came. When it retains its memory, the offspring resembles the parent. When it does not, a birth defect occurs. Because matter is conscious, particles organize into threads, threads into
bundles of fibers, and bundles of fibers into organs. Each successive entity
has a consciousness of its own and functions as a whole. When matter combines to form a new entity, it loses its memory of its former self and assumes
the memory of the new entity it has formed. Each of the fibers in the bundle
is transformed solely by nutrition and according to its conformation into a
particular organ; an exception is made for those organs in which the germs
themselves are reproduced.
Fibers [brins] are the key to transformism: man is a complicated machine
that proceeds towards perfection through countless, successive stages, whose
formation depends on delicate fibers that can be mutilated: where the least
important fiber cannot be broken, ruptured, moved from its original position,
without a problematic consequence for the whole, is bound to get twisted,
entangled even more often in the place of its formation than my silks on my
skein-holder.38 It was Maupertuis who conceptualized that errors that occur
in the generative process cause birth anomalies. It was Diderots attendance
at autopsies and dissections that exposed him to the myriad anomalies in
miscarried fetuses. When the character Julie says that she is amazed that
errors do not occur more often, it is really Diderot, who has witnessed many
dissections of miscarried fetuses, who is speaking. Diderot cites examples of
people whose fibers were ruptured, moved or missing during gestation: there
are hunchbacks, cripples, Siamese twins, and Jean-Baptiste Mac, the man
who was born with his heart and stomach on the right side and his liver on
the left.
Diderot mentions that if Jean-Baptiste Mac had lived, some descendant
in a hundred years would have his deformities because such irregularities
make jumps in generations. We see the influence of Maupertuis here, who,
in the Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics discusses the fact that certain
traits skip generations.39 Diderot surmises that perhaps one of the parents
fixes the defect that the other has and that the defective network does not
recur until the next generation, when the descendant in the family with the
138
monstrosities predominates and determines the formation of the network.40

Diderot derives the terminology predominates [prdomine] from Maupertuis. It is a testimony to the genius of Diderot and Maupertuis that they were
able to relate errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements to the
idea that over time, these errors could create new species and even cross over
into other kingdoms.
Diderot envisaged that one day science would be able to control the
process of generation and give mankind the offspring of his choice. He believed that one day man could breed improved offspring that excel at certain
occupations or have specific talents: A hot room, covered with small flasks,
and on each of these flasks, an identification tag: warriors, magistrates, philosophers, poets, flask of courtiers, flask of harlots, flask of kings.41 He also
advocated investigating whether crossbreeding could result in improved species that would be useful, perhaps as servants to man. While experiments
had shown that crossbreeding results in the production of infertile offspring,
he advised that more experimentation was needed. The purpose of crossbreeding would be to create more perfect beings, to improve what nature
cannot improve by itself. In the Sequel to the Conversation (1769), the character Bordeu suggests that crossbreeding men and goats might yield an intelligent, fleet-footed race of beings that could be servants to man. However,
Julie wisely articulates the possibility that tampering with nature may be
dangerous and that it may produce unexpected, horrific results: the goat-men
might turn out to be an immoral race of terrible lechers and society may degenerate to the point that there might be no safety for women.
Furthermore, tampering with science raises religious issues. Bordeu and
Julie joke about hybrid men: would they have a soul that requires redemption
from original sin? The reader is led to wonder how highly organized a being
must be before it is endowed with an immortal soul that requires salvation. It
also implies that animals are conscious; Diderot argues that animals are indeed conscious in the article Animal. Since the chain of beings is a continuum of infinite gradations, experiments may show that it is possible to
crossbreed man with lower species.
Diderot
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WHAT CRITICS HAVE WRITTEN ABOUT

DIDEROTS TRANSFORMISM
Mary Efrosini Gregorys book, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species,
fills a gap that exists in literary criticism. Much has been written about individual elements of Diderots biology, but there is an absence of material discussing how he synthesized a variety of elements from different sources to
create a composite transformist biology. Diderot and the Metamorphosis of
Species examines how Diderot derives his ideas from various contemporary
sources (Buffon, Maupertuis, La Mettrie, Encyclopedia articles, attendance
at dissections) and combines them to arrive at something new. It is also the
only book that focuses specifically on the influence that probability theory
and games of chance had on Diderots notion that species metamorphose
over millions of years.
Lester Crockers article, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism is the only article that provides an overview of Diderots thought
from 17461769. In his article Crocker mentions the most important contributions that Leibniz, La Mettrie, Maillet, Buffon, Maupertuis, Robinet, and
Bordeu, made to Diderots transformism. He also discusses the factors that
caused Diderot to migrate from deist to pantheist to atheist during the three
year period 17461749. Crocker concludes that it was La Mettrie who had
convinced Diderot that Nature had to be conceived of as a self-creating,
self-patterning force, as an experimenting-and a blindly experimentingforce.42
Several scholars have written articles on Diderots monsters: Emita
Hills two articles, Materialism and Monsters in Diderots Le Rve de
dAlembert43 and The Role of Le Monstre in Diderot Thought,44 Gerhardt Stengers, Lordre et les monstres dans la pense philosophique, politique et morale de Diderot,45 Aurlie Suratteaus, Les hermaphrodites de
Diderot,46 Johan Werner Schmidts, Diderot and Lucretius: The De Rerum
Natura and Lucretius Legacy in Diderots Scientific, Aesthetic and Ethical
Thought,47 and Christine M. Singhs, The Lettre sur les aveugles: Its Debt
to Lucretius.48 The critics agree that monsters are iconic representations of
the random events that flux provides and evidence of the metamorphosis of
living things that occur all the time. Nature continually produces monsters;
monsters are not something that has ceased at the beginning of time. Henri
Coulet, in his article, Diderot et le problme du changement, discusses the
140
impact that the notion of flux had on contemporary thought. He observes

that during the eighteenth century, men were ready to tolerate contradictions and accept the fact that they have been immersed in the changing flux
of phenomena and the inexhaustible chain of causes and effects.49 Because
nature is random, the terms normal and anomaly have no meaning. Nature is continually producing errors that result in variations without regard to
their outcome. Coulet observes that for Diderot the difference between monsters and normalcy is purely statistical-in the Dream, Julie is surprised that
the formative fibers of the embryo do not get mixed up or mutilated more
often, like the silk threads on her spindle. Coulet adds that in the article
Ftus in the Elements of Physiology, Diderot shows that if monsters were
those that do not last, then everyone is a monster because no one is immortal.50
There are also a few articles on the influence that Maupertuis had on Diderot. Maupertuis had studied polydactyly in a Berlinese family and noted
its recurrence over several generations. He extrapolated that parental elements contributed by both parents, statistical probability of recurrence, and
birth anomalies were all interdependent. He was even able to calculate, with
exactitude, the statistical probability that polydactyly would appear in a population of 100,000 (he calculated it to be 8,000,000,000,000:1)51 Bentley
Glass offers an outstanding criticism of Maupertuis and Diderot in his article,
Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution,52 as does Aram Vartanian,
in his article, Diderot et Maupertuis.53
There is also ample criticism of the influence of that Buffons Natural
History had on Diderot: there exists articles by Michle Duchet,
Lanthropologie de Diderot,54 Jean Ehrard, Diderot, lEncyclopdie, et
lHistoire et thorie de la Terre,55 Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the
Problem of Species,56 Jacques Rogers book, Buffon: A Life in Natural History,57 Rogers article, Diderot et Buffon en 1749,58 Rogers book, The Life
Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought,59 and Aram Vartanians
article, Buffon et Diderot,60
Several articles have also been written on La Mettries influence on Diderot: Jean E. Perkins, Diderot and La Mettrie,61 Ann Thomson, La Mettrie et Diderot62 and Lunit matrielle de lhomme chez La Mettrie et
Diderot,63 Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: An Intertextual Encounter64 and Trembleys Polyp, La Mettrie, and EighteenthCentury French Materialism,65 and Marx W. Wartofsky, Diderot and the
Diderot
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Development of Materialist Monism.66 In this last work by Wartofsky, the

critic addresses the Diderots monism and the causality between the motive
property of atoms and the metamorphosis of inanimate matter to animate
matter. Wartofsky says that La Mettrie taught Diderot that consciousness is
the product of motion. Diderot concluded that consciousness arises in the
egg after the motion of atoms has successively caused various levels of organization to occur. Because the motion in atoms eventually leads to consciousness, all life could have resulted from the mineral kingdom.
In summation, Diderots originality is seen in the fact that he viewed
species as mutable, rather than fixed. His transformism rests on a fulcrum
with three pivotal points: probability theory, the motive property of matter,
and the conscious property of matter. Flux+time dispels chaos. Atoms are
continually in motion and randomly colliding, testing every possible combination (Lucretius). They are also conscious: they have desire, aversion,
memory, and intelligence. When they combine, they lose the memory of
their former situation and acquire the consciousness of the new entity that
they form. Hence, all matter is conscious at every level of organization.
Carrying the notion to the limit, perhaps the universe is conscious, and is
therefore God. In the developing embryo, conscious fibers form bundles of
threads, which in turn, form organs. Errors occur in the generative process
when particles suffer from a lapse of memory and do not go on to take up the
exact arrangement that they had before. Parental elements are like bees sitting on the branch of a tree: they have a specific arrangement and memory of
their original position in that arrangement. When they fail to remember their
original situation, there arises an anomaly. Over time, these anomalies can
create new species and cross over into other kingdoms. There errors can explain how all living things arose from a single prototype, and how the three
kingdoms arose from one.
Chapter7
Rousseau
I shall suppose his conformation to have been at all times what it appears to us at
this day; that he always walked on two legs, made use of his hands as we do, directed his looks over all nature, and measured with his eyes the vast expanse of
Heaven.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755)1
Jean-Jacques Rousseau embraced anthropological (intraspecies) change and

sociological progress, but he rejected biological transformism (the notion
that man metamorphosed from species of a lower organization). As an observer of nature, he held that there was no evidence that man had ever been a
quadruped. As a deist, he agreed with Buffon that man left the hands of God
as a biped, not a quadruped, in the same anthropomorphic form as we see
him today. God differentiated man from the animals by giving him intellectual potential or intellectual perfectibility (that is, the ability to learn and improve himself as he grows older) and free will. There were several factors
that influenced Rousseaus thought:
1. He had enormous respect for Buffon and Buffon rejected transformism. Buffon hypothesized that an interior molding force shapes the
essential physical characteristics of each species and that therefore,
species do not undergo significant changes over time. Rousseau accepted the permanence of mans anthropomorphic characteristics.
2. Rousseau was a deist and he believed that God created all species
perfectly at the time of Creation. In the first sentence of Emile, Part
144

1, he says, as Buffon had done before him, Everything is good as it
leaves the hands of the Author of things, everything degenerates in
the hands of man.
3. There was an absence of scientific proof that man had metamorphosed from quadrupeds and this lack of evidence was significant.2
Rousseau demanded evidence.
4. It was highly improbable that man had metamorphosed from quadrupeds and he explains why: the placement of eyes in front of the
head, placement of his feet, and high hind quarters would make him
vulnerable to prey if he had been a quadruped.3
While Buffon argues that the physical constitution of species degenerate

when they are taken out of their natural environment and domesticated,
Rousseau attempts to show that the morals of man have degenerated when
man left his original environment, the woods, to form civilized society.
Rousseaus originality lies in the fact that he applied Buffons notion of degeneration, environment, food, soil, time and space, to the deterioration of
mans spiritual self.
In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), Preface, Paragraph
1, Rousseau asks, And how shall man hope to see himself as nature made
him, across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have
produced in his original constitution? And how can he distinguish what is
fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition?4 Here Rousseau is not referring to changes in physical
characteristics, but to changes in mans psyche. While Buffon examines the
details of physical changes that species undergo with the passage of time and
a change in environment, Rousseaus goal will be parallel, but will examine
instead the changes in mans soul. Hence, he does recognize the impermanence of nature and that it continually produces a flux of events. He uses the
terms changes, succession, times, original, and progress.
Rousseau uses the terms changes [changements], succession [succession], times [des temps], things [des choses], original [originelle],
circumstances [circonstances], and progress [progrs]. We have the
language of probability theory here: events (changes, times, things, circumstances), parcels of time (time itself if divided into periods, which themselves, are events), the beginning of a string (original), and flux (succession).
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145
When he says original constitution, he is not talking about the human

body. He does not believe that the human body has changed significantly
since God created it. He is referring to the spiritual constitution-morality,
values, passions, likes and dislikes. The attempt to distinguish what is fundamental in his own nature will have to do with the psychic part of man,
rather than his physical self.
Rousseau compares the spiritual degeneration that man has suffered
when he left the woods to enter civilization to the erosion weathered by the
statue of Glaucus: Like the statue of Glaucus, which was so disfigured by
time, seas and tempests, that it looked more like a wild beast than a god, the
human soul, altered in society by a thousand causes perpetually recurring, by
the acquisition of a multitude of truths and errors, by the changes happening
to the constitution of the body, and by the continlual jarring of the passions,
has, so to speak, changed in appearance, so as to be hardly recognizable.
Instead of a being, acting constantly from fixed and invariable principles,
instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity, impressed on it by its divine
Author, we find in it only the frightful contrast of passion mistaking itself for
reason, and of understanding grown delirious.5
Rousseau metaphorizes the spiritual deterioration of man as the physical
decay of the statue of Glaucus. He hypothesizes that changes in place and
time must have caused mans psyche to degenerate just as the statue was so
disfigured by time, seas and tempests, that it looked more like a wild beast
than a god. Tous les changements que la succession des temps et des choses
a d produire dans sa constitution originelle indicates the importance that
Rousseau gives to time and the events that flux delivers to mans decline into
immorality and vice. It appears that Rousseau was influenced by Buffon,
who declared that everything left the Creators hands perfectly at the time of
Creation and that afterward it degenerated. Rousseau, a deist, believed the
same thing. In fact, the first sentence of Emile, Book 1, testifies to that notion: Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things, everything degenerates in the hands of man. [Tout est bien sortant des mains de
lAuteur des choses, tout dgnre entre les mains de lhomme.].
The decay of the statue of Glaucus is a striking reversal of the journey up
the chain of beings and demonstrates contempt for civilization: instead of a
beast gradually transforming into a god over time, the image of a god degenerates, with time, into the figure of a wild beast. This is the opposite of Montesquieus early Troglodytes, who resembling animals, eventually assumed a
146
human appearance, as well as a reversal of man in the writings of Aristotle,

Herodotus, and Pliny, who have portrayed the effect of time on man as an
ameliorating one. In the works of the ancients and in Montesquieus Troglodytes, there was a time when man was indistinguishable from any other animal; he was disfigured and monstrous, half human, half animal; it took time
for him to acquire his present human form. However, in Rousseau, we have
the opposite: he compares man to a likeness of a god that slowly metamorphosed into that of a wild beast. Rousseau tells us that man started out always acting from fixed and invariable principles, having a celestial and
majestic simplicity that God had impressed upon him, and having understanding, but with time, he developed a frightful passion mistaking itself for
reason, and understanding grown delirious. These are marred personality
traits and Rousseau is talking about the fact that civilization and time have
warped and twisted mans soul. He metaphorizes the warping and twisting
of the spiritual as the marred physical appearance of Glaucus statue.
Again we have the language of probability theory: time (time, forever)
[temps, sans cesse], events (sea, storm, causes, knowledge, errors, changes,
passions) [mer, orages, causes, connaissances, erreurs, changements, passions], number of throws (thousand) [mille], flux (sea, storm, lap of society,
recurring, continual) [mer, orages, sein de la socit, sans cesse, continuel].
What Rousseau shows is that flux+time=degeneration of mans psyche. He
compares mans mind to the statue of Glaucus; he likens ownership, the arts
and sciences, and society to the sea and storms that mutilated the statue. The
beginning of the string is as nature made him. Time passes. There is a
flux of events (discoveries, landmarks in human progress, the arts and sciences). The long term effect is the degeneration of mens souls. While Buffon described the degeneration of the physical characteristics of animals,
Rousseau also uses the terms disfigured [dfigure], ferocious Beast
[bte feroce], altered [altre], changes [changements], changed in appearance [chang dapparence], unrecognizable [mconnaissable], and
deformed [difforme]. The difference between Buffon and Rousseau is this:
Rousseau applies these terms to mans psyche, not his body. It is mens passions and understanding that are both deformed: deformed contrast of passion [difforme contraste de la passion] and understanding grown delirious
[lentendement en dlire].
In the Preface, Paragraph 2, we have yet another reversal: It is still
more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species removes it still
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147
farther from its primitive state6 Cruel [cruel] connotes animality, ferocity, carnivorousness, all of the brutal qualities of animals in the jungle.
However, Rousseau associates cruelty with every advance [tous les progrs] and the more new knowledge [plusnouvelles connaissances]. Progress and civilization take man farther from his original state, cause him to
forget what he once was, and make it more difficult to retrace his steps back
to his true self, that of natural man. Hence, there is a reverse transformism, a
degeneration in the Buffonian sense, but not of physical characteristics, but
of morality.
In Paragraph 3 there is another Buffonian analogy: as species differentiate into varieties, man differentiated into various social classes and inequality
began. There is an analogy between physical causes had introduced those
varieties which are now observable among some of them and the origin of
those differences which now distinguish men. Rousseau mentions that
when mans character began to ameliorate or degenerate, men were acquiring various good or bad qualities not inherent in their nature. Here we see
that it is Rousseaus thesis that man is born neither good nor evil-he is a
tabula rasa upon which society imprints. The fact that men were acquiring
various good or bad qualities not inherent in their nature indicates that good
and evil are learned and acquired.
In the Exordium (the prefatory material immediately preceding Part 1),
Paragraph 2, Rousseau conceives of two kinds of inequality: the physical
(comprised of differences in age, health, body strength, and quality of the
mind or soul) and the moral or political inequality. The latter is contingent
upon convention and mans consent and consists of various privileges that
men have, some more than others: wealth, honor, and power. Rousseau
states his goal: it is to examine how inequality arose among men, when originally, when man lived in the woods and before he joined civilization, all
men were equal, did not own property, but the earth belonged to everyone.
In order to pinpoint the origin of inequality among men, it is necessary to go
back to the state of nature, before it arose. When man existed in a state of
nature, he did not understand the concept of belong to and ownership.
Need, greed, oppression, desires and pride were vices that came with society.
The authority of the strong over the weak is another convention that arose by
mutual agreement.
In Part 1, Paragraph 1, Rousseau shows contempt for Aristotles inclusion of hairy monsters in the great chain of being. Rousseau summarizes the
148
Aristotelian viewpoint thus: I shall not ask whether his long nails were at
first, as Aristotle supposes, only crooked talons; whether his whole body,
like that of a bear, was not covered with hair; or whether the fact that he
walked upon all fours, with his looks directed toward the earth, confined to a
horizon of a few paces, did not at once point out the nature and limits of his
ideas. On this subject I could form none but vague and almost imaginary
conjectures. Comparative anatomy has as yet made too little progress, and
the observations of naturalists are too uncertain to afford an adequate basis
for any solid reasoning.7 Here Rousseau clearly articulates the materialists
transformist hypothesis that he would go on to refute: that man walked on all
fours, had claws, was hairy like a bear, gazed down at the ground, and because he looked down at the ground, his perspective, and hence his intellect,
were necessarily limited. This statement indicates that Rousseau was aware
of the tranformist theory and that he had carefully read Buffon, who had previously articulated it and then, too, went on to refute it.
Rousseau rejects the transformist view of mans origins and he articulates several reasons why. First, he points out that no one has any idea of
mans origins and that therefore, the transformist hypothesis is purely speculative, not factual. His statement, On this subject I could form none but
vague and almost imaginary conjectures undercuts Aristotle, Herodotus,
and Pliny, as well as contemporary materialists. The terms vague [vagues], imaginary [imaginaires], and conjectures [conjectures] are tautological and hyperbolize the unknown or speculative nature of the subject. He
reiterates this further: comparative anatomy has made too little progress
[trop peu de progrs] and the observations of naturalists are too uncertain
[trop incertaines]. Too little progress and too uncertain are also tautological and further undercut contemporary scientists and the transformist
point of view. He demonstrates contempt for science by hyperbolizing its
limitations.
In his endnotes, Rousseau explains in detail why he rejects interspecies
transformism. In Note 3, Part 2, he refutes the notion that originally man
walked on all fours; he asserts that man must always have been a biped for at
least six reasons.8 First, even if one could show that he could originally have
been structured differently than he presently is, hypotheses based on possibilities are not enough-one would have to prove not that it is possible, but
that it is probable. Possibility [la possibilit] is not enough, one must show
probability, likeliness, likelihood [la vraisemblance]. Here we see the influ-
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149
ence of probability theory. Rousseau relies on probability to show whether

man was originally structured differently than he presently is. Hence, he
cleverly uses mathematics and probability theory, a tool of the materialist
transformists, against them. Secondly, if man had originally walked on all
fours, then the way his head is attached to his body would cause his gaze to
be directed downwards, rather than straight ahead, and this is antithetical to
survival. Rousseau stresses the all importance of survival and selfpreservation and points out that a downward gaze is a position scarcely favorable to the preservation of the individual. Thirdly, man has no tail because bipeds do not need a tail. Quadrupeds find a tail useful and none of
them is without it. Fourthly, a womans breast is well placed for a biped
holding a child in her arms and is so poorly placed for a quadruped, that none
has it so placed. Fifthly, the hindquarters is inordinately high in relation to
the forelegs, which is why we drag ourselves around on our knees when we
walk on all fours. This, too, would be antithetical to survival in a quadruped.
Sixthly, if man were originally a quadruped, he would not be able to lay his
foot flat on the ground the way animals do. Lastly, Rousseau dismisses the
argument that originally man walked on all fours because children crawl on
the ground. He points out that puppies also crawl on the ground for several
weeks after birth and then eventually walk on all fours. He surmises that the
only reason that babies crawl is because of the weakness of their limbs.
What infants do does not prove the metamorphosis of species.
Rousseau accepted Buffons stance against transformism and offered his
own ideas to refute it. It appears that Rousseau adopted Buffons opinion
about an original molding force that make species what they are and because
of it, they do not change radically. Furthermore, Rousseaus deism also
caused him to adopt Buffons view that God made everything perfectly and
that it did not need to be improved in physical form.
Rousseau was contemptuous of the materialists who proposed transformism: regarding the question of whether man originally walked on all fours,
Rousseau says, On this subject I could form none but vague and almost imaginary conjectures. Comparative anatomy has as yet made too little progress, and the observations of naturalists are too uncertain to afford an
adequate basis for any solid reasoning. He dismisses conjectures, then, as
futile and speculative and asserts, I shall suppose his conformation to
have been at all times what it appears to us at this day; that he always walked
150
on two legs, made use of his hands as we do, directed his looks over all nature, and measured with his eyes the vast expanse of Heaven.
Hence, Rousseau was not a transformist. He did not believe man ever
walked on all fours and enumerates a list of reasons why he believes that
God made man a biped, not a quadruped that, with time, became a biped. He
takes his cue from Buffon and, in fact, cites him in the first sentence of
Emile, Part 1, Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of
things, everything degenerates in the hands of man.
In Part 1, Paragraph 2, Rousseau says that man in a state of nature is an
animal: we behold in him an animal weaker than some, and less agile
than others; but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organized of
any.9 Here we see the influence of Buffon: the most advantageously organized of all [organis le plus avantageusement de tous] reiterates the importance that Buffon gave to mans organization. Buffon said that man
stands at the head of all created beings and that the chain of beings extends
from the most organized animal to the crudest matter10 From Buffon
Rousseau had gleaned that man is also an animal, but he is one of an organization of a higher order. In Paragraph 2 Rousseau demonstrates that because man is an animal, nature filled all of savage mans needs and he lacked
nothing. In a state of nature savage man easily acquired everything his heart
desired: he was able to satisfy his hunger beneath an oak tree, drink from a
stream, find his bed beneath the same tree that supplied his meal, and thus,
all of his needs were satisfied.
In Paragraph 3 Rousseau declares that men learned to use natures provisions by observing and imitating the behavior of animals. The earth and
forests offer storage and shelter to all animals: by copying the behavior of
lower species, men, who had no instinct of their own, raised themselves up to
the level of the animals instincts. Here man originally had no instincts, but
intellect instead. Having no instincts of his own, he learned by observing the
behavior of animals. Rousseau repeats that fact that originally man was devoid of instinct: attain even to the instinct of the beasts and man, who
perhaps has not any one peculiar to himself. This is more evidence that
man rejected transformism: God created man as a distinct species at the time
of Creation and the fact that originally he had no instinct is evidence of this.
By observing and imitation various animals, man learned to eat a variety of
different foods. Each species of animal instinctively searches for and consumes a particular food. Man observed them all and learned to eat a variety
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of foods. Thus, by observing, imitating, and having new experiences, he developed his intellectual potential or his intellectual perfectibility and this intellect was much more useful than animal instinct and made man superior to
animals. It is mans intellect that puts him at the head of the chain of beings.
In Paragraph 4 Rousseau mentions the rugged constitution of men living
in the state of nature: Accustomed from their infancy to the inclemencies of
the weather and the rigour of the seasons, inured to fatigue, natural man
had a robust and almost unalterable constitution.11 We see the influence of
Lucretius here: all those that have weak constitutions perished and only the
strong survived: Nature in this case treats them exactly as Sparta treated the
children of her citizens: those who come well formed into the world she renders strong and robust, and all the rest she destroys12 Thus nature dealt
with men as with all other animals, according to Lucretian law. He makes an
analogy between the physical and the moral realms: the converse is true of
moral man. The law of nature in which only the robust survive in the opposite of social law: differing in this respect from our modern communities,
in which the State, by making children a burden to their parents, kills them
indiscriminately before they are born.13 Civilized society kills children
morally by instituting inequality, slavery, vice, and crime. Men become a
burden to others because man must bear the burden of criminals (it must
have a legal system to mete out justice) and must take care of the poor (there
is no poverty in the natural state).
In Paragraph 11 Rousseau returns to Buffons opinion that domestication brings about degeneration and he again applies it to the deterioration of
mans morals: The horse, the cat, the bull, and even the ass are generally of
greater stature, and always more robust, and have more vigour, strength and
courage, when they run wild in the forests than when bred in the stall. By
becoming domesticated, they lose half these advantages; and it seems as if all
our care to feed and treat them well serves only to deprave them.14 When
they are domesticated, they lose half these advantages. Similarly it is with
the character of social man: It is thus with man also: as he becomes sociable
and a slave, he grows weak, timid and servile15 When man enters society, his character changes along with his physical constitution: he learns to
be afraid of others, to value others more than he does himself, and to consent
to being subservient to others. There are no servants in nature: slavery is a
convention instituted by the mutual agreement of men. Thus Rousseau takes
Buffons notion that the domestication of animals cause physical degenera-
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tion and applies it to the destruction of mans morals, the introduction of inequality, vice, greed, murder, slavery, honor, and war, into the psyche of civilized man.
In Paragraph 15 Rousseau says that man is a machine with free will: I
see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath
given senses to wind itself up, and to guard itself, to a certain degree, against
anything that might tend to disorder or destroy it. I perceive exactly the
same things in the human machine, with this difference, that in the operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his
own operations, in his character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses
by instinct, the other from an act of free-will.16 Unlike animals, that have
only instinct, man has perfectibility and free will. While animals always behave in the same way by instinct, man has the ability to choose his course of
action. As an example, Rousseau says that man can select the food he eats
from what is available; on the other hand, certain species eat only certain
foods and do not diversify their meals. Hence, a pigeon would starve to
death next to a bowl of meat and a cat, by a dish of fruit or grain; by observing animals, man has learned that meat, fruit, and grain can all be consumed.
Man has perfected his intellect by observing animals behaving from instinct.
In Paragraph 17 Rousseau points out another difference between animals and man: the faculty of self-improvement or perfectibility. An animal
is, at the end of a few months, all that he will ever be during the course of his
lifetime; at the end of a thousand years, the species will not change. Man,
however, has the capacity to learn and improve his condition. He examines
why men grow senile and animals do not: animals acquire no intellect
through the course of their lifetime and therefore, have nothing to lose. Man
perfects himself and then loses the intellectual faculties that he has acquired.
Natural man lived from moment to moment. He was destitute of intelligence and desired only what he needed at the moment. The only things that
he feared were pain and hunger. He feared pain and not death because he
was an animal. Animals live from moment to moment and do not contemplate death. Natural man did not contemplate death either until he left the
natural state and entered society.
The notion that man is an animal is derived from Buffons First Discourse: he must put himself in the class of animals whom he resembles by
everything material he is.17 Placing man in the category of animals dates
back to Aristotle, who had classified man among social animals who engage
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153
in common activities, along with bees, wasps, ants, and cranes.18 In 1735
Linnaeus, in the Systema natur, had placed man in the category of anthropomorphic quadrupeds with monkeys and sloths.
Rousseau was a disciple of Buffon, who based his views on Cartesian
dualism. Buffon articulated the importance of recognizing the nature of the
two substances of which we are made.19 The two natures are the unextended, the immaterial, the immortal, and the other is the extended, the material, and the mortal. Buffon went the way of Descartes, who posited, I
think, therefore I am [Cogito, ergo sum or Je pense, donc je suis.]. Buffon
agreed with Descartes that we have a soul and that our existence is proven by
our ability to think: The existence of our soul is proved to us, or rather we
only form a unity, this existence and us: to be and to think are the same thing
for us; this truth is intimate and more than intuitive, it is independent of our
senses, our imagination, our memory, and of all our other related faculties.20
Rousseau also declares that we have a soul. In the Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality, Preface, he compares mans soul to the statue of Glaucus: as
the statue is disfigured by time, sea, and storm, so is the human soul, altered
in society. It was contemplating the first and most simple operations of the
human soul that caused Rousseau to see that 1) well-being and selfpreservation and 2) a natural repugnance to seeing others suffer, are natural
characteristics of the soul that antecede the acquisition of reason. Before he
learned how to reason, mans soul, in the state of nature, sought survival and
did not want to see other men or animals suffer.
In the Exordium, Paragraph 2, Rousseau mentions natural inequalities of
man: differences in age, health, body strength, and qualities of the mind or
soul. When he says that mans morality was poisoned when he left the state
of nature to enter society, he is saying that mans mind was corrupted. It was
mans mind that learned inequality, slavery, vice, greed, crime, murder.
Roger summarizes Rousseaus description of natural man and then explains why Buffon had no choice but to challenge him: Rousseaus man of
nature roamed through the woods alone and did not need other human beings; it was natural disasters and catastrophes such as droughts and floods
that forced man to leave his state of solitude and enter society.21 Even Rousseau, himself, admits that his account is a moral allegory and that it cannot
be proven. In the Preface he acknowledges, I have here entered upon certain argumentsFor it is by no means a light undertakingto form a true
154
idea of a state which no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably
never will exist22
Roger points out that it was these suppositions and absence of evidence
that caused Buffon to reject Rousseaus natural man. Buffon wanted to explain the present with known facts of the past, not allegory. Roger explains
that Buffon considered Rousseaus natural man to be allegorical and fabulous, not scientifically proven fact. Naturalists who have traveled around the
world have never seen any natural men such as those described by Rousseau:
We do not find, in traveling over all the isolated places of the globe, human
animals lacking words, deaf to voices as well as signs, dispersed males and
females, abandoned children Children would die if they were not helped
and cared for over several yearsit is not possible to maintain that man has
ever existed without forming families. And Rousseaus natural man was no
more than a myth.23 Thus Buffon rejected Rousseaus natural man. Roger
demonstrates that Buffon concluded that the distance between natural man
and the modern primitive such as Rousseau had established it, did not exist.24 Buffon rejected the notion that natural man had ever existed. Buffon
had traveled all over the world, he had seen the Hottentots and other people
living in extremely primitive conditions, and none of them fit the picture of
Rousseaus natural man: the Hottentots had a language, families and society.
There is no evidence anywhere on the earth that Rousseaus natural man,
without language, wandering solitary in the woods, ever existed. Buffon
shows that man cannot exist apart from a family because children must be
protected by their parents for many years before they can survive on their
own. Therefore, the most primitive and elementary form of a society, the
family, must have existed as long as man has. Language must have always
existed as long as families have, because family members must communicate
among themselves for the purpose of survival.
Roger summarizes the reasons for Buffons rejection of Rousseaus natural man: human children take many years to mature and they must be protected by their parents longer than do animal offspring; families remain intact
for a longer time than do animal families in order to raise the children; language and intellect are functions of the soul and only men have souls, imparted by the divine breath of God.25
Furthermore, there is an insurmountable distance between the most primitive man and the ape. Humans living in the most primitive conditions
have thoughts and words; apes cannot speak and there is no evidence that
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they can think, either. If apes had thoughts, they would have spoken by now
and become mans rival. This has not happened and therefore, mans superiority over all the animal kingdom is permanent.
Hence Buffon rejected Rousseaus natural man as fictional because:
he traveled all over the world and never found a solitary man wandering through the woods
families must have always existed in order to protect the children
language must have always existed for the purpose of survival
God exists and He endowed man with a soul
language is evidence of the insurmountable chasm between man and
other animals
Otis Fellows also compares the works of Buffon and Rousseau. He finds
it significant that Rousseau greatly admired Buffon and held him in high esteem: Marguerite Richebourg, in her Essai sur les lectures de Rousseau, has
found in Jean-Jacquess voluminous correspondence, his Confessions, and
other writings, some fifty references to the author of the Histoire naturelle.26 Fellows goes on to examine how Rousseau derived his ideas from
Buffons work. First, there are similarities between Buffons account of the
origin of the universe and that of Rousseau in his First Discourse, Part 1:
neither writer mentions Genesis or God, but rather, events unfold and things
change independently of Gods will. Fellows observes, Rousseau opened
the Premire Partie of his essay with a daring, majestic sweep which ignored the account of mans origin in Genesis and stressed his rise from primeval nature. In this he was following, wittingly or not, in the footsteps of
BuffonJansenists of the Nouvelles ecclsiastiques and the Facult de Thologie of the Sorbonne were scandalized to find no evidence of belief in any
particular act of creation. The thought immediately arises that here Rousseau
found more than fleeting inspiration for the development of his own early
speculations on evolving man in a changing universe.27 Fellows goes on to
show how Rousseau also derived his notion of natural mans virtue and innocence from Buffon. In 1749 Buffon had written, virtue belongs to the
savage man more to civilized man, andvice originated in society.28 Fellows amusingly points out that while Rousseau embraced the notion and
made it the foundation of his second discourse, Buffon was to take JeanJacques to task for adopting precisely the same supposition.29
156
Fellows advises that there are numerous instances when Rousseau

openly calls on Buffons authority in support of his own arguments and, by
so doing, furnishes irrefutable proof of influence.30 For example, there is
the lengthy quotation of Buffon in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,
Note 2.31 Fellows refers the reader to Jean Morels Recherches sur les
sources du Discours de lingalit for an examination of Rousseaus use of
Buffon in his work. Fellows advises that Jean Morel has proved the early
volumes of the Histoire naturelle to have been a primary source of the information scientifique scattered throughout the Second Discourse.32
In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Note 10, Rousseau discusses species of apes that eighteenth-century naturalists were confronted
with classifying: orangutans, pongos, enjokos, beggos, and mandrills. The
question arose whether these anthropomorphic species were men or animals.
Rousseau finds that orangutans occupy something like a middle position
between the human species and the Baboons.33
In Note 10 Rousseau mentions Dappers statement that the orangutan is
so similar to a man, it is thought that it might have been the offspring of a
woman and a monkey. Rousseau goes on to discuss the striking similarities
between apes and men and he even goes so far as to say that there are fewer
differences between apes and men than there are between one human being
and another. Rousseau notes that while naturalists hypothesize that these
beasts cannot possibly be men because they are stupid and have no language,
one must take note of the fact that speech is not natural to man and that it is
something that he acquired when he first entered society. Hence, he is reasoning from his own premise that man never spoke before he entered society
and is thus open to classifying orangutans and pongos as men. Rousseau
maintains that if scientific experiments were to show that these apes have the
faculty of perfectibility, then it would be proven that there are multiple species of man. Naturalists had performed experiments with monkeys and they
knew that monkeys are not men because they lack perfectibility. However,
experiments had not been done with orangutans and pongos to ascertain
whether they can be taught language and whether they have the faculty of
perfecting themselves, a characteristic which is the hallmark of the human
species. Hence, pending scientific investigation, Rousseau would not judge
whether or not orangutans and pongos are a variety of the human species.
This distinguishes him from Buffon, who held that the great apes are not
men.
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157
The question arises as to whether Rousseau thought that man metamorphosed from the apes. It should be noted that even though Rousseau observes all of the similarities between apes and men, and even though he is
open to the possibility that experimentation may prove that orangutans and
pongos can learn language and have the faculty of perfectibility, and that
they may, indeed, be men, nowhere does he indicate a transformist biology,
as say, Diderot does in DAlemberts Dream. Rousseau maintains faithful to
the fixity of species, as Buffon had done. What Rousseau is proposing is
anthropological and sociological transformism, rather than biological. The
metamorphosis that he sets forth is intraspecies (anthropological), and not
interspecies (biological).
Buffon, Rousseaus role model, clearly denies the possibility of biological transformism. Buffon articulates the materialist hypothesis in order to go
on to refute it: if one had to judge only by its form, the monkey species
could be considered to be a variety of the human species is immediately
followed by whatever resemblance there may be between the Hottentot and
the monkey, the interval that separates them is immense because inwardly he
is filled with thought and outwardly, with the spoken word.34 Hence, Buffon maintained the insurmountable chasm between man and animal. Rousseau, at the end of Note 10, says that what is required is for men of the
stature of Montesquieu, Buffon, Diderot, Duclos, dAlembert, and Condillac
to travel across the world to every country, and ascertain whether these creatures are men or animals. When such great men arrive at a conclusion about
this matter, we must believe them: I say that when such Observers assert
about a given Animal that it is a man and about another that it is a beast, they
will have to be believed35
Nineteen years after Rousseau wrote his second discourse, Lord Monboddo examined Buffons influence on Rousseau and tried to ascertain
whether either of these men thought that orangutans were men. Monboddo
considered Buffons statement, if one had to judge only by its form, the
monkey species could be considered to be a variety of the human species to
which he adds, whatever resemblance there may be between the Hottentot
and the monkey, the interval that separates them is immense because inwardly he is filled with thought and outwardly, with the spoken word.36
Monboddo then carefully examined Rousseaus Note 10 and saw that Rousseau allowed for the possibility that orangutans might be of the same species
as man. Because Rousseau was open to the idea, Monboddo surmised that
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there is a difference of opinion between Buffon and Rousseau as to whether

orangutans are men. Monboddo concluded, It is from these facts that we
are to judge, whether or not the Orang Outang belongs to our species. Mr.
Buffon has decided that he does not, Mr. Rousseau inclines to a different
opinion.37
Otis Fellows examines the implications of this. He observes that in the
History of the Ass (1753), Buffon summarizes the materialist hypothesis and
then denies it: if the ass were to be considered of the same line as the
horse, then one could also add that the ape was of the same family as man,
and furthermore that both man and ape had the same origin. In fact, all animals may have descended through eons of time from a single source. This
was indeed bold speculation for the day, and two paragraphs further on Buffon hastens to add: But no: it is certain, by revelation, that all animals have
equally participated in the grace of Creation.38 Rousseau, on the other
hand, was open to the possibility that orangutans and man were of the same
species. In Note 10 he says, Dapper confirms thatThis Beastis so similar to man that it has entered into the mind of some travelers that it might
have been the offspring of a woman and a monkeyone finds in the description of these supposed monsters striking conformities with the human species, and smaller difference than might be pointed to between one human
being and another.39
The point of contention between Rousseau and Buffon is whether or not
apes are men, not whether man or apes metamorphosed from animals of a
lower organization. Fellows reiterates that for Rousseau, the chasm between
man and ape was not insurmountable as it was for Buffon.
In Note 10 Rousseau argues that there is a strong possibility that orangutans and men belong to the same species: pongos gather around campfires
abandoned by men, sit by them until the embers die out, and then leave. He
criticizes Andrew Battel and Samuel Purchas for concluding that these animals, as dexterous as they are, do not have the sense to keep the fire going
by adding wood to it. Rousseau italicizes Battel and Purchas conclusion in
order to ridicule it: Car avec beaucoup dadresse, ils nont pas assez de sens
pour lentretenir en y apportant du bois. Rousseau takes them to task for
extrapolating that apes are stupid. He demands to know how they can tell
that the apes departure from the campfire is an indication of their stupidity
or their will. Here we see that Rousseau attributes free will to apes and in so
doing, erases the chasm between men and apes. For Rousseau, free will is a
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hallmark of natural man, as is his perfectibility: these two characteristics distinguish natural man from the animals. Here, Rousseau is clearly ascribing
free will to apes. He argues that apes do not need the warmth of a campfire
in a hot climate and that therefore, the flames must entertain them. When
they get bored from sitting in one location, they move on and forage, which
requires more time to do than if they ate flesh. Rousseau observes that animals are amused and cheered, they get bored, they need new stimulation, and
they are aware that foraging takes time, and they choose not to waste time by
sitting in one place. Furthermore, the great apes, like natural man, are not
carnivorous (Rousseau specifies that foraging takes more time than if they
ate meat), but rather, they, too, are vegetarians.
Rousseau goes on to say that pongos bury their dead and make roofs out
of branches. This clearly indicates volition and intelligence. Therefore, he
doubts that they would not know how to push embers into fires. Rousseau
declares that he has seen a monkey push embers into a fire, an operation that
Battel and Purchas claim that pongos cannot do. Rousseau admits that while
it is certain that a monkey is not a man because he lacks the faculties of
speech and perfectibility, experiments have not been done with pongos or
orangutans to ascertain whether or not they are men.
Fellows points out that it is obvious that Rousseau parts company with
Buffon to allow for the possibility that apes are men. Does this make him a
transformist? Nowhere does Rousseau say that man or apes metamorphosed
from animals of a lower organization. All he is articulating is the possibility
of an anthropological (intraspecies), not biological (interspecies) relationship. Because Rousseau believed that natural man had once existed, perhaps
he thought that he had found evidence of this. He is open to the possibility
that men and the great apes are of the same species and this would explain
the will and intelligence of apes. Fellows notes that Arthur O. Lovejoy, who
is more prudent, points out that Rousseau is a transformist in the anthropological and sociological sense rather than in the biological.40
Francis Moran also argues that Rousseau was not a transformist and contends that the orangutans are used to make a political statement, not a biological one. First, Moran points out that Rousseau takes advantage of the
eighteenth-century debate on the possibility of multiple human species as an
opportunity to criticize contemporary civilized Europe: The significance of
his speculation has less to do with his special insights in human descent than
with the political point to be made were it true. Rousseau uses orangs-
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outang like the pongo to construct a viable model for criticizing his contemporary Europe and to defend his claim that the kind of political inequalities
associated with late European society do not issue from God or nature but are
accidental events in the life of the species.41 Moran reminds the reader that
the title of Rousseaus work is Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men and that it is essentially a political statement. Moran
sees Note 10 as a tool to bolster his suppositions about natural man, which, in
turn, are merely an entre to the real dish, a criticism of inequality in European civilization.
Moran agrees with Gourevitch that the notion of natural man is conjectural and not factual.42 Rousseau, himself, admits, in the Preface, I have
hazarded some conjecturesFor it is no light undertakingto know accurately a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never did exist, which
probably never will exist The purpose of his conjecture is to criticize
contemporary civilization, as the title of the work indicates.
Secondly, Moran points out that the relationship (either proximate or distant) between humans and apes was an important issue among eighteenthcentury naturalists because they were trying to gain a better understanding of
the chain of being. The human-ape relationship was not a concern about descent, but rather, about the chain of being, its corollaries, plenitude and continuity, and most of all, mans place on the great chain. Moran explains,
Throughout the Enlightenment we find naturalists preoccupied with arranging species along a continuum descending from God and linking each part of
His creation. The meaning of the claim that orangs-outang might be some
sort of mid point is lost unless we place it in the context of this tradition.
The discovery of the orangs-outang was important for eighteenth-century
naturalists not for what these animals could tell us about human descent, but
for what they revealed about the viability of the chain of being and the position of human beings within that chainthe apparent uniqueness of human
consciousness and spirituality seemed to raise special difficulties for a theory
which presented nature as a continuum. For instance, Rousseau, Voltaire,
and Buffon all refer to this gap in rejecting the idea of a natural continuum.43
Moran finds that Rousseau is extending the range of the human species
as it currently exists, something which was not unusual to do in the eighteenth century. He points out that Maillet, in Telliamed, also ends his discussion on orangutans by saying if we could not say that these living creatures
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were men, at least they resembled them so much that it would have been unfair to consider them only as animals.44
Rousseau concedes that more accurate accounts of the apes are needed,
as well as experimentation to see if they are of the same species as man. He
acknowledges that men of the caliber of Montesquieu, Buffon, Diderot, Duclos, dAlembert, and Condillac, are needed to travel abroad, observe the
apes, and describe them for others.
Moran concludes that Rousseau raises the question as to whether apes
can be perfected (since they seem to have volition and intelligence) in order
to make a political point. What Rousseau is declaring is the unity of the human race and that racial and social equality is a basic tenet of natural law.
He was condemning the strict divisions among social classes in Europe. Furthermore, Europeans had discovered the existence of other races living under
very primitive conditions. Rousseau, in widening the umbrella to allow for
the possibility of multiple human species, was declaring that all humans, regardless of their social status, culture and living conditions, belong to one
species, namely, the human race; again, the title of the work indicates that his
treatise is a condemnation of the evils of inequality and prejudice.
Moran summarizes the point that Rousseau was making with his orangutans thus: If his discussion of natural man is to become a foil for criticizing
contemporary Europe, and if that description is culled from European reports
of the worlds primitive populations, then it is essential that these people be
included in the same species as Europeans. If this were not the case, he
could have been vulnerable to questions about their relevance to the kind of
European political problems that he was addressing. He therefore needed a
definition of the human species which not only recognized a single species
but also accommodated the diversity within the species. In other words, he
needed an account of human natural history which could explain how
orangs-outang might become Europeans (or vice-versa).45
Francis Moran, in another article, Between Primates and Primitives:
Natural Man as the Missing Link in Rousseaus Second Discourse, examines Rousseaus objective to understand mans placement in the chain of beings. This job involved assessing the gap between man and the next higher
being on the chain of beings. In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,
Note 10, Rousseau cites the abb Prvosts description of orangutans as a
sort of middle point between the human species and the baboon.46 In Part
2 he puts natural man at equal distances from the stupidity of brutes and the
162
fatal enlightenment of civil man.47 Moran advises that Rousseau had devised natural man to fill a gap on the chain of beings between man and orangutans. Moran interprets Rousseaus analogy between natural man and the
orangutan according to the eighteenth century:
By referring to natural man as a mid-point between animals and human beings,

Rousseau is providing his audience with a recognizable framework for understanding the kind of creature he will be describing. In the context of mainstream eighteenth-century thought, this reference would probably have been read as an allusion
to the chain of being rather than as an indication of human descent, for unlike the
later evolutionists, eighteenth-century naturalists who suggested a possible relationship between primates and human beings were generally uninterested in tracing the
genealogy of these populations. Instead, their claims were meant to establish the
relative position of each in the chain of being.
Because there was some concern that the human species represented a possible
break in the natural hierarchy of the chain of being, those naturalists interested in
preserving the chain began to search for possible missing links which would reunite human beings with other animals. This search focused primarily on the (alleged) anatomical, morphological, and behavioral similarities of the populations
presumed to be closest to the breaki.e., primates (as the highest animal) and the
native populations of Africa, the South Pacific and the Americas (as the lowest human beings).48
Jean Starobinski also discusses Rousseaus anthropologic transformism

and Buffons influence on his thought in his article Rousseau and Buffon.49
Starobinski begins by observing that Rousseau adopts Buffons method of
explaining man by beginning from the most elementary form of existence
and proceeding to the most complex. They both embrace Cartesian dualism
(body and soul) modified by Locke (sensations). The body works according
to the physical properties of matter and mans spirituality lies in the activity of the reasoning soul.50
Starobinski finds that Rousseau adopted Buffons view that man alone is
capable of comparison and also, that man alone is capable of anticipating
the future and remembering the past. Further, animals, even at their most
ingenious, infallibly obey their instincts, repeating the same actions without
modification; only man has the power to perfect himself, to progress51
Starobinski mentions that this is found in Buffons Natural History and in
Rousseau Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and the Profession of Faith.
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He point out that there is a difference between them: Buffon believes that
mans spirituality lies in his understanding and Rousseau says that it is in his
freedom.52 Starobinski notes that for Rousseau, the animal is nothing more
than an ingenious machine, whereas man is endowed with freedom.53 Starobinski observes, like Moran, that Rousseaus inclusion of the great apes in
the human species is a historical commentary on how European civilization
has caused man to degenerate morally: By including creatures so different
from civilized man in the human race, Rousseau pointed to the existence of a
huge gap between primitive man and the disciplined European. This gap
could only be explained by history, which altered and transformed if not
mans nature then at least his Constitution. This made man a particularly
eloquent example of the restricted transformism whose stages Buffon had so
ably described for those species modified by human husbandry. The opening
sentences of Emile make clear that Rousseau saw no essential difference between mans transformation of himself and his transformation of such natural
species as dogs and horses.54 Here Starobinski recognizes the parallel between the moral degeneration of natural man when he entered society and the
physical degeneration of Buffons domesticated animals.
Starobinski also examines natural mans consciousness of self. For
Rousseau, natural man can be aware of his existence without forming any
ideas.55 Furthermore, natural man is more aware of his existence than is
civilized man because he is not distracted by what others think of him, he is
not preoccupied with pleasing others, he is not living outside of himself.
Starobinski explains: In fact, the less man reflects, the more aware he is of
his existence: His soul, which nothing disturbs, dwells only in the sensation
of its present existence, without any idea of the future, however close that
might be.56 and Rousseau holds that we are turned away from selfknowledge by active contemplation of the past and, even more, by concern
for the future. When we reflect, we compare objects and moments of our
experience and as a result distinguish between ourselves and others and look
to others to confirm our sense of ourselves. In other words, reflection is
alienating. Rousseau therefore maintains that the savage lives within himself; social man lives always outside himself; he knows how to live only in
the opinion of others. It is, so to speak, from their judgment alone that he
derives the sense of his own existence. If living within the sense of present
existence is also living within oneself, then natural man spontaneously at-
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tains an ideal of independence that civilized man can attain only after lengthy
philosophical exertion57
Leonard Sorenson agrees with Jean Starobinski that the purpose of the
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is political: Sorenson says, Rousseau
apparently addressed the theme of inequality in his Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality in order to defend the fundamental principle of human equality.58 Sorenson observes that while Rousseaus natural man is equal, inequality is born of accidental, historical conditions: Inequality is caused by
human relations-social, economic, and political-but all relations and even
most if not all human capacities are artificial products of accidental historical
circumstances. The root of all evil, inequality, has its source in an accidental
history that disjoined man from nature.59
However, Sorenson points out that inequality is not just a result of history and social convention. Rousseau concedes on the first page of his Discourse on Inequality that there is also natural inequality that is established by
nature: there are differences in age, health, strength, and mind. Rousseau
recognize the natural inequality in intelligence and faculty of the mind (esprit
or me). How does Rousseau propose to reconcile natural equality with natural inequality for the good of all? After examining the question in 21 pages,
Sorenson capsulizes the answer thus: One of the tasks of political philosophy, intrinsic to its own success, is to discover or invent ways to benevolently reconcile in so far as possible, natural inequality with natural
equality, the requirement of rule by the naturally superior for the good of the
naturally equal with the requirement of self-rule by the naturally equal: to
reconcile wisdom and consent. As has been recognized by many, Rousseau
himself recognized and addressed this dilemma.60 The naturally superior,
those with superior minds, can cultivate philosophy for the good of all. The
goal of philosophy is to restore self-rule to the naturally equal.
David Gauthier, in Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence, identifies the
transformation of natural man to civilized man not as biological, but rather,
as psychological.61 He describes the transition as a passage from an inward
focus to an outward focus, from that of the inward man, out to the world outside of himself. Gauthier explains the passage as the conversion of amour de
soi (self-preservation) into amour propre (vanity): Rousseau represents this
as the conversion of amour de soi into amour propre. Amour de soi (-mme)
is no more than the case each person-indeed, each animal-has for its own
preservation. It is a love centered on the self and addressed to its natural
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needs; it involves no awareness of others, much less comparison between

self and others. But as awareness of others develops, this self-love is transformed into amour propre, a love centered on the relation between the self
and others and addressed to comparative advantage.62
Gauthier points out that self-preservation (amour de soi) is related to the
sentiment of our existence, while vanity (amour propre) is linked to the concern of what others think of us-whether they think we are powerful or weak.
We want others to think that we are powerful, and there is an enslavement
here-a concern for the opinion that others have of us, that takes over all our
thoughts, and so we forget our sentiment of existence. Gauthier puts it this
way: Amour de soi is linked to our sentient of existence. As long as it alone
holds sway, each person unreflectively senses his existence in himself. But
as it comes to be transformed into amour propre, each senses his existence
not in himself, but in his relation to those whom he perceives as other. It is
the regard that others have for me, their concern with my power, or their contempt for my lack of power, their valuing or disdaining my assistance, their
fearing or ignoring my opposition, that form the basis of my own selfconception. I am no longer psychologically self-sufficient, and so no longer
free; I seek the recognition of the others that confers prestige. But this loss
of freedom depends on distinguishing self and other63
Gauthier states that Rousseau contrasted liberty with its opposites: slavery, illusion and prestige: The slave fails to gain the recognition of his or
her fellows and can survive only by literal abasement, by being a person entirely for another and not for himself.64 Similarly, the person who is regarded as powerful, as having gained the esteem and recognition of others is
also enslaved: he is concerned with what others think of him. Gauthier says,
He cannot be free, since the powers requisite to meet his needs and desires
are not his own; rather, they are the powers he is believed to possess, for it is
these that affect the responses of others, and so determine whether he will
gain satisfaction.65
Gauthier cites Rousseau, who in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, says, having been formerly free and independent, behold man, due to a
multitude of new needs, subjected so to speakespecially to his fellows,
whose slave he becomes in a sense even in becoming their master; rich, he
needs their services; poor, he needs their help.66 Gauthier concludes, The
masters condition is one of psychological slavery.67
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In summation, Jean-Jacques Rousseau proposed anthropological (intraspecies) and sociological change, not biological (interspecies), as did the materialists Diderot and Maupertuis.
He recommended that more
experimentation be conducted, in the way of hybridization, to ascertain
whether orangutans belong to the human species. He also recommended that
minds of the caliber of Montesquieu, Buffon, and Diderot travel around the
world and relate their observations of how the great apes behave in their natural environment. Rather than proposing transformism, he was declaring a
political statement as to the unity of the human race. The eighteenth century
was confronted with the discovery of humans living under the most primitive
conditions, as well as the discovery of the great apes, which appeared to have
free will and intelligence (i.e., orangutans bury their dead, put roofs on their
houses, and exhibit boredom and restlessness). Because he was a deist and a
follower of Buffon, he articulated numerous reasons why he did not believe
that man had ever been a quadruped. His purpose then, was to make a scathing social commentary on civilized Europe that had divided human beings
into different social and economic classes and demonstrate that inequality is
not natural, but an anthropological and historical artifice based on consent.
Chapter8
Voltaire
People may tell me that porphyry is formed of bears bristles; I will believe them
when I find that white marble is made of ostrich feathers.1
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, A Defence of My Uncle (1767)
Voltaire did not believe that the earth is more than 6,000 years old; nor did
he believe that one species can metamorphose into another. His satirical jabs
at contemporary naturalists are iconic representations of the enormous extent
to which investigation into mans beginnings was polemicized in the eighteenth century. Voltaire was a fervent deist, and so, he vigorously opposed
transformism because it threatened to bring deistic cosmogony to the ground.
Disme is derived from the Latin deus, god. During the eighteenth century deism was defined as System of those, who, not having any particular cult, and rejecting every kind of revelation, believe only in a sovereign
Being. To be suspected of deism.2 Deist was defined as He or she who
recognizes a God, but who does not recognize any revealed Religion. He is
a deist.3 The Oxford English Dictionary defines deism as usually, belief
in the existence of a Supreme Being as the source of finite existence, with
rejection of revelation and the supernatural doctrines of Christianity; natural
religion.4
Because Voltaire believed in God the Creator, he recognized the danger
inherent in random creationism: it obviated the need for a Prime Mover.
Furthermore, if everything in the universe is the result of the motive property
of matter, then random molecular motion is determinative and not Gods
will; Gods will is rendered subordinate to Newtonian physics.
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Since Voltaire was an impassioned deist, he defended only those hypotheses that he could use as polemic tools and spent the last thirteen years
of his life attacking science: he zealously promulgated preformation theory
and the notion that the earth is only 6,000 years old and vociferously attacked the metamorphosis of species, epigenesis, spontaneous generation, the
notion that random molecular motion brought about the universe and everything in it, the chain of being, along with its corollaries, plenitude and continuity, fossils, and the hypothesis that the earth is much older than 6,000
years old. Because he did not believe in transformism, he had to necessarily
deny the unity of the human race: all the different colors of the various races
could not have proceeded from one man because physical characteristics had
not changed since Creation. Therefore, he defended the notion that at the
time of Creation, God created men of different colors as separate acts of
Creation.
OPPOSITION TO RANDOM CREATION

In the article Atheism, Section 2, in the Philosophical Dictionary (1764),
Voltaire declares that conscious, intelligent beings cannot have arisen either
by spontaneous generation or by random chance: We are intelligent beings;
well, intelligent beings cannot have been formed by a crude, blind, insensate
being: there is certainly some difference between the ideas of Newton and
the dung of a mule. Newtons intelligence comes, therefore, from another
intelligence.5 Here Voltaire focuses on the inability of the materialists, who
embraced creation by random chance, to prove that consciousness arises
from random molecular motion. Maupertuis recognized the insufficiency of
the hypothesis, and so, he had to necessarily attribute aversion, desire, memory, and intelligence to molecules. However, Maupertuis hypothesis was
merely a hypothesis, and not a proven fact. Therefore, Voltaire jumps on
this lack of evidence, and points out the difference between consciousness
(the ideas of Newton) and insensate matter (mule dung). Another contemporary, Diderot, had also pondered the difference between living matter and
dead matter in 1753 and wondered whether it is possible that the two states
oscillate back and forth ad infinitum. The answer to this question was crucial
because it meant that either God exists or He does not.
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This sentence is also an attack on spontaneous generation (the notion that

living things are born of non-living material). He attacks spontaneous generation because if animalcules are continually born of inorganic mater, then
there is no need for God. This sentence is an attack on Buffon and Needham,
whose flawed experiments indicated that spontaneous generation was a fact,
and the materialists (Maupertuis, Diderot, and La Mettrie) who found spontaneous generation useful in proving that life is the result of random molecular action.
A few paragraphs later, under the subtitle, Reasons of the Atheists,
Voltaire goes on to say, Nevertheless I have known roguish individuals who
say that there is no creative intelligence at all, and that motion alone has by
itself formed all that we see and all that we are. They impudently tell you:
The combination of this universe was possible, hence the combination exists:
therefore it was possible that motion alone arranged it.6 Here Voltaire
clearly states his opponents argument before refuting it: random molecular
motion, given an eternal time frame, will eventually bring about the universe.
He proffers his response beneath the subtitle, Answer, and it is a repetition
of what he has previously said: intelligence and consciousness exist and random molecular motion is insufficient to produce either. As is his style, Voltaire focuses on a point, magnifies it, and repeats its, all the while excluding
everything else his opponents offer. He cites Spinoza, who proclaimed universal consciousness, but visibly ignores Maupertuis and Diderot, who both
hypothesize that molecules are conscious and that consciousness exists at
every level of organization.
Having reiterated the insufficiency of motion to bring about consciousness, he goes on to pounce on the argument of Diderot, La Mettrie, and
Maupertuis that parts of animals conform to their needs not because of Divine planning or final causes, but because all animals that were born with
self-contradictions have perished; only the ones that random chance brought
about without self-contradictions have survived. Voltaires response to this
argument is the same reply that he has given to antecedent arguments, namely, that the combinations that random chance produces cannot create consciousness or intelligence.
At this point, Voltaire goes further and identifies by name the materialist
philosophe that he is attacking: the next subtitle reads, Maupertuis Objection. In this discourse, the atheist interlocutor, who has finally been identified, argues that deists see Gods beneficence in the folds of a rhinoceros
(which permit the thick-skinned animal to move), but one could equally deny
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His existence because of the shell of the tortoise. In his response to this argument, Voltaire sounds like a scientist: the physical structures of both the
rhinoceros and the tortoise demonstrate the infinite variety of different species and the goal of nature, which is preservation, generation and death. As
is his style, Voltaire searches deeply and calls up the facts: there is infinite
variety in nature and the legitimate question does arise, Is it due to the fact
that nature is in perpetual flux and is nature continually creating new variations? Voltaires position is the deistic one: the magnificent complexity of
a flys wing and a snails organs suffice to bring the atheist to the ground.7
The infinite variety in nature announces Gods beneficence and genius. The
beauty of Gods infinitely varied creatures, their proportion, their uses, all
exist, even if we do not fully comprehend them.
In the dialogue Maupertuis continues to argue that the snake appears to
have no purpose in nature and does only harm-this is an attack on final causes-what purpose could God have had in creating an animal that has no use
and does only harm? Voltaires response to this is comical and he scolds
Maupertuis: snakes are venomous and so is he; snakes do harm and so has
he; men are worse than snakes.
REFUTATION OF THE CHAIN OF BEINGS

We have seen that Voltaire attacks random creation via molecular motion by
arguing that there is no evidence that it leads to consciousness. What remains is to show that nature is not in perpetual flux, that the time of Creation
has long passed, and that no new species have been created since Genesis. In
the article, Chain of Beings, in the Philosophical Dictionary, Voltaire
launches an attack to demonstrate that the chain of beings is pure fiction:
when one examines the great chain carefully, it vanishes;8 he points out that
there is no chain because the supposed gradation no longer exists in vegetables and animals;9 there are species of plants and animals that have become
extinct;10 we no longer have murex;11 Jews were forbidden from eating griffin and ixion: these two species have probably disappeared from this world;12
he asks, Where then is the chain?;13 it apparent that species can be destroyed: the lion and the rhinoceros are beginning to be exceedingly rare;14 it
is likely that there have been races of men that are no longer found;15 he asks,
Is there not a visible gap between the monkey and man?16 In Voltaires
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cosmogony, God created a fixed number of species at the time of Creation

and there have been no new species since then. Nature is not continually
producing new creations. Some may be extinct because men have hunted
and killed them. For Voltaire, only God can create species and the time of
Creation has passed.
Arthur O. Lovejoy examines the article, Chain of Beings, and advises
that Voltaire makes three cogent arguments that the chain of beings is fictional. Lovejoy says, First, some species which once existed have disappeared; others are in the process of extinction; and yet others might be or
may yet be destroyed by man, if he should so desireIt is probable also that
there have been races of men which have vanished.17 Lovejoy mentions
that Voltaire had observed that there is a visible gap between the monkey and
man. Voltaire recognized that man can destroy species and render them extinct; he did not believe that new species can metamorphose into existence
from existing species. Hence, the number of species is always getting smaller and there is no chain of beings that exists today. Therefore, we cannot
hypothesize that there ever was a chain of being.
Secondly, Lovejoy points out that Voltaire argues that because we can
imagine intermediary species between existing ones shows that there are
gaps between species. Voltaire asks, Is there not visibly a gap between the
ape and man? Is it not easy to imagine a featherless biped possessing intelligence but having neither speech nor the human shape18 Voltaire posits
that the fact that man can imagine an intermediary creature between himself
and the monkey shows that it is visibly absent from nature.
Thirdly, Lovejoy maintains that because Voltaire believed in God,
the supposition of the completeness of the chain of beings requires the
existence of a vast hierarchy of immaterial beings above man.19 In an apostrophe Voltaire cries out to Plato, But you, what reason do you have for believing in it?20 The inferred answer is simply because the chain of beings,
by definition, requires a complete ladder from the atom all the way up to God
Himself. Hence, imaginary celestial beings are intrinsic to the chain by its
definition.
Voltaire declares that there is no chain of beings in the inanimate world
either: he points out that there is no gradation among the planets or moons,
either in their magnitude or in their orbits.21 Voltaire also mentions the vacuum that exists in outer space and points out that not everything in nature is
connected: And then how can you expect there to be a chain that links everything in the great empty spaces?22
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Lovejoy researches and cites several works in which Voltaire uses Newtons vacuum in space to refute the notion that everything in nature must be
connected. In We Must Take Sides, or the Principle of Action (1772), Voltaire reiterates the fact that the vacuum that exists in outer space negates the
notion that continuity must exist in all of nature. Newton had proven the
existence of a vacuum in space: since this vacuum exists, it can exist anywhere, even in the hierarchy of species: Why should, and how can, existence be infinite? Newton demonstrated the reality of a vacuum. If in nature
there can be a void beyond nature, wherein lies the necessity that entities
should extend to infinity? What would an infinite extension be? It could no
more exist than an infinite number.23
Lovejoy also cites a footnote that Voltaire appended to the Poem on the
Lisbon Disaster (1756), in which he says, It is demonstrated that the heavenly bodies perform their revolutions in a non-resistant space. Not all space
is filled. There is not, therefore, a series (suite) of bodies from an atom to the
most remote of the stars; there can therefore be immense interims between
sensible beings, as well as between insensible ones. We cannot, then, be sure
that man is necessarily placed in one of the links which are attached to one
another in an unbroken sequence.24 In that same footnote Voltaire reiterates
his denial that a continuous gradation exists that links all beings. He declares
that there is probably an immense distance between man and animals, between man and superior (celestial) beings, and there must be infinity between
God and all created beings. He repeats his statement of 1765 that the planets
that revolve around the sun do not exhibit any gradual gradations in their
sizes, distances, or their moons.25
REFUTATION OF SPONTANEOUS GENERATION

In the Questions on Miracles (1766), the 4th Letter, Foreword to the 5th Letter, 5th Letter, 6th Letter, and 7th Letter, Voltaire ridicules John Turberville
Needham and warns worshippers of God to steer clear of spontaneous generation because it is a tool of deception that materialist atheists will use to
shake their faith. Voltaires association of spontaneous generation to atheism
is a personal jab at Needham, who was a Catholic priest. In the Foreword to
the 5th Letter, Voltaire ridicules Needham for thinking that he has discovered
that spurred wheat flour steeped in water is transformed into small animals
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that look like eels. He declares that the claim is false because the Italian scientist Lazzaro Spallanzani has proven it to be false and furthermore, it is
false because it is impossible to do. Spallanzani was also a Catholic priest,
but Voltaire significantly omits this fact because of his opposition to Catholicism; however, Christians benefited from debunking the materialists tool
just as much as the deists did, and in this rare moment, Voltaire is in the
camp of a priest. Voltaire argues that if animals could be born without seed,
generation would be unnecessary and a man could be born from a clump of
earth as easily as an eel could be born of a piece of dough. This dangerous
belief system leads to atheism and the materialist philosophes use it to show
that God is not necessary for the greatest miracle of all, the generation of
living beings.
In the 5th Letter Voltaire challenges the veracity of Needhams experiments: Needham has made quite a little reputation for himself among atheists
by claiming that flour produces eels and that thus, all men, starting from the
first one, may have been born the same way. Voltaire makes fun by asking a
comical question: The only difficulty that remains is to know how there
could have been flour before there were men.26
Voltaire repeatedly calls Needham an atheist. In the Foreword to the 5th
Letter he says, This systemwould leadto atheism and Needhams
microscopewas considered to be the atheists laboratory. In the 5th Letter
he says, You got yourself a little reputation among atheists, Atheist that
you are, and you have shaken their faith. Aside from the fact that he
was insulting a Catholic priest, Voltaire clearly understood that if life springs
forth from dirt all the time, than there is no need for Divine agency.
In the Defence of My Uncle (1767), Chapter 19, Voltaire again refutes
spontaneous generation by associating it with another hypothesis that could
not be proven: Descartes globular, penetrating, channeled, striated matter.
Voltaire makes the analogy between the two hypotheses, one biological and
the other pertaining to physics, one purported to explain the origin of man,
and the other, the origin of the universe: The seed is useless; everything will
grow spontaneously. Upon this supposed experiment a new universe is constructed, in the same manner as a new world was formed a hundred years
ago, with a penetrating, globulous, and channeled matter.27 This is a dig at
Descartes, who in the Principles of Philosophy, Part 3, Sections 4648 and
8687, tries to explain the genesis of the stars in the universe by molecular
motion. Descartes hypothesizes that tiny globules of matter seek to penetrate
the vortex of a whirlwind of matter, and in doing so, become channeled or
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striated in shape. These fluted globules are visible as sunspots. For Voltaire,
the attempt to explain either the origin of man or the origin of the stars in the
universe through Newtonian mechanics is dangerous to deism because it
threatens to replace God as a causative agent. Newtonian physics is a twoedged sword: it both proves the brilliant engineering of a beneficent Creator,
but also threatens to eliminate the need for Him.
Two years later, Diderot would respond to Voltaire in DAlemberts
Dream:
Mademoiselle de lEspinasse: Voltaire can joke all he wants, but the eel-monger is
right; I believe my eyes; I see them: how many there are! How they go! How they
come! How they jump about!28
As far as Diderot was concerned, scientists did see animalcules under microscopic magnification; they had no reason to doubt spontaneous generation as
it was a belief system that dated back to antiquity. If Francisco Redi and
Lazzaro Spallanzani were able to perform experiments that disproved the
hypothesis, Jan Baptista van Helmont, John Needham and Georges-Louis
Leclerc de Buffon were able to uphold it.
Voltaires assault on spontaneous generation and its chief proponent,
Needham, is endless. In The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French
Thought, Jacques Roger advises that during the thirteen year period 1765
1778, Voltaire dedicated twenty-five of his works to denouncing atheism and
ten works to ridiculing Needham and his eels.29 Roger copiously researches
and enumerates the sources for readers to explore further: Voltaire
unrelentlessly assails Needham in the Questions sur les miracles (1766), 4th
letter, Avertissement, 5th letter, 6th letter, and 7th letter; La Dfense de mon
oncle (1767), ch. 19 Des montagnes et des coquilles; Singularits de la
nature (1768), ch. 20 De la prtendue race danguilles forms de la farine et
de jus de mouton; Homme aux quarante cus (1768), ch. 6 Nouvelles
douleurs occasionnes par de nouveaux systmes; Les Deux Sicles [the
Sicle de Louis XIV (1751) and Supplment du sicle de Louis XIV (1753)];
LABC (1768), 17th discourse; Les Colimaons du rvrend pre
LEscarbotier (1768), 3rd letter Dissertation du physicien de Saint-Flour;
Prcis du sicle de Louis XV (1768), ch. 43; Questions sur lEncyclopdie
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(17701772) Dieu 4; and Dialogues dEvhmre (1777), 9th dialogue

(Sur la gnration).30
OPPOSITION TO FOSSILS
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were many fossil discoveries: mammoth bones and teeth in Siberia and the New World, stones
containing fossilized figures of small animals and plants (hence, the term
figured stones were given to fossils), and seashells on the peaks of very
high mountains. While pondering what these strange artifacts might be, scientists began to move away from the Aristotelian notion that fossils were of
inorganic origin and began to accept the view that they were the remains of
living things. However, there were conflicting schools of thought as to how
old the fossils might be. At first, scientists, accepting the Genesis chronology of Creation, believed that these articles, of organic origin, had been deposited by the Noachian flood; they believed, therefore, that the fossils could
not be more than 6,000 years old. Soon, however, forward thinkers like Buffon and the encyclopedists extrapolated that they could not possibly be 6,000
years old, and that therefore, they were proof that the earth was much older
than that.
In addition, there were discoveries of heaps of seashells in beds in the vicinity of Paris, atop very high mountains, and all of Europe, in areas far from
the sea. The question arose as to why these shells were found in very large
quantities in areas far away from oceans and seas. Buffon and Diderot vehemently denied that deposits of fossils and seashells had anything to do
with Noahs flood, and they were not the first to do so. Leonardo da Vinci,
c. 1500, intuited that the seashell beds were unrelated to the Flood: And if
you wish to say that it was the Deluge which carried these shells hundreds of
miles from the sea, that cannot have happened, since the Deluge was caused
by rain, and rain naturally urges rivers on towards the sea, together with everything carried by them, and does not bear dead objects from sea shores toward the mountains. And if you would say that the waters of the Deluge
afterwards rose above the mountains, the movement of the sea against the
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course of the rivers must have been so slow that it could not have floated up
anything heavier than itself.31
During the seventeenth century, Steno (Niels Stenson) and Robert Hooke
corroborated da Vincis thesis with scientific investigation, as did Antonio
Vallisneri during the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1666 Steno inspected the mouth of a shark and discovered that its teeth were similar to fossils called glossopetr (tongue stones), which had previously been thought to
be snake tongues or dragon tongues. Comparing the two, Steno surmised
that the glossopetr fossils were, in fact, shark teeth, and therefore, they
were the remains of organic organisms. What remained was to ascertain how
the figures got encased in the stone. Steno posited that the sandstone must
have once been loose sand that enveloped the fossils and then became petrified. Hence, he extrapolated that the fossils inside must be older than the
stone encasing it. In 1669 Steno articulated his hypotheses in Prodromus a
Dissertation Concerning Solids Naturally Contained with Solids.32
Robert Hooke arrived at the same conclusions as Steno and went a step
further: because many fossils have no living counterparts, species must pass
in and out of existence. Hence, species must be mutable, not fixed. In 1668
Robert Hooke read his Discourse of Earthquakes to the Royal Society in
which he noted that some fossils seem to have no living equivalents and that
there may have been diverse species of things wholly destroyed and annihilated, and diverse others changed and varied33 This raised eyebrows as it
was still commonly held that God created all species during Creation and
that they were still in existence, unchanged.
Antonio Vallisneri also broke away from the Noachian flood theory. In
1721 Vallisneri hypothesized that fossils are of organic origin and are the
remains of animals who lived in previous ages; their location on mountains is
unrelated to the Noachian flood.34
Voltaire, because he was an impassioned deist, could not help but become embroiled in the controversy surrounding the origin of fossils and the
location of seashells far from water. He denied that they had anything to do
with Noahs flood because he was fighting a war simultaneously on two
fronts. First, he was afraid that the fossils would be used as proof to substantiate that there really was a flood and that therefore, everything in the Old
Testament was true (as Johann Scheuchzer had done in 1726), and secondly,
the atheist materialists could use them to prove random creation, that species
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come into and pass out of existence all the time, without any particular purpose.
In the Dissertation Sent by the Author in Italian to the Academy of Bologna and Translated by Himself into French on the Changes that Have Taken
Place on Earth and on Petrifications that are Pretended to Still Bear Witness
(1746), Voltaire maintains that fossils found on mountaintops were carried
there by men: a stone that appears to bear the impression of a turbot (species
of flatfish) has been found in the mountains of Hesse (in Germany), and a
petrified pike was found in the Alps; he mocks scientists who have concluded that the sea and rivers must have flowed around and around over
mountains. He declares that it would have been more natural to suppose that
these fish, carried by travelers, having spoiled, were thrown away, and petrified over time; but this idea was too simple and too systematic. A boat
anchor was discovered atop a Swiss mountain: men probably carried it with
them to serve as an anchor for the loads they carried in case of a rockslide.
Glossopetr are merely the shells of a genus of contemporary mollusks
called Venus and they were not left by Noahs flood.
The foreword to the first complete edition of Voltaires works, the Kehl
edition (17841789), advises that the Dissertation had appeared anonymously and that for a long time no one knew that Voltaire was the author.
Kehl states that Buffon was unaware that Voltaire had written the piece when
he severely criticized the work and scolded its author in the Natural History,
General and Particular, Volume 1, The Theory of the Earth (1749).
In the 1829 edition of Voltaires Works, the editor, Beuchot, advises that
Voltaire had written the piece in three languages and circulated it through
diverse venues: Voltaire sent a letter to G.-Fr. Muller on June 28, 1746 indicating that he had sent his piece in English to the Royal Society of London
and that he proposed to translate it into Latin to send it to the Academy of
Saint-Petersburg. A French translation of the Italian was published in the
Mercure in July 1746. It was in the 1748 edition of his works (Dresden), that
Voltaire added his own translation into French, which, for the majority of
readers, was preferable to the original in Italian. Moreover, Voltaire made
several additions and corrections in various editions. The Digression, which
follows the Dissertation, was published in 1751.
Buffon was in the midst of correcting the proofs to the Natural History
when the Dissertation crossed his desk. The naturalist could not help but
comment on the piece and he felt it necessary to admonish its anonymous
author: While reading an Italian letter on the changes that have taken place
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on earth, published in Paris this year (1746)petrified fish are only, in his
opinion, rare fish, thrown off the table of Romans, because they were not
fresh; and regarding shells, he says that it was Syrian pilgrims who carried
them back from eastern seas during the times of the Crusades, that are now
found petrified in France, Italy and in other Christian countries; why didnt
he add that monkeys carried the shells to the tops of high mountains and all
the places where men cannot inhabit, that would have spoiled nothing and
would have made his explanation even more probable. How is it possible
that enlightened men, who even take pride in philosophy, still have such erroneous ideas on this subject? Therefore, we will not be satisfied to have
said that petrified shells are formed in nearly every place on earth that has
been excavated, and to have reported the testimony of authors of the Natural
History; as one could suspect them of perceiving, in view of some systems,
shells where there are none, we believe it necessary to cite travelers besides,
who have noticed them by chance and whose eyes, being less trained, could
recognize only whole and well preserved shells; their testimony will be perhaps of a greater authority next to people who do not have thee ability to ascertain the truth of facts by themselves, and those who do not know either
shells or petrifications, and who not being in a position to make a comparison, could doubt that the petrifications were in fact true shells, and that these
shells are found heaped together by the millions in all climates on earth.
Everyone can see with their eyes the banks of shells that are in the hills in the
vicinity of Paris35
Impervious and unyielding to the opinions of naturalists, Voltaire, in A
Defence of My Uncle (1767), Chapter 19 (Of Mountains and Shells), devotes himself to proving that fossils have nothing to do with any flood and to
deny that there ever was a Noachian flood. He enumerates nine reasons why
he disagrees with a great naturalist (Buffon) who has imagined that
mountains were formed by the sea and that the sea deposited petrified fish
on mountain peaks through flux and reflux.36 Flux and reflux is a scatological pun and he uses it several times to make fun of the hypothesis. During the eighteenth century the primary definition of flux was diarrhea:
FLUX also means the flow of excrement that has become too fluid, and signifies loose bowels.37 Flux and reflux strung together, to form the
phrase flux and reflux, connote the ebb and flow of the oceans tide.
However, Voltaire takes care to use the terms flux and reflux separately,
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and as often as possible, to ridicule the image of the ocean depositing fossilized objects all over the place, and especially, in very high spots.
Voltaire proffers nine reasons why seashells, discovered on mountain
peaks, could not have possibly been deposited there by Noahs flood:
1. If the sea had formed a small mountain by its flux, it would destroy
what it built by its reflux.38
2. The flux of the ocean can create heaps of sand, but it cannot create
rocks.39
3. If it takes 6,000 years for the ocean to raise hills of sand 40 feet perpendicular, it would require 30 million years to form the highest
mountain of the Alps, which is 20,000 feet high.40
4. How could the flux of the sea, which never rises more than eight feet
high at the coasts, have formed mountains 20,000 feet high? How
could there be enough water to cover them to leave fish at the summits?41
5. How could the tide and currents form chains of mountains, almost
circular, such as those that circumscribe Kashmir, Tuscany, Savoy,
and Vaud?42
6. If the sea were above the mountains, all the rest of the globe must also have been covered with water equal in height, otherwise the waters would have fallen again by their own weight. An ocean that
high would contain the water of forty of our present oceans; therefore, thirty-nine oceans must have necessarily vanished.43
7. If the earth were covered with water, it would have been inhabited
only by fish. It is difficult to comprehend how porpoises could produce men (This is a little dig at Maillets Telliamed, in which the author posits that all life originated in the sea).44
8. If the oceans covered the mountains for a long time, there would
have been no fresh water for two-footed animals and quadrupeds to
drink. The Rhine, the Rhone, the Soane, the Danube, the Po, the Euphrates, and the Tiber, derive their water from snow and rain.45
9. Nature never contradicts itself. All species remain the same forever.
Animals, vegetables, minerals, metals, everything is invariable. Everything preserves its essence. The essence of the earth is to have
mountains, without which there would be no rivers. The steep banks
of some rivers and lakes are embroidered with seashells. I have
never seen that they were the remains of sea-monsters. They look
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like the torn coats of muscles and other small shellfish that inhabit
rivers and lakes. There are some which are apparently nothing but
talc, which have taken different forms. There are a thousand earthly
productions that are mistaken for marine productions.46
Voltaire also offers an explanation as to why oyster shells can be found a

hundred leagues from the sea: because he has seen Roman money buried
twenty feet deep and rings of knights more than 900 miles from Rome, he
must necessarily extrapolate that these shells, coins and rings were not made
there, but rather, that travelers carried them to those locations.47
His response to the news that Syrian shells have been discovered in the
Alps is that these shells were probably brought there by Pilgrims, upon their
return from Jerusalem.48 He adamantly declares, People may tell me that
porphyry is formed of bears bristles; I will believe them when I find that
white marble is made of ostrich feathers.49 It is thus that Voltaire acquired
his reputation for believing that fossils were carried to their present locations
by the Crusaders returning from Jerusalem, picnickers who threw away their
trash, and conchologists who misplaced their samples.
In On the Singularities of Nature (1768), Voltaire devotes 102 pages to
refuting the findings of contemporary scientists and the impact that their hypotheses had on deism. In Chapter 12 he denies that the discovery of seashell beds in Touraine, the suburbs of Paris, and all over Europe, prove that
the earth is more than 6,000 years old: We find in some places in this globe
heaps of shells; we see in some others petrified oysters: from this it has been
concluded that, despite the laws of gravity and those of fluids, and despite
the depth of the ocean bed, the sea has covered all the earth millions of years
ago.50 He reiterates his argument that the sea, whose tide reaches a maximum of fifteen feet, could not have possibly, through the action of its flux,
formed tall rocks 18,000 feet high.
What Voltaire feared the most about this hypothesis was that if the earth
was covered with water, life must have originated in the sea, and perhaps
Maillet was right. This was insupportable. The hypothesis had to be refuted,
but since it could not be, with eighteenth-century science, then it would suffice to ridicule it to the fullest extent possible.
In Chapter 13 Voltaire makes note of the fact that although a thousand
places are filled with the remains of testaceans, crustaceans, and petrificationsthey are almost never found either on the tops or the sides of moun-
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tain chains.51 Rather, they are found several leagues from mountains, in
the middle of the ground, in caves, in places where it was very likely that
there were small lakes that have disappeared, small rivers whose courses
changedbut true marine bodies, those you never see. If there were any,
why have we never seen the bones of dog-fish, sharks or whales?52 The
answer that comes immediately to the readers mind is that dog-fish, sharks
and whales can swim out to sea in the event of a cataclysmic event, but turtles, muscles, snails, and small river crustaceans cannot. It is obvious that
Voltaire is grasping at straws here. It gets worse in other passages, where he
appears to be reverting to the Aristotelian notion that fossils are of inorganic
origin. He concludes Chapter 13 by asking, Again, I am not denying that
we find, a hundred miles from the sea, some petrified systems, sea-shells,
univalves, products of nature that perfectly resemble marine productions; but
are we assure that the soil of the ground cannot produce these fossils?
Mustnt the formation of arborized or herborized agates make us postpone
our judgment? A tree has not produced the agate that perfectly represents a
tree; the sea may also not have produced shells that resemble the dwelling
places of small marine animals.53 Voltaire attempts to substantiate his thesis that marine fossils have originated in the soil with an eyewitness account
in Chapter 14.
In Chapter 14, entitled, Important Observations on the Formation of
Rocks and Shells, Voltaire proves that seashells do not necessarily come
from the sea: a certain Mr. Le Royer de la Sauvagre claims that near his
castle, a part of the earth metamorphosed into a bed of soft stone twice in
eighty years. He built with this stone, which became very hard when used.
The small hole in the ground that he created when he removed the stone began to take form again. Shells reappeared there that at first, could be distinguished only with a microscope, and which grew with the stone. These
shells were of different species: there were ostracites, gryphites, which are
not found in any sea; cams, telines, hearts, whose seeds developed imperceptibly until they were a half inch thick. Voltaire asks, Isnt that enough to at
least surprise those who maintain that all shells that are found in some places
one earth were deposited there by the sea?54
In 1778 Buffon reveals that he had been horrified when he discovered
that the author of the Italian Letter was Voltaire. Being the courteous gentlemen that he is, he tries to make amends and soften the harsh criticism that
he had given twenty-nine years earlier. However, he remained adamant that
the heaps of seashells discovered buried in the earth in diverse places in
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France and other parts of Europe prove that these places had once been covered by water. In his Supplement to the Natural History, he admitted, Concerning what I have written, page 281, on the subject of the Italian Letter,
where the author states that it is pilgrims and others, who, in the times of the
Crusades, have brought back shells from Syria that we find in the bowels of
the earth in France, etc. one could have found, as I find myself, that I did not
treat Mr. Voltaire seriously enough; I admit that I would have done better to
drop the matter, rather than to jokingly take it up again, insofar as it is not
my style, and that it is perhaps the only instance of it in my writings. Mr.
Voltaire is a man, who by the superiority of his talents, merits the greatest
esteem. This Italian Letter was brought to me at the same time I was correcting the proofs to my book that is at issue; I read this letter only in part, believing that it was the work of some scholar in Italy, who, according to his
historical knowledge, only followed his prejudices, without consulting Nature; and it was only after the publication of my volume on the Theory of the
Earth, that I was apprised that the Letter was by Mr. Voltaire; therefore, I
regret my language. This is the truth, I declare it as much for Mr. Voltaire,
as for myself and for posterity to which I would not want to leave any doubt
as to the high esteem that I have always had for such an extraordinary man
who has done such credit to his century.55
Having shown Voltaire the respect that he was due, Buffon goes on to reiterate that seashells are found everywhere, and in such great quantity in certain places, and they are arranged in such a way, that one must necessarily
extrapolate that spots on the earth that are presently land must have formerly
been covered by water. The seashells suggest that where there is now
ground, there must have once been a seabed, and that by some revolution of
the earth, the sea pulled back and left its productions. Buffon politely introduces the work of a contemporary naturalist, P. Chabenat, who differs with
Voltaire. Buffon diplomatically says, Because Mr. Voltaires authority had
made an impression on some people, there were a few who wanted to verify
for themselves if the objections against the shells had some basis, and I believe that it is necessary to provide here the extract of a Memoir that was sent
to me56
Buffon cites the authority of naturalist Chabenat, who had traveled extensively throughout France and Italy, and who concluded, I saw figured
stones everywhere, and in some places in such great quantity, and arranged
in a way, that one could not help but believe that these parts of the Earth
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were a seabed in former times. I have seen shells of every species and which
perfectly resemble their living counterparts. I have seen them in the same
shape and the same size: this observation seemed sufficient to persuade me
that all these individuals were of different epochs, but they were of the same
species. I have seen ammonite horns from a half inch up to almost three feet
in diameter. I have seen scallops of all sizes, other bivalves and univalves as
well. Other than that I have seen belemnites, sea-mushrooms, etc. The form
and quantity of all these figured stones prove to us almost invincibly that
they were once animals that lived in the sea. Above all the shell that covered
them seems to leave no doubt because in certain ones, it is as shiny, as fresh
and as natural as in the living ones; if it were separated from the stone, one
would not believe that it was petrifiedAll this seems to tell me very intelligibly that this country was formerly a seabed, which by some sudden revolution, receded and left its productions there as in many other places.
However, I suspend my judgment because of Mr. Voltaires objections. To
answer him, I wanted to combine experimentation with observation.57
Buffon concludes, Mr. P. Chabenat reports afterwards many experiments to prove that shells which are found in the bowels of the earth are of
the same nature as those of the sea; I do not report them here, because they
teach nothing new, and no one doubts the identity between fossils shells and
seashells. Finally, Mr. P. Chabenat concludes and ends his Memoir by saying: Therefore, one cannot doubt that all these shells that are found in the
bowels of the earth are true shells and the remains of marine animals that
formerly covered all these regions, and that consequently, Mr. Voltaires objections are ill-founded.58
Martin J.S. Rudwick demonstrates how Voltaire, who insisted that there
was no flood and was compelled to deny the mutability of species, had
painted himself into a corner and was forced to argue that Crusaders brought
fossils back after they had ransacked Jerusalem: Yet if the evidence was
sometimes strained to provide support for the reality of the Deluge, it could
be equally strained in the opposite direction by those who, in the name of
Enlightenment, wished to deny that any such inexplicable event had ever
occurred. For example, Voltaire, whose first-hand knowledge of fossils was
probably minimal, nevertheless felt himself qualified to assert that they gave
no evidence of any interruption of the Newtonian regularity of the universe.
To reach this conclusion he was obliged to dismiss fossils variously as inorganic productions, as the relics of freshwater lakes, and as shells dropped on
land by pilgrims: but these were arguments hardly calculated to persuade
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naturalists who knew that many fossils closely resembled marine organisms
and yet were embedded within strata. On the whole, therefore, it was the
diluvialists whose work most encouraged the acceptance of an organic interpretation of fossils.59
OPPOSITION TO EPIGENESIS
Voltaire embraced preformation and he refuted epigenesis, which he believed was dangerous and would lead to atheism: epigenesis could be used as
stepping stone to spontaneous generation and if inanimate matter brings forth
living things, then Divine agency is unnecessary. Shirley A. Roe explains
why deists regarded preformation critical in their polemics: The belief that
the clockwork universe had been created by an intelligent and all-powerful
God demanded that Gods involvement in the creation of living creatures
play a fundamental role in explanations of their generation. For there was
always a danger in the mechanist world view that God as Creator might be a
superfluous entity and that matter and motion might themselves be responsible for all of the phenomena of the universe, including the creation of life
and the existence of the human soul. Preformation undercut these dangers by
making both God and mechanical laws essential to the explanation of generation.60
Therefore, Voltaire denounced epigenesists (ie: Maupertuis, Buffon, and
Needham) going all the way back to William Harvey. In his review of
Charles Bonnets Considerations on Organized Bodies (1762) that appeared
in the Literary Gazette of Europe on April 14, 1764, he takes the opportunity
to refute the work of Harvey and Maupertuis. According to Voltaire, even
the legendary William Harvey, who dissected dogs taken from the royal
parks of England, did not succeed in disproving preformation.
Voltaires contemporary, Charles Bonnet, believed in preexistent germs
and therefore, he devotes eight pages to defending the hypothesis in his review of Bonnets Considerations. Bonnet, on the first page of his book, declares his purpose, which is to prove that preformation is a fact: Philosophy,
having understood the impossibility of explaining the formation of organized
beings through mechanical means, has fortunately imagined that they have
already existed in miniature, in the form of germs or organic corpuscles.61
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In Chapter 8 Bonnet summarizes his defense of encasement thus: I will

content myself in reminding my readers of the astonishing apparatus of fibers, membranes, vessels, ligaments, tendons, muscles, nerves, veins, arteries, etc. that enter into the composition of an animals body. I will ask them
to consider with great care the structure, the relationships and the functioning
of all these parts. Then I will ask them if they imagine that a whole as assembled, as interrelated, and as harmonious, could have been formed simply
by the collision of molecules in motion, or directed, following certain laws
unknown to us. I will ask them to tell me if they do not feel the necessity we
are in of admitting that this admirable machine was first designed in miniature by the same hand that traced the design of the universe.62
In his review of Bonnets work, Voltaire begins by admitting that he
does not believe that Considerations can shed much light on the great and
mysterious question of generation, which is the despair of both ancient and
contemporary philosophers, but at least his book reveals a very wise and very
enlightened mind.63 He remarks that the ancients had to guess as we do
the secrets of nature, but they had no thread to guide them in the roundabout
ways of this immense labyrinth.64
The assistance of microscopes, comparative anatomy, and two centuries
of observation have offered a little enlightenment, but not much. For Voltaire there is no point in trying to unravel the mystery of generation with a
microscope because it cannot be done. Harvey, Malpighi, Leeuwenhoek,
Vallisneri, they all solved nothing, not even after copious investigation:
They concluded by remaining in doubt; which is what always happens when
you want to go back to first causes.65
Voltaire takes Maupertuis to task for defending epigenesis in Physical
Venus: Maupertuis pretended that the left leg of the fetus attracts the right
leg without being mistaken; one eye attracts an eye while leaving the nose
between them, one lobe of lung is attracted by the other lobe, etc.66
Having ridiculed Maupertuis theory that embryonic particles attract,
Voltaire supplies the answer: it is necessary to return to preformation: It
seems necessary to return to the ancient opinion that all germs were formed
at the same time by the hand that arranged the universe; that each germ contains within itself all those that must be born of it; and, whether the germs of
animals are contained in the males, or in the females, it is likely that they
have existed since the beginning of things, just like the earth, the seas, the
elements, the celestial bodies.67
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In the article Atheist, Atheism in the Philosophical Dictionary (1764),

Voltaire relates preformation to eradicating atheism from the planet: Above
all, let me add that there are fewer atheists today than there have ever been,
since philosophers have perceived that there is no vegetative being without
germs, no germ without design, etc., and that grain is not produced by putrefaction. Unphilosophical mathematicians have rejected final causes, but true
philosophers accept them; and as a well-known author has said, a catechist
announces God to children, and Newton demonstrates him to wise men.68
The well-known author to whom Voltaire refers is himself (see his article,
Theism, published in 1742).
In On the Singularities of Nature (1768), Voltaire reiterated his defense
of preformation: And today it has been shown to the eyes and to reason that
there is neither vegetable, nor animal that does not have its germ. We find it
in the egg of a chicken as in the acorn of an oak. A formative power presides
over all these developments, from one end of the universe to the other.69
REFUTATION OF TRANSFORMISM
Voltaire thought that it was preposterous that one species could metamorphose into another over millennia. He believed that God had created all species in perfect condition at the time of Creation and that He had not created
any new species since then. Moreover, he considered transformism to be a
dangerous tool used by atheists to promote their philosophy. It was the fulcrum of the random creation of the materialists and if it could be successfully
refuted, the mechanics of their argument would disappear. It was also dangerous to deism because it negated final causes: if transformism is true, then
God contradicts Himself all the time and eradicates something that originally
must have had a purpose.
In the Treatise on Metaphysics (1734) Voltaire calls upon believers in
God to reject transformism because it negates final causes: each species is
unique and distinct and God made each one with a special purpose in mind.
Voltaire begins his argument by declaring that there are two ways to arrive at
the notion of a Being that presides over the world. God is demonstrated
through the order of the universe and the purpose that each being seems to
have.70 The worlds order implies a creative intelligence and final causes.
Species do not vary or metamorphose. At the end of Chapter 1 he declares,
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a moderately instructed man has never advanced the notion that unmixed
species degenerate71 and Therefore, it seems to me that I am quite justified
in believing that it is with men as with trees; that pear trees, pines, oaks, and
apricot trees do not come from the same tree, and that bearded white men,
woolly haired black men, yellow men with manes, and beardless men do not
come from the same man.72 Here he is denying the unity of the human race:
this is because the unity of the human race presupposes transformism and a
common origin. Voltaire denied that there have been any physical changes
since Creation, and so he was forced to deny the common origin of all men.
He thought that the white, black, and yellow races are different species of
men and that they have been created separately by God. In the 17841789
edition of Voltaires Works, Kehl was compelled to add a footnote to Voltaires statement to remind the reader of Linnaeus and Buffons definition of
species: All these different races of men produce together individuals capable of reproduction, which we cannot say about trees of different species; but
has there been a time when there existed one or two individuals of each race?
That is what is completely unknown to us.73
In Chapter 2, Voltaire reiterates that each species has a purpose or final
cause: We must, above all, reason in good faith, and not seek to fool ourselves; when we see a thing that always has the same effect, that uniquely
has only this effect, that is comprised of an infinite number of organs, in
which there are an infinite number of movements, all of which cooperate to
meet the same end, it seems to me that we cannot, without some hidden reluctance, deny a final cause. The seed of all vegetables, of all animals, is in
this category: wouldnt we be a bit rash to say that all this is unrelated to any
end?74
Voltaire restates his belief that the different races of men are different
species in Relation touchant un Maure blanc amen dAfrique Paris en
1744 (1744). This piece was written after an albino Negro had been exhibited in Paris in 1743 and as a response to Maupertuis Dissertation physique
loccasion du ngre blanc (1744). Voltaires comment on the phenomenon
of the white Negro was, Here at last is a new wealth of nature, a species that
no more resembles ours than spaniels do greyhounds.75 Voltaire thought
that the albino Negro was a species of man different from that of the other
blacks in Africa and from that of white Europeans. He uses the term species [espce(s)] eleven times in the piece and each time he employs it, he
indicates that he believes that there are multiple species of men. Some of the
phrases are This species is scorned by blacks [Cette espce est mprise
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des ngres], To blacks they seem to be an inferior species made to serve

them [Ils paraissent aux ngres une espce infrieure faite pour les servir],
We knew about the existence of this species a few years ago [Il y a quelques annes que nous avons connu lexistence de cette espce], there was a
species of men as black as moles [il y avait une espce dhommes noirs
comme des taupes], a species that no more resembles ours than [une espce
qui ne ressemble pas tant la ntre que], and There is probably yet still
some other species towards Australian lands [Il y a encore probablement
quelque autre espce vers les terres australes].76
It is significant that Voltaire finishes the piece by declaring the equal
worth of all men: if we think that we are worth much more than they, we
are very mistaken.77 This climax to the four page essay reaffirms the deistic
ideal, which is to recognize the equal worth of all men and to treat them with
dignity and respect, regardless of how they originated. Voltaire devoted his
life to fighting intolerance of all kinds, including racial. In the article entitled, Theism, in the Philosophical Dictionary, Voltaire defines the theist as
one who says, I love you, to all of humanitys races: What is a true theist?
It is someone who says to God: I adore you, and I serve you; it is someone
who says to the Turk, to the Chinese, to the Indian, and to the Russian: I love
you.78 In the article entitled, Theist, he reiterates that the theist has
brothers from Peking to Cayenne, counting all wise men as his brothers.79
In the Defence of My Uncle (1767), Chapters 18 and 19, Voltaire again
denies the common origin of the various races. In Chapter 18, entitled, Of
Men of Different Colours, he defends the Abb Bazin, whose views questioning the unity of man had been attacked in a journal entitled the
conomique. Voltaire says, He never thought that English oysters were
engendered by the crocodiles of the Nile; or that gilliflowers of the Molucca
islands derived their origin from the firs of the Pyrnes.80 Voltaire repeats
what the conomique journalists had to say about the Abb: his thesis that
there are multiple species of men is as absurd as the supposition of ancient
philosophers who thought that there are black atoms and white atoms that
have produced black men and white men. Voltaire supports the multiple
species theory by observing that autopsies show that the reticulum mucosum
of the African is black, from head to toe, while that of the European is white;
he also cites the example of four red men who traveled to France in 1725; the
natives of the New World have skin the color of red copper. This leads one
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to concur with Bazin that there are varieties of men and that one does not
proceed from another.
In Chapter 19 Voltaire makes another statement that implicitly denies
the unity of the human race: Never lose sight of that great truth that nature
never belies itself. All species ever remain in the same situation. Animals,
vegetables, minerals, metals, everything is invariable in this great variety.
Everything preserves its essence.81 Again, the implication is that each of
the races was created separately.
Jacques Roger advises, What Voltaire defended was a stable creationism, which could admit only that nature had changed only minimally since
its creation. Buffon could not escape his criticism here. In 1767 Voltaire
published the Dfense de mon oncle [Defense of My Uncle], which attached,
first of all, the unity of the human species. Such a unity was impossible by
definition, since it presupposed that the current races had appeared progressively and therefore that nature had changed. For the same reasons, he then
attacked the Theory of the Earth and, in passing, organic molecules.82
In The Man of Forty Ecus (1768), Voltaire takes the opportunity to ridicule Benot de Maillets Telliamed (published posthumously in 1748) for its
transformist views. Maillet, in the chapter entitled, Sixth Day. Of the Origin of Man and Animals, and of the Propagation of the Species by Seeds,
proffers much transformist material that Voltaire was able to use as propaganda against science. Maillet expounds on how life began in the sea, the
interrelatedness of all species, and how flying fish left the water and over
time, were transformed into land creatures. Fish developed wings that enabled them to fly and then the little Wings they had under their Belly, and
which like their Fins helped them to walk in the Sea, became Feet, and
served them to walk on Land.83 Land creatures come from their counterparts in the sea: men and women come from mermen and mermaids, apes
come from sea monkeys. Intermediary species between men and fish (mermen and mermaids) have been sighted by seafarers and the Telliamed recounts many such events. There are different species of men, some with tails
and some without. Maillet asks the ultimate question as to whether men
could have metamorphosed from apes with tails: To return to the different
Species of Men. Can those who have Tails, be the Sons of them who have
none? As Apes with Tails do not certainly descend from those which have
none, is it not also natural to think, that Men born with Tails are of a different Species from those who have never had any?84
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Voltaire went wild and pounced on Maillet with delight: he would use
The Man of Forty Ecus as propaganda to ridicule the transformist hypothesis.
Maillets book provided an excellent opportunity to ridicule the wild imagination of contemporary transformists, which he heaped all together. The fact
that Maillet was not a transformist, but believed that the ocean carried human
eggs to land where they hatched (this made him a panspermist), was irrelevant: transformism was dangerous and now was the time to expose it for the
lie that it is. Voltaire mocks Telliamed, who taught me that mountains and
men are made by sea waters. First, there were handsome mermen that later
became amphibians. Their beautiful forked tail transformed itself into buttocks and legs. I was full of Ovids Metamorphoses, and a book where it
was shown that the human race was the bastard of a race of baboons. I liked
descending from a fish about as much as from a monkey. With time I had a
few doubts about this genealogy, and even about the formation of mountains.85
In On the Singularities of Nature (1768), Chapter 10, Voltaire makes it
clear that everything has a purpose. An iconic representation of final causes
is a great mountain range because it seems to be an essential part of the
world machine, just like bones are to quadrupeds and bipeds. It is around
their summits that clouds and snow congregate, which, emanating from there
unceasingly, form all the rivers and all the fountains, whose source we have
for such a long time and so erroneously attributed to the seaThese mountain ranges that cover both hemispheres have a more sensible use. They
strengthen the ground; they serve to irrigate it; they enclose at their bases all
the metals, all the minerals. We should notice here that all the pieces of this
world machine appear to be made for one another.86
In Chapter 11 he goes on to reiterate his refutation of transformism and
takes a jab at Maillet: The great Being who made gold and iron, trees, grass,
man and the ant, has made the ocean and mountains. Men were not fish, as
Maillet says; everything has been probably what it is by immutable laws.87
In Chapter 12 he discusses what he believes to be erroneous theories of
the metamorphosis of man from marine creatures that have found new life
thanks to the discoveries of seashell beds. He compares the unearthing of
seashells to sightings of Needhams eels under microscopic magnification.
He ridicules Maillet thus: The same thing has happened with shells as has
happened with eels: they have hatched new systemsIf the sea were everywhere, there was a time when the world was populated only by fish. Little
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by little the fins became arms; the forked tail, becoming longer, formed buttocks and legs; finally fish became men, and all that has happened according
to shells that have been unearthed. This theory is about as good as the horror
of the void, substantial forms, globular, penetrating, channeled, striated matter, the denial of the bodys existence, Jacques Aimards divining rod, preestablished harmony, and perpetual motion.88 In this Proustian stream of
consciousness, Voltaire unleashes every imaginable insult that he can muster
at the moment.
The horror of the void [lhorreur du vide] is a little jab at Pascal, who,
in his Thoughts, addresses the universal issue of mans terror when confronted by the inevitability of death. Pascal declares, When I see the blindness and the wretchedness of man, when I regard the whole silent universe
and man without light, left to himself and, as it were, lost in this corner of the
universe, without knowing who has put him there, what he has come to do,
what will become of him at death, and incapable of all knowledge, I become
terrified, like a man who should be carried in his sleep to a dreadful desert
island and should awake without knowing where he is and without means of
escape.89 Pascal employs the phrases without knowingwhat he will become upon dying [sans savoirce quil deviendra en mourant] and I enter
into horror [jentre en effroi]-this is Voltaires horror of the void. The
tautology of blindness, wretchedness, silent, without light, left to
himself, lost, without knowing, death, incapable, terrified,
sleep, dreadful, without knowing, and without means hyperbolizes
the horror and the void. Pascal forces the reader to confront the issue of horror and dread when faced with the corruption of the human body, as well as
the great unknown regarding a spiritual end, if any. Pascal observes that as a
result, men, who are wretched and lost beings, seek escape from their terror
with diversions. Pascal invites the reader to wager that God exists to extricate himself from this abyss of terror. When the reader believes in Christ, he
will undergo a transformation of the spirit: he will find peace in the midst of
despair, just as Saint Paul had discovered the presence of God in the midst of
turmoil. Voltaire ridiculed Pascal not only because Pascal was a follower of
Christ, but also because he invited the unbeliever to wager that God exists.
As far as Voltaire was concerned, a wager is unnecessary because the complexity and harmony of the Newtonian universe suffices to prove that God
exists.
For Voltaire, the horror of the void is fictional, as is everything else in
his enumeration, horror of the void, substantial forms However, Vol-
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taire places Pascals horror of the void at the beginning of his list of notions
that he wants to ridicule because of the association between Pascal and the
Catholic Church. For Voltaire, Pascal represented not only a religion that he
did not embrace, but a church that tortured its critics on the rack and burned
them at the stake. There is no doubt that the execution of the young Chevalier de La Barre on July 1, 1766 was still troubling Voltaire: when the teenager did not raise his hat at a passing procession of Capuchins, he was tried,
convicted of blasphemy, his hands were cut off, he was beheaded, and then
his body was burned along with Voltaires Philosophical Dictionary. Voltaire tried to get La Barre reinstated, but he was unable to do so. La Barre
was finally reinstated by the National Convention of the 25th of Brumaire,
Year II (November 15, 1794). Paul Johnson explains, What made Voltaire
hate Pascal was not the latters awareness of the limitation of reason, for he
shared it, but the way in which Pascal was used to defend a Christianity still
capable of monstrous cruelty. In 1766 there was a further outrage, when the
young Chevalier de la Barre failed to doff his hat in respect while a Capuchin
religious procession passed through the streets of Abbeville. (It was raining.)
He was charged and convicted of blasphemy, and sentenced to the torture
ordinary and extraordinary, his hands to be cut off, his tongue torn out with
pincers, and to be burned alive. This atrocious case haunted Voltaire for the
rest of his life, and indeed it was a reminder to the European intelligentsia
that Catholic Europe, despite the apparent triumph of reason, was still basically unreformed.90 Hence, Voltaires hatred of Pascal, the Jansenist sect to
which Pascal had belonged, and everything Catholic, far outweighed the horror of the void that Pascal had used as an entre to the wager that God exists.
The analogy that Voltaire makes between Maillets transformism and
substantial forms is also intended to deride Maillets metamorphosis of species. The Oxford English Dictionary defines substantial forms as the nature or distinctive character in virtue of possessing which a thing is what it
(specifically or individually) is.91 The OED also defines the term as In the
Scholastic philosophy: The essential determinant principle of a thing; that
which makes anything (matter) a determinate species or kind of being; the
essential creative quality.92 Chambers Cyclopdia (1728) defines substantial forms as Forms independent of all Matter; or Forms that are Substances themselves.93 La Mettrie devotes Treatise on the Soul, Chapter 7,
to substantial forms and clarifies the definition greatly. La Mettrie explains
that ancient philosophers distinguished between two kinds of substantial
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forms in living bodies-those that comprise the organic or physical parts, and
those that are considered to be their principle of life, or the soul; the term
soul was assigned to the latter, and Aristotle distinguished among the
vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the rational soul. Voltaire had contempt
for metaphysical discussions on the nature of the soul and for scholasticism,
which reveled in it. In the article Soul [Ame] in the Philosophical Dictionary, he ridicules Aristotles tripartite soul and declares the vegetative, the
animal, and the rational soul to be false. It is evident that he regarded the
subject of substantial forms, and their divisions, the tripartite soul, so preposterous, that he considered the analogy to transformism a great insult to the
latter.
The analogy between transformism and globular, penetrating, channeled, striated matter [matire globuleuse, subtile, cannele, strie] is an
assault upon Descartes, Newton, and science. The Encyclopdie defines globulous matter [la matire globuleuse] as matter comprised of detached parts
that have the form of small globes.94 It defines penetrating matter [la matire subtile] as the name that Cartesians give to a matter that they imagine
crosses and freely penetrates the pores of all bodies, and fills these pores so
as not to leave any void or interstice among them.95 The Encyclopdie
points out that if such matter existed (perfectly solid and penetrating all
things), it would necessarily be heavier than gold and it would contradict the
laws of physics.96
The Encyclopdie mentions that Newton also incorporated penetrating
matter into his physics: Nevertheless, Mr. Newton accepts the existence of a
penetrating matter, or of an environment much finer than air, that penetrates
the densest bodies & which thus contributes to the production of several of
natures phenomena.97
In the Principles of Philosophy, Part 3, entitled, Of the Visible Universe, Descartes attempts to explain the genesis of the universe and the formation of stars with globulous matter. He posits that the universe is full of
matter that is perpetually in motion and colliding with other matter. This
creates many circular movements and vortices or whirlwinds of tiny particles. In Sections 4648 and 8687, Descartes posits that small globules of
matter circle around and because of centrifugal force, fly away from the center of the vortex towards its circumference. These small globules of matter
give rise to the phenomenon of light emanating from a star. Other matter,
seeking to penetrate the vortex, becomes channeled or striated in shape and
goes on to form spots in the sun.98 Voltaire thought it utterly preposterous
194
that anyone would try to explain the formation of stars and again, because
the physics is purely hypothetical and cannot be proven, he felt that the comparison to Maillets transformism is propos and demeaning. Thus, the
enumeration globular, penetrating, channeled, striated matter is intended as
an affront to Descartes, Newton, and all of speculative science.
Voltaire had used the same enumeration, globular, penetrating, channeled, striated matter, earlier in his literary career, in the Defence of My Uncle (1767), Chapter 19. Here, he uses analogy to ridicule Needhams
animalcules, which are as fantastic and as farfetched, as Descartes globules:
The seed is useless; everything will grow spontaneously. Upon this supposed experiment a new universe is constructed, in the same manner as a
new world was formed a hundred years ago, with a penetrating, globulous,
and channeled matter.99
In summation, Voltaire viewed science as a death threat to deism. The
science of the eighteenth century revolved around random creation, spontaneous generation, transformism, and the unity of all living things which have
proceeded from a single prototype; this was insupportable to Voltaire and he
devoted the last thirteen years of his life, right up until his death, to denouncing atheism and its partner in crime, science. Jacques Roger sums up, Voltaire would write more than twenty-five works, treatises, dialogues, putative
letters, fictive questions, verse and prose satires, meditations, or tales, all of
them directed in whole or in part against atheism and its scientific underpinningVoltaire was to avenge the honor of God on the backs of eels, mountains, and shells. He would even perform some hasty experiments in order
to persuade himself more firmly that the lime pits of Touraine were not the
result of fossilized shells and that the polyp was not an animal. For he had
understood that these wretched little details called into question the existence
of God.100
Chapter9
TheControversyoverwhetherApes
CanBeTaughttoSpeak
In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the ape a language? I do not

think so.1
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine (1747)
As travelers voyaged around the world and returned to Europe with stories
about strange beasts that resembled men (ie: men with tails), interest in the
plenitude and continuity of the great chain of being increased. As naturalists
began to take notice of the physical similarities between man and apes, and
to note that apes, too, have a larynx and pharynx, the question arose whether
they can be taught language. Hence, the debate over whether apes can be
taught language arose from the effort to determine which animals were right
beneath man on the chain of beings (scala natur). Materialists such as La
Mettrie and Diderot, who held that only one substance exists (matter), and
that the universe is the result of random molecular organization, did not see
any reason why apes could not be taught to speak: since apes possess the
physical apparatus required for speech, all they require is instruction. Rousseau found it significant that the great apes exhibit intelligent behavior and
he did not rule out the possibility that perhaps they are a variety of the human
species. He recommended that scientific experiments be performed with
hybridization to ascertain whether orangutans belong to the same species as
man and to find out exactly how intelligent they are. He allowed for the possibility that perhaps apes are like natural man, who did not speak simply because he had no reason to do so.
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The question also involved theological polemics and sides were drawn
between the monist materialists and the Cartesian dualists. Cartesians argued
the notion of homo duplex, that is, that man is comprised of two substances,
body and soul, matter and mind; intellect arises from the activity of the soul
and only man has a soul. Therefore, apes will never be taught to speak. On
the other hand, the materialists, who rejected the notion of homo duplex, argued that consciousness is the product of the activity of the brain and organs,
education, environment, climate, and food. Rejecting the notion of the immortal soul as fictional, they argued that apes, who possess a larynx, pharynx, and trachea, could probably be taught to speak. The answer to this
question would determine just how great the gap actually was between man
and the other animals, and if it were to be shown that apes could be taught to
speak, then it would show that man does not have a special place on the great
chain of beings as the head of all animals and that the distance between men
and other animals is not as great as had been previously thought. It would
indicate that the difference between men and other animals is caused by environmental factors that can sometimes be remedied with instruction. It
would raise the question of whether apes, too, have an immortal soul that
requires forgiveness and redemption. It would also pose the more basic
question of exactly how highly organized a being must be before it could be
considered to have a soul. This theological question is cleverly noted by
Diderot, who, in the Sequel to the Conversation (1769), humorously asks,
Have you seen in the Kings Garden, in a glass cage, an orangutan that
looks like Saint John preaching in the wilderness?Cardinal Polignac said
to him one day, Speak, and I will baptize you.2
THE PHYSICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN

MAN AND THE APES
In 1597 an English translation of Philippo Pigafettas account of apes seen
by the Portuguese sailor Odoardo Lopez was published under the title, A Report of the Kingdome of Congo, a Region of Africa. Pigafettas work briefly
alludes to the similarities between human and apes that Lopez had noted. In
Chapter 9, entitled, The Six Provinces of the Kingdome of Congo, and First
of the Province of Bamba, Pigafetta writes, Apes, Monkeys, and such other
kinde of beasties, small and great of all sortes there are many in the Region
The Controversy over whether Apes Can be Taught to Speak
197
of Sogno, that lyeth upon the River Zaire. Some of them are very pleasant
and gamesome, and make good pastime, and are vied by the Lordes there for
their recreation and to shew them sport. For although they are venerable
Creatures, yet will they notably counterfait the countenances, the fashions, &
the actions of men. In every one of these Regions abovenamed, there are
some of the aforesaid Creatures, in some places mo, and in some places fewer.3 The salient point of this quote is that multitudes of apes were discovered that delighted the nobility by imitating human gestures. Pigafettas
book also contains drawings of the De Bry brothers in which apes are depicted as resembling chimpanzees-the apes in the drawings have no tail, long
arms, large ears, and look anthropomorphic.
In 1613 Samuel Purchas published Purchas his Pilgrimage, or Relatons
of the World and the Religions Observed in all Ages and Places Discovered,
from the Creation unto this Present. In Book 6, Chapter 1, entitled, Of Africa, and the Creatures Therein, he relates the descriptions of apes that Andrew Battell had seen during his voyages to the Congo. Purchas writes, But
more strange it seemed which hee told mee of a kinde of Great Apes, if they
might so be termed, of the height of a man, but twice as bigge in feature of
their limmes, with strength proportionable, hairie all over, otherwise altogether like men and women in their whole bodily shape. They lived on such
wilde fruites as the Trees and woods yielded, and in the night time lodged on
the Trees.4
Purchas discusses the resemblance between pongos and men in much
greater detail in his subsequent work, Purchas his Pilgrimes (1625). In Book
7, Chapter 3, Section 6, entitled, Of the Provinces of Bongo, Calongo,
Mayombe, Manikesocke, Motimbas: Of the Ape-monster Pongo, their Hunting, Idolatries; and divers other Observations, he writes, The greatest of
these two Monsters is called, Pongo, in their Language: and the lesser is
called, Engeco. This Pongo is in all proportion like a man, but that he is
more like a Giant in stature, than a man: for he is very tall, and hath a mans
face, hollow-eyed, with long haire upon his browes. His face and eares are
without haire, and his hands also. His bodie is full of haire, but not very
thicke, and it is of a dunnish colour. He differeth not from a man, but in His
legs, for they have no calfThey sleepe in the trees, and build shelters for
the raine. They feed upon Fruit that they find in the Woods, and upon Nuts,
for they eate no kind of flesh. They cannot speake, and have no understanding more than a beast. The people of the Countrie, when they travaile in the
Woods, make fires where they sleepe in the night; and in the morning, when
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they are gone, the Pongoes will come and sit about the fire, till it goeth out:
for they have no understanding to lay the wood togetherWhen they die
among themselves, they cover the dead with great heapes of boughs and
wood, which is commonly found in the Forrest.5
The salient features of Purchas account deserve summary, as they will
be discussed by the abb Prvost in Histoire gnrale des voyages (Paris,
17461789), by Buffon, Rousseau, and in numerous articles in the Encyclopedia. Purchas main points are:
Pongos look like men, except they have no calves: they are tall,
have a mans face, they are hollow-eyed, have eyebrows, the face
and ears are hairless, the hands are hairless, and they walk upon
their legs.
They build shelters from the rain. This implies roofs over their
shelters and is therefore significant.
They are vegetarian.
They cannot speak because they do not have more intelligence than
other animals.
They are attracted to campfires left by humans and they remain by
the campfires until the embers die out.
They do not have the intelligence to lay wood together to keep a
campfire going.
They cover their dead with great heaps of boughs and wood.
After Purchas account, seventeenth and eighteenth-century naturalists

began to pay attention to the physical similarities between man and the apes.
Francis Moran, in his article, Between Primates and Primitives: Natural
Man as the Missing Link in Rousseaus Second Discourse, has researched
and cited many primary sources.6 Moran mentions that Franois Leguat
(1708) and Daniel Beeckman (1718) compared apes to human populations.
Moran cites Franois Leguat, who found that the ape resembles the Hottentot: Its Face had no other Hair upon it than the Eyebrows, and in general it
much resembled one of those Grotesque Faces which the Female Hottentots
have at the Cape.7 Similarly, Daniel Beeckman agreed that the orangutan
was handsomer I am sure than some Hottentots that I have seen.8 Other
writers observed that apes walk like human beings: besides Samuel Purchas
(1625), there were Edward Tyson (1699), Franois Leguat (1708), Daniel
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Beeckman (1718), William Smith (1744), Benot de Maillet (1748), and Buffon (1766).9 Edward Tyson also gave attention to the human face of an
ape that he called a pygmie.10 Likewise, William Smith discusses the
boggoe or mandrill that bore the near resemblance of a human creature,
though nothing at all like an Ape.11 Similarly, Rousseau, in the Discourse
on the Origin of Inequality, Note 10, examines Purchas account in great detail and reiterates that the pongo is said to have a human face and to resemble man exactly.
Moreover, Moran points out that when artists drew pictures of monkeys
and apes for illustrations to be incorporated into naturalists books, they often embellished upon the human qualities of simians by depicting them
standing with a walk stick or cane. Because most Europeans had never come
into contact with these primates, they believed, from the drawings in books,
that apes had the ability to use human tools and that they were very close to
humans on the chain of beings. Moran surmises that it was drawings of apes
with walking sticks that suggested to Enlightenment audiences that perhaps
the gap between man and other animals was not as great as previously
thought: These drawings help us to appreciate Rousseaus uncertainty over
whether such creatures were animals or primitive human beings who had
been misidentified by careless observers. Recall that in Note X Rousseau
wonders whether various animals similar to men (i.e., orang outangs),
which travelers have without much observation taken for Beastsmight not
indeed be genuine Savage men whose racehad not acquired any degree of
perfection, and was still in the primitive sate of nature. Indeed, this speculation becomes all the more plausible when we take into account European
description of primate ethology.12 Moran also mentions Tysons observation that when orangutans have the choice of associating with men or monkeys, they prefer the company of men.13 Tyson concluded that the orang
outangs themselves recognized their proximity to human beings.14
There were also many articles on apes in the Encylopedia. The encyclopedists used the articles on the apes as propaganda to further their materialist
agenda. They emphasized the great physical similarities between apes and
man in order to narrow the distance between man and the other animals on
the great chain of beings and to suggest that the chasm was not insurmountable. In Man a Machine (1747), La Mettrie would take the next logical step,
which was to declare that it is possible to teach apes to speak.
The unsigned article, Ape [Singe] (1765), describes and differentiates
among 5 species of monkeys, incorporating 38 varieties, paying attention to
200
distinguishing physical characteristics.15 The author emphasizes and continually reiterates the great similarity between the apes and man: Most of
these animals have more in common with man than do other quadrupedsabove all in their teeth, ears, nostrils, etc. They have eyelashes on both eyelids and two breasts at the chest. Females for the most part have menses
similar to women. The front feet are very similar to mans hands; the hind
feet also have the form of hands, since the four fingers are larger than those
on the front feet and the thumb is large, fat and far removed from the first
finger; they also use their hind feet as they do their front to grab and point.16
A few lines below, describing the monkey, the author reiterates, they have a
great resemblance to man in their face, ears and nails.17 Next he identifies
the man of the woods orangutan thus: It resembles man more than does
any other species of ape; its hair is short and very soft.18
In the article Pongo (1765), Jaucourt describes the pongo according to
Purchas and Battells account: The pongo is more than five feet tall; it has
the height of an ordinary man, but is twice as heavy. Its face is hairless and
resembles a mans, it has rather large, sunken eyes, and its hair covers the
head and shouldersthey build types of shelters in the trees against the rains
with which this country is inundated during the summertime. They live only
on fruit and plants; they cover their dead with leaves and branches: the
blacks consider this as a kind of sepulchre. In the morning, when pongos
find campfires that Africans lit at night, as they travel across the forests, they
are seen to approach them with pleasure. Nevertheless, they have never
imagined kindling them by throwing wood into them. The Africans assure
us that pongos have no language, and that they are not considered to have
any degree of intelligence that would make them superior to animals.19 The
important points that Jaucourt captures are that pongos resemble men, they
built roofs on their shelters (the build types of shelters against the rain), they
cover their dead, and they exhibit pleasure (on le voit sen approcher avec
une apparence de plaisir).
THE DEBATE OVER WHETHER APES

CAN BE TAUGHT TO SPEAK
Robert Wokler, in his article, The Ape Debates in Enlightenment Anthropology, traces the history of the controversy over whether apes can learn
201
language back to the seventeenth century.20 Wokler says, To be sure, the

Enlightenment controversy about apes, men and language stemmed in large
measure from an ancient tradition of speculation about the chain of being and
about the distinction between the natural and cultural determinants of human
behavior which had attracted the interest of both Plato and Aristotle among a
host of other thinkers.21 Wokler points out that during the latter half of the
seventeenth century, scholars were trying to determine which animals were
right beneath man on the chain of beings. William Petty held that elephants,
rather than monkeys, were right beneath man because they were more intelligent. In 1676 Claude Perrault said that although monkeys have a larynx,
pharynx, and other speech apparatus, they did not have the intellect that God
intended for man alone.22 In 1699 Edward Tyson, an anatomist who was
interested in the physical similarities between chimpanzees and humans,
agreed that chimpanzees have all of the essential body parts of man, but that
they do not have mans intellect.23
The eighteenth century saw more diverse opinions on the subject. The
doctor and materialist philosophe, La Mettrie, author of The Natural History
of the Soul (1745) and Man a Machine (1747), argued that consciousness is
the result of the organization of matter alone: levels of awareness, intelligence, behavior, and a penchant for criminal behavior, are determined by the
brain, nervous system, heredity, education, climate, and food, in short, biological and environmental factors. Regarding language, he astutely observed
that language does not provide evidence of the existence of the immortal soul
because the deaf-mute cannot speak and they are still men. Since La Mettrie
did not believe in an immortal soul, and because he noted that man and apes
have similar physical apparatus, he contended that apes can be taught to
speak.
In Man a Machine (1747), La Mettrie compares the size of mans brain
to those of other animals. Because he is a doctor and a materialist, he attributes behavior and intelligence to how highly organized the brain is. He observes that in general, the form and structure of the brain of quadrupeds are
almost always the same as those of the brain of man. He finds that of all
animals, man has the largest brain, followed by that of the monkey, the beaver, the elephant, the dog, the fox, and the cat. Next, after the quadrupeds,
birds have the largest brains; fish have very little brain, and insects have
none.
La Mettrie establishes a causality between the size of the brain and intelligence and he also observes an inverse relationship between the size of the
202
brain and ferocity and the size of the brain and instinct. He draws the following conclusions: 1) the less brain that animals have, the fiercer they are;
conversely, the larger the brain, the gentler the animal, and 2) the more intelligence that an animal has, the less instinct. La Mettrie also establishes a
causality between brain size and the ability to learn. He observes that man is
not the only animal that can learn things. He points out that the brain and
vocal apparatus of birds permit them to vocalize: Among animals, some
learn to speak and sing; they remember tunes, and strike the notes as exactly
as a musician.24 He concludes that since apes have been shown to be unable
to learn music, it must be due to some defect in their organs.25 He is optimistic that one day apes will be taught to speak: But is this defect so essential
to the structure that it could never be remedied? In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the ape a language? I do not think so.26 Hence,
La Mettrie takes the position that apes can be taught language.
He bolsters his thesis by noting the great physical similarity between
man and ape: The ape resembles us so strongly that naturalists have called it
wild man or man of the woods.27 He is confident that the task could be
accomplished if an excellent teacher, someone of the caliber of Amman, took
charge of the responsibility, if the subject selected were a young ape (one not
too young or too old), and if one selected the ape with the most intelligent
face, one that appeared to live up to its look of intelligence by performing a
thousand small operations. La Mettrie considers Johann Conrad Amman, a
Swiss/Dutch physician, to be the best teacher for the job. Amman was celebrated in his time for teaching the deaf-mute to speak. His method of instruction was to have his pupils observe the motions of his lips, feel the
vibrations in his throat with their fingertips, and then to imitate his movements until they repeated distinct letters, syllables, and words.
La Mettrie places the burden of teaching apes to speak squarely on the
shoulders of the teacher. La Mettrie admits, with reference to the ape, Finally not considering myself worthy to be his master, I should put him in the
school of that excellent teacher whom I have just named, or with another
teacher equally skillful, if there is one.28
La Mettrie finds that it is significant that although Ammans pupils could
not hear, their teacher was able to instruct them via sight and touch. From
this La Mettrie extrapolates that perhaps it might be easier to teach apes to
speak than deaf-mutes because they do hear: but apes see and hear, they
understand what they hear and see, and grasp so perfectly the signs that are
203
made to them, that I doubt not that they would surpass the pupils of Amman
in any other game or exercise. Why then should the education of apes be
impossible? Why might not the ape, by dint of great pains, at last imitate
after the manner of deaf mutes, the motions necessary for pronunciation. I
do not dare decide whether the apes organs of speech, however trained,
would be incapable of articulation. But, because of the great analogy between ape and man and because there is no known animal whose external
and internal organs so strikingly resemble mans, it would surprise me if
speech were absolutely impossible to the ape.29
La Mettrie reiterates his confidence that the ape can learn language a few
paragraphs later: Not only do I defy anyone to name any really conclusive
experiment which proves my view impossible and absurd; but such is the
likeness of the structure and functions of the ape to ours that I have very little
doubt that if this animal were properly trained he might at last be taught to
pronounce, and consequently to know, a language. Then he would no longer
be a wild man, nor a defective man, but he would be a perfect man, a little
gentleman, with as much matter or muscle as we have, for thinking and profiting by his education.30
For La Mettrie, it is language that differentiates man from the apes, and
this difference can be overcome through education. He points out that before
man learned the artifice of language, he was indistinguishable from the ape.
As a materialist, La Mettrie was a transformist: he did believe that species
metamorphose into other species; he believed that with education, apes could
become men. The continuum between man and ape is evident: The transition from animals to man is not violent, as true philosophers will admit.
What was man before the invention of words and the knowledge of language? An animal of his own species with much less instinct than the others.
In those days, he did not consider himself king over the other animals, nor
was he distinguished from the ape, and from the rest, except as the ape itself
differs from the other animals, i.e., by a more intelligent faceWords, languages, laws, sciences, and the fine arts have comeMan has been trained in
the same way as animals.31
Conversely, there were eighteenth-century thinkers, such as Buffon, who
were Cartesians, and who held that consciousness is a uniquely human phenomenon and that animals are merely insensate automata. Leonora Cohen
Rosenfield explains Cartesian dualism in an excellent study, From BeastMachine to Man-Machine; Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to
La Mettrie. In this work, Rosenfield examines the genealogy of the Carte-
204
sian view that animals have no soul, no intelligence, no free will, and that
they are merely machines. She identifies an early statement that Descartes
made regarding the nature of animals, one that far antecedes his well known
exposition on animals in the Discourse on Method (1637): From the very
perfection of animal actions we suspect that they do not have free will.32
Rosenfield advises that this passage, from Private Thoughts [Cogitationes
privat], is Descartes earliest reference to animals. He jotted it down in his
private notebooks some time between 1619 to 1621. He addresses the subject more fully in 1637 in Chapter 5 of the Discourse on Method. Rosenfield
cites this quote: though there are many animals which manifest more industry than we in certain of their actions, the same animals are yet observed
to show none at all in many others: so that the circumstance that they do better than we does not prove that they are endowed with mind, for it would
thence follow that they possessed greater Reason than any of us, and could
surpass us in all things; on the contrary, it rather proves that they are destitute
of Reason, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs: thus it is seen, that a clock composed only of wheels and
weights, can number the hours and measure time more exactly than we with
all our skill.33 This often quoted statement was the foundation of the seventeenth-century view that animal are insensate machines devoid of consciousness, intelligence, and feeling. It would also influence Buffon, who
metaphorized animals as machines and clockwork.
Descartes goes on to declare that only man has a soul, which is real and
distinguishable from the body: we much better apprehend the reasons
which establish that the soul is of a nature wholly independent of the
bodyand finally, because no other causes are observed capable of destroying it, we are naturally led thence to judge that it is immortal.34 Hence,
Descartes recognized the existence of two substances, the extended (that
which occupies space) and the unextended (that which does not occupy
measurable space, namely, the soul).
Buffon, who embraced Cartesian dualism, held that animals will never
be taught to speak and that there is an insurmountable chasm between man
and ape. He maintained that animals are mindless, soulless machines that are
unteachable because they lack the intelligence that only a soul can bring. In
the Discourse on the Nature of Animals (1753), he continually employs the
metaphor machine: la mchanique vivante (the living machine), mis en
mouvement (set in motion), la machine animale (the animal machine), cette
205
mchanique (this machine), tous les ressorts de la machine animale (all of

the springs in the animal machine), une machine moins complique (a less
complex machine), en mouvement (in motion), le mouvement du corps et des
membres (motion of the body and members), and le mouvement continuel
(continual movement), are a few examples. Buffon is a Cartesian and believes that animals are purely machines without a soul. He further objectifies
animals by reducing them to machines whose springs exhibit either kinetic
energy or potential energy: An animal is distinguished by two modes of
existence, that of motion, and that of restIn the former, all the springs of
the machine are in action; in the latter, all is at rest, excepting one part35
Besides the machine metaphor, Buffon frequently employs the phrase
animal economy [conomie animale]. He states that he will examine the
nature of the animal world and study the animal economy in general, and
also, Sleepserves as a basis to the animal oeconomy, we must not understand the animal economy, per se, the animal economy of the oyster,
one is the fundamental part of the animal economy, the action of the heart
and lungsis the first part of the animal economy, and if we imagined
beings to whom nature accorded only this first part of the animal economy.
These are a few examples taken from the first few pages of the Discourse on
the Nature of Animals. The phrase animal economy hyperbolizes the mechanical nature of animals and reduces them to objects governed by Newtonian physics: the universe operates according to laws of economy and the
least action required to accomplish a motion. We should recall that Maupertuis was embattled in a controversy over who wrote The Law of Least Action.
The principle of least action states, When some change occurs in nature,
the quantity of action used for this change is always the smallest possible.36
The principle of least action also posits that in all the changes that take
place in the universe, the sum of the products of each body multiplied by the
distance it moves, and by the speed with which it moves, is the least that is
possible. Hence, Buffon metaphorizes animals as mechanical devices
whose cogs, wheels, springs, and pulleys operate according to the principle
of least action.
Having established that animals are soulless, mindless machines that operate according to Newtonian physics, Buffon goes on to distinguish man
from animals: only man has a soul. He says, With regard to man, whose
nature is so different from that of other animalsthe soul participates in all
our movements; and it is not easy to distinguish the effects of his spiritual
substance from those produced solely by the material part of our
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frameBut, as this spiritual substance has been conferred on man alone, by

which he is enabled to think and reflect, and, as the brutes are purely material, and neither think nor reflect, and yet act, and seem to be determined by
motives, we cannot hesitate in pronouncing the principle of motion in them
to be perfectly mechanical, and to depend absolutely on their organization.37
The salient points of this citation are that God has conferred the soul only
upon man, that the soul participates in our movements, that it permits man to
think and reflect; and that conversely, animals do not have a soul and that
that is why they can neither think, nor reflect.
Buffon goes on to point out that animals never invent, nor bring anything to perfection; of course, they have no reflection; they uniformly do the
same things in the same manner38 and may all the actions of animals, however, complicated they appear, be explained, without the necessity of attributing to them either thought or reflection. Their internal sense is sufficient to
produce every motion they perform.39 On what is this internal sense based?
Buffon explains, The internal sense of the brute, as well as its external
senses, are pure results of matter and mechanical organization.40 Man also
has the internal and external senses of brutes, but in addition, he has something superior, the soul: Like the animal, man possesses this internal material sense; but he is likewise endowed with a sense of a very different and
superior nature, residing in that spiritual substance which animates us, and
superintends our determinations.41
Buffon surmises that animals do have a consciousness of their existence
and that that awareness is only of the present moment: Now the power of
reflection being denied to brutes, it is obvious, that they cannot form ideas,
and consequently, that their consciousness of their existence must be less
certain and less extensive than ours; for they have no idea of time, no knowledge of the past, or of the future. Their consciousness of existence is simple;
it depends solely on the sensations which actually affect them, and consists
of the internal feelings produced by these sensations.42 Later on he reiterates this point: brutes have no knowledge of past events, no idea of time,
and, of course, no memory.43 He goes on to declare that brutes are incapable of comparing sensations and forming ideas from them; animals cannot
compare ideas, they cannot form a chain of reasoning, and hence, they cannot deduce abstract truths. Buffon concludes that animals lack these faculties because they have no understanding.
207
Conversely, Buffon declares that man is homo duplex: he is comprised of

two natures that are at war with one another because they are opposite in
their actions: the mind, or principle of all knowledge, is opposed to the body;
man has two natures, body and soul, matter and mind. His intelligence arises
from his soul. Jacques Roger explains Buffons view thus: The soul was
thought, reflection, understanding, the mind, memory, reason. It was
given to us to know, not to feel. It constituted the principle of knowledge, what we would call today the whole of our cognitive faculties. Essentially it was the power that produces ideas, that is capable of
comparing sensations and therefore of judging.44 In 1755 Buffon declared the unbridgeable chasm between man and other animals. God had
given intellect to man alone.45 Hence, because he believed that God gave a
soul to man alone, Buffon denied that animals could ever be taught to speak.
Buffon continually reiterated the insurmountable chasm between man
and ape: in 1753 in the Discourse on the Nature of Animals, in 1758 in Carnivorous Animals, and in 1766 in the Nomenclature of Apes. Jacques Roger
explains, In all these texts, he wanted to show that man is not an animal,
even when the physical resemblance is striking, as with the orangutan. And
he always repeated the same necessary sequence: slow growth, therefore
long education; durable families, therefore language and thought. In addition, he always maintained his two major assertions: the soul is a living immortal force, a divine light, and although the Creator chose to give man an
animal form similar to that of the ape, He suffused this animal body with
His divine breath.46
In 1766 Buffon flatly denied that apes can ever be taught to speak. In the
Nomenclature of Apes, he declares that the soul, thought, and speech do not
depend on the organization of the physical body; they are gifts given to man
alone and this explains why orangutans do not speak. When one considers
the physical appearance of the orangutan, one might supposes that this animal is the first among apes or the last among men. However, it lacks a soul,
thought, intellect, and language, and therefore it cannot be considered to be
the last among men: In the history of the orang-outang, we shall find, that, if
figure alone be regarded, we might consider this animal as the first of apes,
or the most imperfect of men; because, except the intellect, the orang-outang
wants nothing that we possess, and, in his body, differs less from man than
from the other animals which receive the denomination of apes. Hence
mind, reflection, and language depend not on figure, or on the organization
of the body. There are endowments peculiar to man. The orang-outang,
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though he neither thinks nor speaks, has a body, members, senses, a brain,
and a tongue perfectly similar to those of man: He counterfeits every human
movement; but he performs no action characteristics of manthe Creator
has not formed a mans body on a model absolutely different from that of the
mere animal. He has comprehended the figure of man, as well as that of all
other animals, under one general plan. But, at the same time that he has
given him a material form similar to that of the ape, he has penetrated this
animal body with a divine spirit. If he had conferred the same privilege, not
on the ape, but on the meanest, and what appears to us the worst constructed
animal, this species would soon have become the rival of man; it would have
excelled all the other animals by thinking and speaking. Whatever resemblance, therefore, takes place between the Hottentot and the ape, the interval
which separates them is immense; because the former is endowed with the
faculties of thought and of speech.47
Jacques Roger finds that it is significant that Buffon distinguishes between people living under the most primitive conditions, the Hottentots, and
apes. Having examined the physical characteristics and living standards of
the Hottentots in detail, Buffon concludes that there is an insurmountable
chasm between the most primitive man and the smartest ape. Jacques Roger
summarizes, despite everything, the distance separating them is immense, since in the inside the savage is filled with thoughts and on the outside with words. If an ape or any other animal species had possessed these
powers belonging only to man, this species would have soon become mans
rival; enlivened by the mind, it would have prevailed over the others, it
would have thought, it would have spoken. Nothing like this has ever occurred. Even though his origin was purely natural, mans superiority is absolute.48
Buffon goes on to solidify his position by addressing the argument that
materialists raise, namely, that apes do not speak because they are like imbeciles who are defective in the organization and functioning of the brain. Buffon, a dualist, maintains that it is more than the physical organization of the
brain that distinguishes imbeciles from apes. He asks, Who will ever be
able to ascertain how the organization of an idiot differs from that of another
man?49 He concedes that it is physical organization that defines the imbecile, the delirious man, the healthy man who sleeps, the newborn who does
not think yet, and the senile old person who no longer thinks. However,
animal offspring learn in a few weeks everything that their parents know,
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while human offspring require years of education and protection from their
families to acquire their knowledge. Hence, there is a qualitative difference
between the nature of animals and that of man, that difference is perfectibility, and it is a function of the soul.
Rousseau agreed with Buffon that animals cannot be taught to speak.
Rousseau, who examined the origin of language in detail, both in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755) and in the Essay on the Origin of
Languages (1755), distinguishes between two kinds of language: natural language and artificial. Natural language is that which is exhibited by animals
and also by natural man when he articulates the cry of nature. Artificial language is what man devised as he realized his perfectibility: it is more complex and requires abstract thought, something that animals do not have and
never will.
In the Essay on the Origin of Languages, Chapter 1, Rousseau says that
animals that live and work together, such as beavers, ants, and bees, have a
natural language for communicating with each other. He emphasizes the
point by declaring that he has no doubt about it. He believes that these animals possess a gestured language that speaks only to the eyes. These languages are natural and not acquired; these animals have these languages at
birth, they all have them, and everywhere they all have the same language.
However, these languages do not require abstract thought; animals, by virtue
of their very limited intelligence, can never be taught to speak: Animals
have a structure more than adequate for this kind of communication, yet none
of them has ever put it to this use. Here, it seems to me, is a most distinctive
difference. Those among them that work and live together, Beavers, ants,
bees, have some natural language for communicating with one another, I
have no doubt about it. There is even reason to believe that the language of
Beavers and that of ants is gestural and speaks only to the eyes. Be that as it
may, precisely because these various languages are natural, they are not acquired; the animals that speak them have them at birth, they all have them,
and everywhere they have the same one: they do not change languages, nor
do they make any progress whatsoever in them. Conventional language belongs to man alone. This is why man makes progress in good as well as in
evil, and why animals do not. This single distinction seems to be farreaching: they say that it can be explained by the differenc in organs. I
should be curious to see this explanation.50 Hence, Rousseau stands in opposition to the materialists, who hold that language is merely a matter of
210
physical organization. On the contrary, it requires abstract thought, which

belongs to man alone. We see Buffons influence here.
In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau surmises that
natural man also had language, the cry of nature: The first language of
mankind, the most universal and vivid, in a word the only language man
needed, before he had occasion to exert his eloquence to persuade assembled
multitudes, was the simple cry of nature. But as this was excited only by a
sort of instinct on urgent occasions, to implore assistance in case of danger,
or relief in case of suffering, it could be of little use in the ordinary course of
life, in which more moderate feelings prevail. When the ideas of men began
to expand and multiply, and closer communication took place among them,
they strove to invent more numerous signs and a more copious language.
They multiplied the inflections of the voice, and added gestures, which are in
their own nature more expressive, and depend less for their meaning on a
prior determination.51
He goes on to demonstrate that language is an artifice created by man
when he started to form societies. David Gauthier, in Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence, explains that Rousseau hypothesized that people began to
speak when they became aware of others and were concerned with what others thought of them. When humans went to the nearby well to draw water
and met and congregated with one another, they began to desire to gain the
esteem of others and so, they created signs and sounds to accomplish this.
They created language to get something. Natural man was self-sufficient and
the sentiment of existence was enough to make his content. When man met
others at the well, he turned his attention outward, to the other, and created
signs and language to gain the love and/or assistance of others. Rousseau
hypothesizes that that is why aimez-moi and aidez-moi sound similar. Both
phrases arise from concern with gaining something from the other and wish
fulfillment.
Rousseau explains that the mans first words had a broader signification
than they did later on, as they were ignorant of what we recognize today to
be the constituent parts of language; hence every single word signified a
whole proposition. Later they began to distinguish subject and attribute,
noun and verb. If one tree was called A, another was called B because
primitives thought that the two trees are not the same, and it required time for
them to realize that two trees might have things in common and that they
might both deserve the same word to identify them. Then man learned to
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arrange things by common and specific properties, which meant that he had
to understand the distinguishing properties of objects. The need arose for
observation and definition.
Rousseau explains that it is these complexities of language and the sophistication of thought that is required to develop language that illustrates
why animals can never be taught to speak, not even apes, as smart as they
appear to be: Add to this, that general ideas cannot be introduced into the
mind without the assistance of words, nor can the understanding seize them
except by means of propositions. This is one of the reasons why animals
cannot form such ideas, or ever acquire that capacity for self-improvement
which depends on them. When a monkey goes from one nut to another, are
we to conceive that he entertains any general idea of that kind of fruit, and
compares its archetype with the two individual nuts? Assuredly he does not;
but the sight of one of these nuts recalls to his memory the sensations which
he received from the other, and his eyes, being modified after a certain manner, give information to the palate of the modification it is about to receive.
Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination meddles with it
ever so little, the idea immediately becomes particular.52
Here we see that Rousseau is arguing that monkeys go from one nut to
another because the sensations that their palate receives from the first are
relegated to memory and then, when the sight of a second nut appears, their
memory calls up the sensation and they are drawn to the second nut. This
falls under the notion of instinct and absence of free will that Rousseau discusses elsewhere. He argues that man has free will and animals are governed
by instinct. Instinct dictates that animals always behave in the same way in a
set of circumstances. Rousseau gives the example of a pigeon starving next
to a bowl of meat and a cat, atop a bowl of fruit or grain; conversely, man
observes that different animals eat different foods and that consequently, a
variety of foods are edible, and so he varies his diet according to what is
available at the time. Hence, man associates ideas, while animals do not.
Rousseau proves that apes could never learn language. He declares that
general ideas can enter the mind only with the help of words and animals are
incapable of forming such ideas, nor ever acquire the perfectibility that depends on them. Hence, animals, which are not perfectible, will never acquire
the ability to connect ideas that is the foundation of language. Humans learn
and grow over a lifetime; conversely, animals are all that they will ever be
after the first few months of life. It is evident that animals lack perfectibility
and the implication is that if they are capable of developing language, they
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would have done so by now. We see the influence that Buffon had on Rousseau, who identified free will and perfectibility as two absolutes that differentiate man from all other creatures.
Diderot, on the other hand, had no doubt that apes were the link between
man and other animals on the great chain of beings. He declared as much in
the Elements of Physiology (17741780): The intermediary between man
and other animals is the monkey.53 This statement is a reiteration of the
views that he had expressed in his 1769 trilogy.
In 1769 Diderot explored and developed the notion that not only might
apes be taught to speak, but that animals might even be crossbred with humans to create useful hybrids that would behave as servants and make mans
life easier. He demonstrates that not only is the plenitude and continuity of
the great chain of beings infinite, but that man can engineer at will what nature does randomly. There is no limit to what man can do with biology. Furthermore, as all matter is conscious at every level of organization, animals,
too, have aversion, desire, memory, and intelligence.
In the Conversation between dAlembert and Diderot, the character
dAlembert declares that consciousness is based on the memory of ones own
actions. Without memory, there would be no I because we would experience our existence only at the moment of receiving an impression and there
would be no connected string of events. Our lives would be a broken sequence of isolated sensations, we would live a schizophrenic existence of
unrelated incidents and live from moment to moment, from birth until death.
The character Diderot maintains that if a conscious being who had the
organization needed for memory links together the impressions he receives,
and constructs from this a story, that of his life, and so acquires consciousness of self, then he is able to deny, affirm, conclude, and think. Diderot
goes on to explain how memory works. He compares the fibers of our organs to conscious, vibrating strings. A vibrating string goes on vibrating
long after I has been plucked. Furthermore, it has the ability to make other
strings vibrate, and so memory is called up. Man is not the only animal capable of remembering: so is a finch and a nightingale, two examples of conscious beings that sing and remember tunes. Hence, birds have memory,
learn tunes, remember them, and warble them , having learned them.
Diderot goes on to show that finches and nightingales are not the only
animals that have consciousness: so do chicks. Diderot paints a very moving
portrait of a tiny chick breaking out of its shell, living its first moments in the
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world. Anyone who has ever witnessed the sight of a chick slowly and relentlessly working very hard to break the shell of its egg with its beak and
emerging, trying very hard to stand up on its wobbly legs that are unaccustomed to supporting its weight, repeatedly falling, and then finally succeeding in standing up, is filled with awe, amazement, and great empathy for the
tiny creature who has worked so hard to enter into what we know to be a
hostile world. Diderot captures the beauty, the mystery, and the great pathos
of the event: This creature stirs, moves about, makes a noise-I can hear it
cheeping through the shell-it takes on a downy covering, it can see. The
weight of its wagging head keeps on banging the beak against the inner wall
of its prison. Now the wall is breached and the bird emerges, walks, flies,
feels pain, runs away, comes back again, complains, suffers, loves, desires,
enjoys, it experiences all your affections and does all the things you do. And
will you maintain, with Descartes, that it is an imitating machine pure and
simple? Why, even little children will laugh at you, and philosophers will
answer that if it is machine you are one too!54
Diderot makes it clear that the newborn chick has consciousness, life,
memory, passions, thought. He goes on to reiterate that not just the chick,
but every animal has joy, sorrow, hunger, thirst, anger, admiration, and
fright.
In the Sequel to the Conversation, Diderot blurs the boundaries between
species: They claim to have seen in the Archdukes farmyard an abominable
rabbit which acted as cock to a score of shameless hens who seemed quite
willing to put up with it, and they will add that they have been shown chickens covered with fur which were the fruit of this bestiality. Of course they
were laughed at.55 While this passage is humorous, it serves as an entre,
one of two, to the real dish. The next entre to the real dish is the suggestion
of creating hybrids of goats and humans to be a fleet-footed race that could
act as servants. This specter immediately raises a theological issue: would
goat-men have souls that require forgiveness and redemption by a Savior?
Julie responds, That would make a rare hullabaloo at the Sorbonne.56 And
yet, this passage is still not the climax of the story: it is merely an intermediary step leading up to what Diderot is really driving at: teaching orangutans
to speak. The character Bordeu asks, Have you noticed in the Zoo, in a
glass cage, the orang-outang that looks like St John preaching in the wilderness? Julie replies, Yes, I have seen him. Bordeu continues, One day
Cardinal Polignac said to him: If you will speak, old chap, I will baptize
you.57
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It is highly significant that Diderot saved the dialogue about the orangutan last. This passage marks not only the end of the Sequel to the Conversation, but to the entire trilogy, as well. This is the climax, the philosophical
statement, the main point of the whole biological treatise. He blurs the
boundaries between man and ape on the chain of beings. He suggests that
man does not have a unique place in Creation far removed from all other
creatures. He is a transformist and is declaring that one species has metamorphosed from the other. The salient points that Diderot makes with this
joke, which is the capstone not only of the trilogy, but the statement that embodies his findings after all of his years as chief editor of the Encyclopedia,
his attendance at autopsies and surgical operations, his perusal of the scientific journals of the time, are as follows:
Man does not have a special place at the head of all nature; there is
not an insurmountable chasm between man and the other animals.
We can turn an ape into a man or a man into an ape by modifying
prenatal fibers in the embryo, education, environment, climate, food,
and applying the fourth dimension, time.
Once the first ape has learned to speak, Cartesian duality will be laid
to rest forever.
Man can willfully engineer his future and accomplish what nature
does by random chance.
Perhaps there are multiple species of man, some more advanced than
others.
Years later he would reiterate his view in one terse statement in the Elements of Physiology (17741780): The intermediary between man and other
animals is the monkey.58
In the next chapter we will see that an even more challenging issue arose
from mans voyages around the world: the enigma of the origin of multiple
races. How the vast diversity of mans physical characteristics could have
derived from a single ancestral pair was problematic. Some naturalists
thought that all of humanity arose from a single ancestral pair, while others
did not.
Furthermore, the diversity of races entailed more than just biological
questions: the transatlantic slave trade was an evil against which the philosophes battled throughout their lives. The philosophes often used their biologi-
215
cal treatises as an opportunity to exercise their masterful skills in composing

vociferous manifestos against slavery and racial injustice; conversely, they
also used their political manifestos to promulgate bold new biological premises. They voiced outrage at the way that Europeans invaded the lands of
indigenous peoples, merchandized slaves, and brutalized and killed natives
for crimes as trivial as stealing a worthless trinket. They declaimed slavery
as being contrary to religion, ethics, and natural law.
The philosophes also used the races discovered in Africa, Asia, the New
World, and the Pacific islands, as a foil to caustically criticize the evils of
European civilization, not the least of which were slavery and the inequality
inherent in distinct social classes. They continually reiterated that slavery
does not exist in far away lands such as Tahiti. At one point, in the middle of
a political and social manifesto (the Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville), Diderot presciently suggested that some races are older than others.
With astonishing acuity, he maintained that the Oriental race is younger than
the Caucasian race! He implied that Tahitians belonged to a younger race
that was newer on the planet and that had not yet developed the vices that
had arisen in the Caucasian race: The Tahitian is close to the origins of the
world and the European near its old age. The gulf between us is greater than
that separating the new-born child from the decrepit dotard.59 We will see
that Diderot, in the Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville, would utilize
race as a platform to denounce European imperialism, slavery, murder, cruelty, and a lot more.
Chapter10
Race
If you think that you have the authority to oppress me because you are stronger and
more clever than me, then do not complain when my forceful arm rips open your
breast to find your heart1
Diderot, History of Two Indias (17701780)
THE GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT OF RACE

Eighteenth-century naturalists recognized that by classifying similar entities,
they could acquire a better knowledge of them: they could readily observe
similarities in structures, quickly retrieve information about relationships that
exist, analyze the information, and draw conclusions. Classification was
used to represent what was known and to generate a new cycle of experimentation, comparisons, and theorizing.
As travelers explored the world and became aware of the great diversity
of humankind, scientists and philosophers tried to compile the information
into a meaningful classification. Whenever they compared races, they identified and compared physical characteristics, perceived intelligence, personality, customs, climate, and geographical location.
In 1684 the French medical doctor and traveler, Franois Bernier, classified humanity according to four or five races in an anonymous work entitled,
A New Division of the Earth, according to the Different Races of Men who
Inhabit It.2 He used the term race [race] and species [espce] interchangeably. Bernier opens by recalling that in the past, geographers had di-
218
vided the earth according to countries or regions. He proposes something

new: to divide the earth according to the physical characteristics of the people indigenous to each region; he also declares that certain distinguishing
physical characteristics are undeniable. His system of racial classification is
based on skin color, facial profile, and the texture and color of hair. Observing these physical traits, he distinguished among four or five races of people, whose differences are so obvious, that by right these should be used as a
basis for a new division of the world.
Bernier distinguishes among the white color (generally indigenous to
Europe and parts of Africa and Asia), and the black color (most of Africa),
which he presciently points out is not caused by the sun because if Africans
are transported to a cold country, their children are still born black. Bernier
hypothesizes that the cause must be sought in the seed or in the blood.
This was highly intuitive, especially since he articulated this a century before
Maupertuis would posit the inheritance of parental elements and conversely,
Buffon would go down the road of acquired characteristics, argue the effect
of climate, and assert that if blacks moved to a cold climate, after many generations, their progeny would turn white. Bernier also stated that a third race
was the group residing in the Orient, and a fourth race was the Lapp, comprised of little stunted creatures with thick legs, who are very ugly.
Bernier was not sure whether the number of races could be pegged at
four or five. He opens by stating that there are four or five, but, after enumerating Europeans, Africans, Orientals and Lapps, he says that the olive
color and facial features of Native Americans are not significantly different
from those of Europeans so as to cause them to be categorized as a race distinct from that of the European. He points out that among Europeans, stature, facial profile, and hair color vary, as they do in other parts of the world.
As an example he cites the Hottentots of the Cape of Good Hope, who seem
to be of a different species from the rest of Africa. The reader draws the
conclusion that Bernier was uncertain about Native Americans and Hottentots because he mentioned them last, apart from the previous groups, and that
since he opened by stating that there are four or five races, that he was leaning toward classifying Native Americans as part of the European group, and
Hottentots, as a distinct race of their own.
In 1753 Buffon, in the History of the Ass, declared that individuals belong to the same species if they can produce fertile offspring together. He
articulated the definition of species thus: we can also unite into one spe-
Race
219
cies two successions of individuals who reproduce by mixing3 and Species

being thus confined to a constant succession of individuals endowed with the
power of reproduction4 Conversely, Buffon declared that individuals
belong to different species if they cannot produce fertile offspring together:
we can draw a line of separation between two species, that is, between
two successions of individuals who reproduce, but cannot mix5 and
Every species, every succession of individuals, who reproduce and cannot
mix, shall be considered and treated separately; and we shall employ no other
families, genera, orders, and classes, that what are exhibited by Nature herself.6
Buffon went on to observe that all the different races of man belong to
the same species because they can produce fertile offspring together: But
these differences in colour and dimensions prevent not the Negro and White,
the Laplander and Patagonian, the giant and dwarf, from mixing together and
producing fertile individuals; and, consequently, these men, so different in
appearance, are all of one species, because this uniform reproduction is the
very circumstance which constitutes distinct species.7
In 1755 Diderot, in his unsigned article, Species (Natural History)
[Espce (Histoire naturelle)], in the Encyclopedia, cites verbatim Buffons
definition of species from the History of the Ass, using quotation marks and a
reference: it is the constant succession and uninterreupted renewal of
these individuals that constitute itwe can always draw a line of separation
between two species, that is to say, between two successions of individuals
that reproduce and cannot mix, as we can also combine into a single species
two successions of individuals who reproduce themselves while mixingSpecies, therefore, being nothing other than a constant succession of
similar individuals & who reproducing themselvesM. de Buffon, Nat.
Hist., Gen. & Part. &c. v. 4, p. 784 & thereafter.8 It must be noted, however, that while Buffons definition of species appears in the Histoire
naturelle in 4:38486, Diderot erroneously refers to p. 784. Diderot also
cites Buffon profusely in his articles, Animal [Animal] (1751), Man
(Natural History) [Homme (Histoire naturelle)] (1765), and Human Species (Natural History) [Humaine espce (Histoire naturelle)] (1765).
In 1758 Linnaeus classified man into seven races in the Systema natur.
Robert Bernasconi identifies the salient points in Linnaeus classification
thus: So one finds in the tenth edition of 1758, after the feral or wild man,
the following classes: Homo americanus, who was allegedly obstinate, con-
220
tent, free, and governed by habit; Homo europus, who was allegedly gentle,
very acute, inventive and governed by customs or religious observances (ritus); Homo asiaticus, who was allegedly severe, haughty, covetous, and governed by opinions; and Homo africanus, who was allegedly crafty, indolent,
negligent and governed by caprice.9 Linnaeus identified feral or wild man
as Homo ferus, who is four-footed, unable to speak, and covered with hair
[tetrapus, mutus, hirsutus].10 He also listed monsters [Monstrosus] and
Troglodytes [Troglodytes] as races.11
In 1765 Diderot, in his unsigned article, Human Species (Natural History), in the Encyclopedia, affirms the unity of the human race. After describing distinguishing physical characteristics and customs of different races
around the globe, he concludes that there is only one human race, comprised
of individuals who are more or less tanned: From what precedes it follows
that in the entire new continent that we have just traversed, there is only one
and the same race of men, more or less tanned. Americans have the same
origin. Europeans have the same origin. From north to south we see the
same varieties in both hemispheres. Therefore, everything goes to prove that
humankind is not comprised of essentially different species. The difference
between whites and browns arises from food, morals, customs, climate; that
between browns and blacks has the same cause. Therefore, originally there
was only one race of men, which, having multiplied and spread across the
surface of the earth, gave rise in the long run to all the varieties that we have
just mentioned12
In 1766 Buffon, in the Degeneration of Animals, explores ways that man
can tamper with race and undo what nature has done. For example, because
he believed in acquired characteristics, he thought that with time, white people who have been transported from the north to the Equator would become
brown or black and vice-versa. The process could be accelerated if they
abandoned the food from their native climate and ate only food from the
country to which they were relocated.
Buffon proposes that another way to change skin color is to interbreed
the races. He surmises that if man were forced to abandon those climates
which he had invaded, and to return to his native country, he would, in the
progress of time, resume his original features, his primitive stature, and his
natural colour. But the mixture of races would produce this effect much
sooner. A white male with a black female, or a black male with a white female, equally produce a mulatto, whose colour is brown, or a mixture of
Race
221
black and white. This mulatto intermixing with a white, produced a second
mulatto less brown than the former; and, if the second mulatto unites with a
white, the third will leave only a slight shade of brown, which will entirely
vanish in future generations. Hence, by this mixture, 150, or 200 years, are
sufficient to bleach the skin of a Negro. But, to produce the same effect by
the influence of climate alone, many centuries would perhaps be necessary.13
Buffon also thought that a race of men or a species of animals could degenerate due to climate, geography, and food. Taking animals out of their
lands of origin, domesticating them, working them too hard, and giving them
food not indigenous to their lands of origin, caused the degeneration of their
species. Domestication causes degeneration because it prevents animals
from exercising and eating food that is suitable for them in the wilderness,
which is their natural habitat. Their weakened state, which is acquired, is
passed on their offspring through inheritance.
Buffon thought that man was originally white and that his land of origin
is Europe; as he traversed the planet and became exposed to extreme weather
conditions, his skin color, facial features, and height, underwent changes. He
regarded these changes as evidence of degeneration. However, despite these
differences, Buffon reiterated that all the different races of man constitute
one species: And, after many ages had elapsed; after he had traversed whole
continents, and intermixed with races already degenerated by the influence of
different climates; after he was habituated to the scorching hears of the
South, and the frozen regions of the North; the changes he underwent became so great and so conspicuous, as to give room for suspecting, that the
Negro, the Laplander, and the White, were really different species, if, on the
one hand, we were not certain, that only one man was originally created, and,
on the other, that the White, the Laplander, and the Negro, are capable of
uniting, and of propagating the great and undivided family of the human
kind.14
RACE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT

Many philosophes believed that all of mankind originated from a single ancestor or ancestral pair. In the nineteenth century the term monogenesis
would be coined to express this idea. Christians were monogenecists and
222
they pointed to the Genesis account in the Bible to uphold the notion that all
humans are of a single origin; they argued the authority of the Word of God.
Furthermore, atheist materialists such as Diderot and Maupertuis also argued
monogenesis: they hypothesized that random errors in the generative process could explain the origin of all races, species, even kingdoms from a single prototype. Conversely, there were thinkers who hypothesized the
origination of mankind from a number of different ancestors. In the nineteenth century, this concept would be called polygenesis. Voltaire was a
proponent of the independent origin of the different races.
Although the eighteenth-century dictionary did not yet have the terms
monogenesis and polygenesis to identify these ideas, the philosophes
had devised the concepts and argued over them. For example, in the Treatise
on Metaphysics (1734), Voltaire makes a polygenecist statement. He declares that the multiplicity of races could not have posibly have metamorphosed from a single ancestral pair: Therefore, it seems to me that I am
quite justified in believing that it is with men as with trees; that pear trees,
pines, oaks, and apricot trees do not come from the same tree, and that
bearded white men, woolly haired black men, yellow men with manes, and
beardless men do not come from the same man.15 Voltaire thought that it
was absurd to think that all men, who have greatly diverse physical characteristics, could be traced back to the same mother and father. Because Voltaire denied that there have been any physical changes since Creation, he was
forced to deny the common origin of all men. It is important to note, however, that although polygenecists believed that all humans are not of the same
origin, they were not necessarily racists or in favor of slavery. For example,
Voltaire, who believed that different races are different species of man, devoted his life to opposing slavery and injustice.
On the other hand, Maupertuis was a monogenecist and in 1745, in
Physical Venus, he hypothesized that the first humans were all of the same
color, and that after many generations, errors in the generative process
caused the appearance of all the different hues of skin color that exist today.
The second part of Physical Venus had been published the previous year under the title, Dissertation on the Origin of Blacks. In this work Maupertuis
points out the inadequacies of the preformation theory (its inability to explain
hybrids or monsters), promotes the theory of epigenesis (because it can explain the chance origin of the different colors of man, as well as hybrids and
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monsters), and hypothesizes that random errors in the generative process can
explain the vast diversity that we see in nature.
Maupertuis begins by taking a stand against his contemporaries who adhere to preformation. Preformation cannot explain the origin of the different
colors of man, hybrids, monsters, or why inherited traits often skip a generation: Therefore, I apologize to modern physicists if I cannot accept the systems that they have so ingeniously conceived. For I am not among those
who believe that we can advance physics by adhering to a system despite
some phenomenon that is clearly incompatible with it; & who, having noticed some aspect that will inevitably lead to the downfall of the edifice, nevertheless finish building it, & inhabit it with as much assurance, as if it were
the most solid in the world.16
Next Maupertuis points out that the laws of attraction (vital laws and vital forces), hypothesized by chemists on a small scale and astronomers on a
grand scale, may play a critical role in generation, as well. He points out that
the most famous chemists today admit Attraction, and extend its function
farther than did the astronomers. Why should this force, if its exists in nature, not be involved in the formation of animal bodies?17 Hence, he begins
by positing that the seeds circulating throughout the bloodstream of the father and mother, that would one day form the offspring, have certain affinities or attraction to each other and to other biological elements. This is not
unlike gravity or chemical attraction. These affinities or attractions must be
the basis of biological theory.
By the time that Maupertuis concludes Part 1 of Physical Venus, he has
shown the flaws in preformation theory and he has explained that there must
exist affinities or attraction that biological elements have for one another.
This serves as the basis for Part 2, which is entitled, Dissertation on the Origin of Blacks.
Before Maupertuis begins his examination of the origin of the black race,
he has something to say about racism and passionately so. He begins Part 2,
Chapter 1 by unleashing a scathing criticism of the white Europeans attitude
towards blacks. The invective states, If the first white men who saw blacks
had found them in the forests, perhaps they would not have accorded them
the name of men. However, those that were found in large cities, governed
by wise queens, who made the arts and sciences flourish, who built the temple of Jupiter Ammon in times when nearly all other peoples were barbarians, these Blacks may well have not been able to regard Whites as their
224
brothers.18 Maupertuis dispenses with the stereotype that blacks live only in
jungles by pointing out that those that are found in large cities are responsible for landmark achievements. One such feat is an architectural one,
namely, the construction of the Temple of Jupiter Ammon. Actually, there
are two temples of Jupiter Ammon that are noteworthy: one is in Karnok,
Luxor (Egypt) and it owes its huge size to 1,300 years of construction. It
was started by the 12th Dynastys Sesostris I and was continually built
through the Ptolemic period. The other Temple of Jupiter Ammon is at Siwa
in the Libyan desert and its inscriptions date from 4th century BC. In this
passage Maupertuis is showing the great subjectivity inherent in ethnocentrism and he is demonstrating contempt for that of the white European.
In the enumeration, governed by wise queens, made the arts and sciences flourish, and built the temple of Jupiter Ammon, Maupertuis is
hyperbolizing the intellectual and cultural achievements of blacks. He further hyperbolizes their accomplishments by undercutting those of the white
European: when nearly all other people were barbarians and not be able
to regard whites as their brothers.
It is significant that Maupertuis puts an asterisk after who were governed by wise queens, and in a footnote, refers the reader to Diodorus of
Sicily. This reference to Diodorus substantiates his commentary on the
achievements of African peoples. Diodorus Siculus was a Greek historian
residing in Argyrium in Sicily circa 8020 BC. In Book 3 of his 40 volume
History, Diodorus chronicles the achievements and customs of the Ethiopians, Libyans and Atlantians, their great sense of honor and loyalty to their
kings, and their adaptiveness and ability to make the most of available natural resources . For example, Book 3, Chapter 2 says that the Ethiopians were
not immigrants from abroad, but that they were natives of the land and that
they bear the name of autochthones (sprung from the soil itself); this indicates that this race originated in Africa and that it was not an immigrant
white race turned black, as the philosophes (even Maupertuis himself, further
on in Physical Venus) would argue is probable; the Ethiopians enjoyed a
state of freedom and peace with one another. Chapter 4 discusses the Ethiopians system of writing, hieroglyphics. In Chapter 5 Ethiopian priests select
a king from the noblest men from their own number. Chapter 7 says that
Ethiopians loyalty to their king is so great that if the king has been maimed
in some part of his body, all of his companions maim themselves in the same
part of their body because it would be a disgraceful thing if the king had been
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maimed in his leg and his friends should be of sound limb; it is customary for
the comrades of kings to commit suicide when the king dies, out of loyalty;
for this reason conspiracies against the king are rare because all his friends
are equally concerned both for his safety and their own. Chapters 1214
describe the mining of gold. Chapters 1520 and 22 describe a people called
the fish-eaters, how they harvest fish, prepare it for consumption, and also,
leave their dead on the shore so that the tide would carry the bodies out to the
fish, and so, be part of a cycle that continues for all eternity. Chapter 21 describes the turtle-eaters, how they catch huge turtles, eat them, and use
their oversize shells as boats. Chapter 23 discusses the methods of survival
of the root-eaters; Chapter 24, the wood-eaters; Chapter 25, hunters who
hunt because their land is not suitable for agriculture; Chapter 26, elephantfighters, who hunt and eat elephants; Chapter 28, bird-eaters; Chapter 29,
locust-eaters; Chapters 5355 describe the Amazons, a race in Libya ruled
by women who practiced the art of war and were required to serve in the
army for a fixed period; the queen of the Amazons, Myrina, with an army of
30,000 foot-soldiers and 3,000 cavalry, defeated the Atlantians, Syria, Taurus, and some islands, such as Lesbos. Hence, Maupertuis invitation to the
reader to peruse the History of Diodorus is an invitation to learn that white
Europe does not have a monopoly on intellect, achievement, creativity, or
adaptation when faced with survival. Furthermore, it is a feminist statement
attesting to the rule of wise queens and the valiant Amazons chronicled in
Diodorus, Book 3, Chapters 5355, who surpass the achievements and valor
of European women.
After opening with a caustic commentary on whites and a footnote on
Diodorus, Maupertuis devotes the rest of Part 2, Chapter 1, to enumerating
the various races that inhabit the earth and to describing their diverse physical characteristics. Then, in Chapter 2, he sets out to explain how all of humanity arose from a single pair of parents, and how errors in the generative
process could explain the great diversity that we see today.
Maupertuis begins Chapter 2 by declaring, All these peoples that we
have just covered, such diverse men, have they come from the same mother?
We cannot doubt it. What remains for us to examine, is how, from a single
individual, so many different races could have arisen. I will venture some
speculation.19 He goes on to set forth the theory of epigenesis, or the unfolding of successive accretions, which could explain the origin of different
colors of men, hybrids, and monsters. In epigenesis, the offspring is a unique
226
new individual, rather than a copy of either parent. Maupertuis attributes

heredity to errors that occur in the arrangement of patterns of parental elements supplied by either parent; once an error has occurred, it is repeated in
subsequent generations, but not necessarily in every generation without skipping one or more.
Maupertuis believed in metamorphoses that would one day be called
acquired characteristics: the eighteenth century believed that every part of
the parents bodies contributed seeds that would eventually form that part of
the embryos body from which they came. That is why he believed that prolonged exposure to the sun would create black offspring. If the parents skin
turned black from the sun, and that skin contained seeds that would one day
go on to form the skin of the offspring, then acquired characteristics can be
passed on from generation to generation.
Maupertuis was intrigued by the fact that traits disappear in offspring
and then reappear generations later. Observing that birth anomalies often
skip a generation, he hypothesized that some of the elements circulating
throughout the parents bodies that find their way to the offspring must come
from their parents (the offsprings grandparents). Parental elements are
passed along from generation to generation, but do not always become manifest. They seem to have disappeared, only to reappear in some future generation. They may not be seen, but they are passed along, nevertheless: These
varieties, if we could trace them, perhaps would have their origin in some
unknown ancestor. They perpetuate themselves in repeated generations of
individuals that have them, and disappear from generations of individuals
that do not have them. But, what is perhaps even more astonishing, is that
after an interruption of these varieties, to see them reappear, to see the offspring who resemble neither his father, nor his mother, born with the traits of
his ancestor.20
Nature contains the basis of all varieties, but it is random chance or, conversely, the art of men, that set them in motion. With careful breeding or
art humans could engineer the appearance of species from the distant past:
Nature contains the basis of all these varieties: but chance or art set them in
motion. It is thus that those whose industry is applied to satisfying the taste
of the curious, are, so to speak, the creators of new species. We see the appearance of species of dogs, pigeons, canaries, that did not previously exist
in nature. They had at first only been fortuitous individuals; art and repeated
generations have made species of them.21
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In Part 2, Chapter 6, Maupertuis observes that black children are born

from white parents and white children are born from black parents. However, he finds it significant that black children are rarely born from white
parents and that white children are more often born from black parents, such
as the albino Negro that had been exhibited in the Parisian salons. Unfortunately, he erroneously concludes that the first race must have been the white
race and that the black race is derived from a hereditary error in white parents: Therefore, it seems to be proven that if blacks are born from white
parents, these births are incomparably more rare than the births of white
children from black parents. Perhaps that would suffice to lead us to think
that white was the color of the first men, & that it is only by some accident
that black became an inherited color in the large families that populate the
Torrid Zone; among which however the primitive color has not been so perfectly eradicated that it does not sometimes reappear.22
It is to Maupertuis great credit that he presciently attributed the origination of race to random chance. He employs the language of probability and
games of chance throughout Part 2: chance [le hasard], accident [accident],
probability [la probabilit], rare [rares], reappear sometimes [reparoisse
quelquefois], and fortuitous combinations [combinaisons fortuites]. All varieties that we see in nature (races, monsters, hybrids) perpetuate themselves
because a chance or random error in the combinations of parental elements
repeats itself: Nature contains the bases of all these varieties: but it is
chance or art that set them going [La Nature contient le fonds de toutes ces
varits: mais le hasard ou lart les mettent en uvre.]; He considers this
whiteness as a disease of the skin; according to him it is an accident, but an
accident that perpetuates itself and exists for several generations [Il regarde
cette blancheur comme une maladie de la peau; cest selon lui un accident,
mais un accident qui se perpetue & qui subsiste pendant plusieurs genrations.]; For one considers this whiteness as a disease, or such accident [Car
quon prenne cette blancheur pour une maladie, ou pour tel accident]; Now
to explain al these phenomena: the production of accidental varieties
[Pour expliquer maintenant tous ces Phnomenes: la production des varits
accidentelles]; Chance, or the scarcity of family traits will sometimes be
of other combinations [Le hasard, ou la disette des traits de famille
seront quelquefois dautres assemblages]; These productions are at first
only accidental [Ces productions ne sont dabord quaccidentelles];
that a new accident would be necessary to reproduce the original spe-
228
cies. [quil faudroit un nouveau hasard pour rproduire lespece originaire.]; Now if these marvels sometimes occur, the probability that they
would sooner occur among children of the lower classes than among children
of upper classes is immense [Or si ces Prodiges arrivoient quelquefois, la
probabilit quils arrivoient plutt parmi les enfans du peuple que parmi les
enfans des grands, est immense]; if these Phenomena are not even
more rares [si ces Phnomenes ne sont pas mme fort rares];
these births are incomparably more rare [ces naissances sont incomparablement plus rares]; and that it is only by random chance that
black became an inherited color [que ce nest que par quelque accident
que le noir est devenu une couleur hrditaire]; and that is does not
sometimes reappear. [quelle ne reparoisse quelquefois.]; are only
fortuitous combinations [ne sont que des combinaisons fortuites].
It is also to Maupertuis credit that he used mathematics to calculate the
statistical probability that albinism would occur in a given population. In
Part 2, Chapter 6, he observes that more black children are born from white
parents among the lower classes than among the upper classes; then he calculates that for every black child born from a white nobleman, there would
have to be 1,000 black births among the general populace. During his scientific career he would go on to calculate the statistical probability that
polydigitism would occur in a given population.
After Voltaire read Maupertuis work, he decided to reiterate his belief
that the different races of men are different species in Relation touchant un
maure blanc amen dAfrique Paris en 1744 (1744). This piece was written after the albino Negro had been exhibited in Paris in 1743 and as a response to Maupertuis Dissertation physique loccasion du ngre blanc
(1744). Voltaires comment on the phenomenon of the white Negro was,
Here at last is a new wealth of nature, a species that no more resembles ours
than spaniels do greyhounds.23 Voltaire thought that albino Negroes belong
to a species different from that of the other blacks in Africa and from that of
white Europeans; he uses the term species eleven times in the piece to
hyperbolize his thesis that there are multiple species of men. However, despite his polygencist beliefs, Voltaire is not a racist and it is significant that
he finishes his work by declaring the equal worth of all men: if we think
that we are worth much more than they, we are very mistaken.24
In 1753 Maupertuis, in the Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies,
reiterates the role of random errors on creation. However, now he expands
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his thought to explain not just the appearance of new races, hybrids, and
monsters, but new species and even kingdoms, as well: Could one not explain by that how from two single individuals, the multiplication of the most
dissimilar species could have resulted? They would owe their first origin
only to some chance productions in which the elementary parts would not
have retained the order that they had in the father and mother animals: each
degree of error would have made a new species; and with repeated deviations
there would arise the infinite diversity of animals that we see today, which
perhaps will increase more with time, but to which the course of centuries
will perhaps bring only imperceptible developments.25 Here Maupertuis presciently hypothesizes that elementary parts would not have retained the order
that they had in the father and mother animals. He also originates and emphasized the importance of the arrangement or pattern [ordre] of parental
elements.
THE PHILOSOPHES WAR ON RACISM

Robert Bernasconi, in the first chapter of his book, Race, traces the genealogy of racism in European thought: One need only think of the purity of
blood statutes of fifteenth-century Spain that were used against the conversos, Jews who had converted to Christianity but who were still not accepted.
Then there were the debates in sixteenth-century Spain when the opponents
of Bartolom de Las Casas justified the mistreatment of Native Americans
on the grounds that they were not human. One can also look at the Atlantic
trade in African slaves that began in the sixteenth century and was already a
large operation in the seventeenth century. It was possible for the Spanish or
the English to exploit Jews, Native Americans, and Africans, as Jews, Native
Americans, and Africans, without having the concept of race let alone being
able to appeal to a rigorous system of racial classification. We have no difficulty identifying these as cases of racism, but they were not sustained by a
scientific concept of race.26
The Black Code [Code Noir], an edict of the King of France dated March
1685, contains 60 articles concerning laws governing slaves in the French
West Indies. Article 1 begins by having the Kings officers evict all Jews
who have taken residence in the French West Indies.27 Article 2 ordains that
all slaves be baptized and instructed in the Roman Catholic religion.28 Arti-
230
cle 11 prohibits priests from presiding over the marriages of slaves who do
not have the consent of their owners.29 Article 12 specifies that children born
from slave marriages will be slaves themselves and will be the property of
the wifes owner and not the husbands, if the wife and husband have different owners.30 Article 33 states that a slave who strikes his owner or the
spouse or children of his owner, causing a contusion or release of blood, will
be punished by death.31 Article 35 states that certain thefts (ie: horses, asses,
cows) will be punished by afflictive punishment, even death, if the case requires it.32 Article 44 says, We declare slaves to be movable goods [les
biens meubles].33
In response to the injustices of the times, Buffon, Diderot, and Maupertuis, declared the unity of the human race. They pointed out that the skin
color of man is an infinite continuum that very gradually changes as one
travels away from the Equator towards the poles; there is one human race
and man is more or less tanned than his brothers. What disturbed the philosophes deeply was mans inhumanity to man that was rationalized by racial
or religious differences. The philosophes defended the integrity of the
other; they were abolitionists and passionately so. We have seen that in
1745, Maupertuis, in what was essentially a biological treatise on heredity
and epigenesis, took the opportunity to boldly point out that the Africans
who lived in large cities accomplished much to lay the building blocks of
civilization and that women were wise queens and, via the footnote to Diodorus, fearless warriors and conquerors.
The philosophes employed various rhetorical strategies to denounce
slavery: these included satire and irony and conversely, blunt, outright condemnations of slavery as being contrary to natural law. Montesquieu, in the
Persian Letters (1721), overtly denounces slavery as being contrary to natural law, from the First Eunuchs Letter 9 to Roxanes suicide letter (Letter
161). It is significant that the laws of nature are mentioned in both of these
letters. In Letter 9, the First Eunuch reveals the tragedy of the wasted life of
one who has been mutilated so that he can tend to the sultans seraglio.
Every day he lives in misery in a private hell. He writes to his friend, Ibbi,
that he, Ibbi, is fortunate to be able to travel with his owner and see provinces and kingdoms; the First Eunuch, on the other hand, is shut inside this
dreadful prison, a eunuch surrounded by beautiful women, whose life is
analogous to the torments of Tantalus; everything that has been done to him,
and that he has agreed to, in order to avoid more strenuous work, is contrary
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to natural law. Consequently, his existence is a wasted life lived against nature.
In Roxanes suicide letter (Letter 161), she also proclaims that slavery is
contrary to the laws of nature: How could you have thought me credulous
enough to imagine that I was in the world only in order to worship your caprices? that while you allowed yourself everything, you had the right to
thwart all my desires? No: I may have lived in servitude, but I have always
been free. I have amended your laws according to the laws of nature, and my
mind has always remained independent.34
In the Spirit of Laws (1748), Books 15, 16, and 17, Montesquieu again
addresses the practice of slavery. Although he posits that a hot climate creates the tendency towards slavery, he holds that climate is not deterministic
or absolute: man has the power to change laws and overthrow tyrannical
governments and institutions when he is ready. Montesquieu maintains that
slavery is intrinsically evil and that it should be avoided.
In Book 15, Chapter 1 Montesquieu declares that slavery is, by its own
nature, bad. It is bad both for the slave and for the slave master: for the slave
because he can do nothing through the motive of virtue; for the slave owner
because unlimited authority corrupts him (absolute power corrupts absolutely); he becomes fierce, hasty, severe, angry, voluptuous, and cruel.
In Book 15, Chapter 3 Montesquieu surmises that slavery must originate
from the scorn that one nation has for anothers customs. As an example he
cites the fact that the Spaniards who traveled to the Americas were so astonished that the natives there ate crabs, snails, grasshoppers and locusts, that
they smoked, and trimmed their beards in a different manner than they did,
they justified making them slaves. Montesquieu concludes that knowledge
and experience makes man gentle; reason humanizes him; prejudice eradicates gentleness and compassion. Hence, slavery is founded on ignorance
and the prejudice that arises from the absence of knowledge and experience.
In Book 15, Chapter 4 Montesquieu boldly asserts that religion gives rise
to slavery: white people think that they have the divine right to own slaves if
they can convert them to Christianity. This is a reference to the Black Code,
Article 2, which says that all slaves will be baptized in the Roman Catholic
faith. Montesquieu demonstrates that Article 2 is a total corruption and reversal of the Great Commission, in which the resurrected Christ instructs his
disciples to spread the faith to all the world (Matt 28:1920, Mark 16:1518,
Luke 24:47, Acts 1:8, and John 20:2123).
232
It is in Book 15, Chapter 5, entitled, On the Slavery of Negroes [De

lesclavage des ngres] where Montesquieu demonstrates his mastery in employing irony and sarcasm to hyperbolize an abolitionist statement. He begins the chapter by announcing his intention to play the advocate and argue
in favor of slavery in America. What follows is a trail of one ironic statement after the next. First, because the Americans killed all the American
Indians, they need to import slaves to clear the land and to keep the price of
sugar low. Next he conducts a comical tirade against the physical appearance of blacks. The point is obvious: esthetics are subjective and highly personal and should not be used as a slide rule to judge intelligence or whether a
person has a soul.
Next Montesquieu sarcastically argues that blacks must lack common
sense because they prefer to own a glass necklace rather than one of gold,
which is so highly valued among nations having a police. It is parenthetically understood that Europe, which prides itself in being a civilized continent, has so many thieves that law enforcement has risen to the ranks of a
profession.
Then comes the strongest statement in the chapter, the climax of his sarcastic exposition: it is impossible for whites to assume that blacks are men
because if they did, they (whites) would have to assume that they are not
Christians. This is a very powerful statement because it evokes all of the
injustice and crimes perpetrated by cruel, tyrannical slave masters. The only
way that whites can rationalize their atrocities and still regard themselves as
Christians, that is, as souls that have been saved for Christ for all eternity, is
if they regard those they oppress as animals. Hence, Montesquieu gathers
momentum in this chapter, only to deliver the final blow at the end, the capstone of a sharpened, polemical tool.
Voltaire, too, in a short tale, The Travels of Scarmentado (1753), shows
that it is ignorance of the other that causes men to commit atrocities. The
phenomenon is universal: no matter where in the world our protagonist,
Scarmentado, travels, people are always prejudiced-against foreigners and
also against their own kind who happen to do things differently. First, Scarmentado, born and raised in Crete, travels to Rome and must rapidly make
his escape from a monsignor who is on the verge of placing him in the category of his minions. Voltaire leaves it to the readers lurid imagination to
deduce what this could possibly mean. Throughout his travels, our protagonist learns that most men are oblivious to the fact that the other, too, may
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have a will of his own and aspirations to fulfil. It is significant that while in
Rome, Scarmentado witnesses processions, exorcisms, and robberies: all
three of these are related to the notion of free will or rather, the relegation of
it to a more powerful entity. Scarmentado must flee to Holland, where a man
is being beheaded for his religious doctrine; he is imprisoned in Spain after
he jokes about the Grand Inquisitors throne; in Constantinople he has misfortunes due to the differences among the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Moslem faiths; in Persia, the preference for white mutton or black
mutton is taken so seriously, that he flees the country before getting involved
in that dispute; in China he is seized and bound by clerics who believe that
he is a spy of the Pope; in Delphi, which is under Ottoman rule at the time,
he is nearly beheaded because a fellow-lodger declares that European sovereigns govern without killing their fathers or brothers, or cutting of the heads
of their subjects; his companion is beheaded.
It is significant that Scarmentados last misadventure is in Africa: by
saving Africa for last, Voltaire is making a statement against slavery all over
the world, but especially against the African slave trade and the Black Code.
In Africa, Scarmentado is captured by Africans and made a slave because of
his facial characteristics and the color of his skin. The black corsair (pirate)
aboard the vessel that captures him explains that because whites buy blacks
in public markets on the coast of Guinea like beasts of burden, turn them into
slaves, and submit them to hard labor under the pain of beatings, Africans, in
turn, will capture and enslave whites, whenever and wherever possible.
However, the black slave owners are merciful to Scarmentado because after
a year of labor, they permit him to buy his freedom and return home. Hence,
Voltaire makes an abolitionist statement via an itinerary of countries where
ignorance prevails over reason, and fear and contempt for the other gives
rise to murder, torture, imprisonment, and slavery. He reiterates Montesquieus view that slavery is born of prejudice against the customs of other
nations and extends it to show that all injustice is born of ignorance and fear.
In 1756 Voltaire employed his sharp wit and satirical pen again to condemn slavery. In the Essay on Morals [Essai sur les murs], Chapter 152,
he points out the injustice of forcing human beings to toil under inhumane
working conditions and shortening their lifespan so that others might comfortably live a life of decadence: One hundred thousand slaves, black or
mulatto, work in sugar mills, indigo and cocoa plantations, sacrificing their
lives to gratify our newly acquired appetites for sugar, cocoa, coffee, and
234
tobacco, needs unknown to our ancestors. We are going to purchase these

Negroes from the Guinea Coast, the Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast. Thirty
years ago a good Negro was purchased for 50 pounds; that is a bit less than
five times the price of a fat oxWe tell them that they are men like usand
then they are made to work like beasts of burden; they are poorly fed: if they
want to escape, one of their legs is broken, and they are made to turn the
sugar mills by hand, since they have been given a wooden leg. After that we
dare to talk about the rights of people!35
The encyclopedist Louis de Jaucourt also speaks out vociferously against
slavery in the articles, Slavery [Esclavage] (1755) and Trait des negres
[Slave Trade] (1765). In the article Slavery, Jaucourt begins by defining
slavery as the establishment of a right based on force, a right that gives one
man ownership of another to the point that he is the absolute master of his
life, his possessions, and his liberty. Jaucourt borrows heavily from Montesquieus treatment of slavery (Spirit of Laws, Books 15, 16, and 17) and declares that he will not stop to praise the soundness of Montesquieus
principles because he has nothing to add to his glory.
Jaucourt begins his article by bolding declaring that all men are born
free; in the beginning, they had only one name, one condition. Humanity
was not classified according to race or social class. As his authority he cites
Plutarch, who said that in the times of Saturn and Rhea there were neither
masters, nor slaves; nature made everyone equal. This equality did not last
long and servitude was introduced, little by little; it was based on mutual
agreement due to necessity: the multiplication of the human race caused men
to leave the simplicity of the first centuries and look for ways to add to their
conveniences and acquire superfluous possessions.
Jaucourt uses the terms slavery and servitude interchangeably.
However, he distinguishes between real and personal servitude. He borrows
the definitions of real slavery and personal slavery from Spirit of Laws, Book
15, Chapter 9, entitled, Several Kinds of Slavery: real servitude annexes
the slave to the land; personal servitude concerns domestic services and relates more to the masters person.
Jaucourt traces the genealogy of slave laws from biblical to modern
times. Moses handed down laws to protect servants from their owners and to
give them certain rights. Moses defined the term slavery and ordained that
it would not last longer than the jubilee year for foreigners and for Jews, six
years (Lev. 25:39). Furthermore, the purpose of the Sabbath was to provide
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rest for servants and slaves (Ex 22 and 23, Deut 16). He goes on to point out
that it is very strange that civil law would relax natural law. He recommends
that civil laws regarding slavery should heed the words of Saint Paul, who
said Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing
that ye also have a Master in heaven (Col 4:1). Jaucourt continues to follow
the history of slavery laws through the Greeks, the Romans, and the Middle
Ages. By the 15the century, slavery was abolished in Europe, except for Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and lower Germany. However, Jaucourt points out
the irony in the fact that at the time when slavery was being abolished in
Europe, Christian powers made conquests abroad and bought and sold
slaves, forgetting the principles of nature and Christianity that render all men
equal.
After a four page exposition on slavery, Jaucourt states his conclusions:
Therefore, it is to go directly against the right of people and against nature,
to believe that the Christian religion gives to those who profess it, the right to
reduce to servitude those who do not profess it, in order to facilitate its
propagation. It is, then, this manner of thinking that encouraged the destroyers of America to commit their crimes; & it is not the only time that religion
has been used against its own maxim, that teach us that the quality of the
other extends across the whole universe.36
In the article Slave Trade [Trait des ngres] (1765), Jaucourt denounces slavery once more as being a business practice contrary to religion
and natural law. He opens by defining slavery as intrinsically evil: slave
trade (African commerce). It is the purchase of blacks by Europeans from
the coasts of Africa for use as slaves in their colonies. The purchase of
blacks in order to reduce them to slavery is commercial trafficking violates
religion, ethics, natural laws and all the rights of human nature.37 He employs purchase [achat] twice and commercial trafficking [ngoce] and
sets the business practice of slavery in opposition to religion {religion], morality [morale], and natural law [lois naturelles]. He goes on to point out that
the Africans leaders abroad do not have the natural right or authority to sell
the citizens that live in their jurisdictions. He lays the blame not only on
buyers and merchants of slaves, but also on tribal leaders who step outside
the boundaries of their natural authority to sell their fellow citizens as commodities in a marektplace: Kings, princes and magistrates do not own their
subjects, and therefore do not have the right to take away their liberty and
sell them as slaves.38 By the same token, no one has the right to purchase a
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slave: On the other hand, no man has the right either to purchase them, or to
become their master. Man and his liberty are not for sale; they cannot be
sold, bought or paid for at any price.39
Jaucourt surmises that if the slave trade were abolished in the colonies,
they would suffer economic ruin, but only for a period of time, and then
there would arise a new system that would be superior to that of slavery. If
the colonies set the slaves free, society would adjust, more people would
emigrate abroad, and the arts and sciences would flourish there.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in Julie, or the New Helose [Julie, ou La Nouvelle Hlose] (1761), denounces slavery by painting a tragic portrait of human suffering with a few deft strokes of his pen. The following passage is
stirring and typical of Rousseaus emotive style: I have seen those vast unfortunate regions that only seem to be destined to cover the earth with herds
of slaves. From their sordid sight I have averted my eyes with disdain, horror and pity; and, seeing one fourth of my fellow humans changed into beasts
for the service of others, I have grieved to be a man.40
Unfortunate anthropomorphoses regions; people are unfortunate, not
property. Unfortunate is hyperbolized by the preceding vast; it sets the
somber mood for the tragic scene that will follow. Destined is fatalistic
and hyperbolizes the sense of tragedy by removing the element of choice,
free will. The regions of land are destined, locked into a tragic picture and
the reader does not yet fully understand why the scene is tragic. To cover
the earth with slaves is a surprise: suddenly the reader visualizes multitudes
of human beings. These people are metaphorized as animals: herds reduces them to a large gathering of animals, faceless, inhuman Cartesian machines who are thought not to think or fell; they are robbed of their humanity.
The animalization of the slaves, implied by herds is hyperbolized by the
beginning of the next sentence: sordid sight connotes the unpleasant, ugly,
hideous. These slaves, reduced to the level of animals by herds, are monsters, deformed beings, creatures that cannot be called men. The speaker is
so repulsed by this hideous sight of people who have lost their identity as
human beings, he is forced to avert his eyes: I turned my eyes is involuntary, the emotional response is so strong, it overwhelms him and he must
look away. The feelings that fill his soul are disdain, sorrow and pity.
These three nouns show that the slaves have not totally lost their humanity:
they are still human enough that an onlooker can empathize with them and
react to them. If they had lost all of their humanity, they would not elicit an
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emotional response. It is precisely because they have the bodies of humans,

the facial expressions which undoubtedly reflect exhaustion, pain, suffering,
that their humanity remains visible despite the fact that mistreatment has
marred their appearance. Rousseau contends that something that violates
nature is taking place: one fourth of humanity is serving the other three
fourths; one fourth of my fellow humans [mes semblables], people like the
speaker himself, are living wasted lives so that the other three fourths can
live in decadence, enjoy products that they did not need before, increase their
conveniences and profits. Rousseau says that my kind is changed into animals for the service of others. The conclusion: I grieve being a man. The
speaker grieves for many reasons. First and foremost, he grieves because he
identifies with the victims. His empathy causes him to momentarily set his
own identity aside and experience the anguish, exhaustion, muscular discomfort, anger, sadness of the unfortunate workers he is observing. Secondly, he
grieves how far humanity has metamorphosed from natural man, how it gave
up its freedoms by mutual consent, how perverse it has become. Thirdly, he
grieves because the institution of slavery is so entrenched, that he, as one
man alone, is powerless to put an end to it. He can write about it, but he
must live with his rage. Fourthly, he may feel guilty and a sense of shared
responsibility with the bourgeois living in big cities, if he enjoys coffee,
sugar, cocoa, or uses products containing indigo. Fifthly, if he has been
raised as a Christian or has read Christs words in the Bible, he is ashamed
and outraged at what other Christians are doing in violation of the Golden
Rule.
In this brief passage, Rousseau combines his masterful skill as a fluid,
seductive novelist with his political agenda. The landscape that he paints is
truly an iconic representation of his belief system that man is born free, but
that everywhere he is in chains. In a few lines, the reader visualizes the
landscape covered with wretched slaves as if he were standing on a hill gazing at the panorama below. He is provided with an iconic representation of
men who have left the simple virtues of living in the countryside to be exploited by decadent civilization. Rousseaus literary style is flowing and seductive. His long, sinuous, elegant sentences, like ocean waves, carry the
readers emotions where he dictates. The panorama he paints stirs a deep,
involuntary emotional response from the reader.
Rousseaus objectives are to attack the institutions of slavery and also of
private property. He believed that the notions of slavery and private property
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did not exist in natural man: it was not until men left the woods to join civilization that they developed the notions of mine and yours. The vast regions are unfortunate now that man has become civilized; originally,
when they belonged to everyone, they were not unfortunate. Slavery is
contrary to natural law, which dictates the self-determination of the individual. Natural man was free; civilized men buy and sell themselves by mutual
consent to gain advantages.
Rousseau, in The Social Contract [Du Contrat social] (1762), Book 1,
Chapter 4, entitled, Slavery [De lesclavage], again exercises his masterful
skill as a polemicist to boldly declare that slavery is an abomination that
must end; is it morally wrong, illegitimate, always, everywhere. Rousseau
begins, Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, slavery exists by convention.41 However, no one has the right
to agree to it by convention; either to sell himself into slavery, or to sell another, either his children or the people in his village, or to buy an individual.
Rousseau contends, To say that a man gives himself gratuitously, is to say
what is absurd and inconceivable; such an act is null and illegitimate, from
the mere fact that he who does it is out of his mind. To say the same of a
whole people is to suppose a people of madmen; and madness creates no
right.To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the
rights of humanity and even its dutiessuch a renunciation is incompatible
with mans nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts.42 Rousseau concludes the chapter by declaring that slavery is against natural law: So, from whatever aspect we regard the question,
the right of slavery is null and void, not only as being illegitimate, but also
because it is absurd and meaningless. The words slave and right contradict
each other, and are mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for
a man to say to a man or to a people: I make with you a convention wholly
at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like,
and you will keep it as long as I like.43
Diderot also staunchly defended the self-determination of the individual
by contributing a considerable amount of abolitionist material to the abb
Raynals Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of
the Europeans in the East and West Indies [Histoire philosophique et
politique des tablissemens et du commerce des europens dans les deux Indes] (17701780). This work is more commonly known as Raynals History
of Two Indias [Histoire des deux Indes]. Since its publication, manuscripts
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have been found in the Fonds Vandeul that have been published under the
abb Raynals name, but that have actually been written by Diderot.
Diderot contributed material to all three editions of Raynals History: the
first edition of 1770, the second edition of 1774, and the third edition of
1780. An excellent anthology of Diderots political works that includes his
contributions to Raynals History that we recommend is Denis Diderot, uvres: Politique, edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995). The
fragments that Diderot authored are also documented by Michle Duchet in
Diderot et lHistoire des deux Indes ou lEcriture fragmentaire (Paris: A.-G.
Nizet, 1978).
In Raynals History, Book 11, Chapter 24, entitled, Slavery and Liberty,
Diderot defines freedom thus: Freedom is owning yourself.44 He also defines natural freedom: Natural freedom is the right that nature has given
every man to make what use he likes of himself, at his will.45 The chapter
also includes a dialogue between two interlocutors, one who advances arguments in defense of slavery, and the other, against. When the former defends
the divine right of white people to own slaves, the latter, the abolitionist,
provides an ardent response: Men or demons, whoever you are, will you
dare to justify attempts on my independence by the right of the strongest?
What! The person who wants to make me a slave is not at all guilty; he is
making use of his rights? Where are these rights? Who has given them such
a sacred character that they can silence my own? Nature has given me the
right to protect myself; it has certainly not given you the right to attack me.
If you think that you have the authority to oppress me because you are
stronger and more clever than me, then do not complain when my forceful
arm rips open your breast to find your heart46
Diderot goes on to attack the argumentation provided by the racist interlocutor. The white supremacist states: But Negroes are a species of man
born for slavery. They are limited, deceitful, nasty; they admit among themselves the superiority of our intelligence, and almost recognize the justice of
our empire.47 Diderot, speaking through the abolitionist, has this to say to
him: Negroes are limited because slavery crushes the energy of the soul.
They are nasty: but not enough to you. They are deceitful because one does
not owe truth to tyrants. They acknowledge the superiority of our minds because we have perpetuated their ignorance; the justice of our empire because
we have abused their weakness. In the impossibility of maintaining our superiority by force, criminal politics has had recourse only to trickery. You
240
have almost succeeded in persuading them that they were a unique species
born for humiliation and dependence, for work and punishment. You have
neglected nothing to degrade these wretched ones, and then you reproach
them for being low.48
The philosophe Condorcet also spoke out vociferously against slavery.
His work, Reflections on the Slavery of Negroes [Rflexions sur lesclavage
des ngres] (1781), written under the pseudonym Joachim Schwartz, is a 99
page manifesto against slavery. He wrote this piece to refute a justification
of slavery that had been published in Paris the year before. Condorcets
book systematically challenges all justifications for slavery, including the
notion that slavery is needed for the economic survival of the colonies. For
example, in Chapter 2, he debunks the myth that Africans are fortunate to be
sold into slavery because, in their native lands, they are criminals condemned
to death or prisoners of war awaiting execution. In an ironic statement he
extrapolates that by this reasoning, the slave trade becomes a humanitarian
act. This is how Condorcet employs reasoning and logic to debunk that myth
that slaves are condemned criminals: first, the belief is not only unproven, it
is improbable. Africans did not behead all of their prisoners before Europeans came along to buy them. Judging from the slave trade, they must have
executed not only married women, but unmarried girls, which has never be
reported anywhere, by any people. Furthermore, selling criminals into slavery is not legitimate law. One of the conditions that the punishment be just is
that it be determined by law, and as to its duration and its form. The law can
never dictate that a man be a slave of another because the punishment is then
contingent upon the whims of the master, and it is necessarily undetermined.
Condorcet concludes, Moreover, it is as absurd as it is atrocious to dare to
posit that most of the unfortunate ones are criminals. Are you afraid of not
having enough scorn for them, of not treating them with enough harshness?
And how do you suppose that there exists a country where so many crimes
are committed, and yet where such exact justice is executed?49
THE USE OF RACE AS A FOIL FOR

EUROPEAN VICES
A favorite polemical technique of the philosophes was to write pieces elaborating on the virtues and vices of dark skinned peoples in order to provide a
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foil for the evils of European civilization. An example of this is Diderots

Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville, which contains several dialogues
and a monologue inspired by Bougainvilles 1771 non-fictional narrative of
his circumnavigation of the earth.50 Diderot uses the work as a platform to
denounce racism, criticize European vices, and hyperbolize the polarities that
exist between nature and European culture. Part 1 is a dialogue between two
interlocutors, A and B, who discuss Bougainvilles voyage. B begins
by hypothesizing the common origin of all life: perhaps all of the land surface on the earth was once joined together and it later broke up into fragments that drifted apart. A asks, How does he explain the presence of
certain animals on islands separated from every continent by a vast expanse
of sea? Who could have transported wolves, foxes, dogs, deer and snakes
there?51 B replies, Who knows the early history of our earth? How
many great tracts of land, now isolated, were once joined?52 B reiterates
this by pointing out that there are men who live on a remote tiny island
northeast of New Zealand: In considering its position on the globe,
wouldnt anyone ask how it was that men came to be there? What form of
communication once linked them to the rest of their species?53
Here Diderot is affirming not only the unity of the human race and of
each species, but also the common origin of all living things: perhaps originally there was only one land mass on which life emerged. Hence, early in
the dialogue he provides a scientific reason to oppose racism and slavery: all
men may have a common origin because groups of them exist on remote islands. The entirety of the dialogue will be devoted to observing principles
that are true in all societies and that provide more evidence as to the commonalities that exist among all men.
Diderot examines how a burgeoning population of men on the tiny remote island northeast of New Zealand might have been able to survive with a
finite supply of natural resources. He surmises that the population must have
been deliberately reduced through cannibalism, murder, and the use of abortion and sexual mutilation as birth control. He wonders whether these evils
are derived from the need for survival. Here Diderot seeks to explain the
origin of practices and rituals that horrified Europeans. The character A
hypothesizes that it is the need for survival that gives rise to murder and barbaric rituals: gives rise to so many bizarre customs, at once cruel and
necessary, for which the justification is lost in the mists of antiquity, leaving
philosophers at their wits end to explain them. It appears to be a fairly uni-
242
versal rule that supernatural and divinely inspired practices grow stronger
and more durable with time, eventually becoming transformed into civil and
national laws, while civil and national institutions become consecrated and
degenerate into supernatural and divine precepts.54 Here Diderot endeavors
to explain the origin of cruel rituals practiced in Africa and Asia, but in addition, he is, by analogy, taking a swipe at Europeans, as well: his principles
explain the fact that European civil law, too, is derived from religious law
(Mosaic law), the divine right of kings, burning people at the stake, and torturing them on the rack by pulling their limbs apart, are examples that are
implied here. If the origins of the beliefs and rituals of indigenous peoples
have disappeared in the night of time, so have those of the Europeans.
Diderot surprises the reader by providing a stunning expos of how the
Catholic Church mistreated dark skinned people in Paraguay. The Jesuits
oppression of the Paraguayans is startling and graphic. He begins by identifying the oppressors by name before enumerating their crimes. When A
asks, Wasnt Bougainville in Paraguay at the very moment the Jesuits were
expelled? he is announcing that the subject of the conversation will be the
order of the Society of Jesus.55 This announcement is necessary because
otherwise the reader could easily mistake the oppressors in the lines that follow as rich, white plantation owners who are imperialistic and exploitative,
but certainly, he would not assume that they are members of the clergy.
Diderot hyperbolizes the Jesuits cruelty to their slaves through the use
of metaphor, simile, and a long enumeration of atrocious acts: these cruel
sons of Sparta in their black habits mistreated their Indian slaves no less than
the Lacedemonians abused their helots, condemning them to incessant work,
slaking their own thirst with their sweat, leaving them no right of property,
brutalising them by the force of superstition, demanding the deepest reverance, striding among them, whip in hand, lashing out against everyone, of
any age or sex.56
B metaphorizes Jesuits as these cruel sons of Sparta in their black
habits and compares them, through simile, to the Lacedmonians [comme les
Lacdemoniens]; he metamphorizes the Paraguayans as Indian slaves and
compares them to the Helots. The Helots are a metaphor for a people that
has been conquered and then treated in the most inhumane manner in the
world. Helots were Peloponnesian Greeks that were enslaved under Spartan
rule and treated with cruelty. They lived in their masters household, but
were owned by the state; unlike ordinary slaves, their master could not de-
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clare them free. Montesquieu advises that the slaves of Lacedemonia could
expect no justice for either insult or injury. They were slaves not only of
citizens, but of the public; they belonged to everyone and not just to one
master.57 They were the backbone of Lacedemonian agriculture, functioned
as domestic slaves, and during wartime, were used in heavy infantry, light
infantry, and as rowers in ships. According to Plutarch, Spartan officials
(Ephors) declared war on the Helots so that citizens could kill them without
reprisal.58 Young Spartans (Krypteia), armed only with their daggers and a
few provisions, went into the countryside by day, and at night, killed Helots
and took their food. This kept the Helots in line and it provided an opportunity for Spartan adolescents to prove their bravery. During the Peloponnesian War, the Helots were promised their freedom if they did well in battle,
but after 2,000 of them were freed, they were later assassinated.
Diderot uses the verb condemn [condamner] to identify what the Jesuits did to the slaves. Condemn is what the law does to the worse criminals
and connotes punishment that is deserved for crimes committed; here it is
ironic because the Jesuits are not justices and the indigenous people of Paraguay are not criminals. Then Diderot provides a long enumeration of the
atrocities that the Jesuits have inflicted on their slaves. Each of the acts that
he enumerates hyperbolizes condemn: incessant work, slaking their
own thirst with their sweat, leaving them no right of property, brutalising
them by the force of superstition, demanding the deepest reverence,
striding among them, whip in hand, and lashing out against everyone, of
any age of sex.
Here Diderot oxymorically pairs the concepts of barbarism and civilization in order to hyperbolize civilized mans inhumanity to man. As a stark
contrast to this, there immediately follows an example of how native Patagonians treat white people who disembark on their shores: Theyre fine people, strong and energetic, who spring at you with embraces, crying out
Chaoua.59 Here we have an essay in contrasts: Paraguayans vs. Patagonians, slavery vs. freedom, the evils of civilization vs. the rights of natural
law, despair vs. strong and energetic, black habits versus dark skin, cruel
sons of Sparta versus theyre fine people, lashing out against everyone,
of any age or sex versus spring at you with embraces.
Having shown that civilization is not so civilized, Diderot reiterates
Rousseaus view that natural man was neither good nor evil, but became evil
when he joined society, and became progressively more evil as society ma-
244
tured: The Tahitian is close to the origins of the world and the European
near its old age. The gulf between us is greater than that separating the newborn child from the decrepit dotard.60 This is more than a statement as to
the innocence of natural man. Diderot is likening the Asian Pacific race to
infancy and the Caucasian race to senility. The former has just begun its
lifespan, the latter is approaching the completion of its own. Here Diderot is
making a highly prescient statement with stunning accuracy: not all races
have been on earth the same amount of time. He surmises that the yellow
race is younger than the white race, that it metamorphosed later. This conclusion is not only evident from his language, The Tahitian is close to the
origins, the European near its old age, new-born child and decrepit
dotard: it is in line with Diderots view that all life metamorphosed from a
single prototype. Since Diderot believed in the metamorphosis of species,
his statement can be understood to mean that whites have been here longer
than yellows and that this explains the Europeans advanced moral turpitude.
In summation, eighteenth-century naturalists classified plants, animals
and races of humans because they recognized that classifying similar things
facilitates the processes of understanding and drawing conclusions. They
classified the various races according to physical characteristics, perceived
intelligence, personality, customs, climate, and geographical location. Buffon devised the definition of species as a group of individuals who can produce a fertile offspring together; he recognized that all of the different races
of man belong to the same species because they meet that definition. Maupertuis and Diderot advanced the theory that all the races can be traced back
to a single ancestral pair: through epigenesis, the offspring is a unique and
new entity, different from either of its parents. Accidents in the patterns or
arrangements of parental elements causes new characteristics to arise in the
offspring that are transmitted from generation to generation. In this way, we
can explain how various races derived from a single ancestral pair.
The philosophes, whose intellectual curiosity caused them to examine
the similarities and differences between the races, always concluded by affirming the unity of the human race: all men have the same wants and needs;
they are merely more or less tanned than their brothers. The philosophes
were polemicists who defended the self-determination of the individual as a
basic tenet of natural law. They wrote prolifically in favor of abolishing the
practice of slavery. Montesquieu, Diderot, Voltaire, Jaucourt, Condorect,
Rousseau, and many others, each using his own unique signature style,
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whether it was satire and irony, or a flowing, pre-romantic, emotive, seductive style, or blunt, outright declamations, repeatedly condemned the Black
Code and the practice of slavery as antithetical to religion, ethics, and natural
law.
Conclusion
The intermediary between man and other animals is the monkey.1

Denis Diderot, Elements of Physiology (17741780)
Eighteenth-century thought regarding the origin of man was a mosaic comprised of diverse opinions, many brilliantly prescient, and as varied and colorful as the naturalists and philosophes who held them. There were the
Creationists, who held that all species left the hands of the Creator in perfect
condition and that no new species have arisen since Creation (Buffon and
Voltaire). There were also the atheist materialists, such as Maupertuis and
Diderot, who embraced random creation propelled by the motive and conscious properties of atoms. On the other hand, there were the panspermists,
such as Maillet and La Mettrie, who held that preexistent seeds fertilized the
earth, sky and sea. Finally, there was Rousseau, who posited anthropological
(intraspecies) change, but not biological (interspecies) transformism. Rousseau creatively applied Buffons theory of the physical degeneration of species to the dissolution of mans morality; he borrowed many of Buffons
observations regarding the physical bodies of creatures, and ingeniously followed a parallel route, applying them to hypothesize a psychic and moral
dissolution that occurred during mans anthropological (intraspecies) metamorphosis from his natural state to his civilized.
Maillet was stunningly prescient, for although he wrote c. 1700, he proposed measuring the rate of sea level decline to date the earth. Furthermore,
his character, Telliamed, says that fish developed wings and fins that helped
them to walk on the ocean floor and later on land. He also tells the tale of a
Dutch cabin boy who fell overboard and reappeared years later as a merman
with scales and a fish tail. Hence, Maillets great contributions to the eight-
248
eenth century were transformism, the idea that life originated in the sea, and
the notion that the physical characteristics of living beings adapt to changes
in their environment.
Montesquieu also surmised that man must have metamorphosed from animals in the distant past. In the Persian Letters (1721), he describes the animal-like ancestors of man, those Troglodytes of former times, who were
deformed, hairy like bears, and who hissed. He derives his imagery of mans
monstrous ancestors from Aristotle, Herodotus, Pomponius Mela, and Pliny
the Elder. This notion was promulgated further by Lucretius, who declared
that in the beginning nature created many monsters and only those without
significant self-contradictions survived.
In the Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu elaborates further on the impermanence of nature and the flux that it delivers. He hypothesizes that a
relationship exists between climate and human physiology and also between
climate and government. Climate, geography, topography, and soil all affect
mans body and temperament and contribute to an array of tendencies that a
nation has. However, climate is not absolutely determinative: man has the
power to progress beyond the influence of climate and improve his life
through legislation, when his intellect and the society in which he lives have
matured to the point where he is ready to fight for self-determination. However, Montesquieu warns us that civilizations rise and fall, that all societies
have a finite lifespan, and that systems of government are cyclical..
La Mettrie, for his part, made many significant contributions to the notion of the metamorphosis of man through the random motive property of
matter. He declared that physical matter is the only reality through which all
phenomena can be explained. He dispensed with the notion of the immortal
soul and declared that consciousness is solely contingent upon the functioning of the brain, central nervous system, and the five senses. Consciousness
is influenced by food, age, learning, inheritance, climate, and the environment. All life is the result of random chance and random molecular collisions: flux+time=dispersion of chaos. Hence, he held that the motive
property of atoms, not God, created everything. Atoms are continually colliding and eventually form every viable organized being that exists. He rejected final causes and attributed all events to the random flux of nature.
Among Buffons contributions to biology was his observation all that
can be, is {tout ce qui peut tre, est]. He observed that nature produces every
imaginable variation in each species. Furthermore, he observed that physical
Conclusion
249
characteristics are shared among species. Hence, he developed the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional cone. The materialists Maupertuis and Diderot added the fourth dimension, time, and posited
the metamorphosis of species over great length of time.
Maupertuis posited that inherited errors explain the vast diversity that the
flux of nature delivers. His study of polydactyly in a Berlinese family
caused him to arrive at some landmark conclusions in biology. He identified
birth anomalies as traits and noted that they were carried by either parent.
He also noted that birth defects often skip a generation or two and reappear
further down the family tree. In addition, he was able to calculate the statistical probability that polydactyly would recur in a given population. His
great influence on Diderots thought was his hypothesis that errors in the arrangement of parental elements are inherited and could explain how the vast
variety of living beings that we see today many have developed from a single
prototype.
Maupertuis other great contribution to Diderot was an emergent consciousness: when particles unite, each particle loses its consciousness of self
and acquires the consciousness of the larger body to which it belongs. It loses its individual memory and consciousness and acquires that of the whole.
This explains why man is conscious of his existence and of the presence of
others, but not of every molecule that constitutes his body.
Diderot seized upon this notion, cited Maupertuis in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), and adopted his two main contributions to biology, namely, 1) that inherited errors in the arrangement of parental
elements could explain how all living beings developed from a single prototype and 2) emergent consciousness (that all matter is conscious and that
when particles combine, they lose their memory and consciousness of self
and acquire the consciousness of the larger body that they form).
Diderots originality lies in the fact that he viewed species as mutable,
not static, and that he posited the appearance, lifespan and extinction of species over time. He surmised that microscopic animalcules, species, star systems, and perhaps the universe itself, randomly come into existence via the
motive and conscious properties of atoms, exist for a time, and then fall out
of existence. Diderots transformism rested on a fulcrum of three pivotal
points: probability theory, the motive property of atoms, and the conscious
property of matter.
Rousseau, on the other hand, was not a transformist. He embraced anthropological (intraspecies) metamorphosis and sociological change, but not
250
biological (interspecies) transformism, as Diderot and the materialists did.

Rousseaus legacy is that he posited anthropological change in a new and
creative way: he applied Buffons theory of the physical degeneration of species to the dissolution of mans morality. Rousseau borrowed many of Buffons observations regarding the physical bodies of creatures, and
ingeniously followed a parallel route, applying them to hypothesize a psychic
and moral dissolution that occurred during mans anthropological (intraspecies) metamorphosis from his natural state to his civilized. Rousseaus natural man was neither good, nor evil, but a tabula rasa, on which his
experiences would imprint. Hence, all of the vices that exist in society today, most notably war, slavery, theft, the notion of honor, pride, and greed,
were unknown to natural man, and are artifices created by civilized man and
consented to by him
Rousseau noted the great similarities between man and the great apes,
who appeared to be conscious, thinking, intelligent animals. Rousseau suggested widening the umbrella of the human species to include the great apes
and accepted the notion that perhaps there are multiple varieties of the human species. This was a political statement, not a biological one: he opposed
racism, slavery and the subjugation of people living in extremely primitive
conditions in Africa and Asia. He declared the human dignity and basic human rights of all men, even apes, who if experimentation could show had
perfectibility and could be taught language, deserved the compassion and
esteem accorded to all men. Therefore, his proposal to include apes in the
human species was not a statement as to biological transformism, which he
denied, but rather, a scathing criticism of civilized Europe in which men consent to inequality and to valuing some people more than others according to
the artifices of social class.
On the other hand, Voltaire, the deist, saw contemporary science as a
threat to God. The motive property of atoms, determinative of all Creation,
could be held to replace Gods will. If particles in motion always existed,
there is no need for a Prime Mover. The discovery of fossils and the placement of marine shells on mountaintops and far from water indicated that the
earth was much older than had been previously thought; the great size of the
fossil bones discovered in Siberia and the New World indicated that species
do metamorphose over time and that perhaps, Diderot might be right after
all.
Conclusion
251
The debate over whether apes can be taught a language challenged mans
unique place on the chain of beings: if the great apes could be taught to
speak, a gap would be filled on the great chain between man and the apes.
There would no longer be an insurmountable chasm between man and all
other animals. Talking apes would also pose innumerable problems for Cartesians: if a soul impart the intellect necessary for language, do talking apes
have a soul that requires forgiveness from Original Sin? How many species
of animals, especially those that work together and communicate (beavers,
ants, bees), have souls? The great apes also raised the possibility of multiple
varieties of the human race or multiple species of men.
The multiplicity of races posed more than intriguing biological questions: there was the pressing issue of the transatlantic slave trade that needed
to be abolished. The philosophes declared that all slavery violates the basic
tenets of natural law. All men come into the world with nothing and leave
with nothing. Hence, nature, itself, indicates that they are all equal. Furthermore, all people have the natural right to freedom and self-determination.
The philosophes polemics against slavery culminated in the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen [La Dclaration des droits de lhomme
et du citoyen] on August 26, 1789. The first article states, Men are born and
remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be based only on
considerations of the common good. Undeniable rights are set forth not
only for French citizens, but for all man without exception. While this document did not abolish slavery in the French colonies, it served as a precursor
to subsequent human rights instruments. On February 4, 1794, the National
Assembly voted to end slavery in all French colonies. However, slavery was
reinstated by Napoleon in 1802 and not banned for good until 1848.
Notes
INTRODUCTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Aristotle, History of Animals, edited by D. M. Balme (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1991), 7.1.588b5, pp. 61, 63.
Chain, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 4a, http://dictionary.oed.com (Apr. 12,
2006).
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 55.
Aristotle, Metaphysics: Books I-IX, translated by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 2.2.994a10, pp. 87, 89.
Ibid., 2.2.994b, p. 91.
Aristotle, Metaphysics: Books X-XIV, translated by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 12.6.1071b15, p. 141.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 56. Also, Aristotle, History of
Animals, edited by D. M. Balme (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991),
book 7.1.588b, pp. 61, 63.
Aristotle, Parts of Animals, translated by A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1937), 4.13.697b, pp. 427, 429. Aristotle discusses the shared
forms and functions of various species of animals. See also Aristotle, History of
Animals, edited by D. M. Balme (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991),
2.89, pp. 103, 105, 107. Discussed by Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of
Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 57.
This is my translation. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
Parcourant ensuite successivement & par ordre les diffrens objets qui composent
lUnivers, & se mettant la tte de tous les tres crez, il verra avec tonnement
quon peut descendre par des degrs presquinsensibles, de la crature la plus
parfaite jusqu la matire la plus informe, de lanimal le mieux organis jusquau
minral le plus brut Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Premier discours (1749)
in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale,
17491767), 1:12.
254
Notes
10. on voit clairement quil est impossible de donner un systme gnral, une
mthode parfaite, non seulement pour lHistoire Naturelle entire, mais mme pour
une seule de ses branches; car pour faire un systme, un arrangement, en un mot une
mthode gnrale, il faut que tout y soit compris; il faut diviser ce tout en diffrentes
classes, partager ces classes en genres, sous-diviser ces genres en espces, & tout
cela suivant un ordre dans lequel il entre ncessairement de larbitraire. Mais la
Nature marche par des gradations inconnues, & par consquent elle ne peut pas se
prter totalement ces divisions, puisquelle passe dune espce une autre espce,
& souvent dun genre un autre genre, par des nuances imperceptibles; de sorte
quil se trouve un grand nombre despces moyennes & dobjets mi-partis quon ne
sait o placer, & qui drangent ncessairement le projet du systme gnral: cette
vrit est trop importante pour que je ne lappuie pas de tout ce qui peut la rendre
claire & vidente. Ibid., 1:13.
11. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Seals, Walrus, and Manati (1765) in Natural
History, General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd edition
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 7:32829. Assemblons pour un instant
tous les animaux quadrupdes, faisons-en un groupe, ou plutt formons-en une
troupe dont les intervalles et les rangs reprsentent peu prs la proximit ou
lloignement qui se trouve entre chaque espce; plaons au centre les genres les
plus nombreux, et sur les flancs, sur les ailes ceux qui le sont le moins; resserronsles tous dans le plus petit espace, afin de les mieux voir; et nous trouverons quil
nest pas possible darrondir cette enceinte: Que quoique tous les animaux
quadrupdes tiennent entreux de plus prs quils ne tiennent aux autres tres, il sen
trouve nanmoins en grand nombre qui font des pointes au dehors, et semblent
slancer pour atteindre dautres classes de la Nature; les singes tendent
sapprocher de lhomme et sen approchent en effet de trs-prs; les chauve-souris
sont les singes des oiseaux quelles imitent par leur vol; les porc-pics. Les
hrissons par les tuyaux dont ils sont couverts, semblent nous indiquer que les
plumes pourroient appartenir dautres quaux oiseaux; les tatous par leur test
cailleux sapprochent de la tortue et des crustaces; les castors par les cailles de
leur queue ressemblent aux poissons; les fourmillers par leur espce de bec ou de
trompe sans dents et par leur longue langue, nous rappellent encore les oiseaux;
enfin les Phoques, les Morses et les Lamantins font un petit corps part qui forme la
pointe la plus saillante pour arriver aux ctaces. Georges-Louis Leclerc de
Buffon, Les Phoques, les morses et les lamantins (1765) in Histoire naturelle,
gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767),
13:33031.
12. Avez-vous vu au Jardin du Roi, sous une cage de verre, un orang-outang qui a lair
dun saint Jean qui prche au dsert?Le cardinal de Polignac lui disait un jour:
Parle, et je te baptise. Denis Diderot, Suite de lEntretien in uvres compltes de
Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877),
2:190.
13. Mary Efrosini Gregory, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species (New York and
London: Routledge, 2007), 19-51.
14. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
15. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1997), 42025.
Notes
255
16. Francis Haber, Fossils and the Idea of a Process of time in Natural History in
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The
John Hopkins Press, 1959), 22261.
17. Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the Problem of Species in Forerunners of Darwin:
17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,
1959), 84113.
18. Bentley Glass, Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution in Forerunners of
Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
Press, 1959), 5183.
19. Lester Crocker, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism in
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The
21. Otis E. Fellows and Stephen F. Milliken, Buffon (New York: Twayne Publishers,
Inc., 1972), 109.
22. John H. Eddy, Jr., Buffon, Organic Change, and the Races of Man (Ph. D diss.,
University of Oklahoma, 1977).
23. John H. Eddy, Jr. Buffon, Organic Alterations, and Man. Studies in the History
of Biology 7 (1984): 145.
24. Paul Lawrence Farber, Buffons Concept of Species (Ph. D diss., Indiana
University, 1970).
25. Paul Lawrence Farber, Buffon and the Concept of Species. Journal of the History
of Biology 5, no. 2 (Fall 1972): 25984.
26. Phillip R. Sloan, The Idea of Racial Degeneracy in Buffons Histoire naturelle.
Racism in the Eighteenth Century. Volume 3 of Studies in Eighteenth-Century
Culture. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973, 293321.
27. Michle Duchet, Lanthropologie de Diderot, Anthropologie et histoire au sicle
des Lumires: Buffon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvtius, Diderot (Paris: Maspro,
1971), 40775.
28. Jean Ehrard, Diderot, lEncyclopdie, et lHistoire et thorie de la Terre, Buffon
88 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 13542.
29. Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the Problem of Species in Forerunners of Darwin,
17451859, edited by Bentley Glass et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1959), 84113.
30. Jacques Roger. Buffon: A Life in Natural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997).
31. Jacques Roger, Diderot et Buffon en 1749, Diderot Studies 4 (1963): 22136.
Stanford University Press, 1997).
33. Aram Vartanian, Buffon et Diderot, Buffon 88 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 11933.
34. Jean E. Perkins, Diderot and La Mettrie, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 10 (1959): 49100.
35. Ann Thomson, La Mettrie et Diderot, http://www.sigu7.jussieu.fr/diderot/travaux/
revseance2.htm (Jan. 24, 2006).
36. Ann Thomson, Lunit matrielle de lhomme chez La Mettrie et Diderot,
Colloque International Diderot (1985): 6168.
256
Notes
37. Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: An Intertextual Encounter,
Diderot Studies 21 (1983): 15597.
38. Aram Vartanian, Trembleys Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French
Materialism, Journal of the History of Ideas 2 (1950): 25986.
39. Marx W. Wartofsky, Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism,
40. Otis Fellows, Buffon and Rousseau: Aspects of a Relationship, PMLA 75, no. 3
(June 1960): 18496.
41. Francis Moran, Of Pongos and Men: Orangs-Outang in Rousseaus Discourse on
Inequality, Review of Politics 57, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 64164.
42. Leonard Sorenson, Natural Inequality and Rousseaus Political Philosophy in his
Discourse on Inequality, Western Political Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December 1990):
76388.
CHAPTER ONE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Benot de Maillet, Telliamed: Or, Discourses between an Indian Philosopher, and a

French Missionary, on the Diminution of the Sea, the Formation of the Earth, the
Origin of Men and Animals, and other Curious Subjects, relating to Natural History
and Philosophy (London: Jacob Loyseau, 1750), 224. Les petits ailerons quils
avoient sous le ventre, & qui, comme leurs nageoires, leur avoient aid se
promener dans la mer, devinrent des pieds, & leur servirent marcher sur la terre.
Benot de Maillet, Telliamed ou Entretiens dun philosophe indien avec un
missionnaire franois sur la diminution de la mer, la formation de la terre, lorigine
de lhomme, &c., Chapter 6, Sixime journe. De lorigine de lhomme & des
animaux, & de la propagation des espces par les semences, 2 vols. (Amsterdam:
LHonor et fils, 1748), 2:140.
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, ed. Michaud, 45 vols. (Paris: Ch.
Delagrave et Cie, 18701873), 26:125.
James Lawrence Powell, Mysteries of Terra Firma: The Age and Evolution of the
Earth. http://www.powells.com/biblio?show=HARDCOVER:SALE:068487282X:
10.98&page=excerpt#page (September 11, 2006).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
and Philosophy, Chapter 1, First Day. Proofs of the Diminution of the Sea
(London: Jacob Loyseau, 1750), 4. Une observation que mon Ayeul avoit
faitedans sa jeunesse, ainsi quil lassura mon pre, que dans le plus grand
calme la mer restoit toujours suprieure au rocher, & le couvroit de ses eaux.
Cependant 22 ans avant sa mort la superficie de ce rocher parut sec, ou pour me
servir de vos termes, commena veiller. Benot de Maillet, Telliamed ou
Notes
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
257
Entretiens dun philosophe indien avec un missionnaire franois sur la diminution
de la mer, la formation de la terre, lorigine de lhomme, &c., Chapter 1, Premire
journe. Preuves de la Diminution de la Mer, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: LHonor et
fils, 1748), 1:56.
Ibid. on y rencontroit, comme dans ces derniers, des coquillages de mer cols &
insers leur superficie. Vingt sortes de ptrifications qui navoient entrelles
aucune ressemblance, soffroient ses yeuxLe principe dune si grande varit
dans les terrains, jointe aux lits divers en paisseur & en substance, ainsi quen
couleur, dont la plupart de ces carrires toient composes, embarassoient
trangement sa raison. Ibid., 1:67.
Or de lestimation que je viens de faire de la diminution des eaux de la mer, cest-dire, denviron un pied dans lespace de trois sicles, & de trois pieds quatre
pouces en mille ans Ibid., 1:204.
and Philosophy (London: Jacob Loyseau, 1750), 218. En effet les herbes, les
plantes, les racines, les bleds, les arbres, & tout ce que la terre produit & nourrit de
cette espce, nest-il pas sorti de la mer, Nest-il pas du moins naturel de le penser,
sur la certitude que toutes nos terres habitables sont originairement sorties de ses
eaux? Benot de Maillet, Telliamed ou Entretiens dun philosophe indien avec un
Ibid., 219. Pour venir prsent ce qui regarde lorigine des animaux terrestres,
plus je remarque quil ny en a aucun marchant volant, ou rampant, dont la mer ne
renferme des espces semblables, ou approchantes, & dont le passage dun de ces
lmens lautre ne soit possible, probable, mme soutenu dun grand nombre
dexemples. Ibid., 2:133.
Ibid., 220. Or la ressemblance de figure, mme dinclination, qui se remarque
entre certains poissons & quelques animaux terrestres, est non seulement digne
dattention; il est mme surprenant que personne, que je scache, nait travaill
jusquici approfondir les raisons de cette conformit. Ibid., 2:13435.
Ibid., 222. Il y a dans la mer des poissons de presque toutes les figures des
animaux terrestres, mme des oiseaux. Elle renferme des plantes & des fleurs, &
quelques fruits: lortie, la rose, lillet, le melon, le raisin y trouvent leurs
semblables. Ibid., 2:138.
Ibid., 223-24. Car il peut arriver, comme nous savons quen effet il arrive assez
souvent, que les poissons als & volans chassant ou tant chasss dans la mer,
emports du dsir de la proie ou de la crainte de la mort, ou bien pousss peut-tre
quelques pas du rivage par les vagues quexcitoit une tempte, soient tombs dans
des roseaux ou dans des herbages, do ensuite il ne leur fut pas possible de
reprendre vers la mer leffort qui les en avoit tirs, & quen cet tat ils ayent
contract une plus grande facult de voler. Alors leurs nageoires ntant plus
baignes des eaux de la mer, se sendirent & se djetterent par la scheresse. Tandis
quils trouverent dans les roseaux & les herbages dans lesquels ils toient tombs,
quelques alimens pour se soutenir, les toyaux de leurs nageoires spars les uns des
258
Notes
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
autres se prolongerent, & se revtirent de barbes; ou pour parler plus juste, les
membranes qui auparavant les avoient tenus colls les uns aux autres, se
mtamorphoserent. La barbe forme de ces pellicules djettes sallongea ellemme; la peau de ces animaux se revtit insensiblement dun duvet de la mme
couleur dont elle toit peinte, & ce duvet grandit. Les petits ailerons quils avoient
sous le ventre, & qui, comme leurs nageoires, leur avoient aid se promener dans
la mer, devinrent des pieds, & leur servirent marcher sur la terre. Il se fit encore
dautres petits changemens dans leur figure. Le bec & le col des uns salongerent;
ceux des autres se racourcirent: il en fut de mme du reste du corps. Cependant la
conformit de la premire figure subsists dans le total; & elle est, & sera toujours
ais de reconnotre. Ibid., 2:13940.
Ibid., 225. Quant aux animaux quatre pied, nous ne trouvons pas seulement dans
la mer des espces de leur figure & de leur mmes inclinations, vivant dans le sein
des flots des mmes alimens, dont ils se nourrissent sur la terre: nous avons encore
cent exemples de ces espces vivant galement dans lair & dans les eaux. Les
Singes marins nont-ils pas toute la figure des singes de terre? Il y en a de mme de
plusieurs espces. Ibid., 2:143.
Ibid., 226. Le lion, le cheval, le buf, le cochon, le loup, le chameau, le chat, le
chien, la chvre, le mouton, ont de mme leur semblable dans la mer. Ibid., 2:144.
Ibid., 228. Cest ainsi sans doute, que tous les animaux terrestres ont pass du
sjour des eaux la respiration de lair, & ont contract la facult de mugir, de
hurler, daboyer & de se faire entendre, quils navoient point dans la mer, ou quils
navoient du moins que fort imparfaitement. Ibid., 2:148.
Ibid., 23031. Jai l dans vos histoires, quun Officier dune des villes du
Delta, ou de la basse Egypte, se promenant sur le soir avec quelques uns de ses amis
sur les bords du Nil, ils apperurent assez proche du rivage un homme marin suivi
de sa femelle Ibid., 2:151.
Ibid., 24556. Rien nest plus commun, que ces hommes sauvages. En 1702ces
Hollandois se saisirent dans une descente de deux animaux mles, quils amenerent
Batavia, & quils nommerent dans la Langue du pays (Orans-outans,) cest--dire,
hommes silvains. Ils avoient toute la forme humaine, & marchoient comme nous
sur deux pieds. Leurs jambes & leurs bras toient trs dlis, & revtus de
poilCes Orans-outans avoient les ongles des doigts des pieds fort longs, & un peu
crochus Ibid., 2:17273.
Ibid., 246. Pour revenir aux diverses espces dhommes, ceux qui ont des queues
peuvent ils tre les fils de ceux qui nen ont point? Comme les singes queue ne
descendent certainement point de ceux qui sont sans queue, ne seroit-il pas naturel
de penser de mme, que les hommes qui naissent avec des queues sont dune espce
diverse de ceux qui nen ont jamais eu? Ibid., 2:174.
Panspermia, Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com (September
18, 2006).
Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, translated by W.H.D. Rouse and revised by
Martin Ferguson Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 5.793
94, p. 441. nam neque de clo cecidisse animalia possunt nec terrestria de salsis
exisse lacunis. Titus Lucretius Carus, De Rerum natura, translated by W.H.D.
Rouse and revised by Martin Ferguson Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2002), 5.79394, p. 440. Cited in Benot de Maillet, Telliamed ou Entretiens
dun philosophe indien avec un missionnaire franois sur la diminution de la mer,
Notes
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
259
la formation de la terre, lorigine de lhomme, &c., Chapter 6, Sixime journe.
De lorigine de lhomme & des animaux, & de la propagation des espces par les
semences, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: LHonor et fils, 1748), 2:131note(a).
Ibid., 5.79192, p. 441. inde, loci mortalia scla creavit multa modis multis
varia ratione coorta. Ibid., 5.79192, p. 440.
Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford:
Tous les Animaux, & lhomme par consquent, quaucun Sage ne savisa jamais de
soustraire leur catgorie, seroient-ils vritablement fils de la Terre, comme la
Fable le dit des Gants? La mer couvrant peut-tre originairement la surface de
ntre Globe, nauroit-elle point t elle-mme le bereau flottant de tous les Etres
ternellement enferms dans son sein? Cest le systme de lauteur de Telliamed,
qui revient peu prs celui de Lucrce; car toujours faudroit-il que le mer,
absorbe par les pores de la Terre, consume peu peu par la chaleur du Soleil & le
laps infini des temps, et t forme, en se retirant, de laisser luf humain, comme
elle fait quelque fois le poisson, sec sur le rivage. Moyennant quoi, sans autre
incubation que celle du Soleil, lhomme & tout autre animal seroient sortis de leur
coque, comme certains closent encore aujourdhui dans les pas chauds, & comme
sont aussi les Poulets dans un fumier chaud par lart des Physiciens. Julien Offray
de la Mettrie, Le systme dEpicure in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean
Nourse, 1751), 34142.
John Turberville Needham, Observations upon the Generation, Composition, and
Decomposition of Animal and Vegetable Substances. Communicated in a Letter to
Martin Folkes, Esq; President of the Royal Society (London, 1749), 39.
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine in Man a Machine, including Frederick
the Greats Eulogy on La Mettrie and Extracts from La Mettries The Natural
History of the Soul, notes by Gertrude Carman Bussey (Chicago: The Open Court
Publishing Company, 1912), 125. Nous ne connoissons point la Nature: Des
causes caches dans son sein pourroient avoir tout produit. Voiez votre tour le
Polype de Trembley! Ne contient il pas en soi les causes qui donnent lieu sa
rgnration? Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres
philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse, 1751), 51.
qui mapprit que les montagnes et les hommes sont produits par les eaux de la
mer. Il y eut dabord de beaux hommes marins qui ensuite devinrent amphibies.
Leur belle queue fourchue se changea en cuisses et en jambes. Jtais encore tout
plein des Mtamorphoses dOvide, et dun livre o il tait dmontr que la race des
hommes tait btarde dune race de babouns: jaimais autant descendre dun poisson
que dun singe. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, LHomme aux 40 cus in
uvres compltes de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols.,
edited by M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 34:43.
Otis E. Fellows and Stephen F. Milliken, Buffon (New York: Twayne Publishers,
Inc., 1972), 109.
Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2003), 3435.
Ibid., 72.
Ibid., 7273.
260
Notes
35. Ibid., 73.
37. Ibid., 423.
38. Ibid., 424.
39. Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, Persian Letters, Letter 11 (London:

Penguin Books Ltd, 2004), 53. ces anciens Trogloditesressembloient plus
des btes qu des hommes. Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, Lettres
persanes, Lettre 11 (Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1754), 2324.
Ibid. Il y avoit en Arabie un petit peuple, appell Troglodite, qui descendoit de ces
anciens Troglodites, qui, si nous en croyons les historiens, ressembloient plus des
btes qu des hommes. Ceux-ci ntoient point si contrefaits, ils ntoient point
velus comme des ours, ils ne siffloient point, ils avoient deux yeux: mais ils toient
si mchans & si froces, quil ny avoit parmi eux aucun principe dquit, ni de
justice. Ibid.
Aristotle, History of Animals, edited by D. M. Balme (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1991), 8.12.597a5, pp. 131, 133.
Herodotus, The Persian Wars, translated by A. D. Godley (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1921), 4.183, p. 387.
Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, edited and annotated by Paul Vernire (Paris:
Garnier, 1960), 28n3.
Pomponius Mela, Geography/De situ orbis A.D. 43, translated by Paul Berry
(Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 11. tum primos ab oriente
Garamantas, post Augilas et Troglodytas, et ultimos ad occasum Atlantas audimus.
intra, si credere libet, vix iam homines magisque semiferi Aegypanes et Blemyes et
Gamphasantes et Satyri sine tectis ac sedibus passim vagi habent potius terras quam
habitant. Pomponius Mela, De chorographia, introduced and annotated by
Piergiorgio Parroni (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1984), 1.4.23, p. 115.
Ibid., 21. Troglodyt, nullarum opum domini strident magis quam loquuntur,
specus subeunt alunturque serpentibusBlemyis capita absunt, vultus in pectore
est. Ibid., 1.8.44, 48, p. 119.
Le gographe disait: Troglodyta, nullarum opum domini, strident magis quam
loquuntur; Hrodote leur faisser pousser des cris aigus comme des chauvressouris(Histoires, IV, 183). Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, edited and annotated
by Paul Vernire (Paris: Garnier, 1960), 28n3.
Montesquieu a lu Pomponius Mela. Celui-ci crit: Troglodytae, nullarum opum
domini, strident magis quam loquuntur, et ce mot explique celui de Montesquieu:
ils ne siffloient point. Lorsquil ajoute: ils avoient deux yeux, il pense au mme
passage de Pomponius Mela qui disait, sur un peuple voisin des Troglodytes:
Blemmyis capita absunt; vultus in pectore est, ou peut-tre Pline lAncien:
Notes
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
261
Blemmyis traduntur capita abesse, ore et oculis pectore affixis. Montesquieu,
Lettres persanes, annotated by Antoine Adam (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1954), 36n1.
Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, 5.83750, 85556.
Montesquieu, Persian Letters, Letter 12 (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2004), 56.
ils avoient de lhumanit; ils connoissoient la justice; ils aimoient la vertu
Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, Lettre 12 (Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1754), 28.
Ibid., 5758. Le soir, lorsque les troupeaux quittoient les prairies, & que les bufs
fatigus avoient ramen la charrue, ils sassembloientils dcrivoient ensuite les
dlices de la vie champtre, & le bonheur dune condition toujours pare de
linnocenceDans ce pays heureux, la cupidit toit trangre: ils se faissoient des
prsens, o celui qui donnoit, croyoit toujours avoir lavantage: le peuple Troglodite
se regardoit comme une seule famille: les troupeaux toient presque toujours
confondus; la seule peine quon spargnoit ordinairement, ctoit de les partager.
Ibid., 31.
Le souvenir de Fnelon demeure ici constant. Cest la Btique du Tlmaque
(Wetstein, 1719, livre VIII, p. 170), avec tous les thmes fabuleux de lge dor.
Les Troglodytes, vertueux comme le peuple de Btique, sont des bergers:
Linnocence des murs, la bonne foi, lobissance et lhorreur du vice habitent
dans cette heureuse terre. Tous les biens sont communs; les fruits des arbres, le
lait des troupeaux sont des richesses si abondantes que des peuples si sobres et si
modrs nont pas besoin de les partager. Communisme et fraternit: Ils saiment
tous dun amour fraternel que rien ne trouble. Mme idal arcadien qui exclut
largent, le commerce, la vie urbaine, les conqutes et la guerre. Le style mme de
Montesquieu imite lonction fnelonienneLa religion nest pas rvle aux
Troglodytes. Elle est naturelle et drive spontanment de curs vertueux.
Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, edited and annotated by Paul Vernire (Paris:
Garnier, 1960), 31n132, 33n1.
Otis E. Fellows and Norman L. Torrey, The Age of Enlightenment, 2nd edition (New
York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1971), 105n5.
J. Robert Loy, Montesquieu (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1968), 24.
Ibid., 4243.
Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 54.
The causality between geographic latitude and tendencies towards virtue or vice is
examined in Jean-Patrice Courtois, Le Physique et le moral dans la thorie du
climat chez Montesquieu in Le Travail des Lumires pour Georges Benrekassa,
edited by Caroline Jacot Grapa, et al. (Paris: Honor Champion, 2002), 13956;
Christopher S. Jones, Politicizing Travel and Climatizing Philosophy: Watsuji,
Montesquieu and the European Tour, Japan Forum 14, no. 1 (March 1, 2002), 41
62; James W. Pennebaker, et al., Stereotypes of Emotional Expressiveness of
Northerners and Southerners: A Cross-Cultural Test of Montesquieus Hypotheses,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70, no. 2 (February 1996), 37280;
Judith N. Shklar, Virtue in a Bad Climate; Good Men and Good Citizens in
Montesquieus LEsprit des lois in Enlightenment Studies in Honour of Lester G.
Crocker, edited by Alfred J. Bingham and Virgil W. Topazio (Oxford: The Voltaire
Foundation at the Taylor Institution, 1979), 31528.
262
Notes
20. il sarme dun microscope pour donner ce lieu commun de la sagesse des
nations un fondement scientifique solide Montesquieu, De lesprit des lois,
introduced and annotated by J. Ehrard (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969), 149.
21. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler,
Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 231. le caractre de lesprit, & les passions du cur, soient
extrmement diffrentes dans les divers climats Montesquieu, De lesprit des
loix, in 2 volumes (Edinburgh: G. Hamilton and J. Balfour, 1750), 1:317.
22. Ibid. Lair froid resserre les extrmits des fibres extrieures de notre corps; cela
augmente leur ressort, & favorise le retour du sang des extrmits vers le cur. Il
diminue la longueur de ces mmes fibres; il augmente donc encore par-la leur force.
Lair chaud, au-contraire, relche les extrmits des fibres & les allonge; il diminue
donc leur force & leur ressort. Ibid., 1:31718.
23. Ibid., 23132. On a donc plus de vigueur dans les climats froids. Laction du cur
& la raction des extrmits des fibres sy sont mieux, les liqueurs sont mieux en
quilibre, le sang est plus dtermin vers le cur, & rciproquement le cur a plus
de puissance. Ibid., 1:318.
24. Ibid., 232. Cette force plus grande doit produire bien des effets, par exemple, plus
de confiance en soi-mme, cest--dire, plus de courage; plus de connoissance de sa
supriorit, cest--dire, moins de desir de la vengeance; plus dopinion de sa suret,
cest--dire, plus de franchise, moins de soupons, de politique, & de ruses. Enfin,
cela doit faire des caractres bien diffrens. Ibid.
25. Ibid. Approchez des pas du Midi, vous croirez vous loigner de la morale mme;
des passions plus vives multiplieront les crimes; chacun cherchera prendre sur les
autres, tous les avantages qui peuvent favoriser ces mmes passions. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 234. Dans les pas du Nord, une machine saine & bien constitue, mais
lourde, trouve ses plaisirs dans tout ce qui peut remettre les esprits en mouvement,
la chasse, les voyages, la guerrre, le vin. Ibid., 1:321.
27. Engin, instrument propre faire mouvoir, tirer, lever, traisner, lancer quelque
chose. Grande machine. machine admirable, merveilleuse, nouvelle machine,
machine fort ingenieuse. machine de guerre. machine de ballet. machine qui
lanoit de gros carreaux de pierre, qui decochoit cent traits la fois. machine pour
tirer de leau. machine lever des pierres sur le haut dun bastiment. machine
hydraulique, ou pour les eaux. Inventer une machine. faire joer une machine.
cette machine joe bien, va bien. leffet dune machine. les pieces, les ressorts
dune machine. Machine, Dictionnaire de lAcadmie franaise (Paris: Baptiste
Coignard, 1694), 1.
28. On appelle aussi, Machine, Certain assemblahge de ressorts dont le mouvement &
leffet se termine en luy-mesme. Lhorloge est une belle machine. les automates
sont des machines fort ingenieuses. Ibid.
29. On dit fig. Que lhomme est un machine admirable. Les Anciens Potes
appelloient lUnivers, La machine ronde. Ibid.
30. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine in Man a Machine, including Frederick
Publishing Company, 1912), 148. Concluons donc hardiment que lHomme est
une Machine; & quil ny a dans tout lUnivers quune seule substance diversement
Notes
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
263
modifie. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler,
Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 242. chez les Anglois elle est leffet dune maladie, elle tient
ltat physique de la machine, & est indpendante de toute autre cause.
Montesquieu, De lesprit des loix, in 2 volumes (Edinburgh: G. Hamilton and J.
Balfour, 1750), 1:332.
Ibid. Il y a apparence que cest un dfaut de filtration du suc nerveux; la machine
dont les forces motrices se trouvent tout moment sans action, est lasse dellemme; lame ne sent point de douleur, mais une certaine difficult de lexistence.
Ibid.
loin dtablir un dterminisme unilatral, il croit que le lgislateur peut et doit
combattre les vices du climat (chap. V IX). Montesquieu, De lesprit des lois,
introduced and annotated by J. Ehrard (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969), 149.
C. P. Courtney, Montesquieu and Natural Law, in Montesquieus Science of
Politics: Essays on The Spirit of Laws, edited by David W. Carrithers, Michael A.
Mosher, and Paul A. Rahe (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2001), 57.
Ibid., 58.
Ibid, 59.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book 19, Chapter 14.
Selon Jean Deprun, dans lintroduction son grand ouvrage sur La Philosophie de
linquitude en France au XVIIIe sicleles hommesvoyant le Dieu paternel et
crateur sloigner deux de plus en plus, ils se sont sentis abandonns; chasss du
centre de lunivers dont ils ntaient plus la fin, ils ont t immergs dans le flux
changeant des phnomnes et dans les enchanements inpuisables de causes et
deffets. Henri Coulet, Diderot et le problme du changement, Recherches sur
Diderot et sur lEncyclopdie 2 (April 1987): 59.
Ibid., 60.
Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1961), 31213.
Ibid., 313.
CHAPTER THREE
1.
2.

Publishing Company, 1912), 103. alors il ne se croioit pas Roi, ntoit distingu
du Singe et des autres Animaux Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine
in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse, 1751), 28.
Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Literature
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 398.
264
Notes
3.
Celui ou celle qui nadmet que la matire. Matrialiste, Dictionnaire de

LAcadmie franaise (Paris: Brunet, 1762), 105.
4. Opinion de ceux qui nadmettent point dautre substance que la matire.
Matrialsme, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie franaise (1762), 105.
5. Materialism, Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged (Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1993), 1392.
6. Ren Descartes, Letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646 in The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham, et al.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3:303. que notre corps nest
pas seulement une machine qui se remue de soi-mme Ren Descartes, Lettre
au Marquis of Newcastle, le 23 novembre in uvres et Lettres, edited by Andr
Bridoux (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), 1255.
7. Ren Descartes, Treatise on Man in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
translated by John Cottingham, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 1:99. Nous voyons des horloges, des fontaines artificielles, des moulins, et
autres semblables machines, qui ntant faites que par des hommes, ne laissent pas
davoir la force de se mouvoir delles-mmes en plusieurs diverses faons. Ren
Descartes, Trait de lHomme in uvres et Lettres, edited by Andr Bridoux (Paris:
Gallimard, 1953), 807.
8. The full sentence reads, Thus every movement we make without any contribution
from our will-as often happens when we breathe, walk, eat and, indeed, when we
perform any action which is common to us and the beasts-depends solely on the
arrangement of our limbs and on the route which the spirits, produced by the heat of
the heart, follow naturally in the brain, nerves and muscles. This occurs in the same
way as the movement of a watch is produced merely by the strength of its spring
and the configuration of its wheels. Ren Descartes, The Passions of the Soul,
Article 16 in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John
Cottingham, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1:335. tous
les mouvements que nous faisons sans que notre volont y contribue (comme il
arrive souvent que nous respirons, que nous marchons, que nous mangeons, et enfin
que nous faisons toutes les actions qui nous sont communes avec les btes) ne
dpendent que de la conformation de nos membres et du cours que les esprits,
excits par la chaleur du cur, suivent naturellement dans le cerveau, dans les nerfs
et dans les muscles, en mme faon que le mouvement dune montre est produit par
la seule force de son ressort et la figure de ses roues. Ren Descartes, Les Passions
de lme, Article 16 in uvres et Lettres, edited by Andr Bridoux (Paris:
Gallimard, 1953), 704.
9. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Treatise on the Soul in Machine Man and Other
Writings, translated and edited by Ann Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 43. Ce nest ni Aristote, ni Platon, ni Descartes, ni
Malebranche, qui vous apprendront ce que cest votre Ame. En vain vous vous
tourmentez pour connotre la nature, nen dplaise votre vanit & votre
indocilit, il faut que vous vous soumettiez lignorance & la foi. Julien Offray
de La Mettrie, Trait de lme in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse,
1751), 85.
10. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, translated by Fritz C.A. Koelln
and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 6667.
Notes
265
University Press, 1996), 45. Jouvre les yeux, & je ne vois autour de moi que
matire, ou qutendue. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Trait de lme in uvres
12. Extension, Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com (July 3, 2006).
University Press, 1996), 50. du langage affectif, tel que les plaintes, les cris, les
caresses, la fuite, les soupirs, le chant, & en un mot toutes les expressions de la
douleur, de la tristesse, de laversion, de la craine, de laudace, de la soumission, de
la colre Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Trait de lme in uvres philosophiques
(London: Jean Nourse, 1751), 98.
14. Ibid. car il nest ici question que de la similitude des organes des sens, lesquels,
quelques modifications prs, sont absolument les mmes, & accusent videmment
les mmes usages. Ibid., 99.
15. Ibid., 55. Beaucoup dexpriences nous ont fait connotre que cest effectivement
dans le cerveau, que lAme est affecte des sensations propres lanimal: car
lorsque cette partie est considrablement blesse, lanimal na plus ni sentiment, ni
discernement, ni connoissance Ibid., 109.
16. Ibid., 56. do comme de son trne, elle rgit toutes les parties du corps. Ibid.,
109.
17. Ibid., 58.
puisque les seuls nerfs moteurs portent lAme lide des
mouvemenschaque nerf est propre faire natre diffrentes sensations Ibid.,
112.
18. Ibid. Prenez un il de buf, dpouillez-le adroitement de la sclrotique & de la
chorode; mettez o toit la premire de ces membranes, un papier dont la concavit
sajuste parfaitement avec la convexit de lil. Prsentez ensuite quelque corps
que ce soit devant le trou de la pupille, vous verrez trs-distincement au fond de
lil limage de ce corps. Ibid., 113.
19. Ibid., 61. Les ides de grandeur, de duret, &c. ne sont dtermines que par nos
organes. Avec dautres sens, nous aurions des ides diffrentes des mmes attributs,
comme avec dautres ides nous penserions autrement que nous ne pensons de tout
ce quon appelle ouvrage de gnie, ou de sentimentDailleurs les sensations
changent avec les organes; dans certaines jaunisses, tout parot jaune. Changez avec
le doigt laxe de la vision, vous multiplierez les objets, vous en varierez votre gr
la situation & les attitudes. Les engelures, &c. font perdre lusage du tact. Le plus
petit embarras dans le canal dEustachi suffit pour rendre sourd. Ibid., 11819.
20. Ibid., 67. La cause de la mmoire est tout--fait mcanique, comme elle-mme;
elle parot dpendre de ce que les impressions corporelles du cerveau, qui sont les
traces dides qui se suivent, sont voisines; & que lAme ne peut faire la dcouverte
dune trace, ou dune ide, sans rappeller les autres qui avoient coutume daller
ensemble. Ibid., 129.
21. Ibid., 68. Limagination confond les diverses sensations incompltes que la
mmoire rappelle lAme, & en forme des images, ou des tableaux, qui lui
reprsentent des objetsdiffrens des exactes sensations reues autrefois par les
sens. Ibid., 132.
266
Notes
Publishing Company, 1912), 85-86. Descartes, & tous les Cartsiens, parmi
lesquels il y a long-tems quon a compt les Mallebranchistes, ont fait la mme
faute. Ils ont admis deux substances distinctes dans lHomme, comme sils les
avoient vus & bien comptes. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine in
uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse, 1751), 10.
23. Aram Vartanian, La Mettries LHomme Machine: A Study in the Origins of an
Idea; Critical Edition with an Introductory Monograph and Notes by Aram
Vartanian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 13.
Publishing Company, 1912), 88. Lexprience & lobservation doivent donc seules
nous guider ici. Elles se trouvent sans nombre dans les Fastes des Mdecins, qui ont
t Philosophes, & non dans les Philosophes, qui nont pas t Mdecins. Ceux-ci
ont parcouru, ont clair le Labyrinthe de lHomme; ils nous ont seuls dvoil ces
ressorts cachs sous des envelopes, qui drobent nous yeux tant de merveilles.
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres philosophiques (London:
Jean Nourse, 1751), 13.
25. Ibid., 93. Le corps humain est une Machine qui monte elle-mme ses ressorts;
vivante image du mouvement perptuel. Les aliments entretiennent ce que la fivre
excite. Sans eux lAme languit, entre en fureur, & meurt abattu. Ibid., 18.
26. Abraham Trembley, Mmoires pour servir lhistoire dun genre de polypes deau
douce, bras en forme de cornes (Paris: Durand, 1744). [Memoirs for History of a
Genus of Freshwater, Horn-shaped Polyps].
27. A discussion of the influence of Trembleys polyp on La Mettrie is found in Aram
Vartanian, Trembleys Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French
Materialism, Journal of the History of Ideas 11(1950), 25986.
28. Lester G. Crocker, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism,
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al., (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 117.
29. Ibid., 117n4. Crocker cites Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine, edited
by Maurice Solovine (Paris: Editions Bossard, 1921), 10809.
30. Ibid., 11718.
31. Ibid., 118.
32. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, edited by
Keith R. Benson and translated by Robert Ellrich (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1997), 396.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Aram Vartanian, La Mettries LHomme Machine: A Study in the Origins of an
Idea; Critical Edition with an Introductory Monograph and Notes by Aram
Vartanian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 21.
36. Vartanians text reads, La Mettrie affirms that chaque petite fibre, au partie des
corps organiss, se meut par un principe qui lui est propre, & dont laction ne
dpend point des nerfs. With respect to the functional mode of the irritable
Notes
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
267
reaction, he observes further: Tel est le principe moteur des Corps entiers, ou des
parties coups en morceaux, quil produit des mouvemens non drgls, comme on
la cru, mais trs rguliers. The sige de cette force inne is placed by him in the
living tissues themselves. Ibid.
Ibid., 22.
Publishing Company, 1912), 93. Quelle puissance dun Repas! La joie renat dans
un cur triste; elle passe dans lAme des Convives qui lexpriment par daimables
chansons
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres
Ibid., 94. La viande cre rend les animaux froces; les Hommes le deviendront par
la mme nourriture. Ibid.
Ibid. Il toit homme faire pendre linnocent, comme le coupable. Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 95. tout dpend de la manire dont notre Machine est monte. Ibid.
Ibid. A quels excs la faim cruelle peut nous porter! Plus de respect pour les
entrailles auxquelles on doit, ou on a donn la vie; on les dchire belles dents, on
sen fait dhorribles festins Ibid.
Ibid., 95. le plus foible est toujours la proie du plus fort. Ibid.
Ibid. Il ne faut que des yeux pour voir lInfluence ncessaire de lge sur la
Raison. Lme suit les progrs du corps, comme ceux de lEducation. Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 9697. Do cela vient-il, si ce nest en partie, & de la nourriture quil
prend, & de la semence de ses Pres Ibid., 21.
Bentley Glass, Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution in Forerunners of
Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959), 5183.
Publishing Company, 1912), 100. Parmi les Animaux, les uns apprennent parler
& chanter; ils retiennent des airs, & prennent tous les sons, aussi exactement quun
Musicien.
Ibid. En un mot seroit-il absolument impossible dapprendre une Langue cet
Animal? Je ne le crois pas. Ibid., 26.
Ibid. le grand Singenous ressemble si fort, que les Naturalistes lont apell
Homme Sauvage, ou Homme des bois. Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 101. Pourquoi donc lducation des Singes seroit-elle impossible? Pourquoi
ne pourroit-il enfin, force de soins, imiter, lexemple des sourds, les mouvemens
ncessaires pour prononcer? Je nose dcider si les organes de la parole du Singe ne
peuvent, quoiquon fasse, rien articuler; mais cette impossibilit absole me
surprendroit, cause de la grande Analogie du Singe & de lHomme, & quil nest
point dAnimal connu jusquau prsent, dont le dedans & le dehors lui ressemblent
dune manire si frappante. Ibid., 2627.
Ibid., 103. Des Animaux lHomme, la transition nest pas violente; les vrais
Philosophes en conviendront. Qutoit lHomme, avant linvention des Mots & la
connoissance des Langues? Un Animal de son espce, qui avec beaucoup moins
268
Notes
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
dinstinct naturel, que les autres, dont alors il ne se croioit pas Roi, ntoit distingu
du Singe & des autres Animaux, que comme le Singe lest lui-mme; je veux dire,
par une physiognomie qui annonoit plus de discernement. Rduit la seule
connoissance intuitive des Leibnitiens, il ne voioit que des Figures & des Couleurs,
sans pouvoir rien distinguer entrelles; vieux comme jeune, Enfant tout ge, il
bgaioit ses sensations & ses besoins, comme un chien affam, ou ennui du repos,
demande manger, ou se promener.
Les Mots, les Langues, les Lois, les Sciences, les Beaux Arts sont venus; & par
eux enfin le Diamant brut de notre esprit a t poli. On a dress un Homme, comme
un Animal Ibid., 2829.
Ibid., 122. Peut-tre a-t-il t jett au hasard sur un point de la surface de la Terre,
sans quon puisse savoir ni comment, ni pourquoi; mais seulement quil doit vivre &
mourir; semblable ces champignons, qui paroissent dun jour lautre, ou ces
fleurs qui bordent les fosses & couvrent les murailles. Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 135. En faut-il davantagepour prouver que lHomme nest quun Animal,
ou un Assemblage de ressorts, qui tous se montent les uns par les autres, sans quon
puisse dire par quel point du cercle humain la Nature a commenc? Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 140. Sil a fallu plus dinstruments, plus de Rouages, plus de ressorts pour
marquer les mouvemens des Plantes, que pour marquer les Heures, ou les
rpter Ibid., 69.
Ibid., 143. ces tres fiers & vainsne sont au fond que des Animaux, & des
Machines perpendiculairement rampantes. Ibid., 71.
William Harvey mentioned the rising point (punctum saliens) or when the heart first
begins to beat in Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt
Qudum de Partu: De Membranis ac Humoribus Uteri et de Conceptione (London:
Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 149.
Publishing Company, 1912), 145. Telle est lUniformit de la Nature quon
commence sentir, & lAnalogie du rgne Animal & Vgtal, de lHomme la
Plante. Peut-tre mme y a-t-il des Plantes Animales, cest--dire qui en vgtant,
ou se battent comme les Polypes, ou font dautres fonctions propres aux Animaux?
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres philosophiques (London:
Jean Nourse, 1751), 74.
Ibid., 148. Concluons donc hardiment que lHomme est une Machine; & quil ny
a dans tout lUnivers quune seule substance diversement modifie. Ibid., 79.
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Plant in Man a Machine and Man a Plant,
translated by Richard A. Watson and Maya Rybalka, and introduced and annotated
by Justin Leiber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 85. Plus
un Corps organis a de besoins, plus la Nature lui a donn de moyens pour les
satisfaire. Ces moyens sont les divers dgrs de cette Sagacit, conne sous le nom
dInstinct dans les Animaux, & dAme dans lHomme. Julien Offray de La
Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse,
1751), 262.
les organes produisent les besoins, et rciproquement les besoins produisent les
organes. Denis Diderot, Rve de dAlembert in uvres compltes de Diderot,
Notes
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
269
edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 2:138
39.
by Justin Leiber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 85.
Moins un Corps organis a de ncessits, moins il est dificile nourrir & lever,
plus son partage dIntelligence t mince. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, LHommeplante in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse, 1751), 262.
Ibid., 89. cette Echelle si impercepiblement gradue, quon voit la Nature
exactement passer par tous les degrs, sans jamais sauter en quelque sorte un seul
Echelon dans toutes ses productions diverses. Ibid., 267.
Lester G. Crocker, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism,
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al., (Baltimore: The
Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, edited by
Press, 1997), 397.
by Justin Leiber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 90. Je
sais que le Singe ressemble lHomme par bien dautres choses que les Dents;
lAnatomie compare en fait foi: quoiquelles ayent suffi Linus pour mettre
lHomme au rang des Quadrupdes ( la tte la vrit). Julien Offray de La
Mettrie, LHomme-plante in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse, 1751),
270.
Ibid., 91. qui rsulte visiblement de lOrganisation Ibid.
quelle ait ouvert son sein aux germes humains, dj prpars, pour que ce
superbe Animal, poses certaines loix, en pt clore. Julien Offray de La Mettrie,
Le systme dEpicure in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse, 1751), 334.
pourquoi la Terre, cette commune Mre & nourrice de tous les corps, auroit-elle
refus aux graines animales, ce quelle accorde aux vgtaux les plus vils, les plus
inutiles, les plus pernicieux? Ibid.
Les premires Gnrations ont d tre fort imparfaites. Ici lEsophage aura
manqu; l lEstomacles seuls animaux qui auront p vivre, se conserver, &
perptuer leur espce, auront t ceux qui se seront trouvs munis de toutes les
Pices ncessaires la gnration, & auxquels en un mot aucune partie essentielle
naura manqu. Ibid., 335.
La perfection na pas plus t louvrage dun jour pour la Nature, que pour lArt.
Ibid.
Denis Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderots Early Philosophical Works,
translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court
Publishing Company, 1916), 112. Voyez-moi bien, monsieur Holmes, je nai
point dyeux. Quavions-nous fait Dieu, vous et moi, lun pour avoir cet organe,
lautre pour en tre priv? Denis Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres
compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris:
Garnier, 18751877), 1:310.
Par quel infinit de combinaisons il a fallu que la nature ait pass, avant que
darriver celle-l seule de laquelle pouvoit rsulter un Animal parfait! Julien
270
Notes
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Offray de La Mettrie, Le systme dEpicure in uvres philosophiques (London:

Jean Nourse, 1751), 33637.
La Nature na plus song de faire lil pour voir, que leau, pour servir de miroir
la simple Bergre. Ibid., 337.
Le hasard va souvent plus loin que la Prudence. Ibid.
Panspermia, Oxford English Dictionary Online. http://www.oed.com. July 19,
2006.
Ibid., 398.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al. (Baltimore: The
Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: an Intertextual Encounter,
Diderot Studies 21 (1983), 15597.
Ibid., 155. Vartanian refers the reader to Jean E. Perkins, Diderot and La Mettrie,
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 10 (1959): 49100; Leo Spitzer,
The Style of Diderot, in Linguistics and Literary History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1948), 18889; Jean-Pierre Seguin, Diderot, le discours et les
choses: Essai de description du style dun philosophe en 1750 (Paris: Klincksieck,
1978), 37988; Jean Mayers critical notes in Diderots Elments de physiologie
(Paris: Marcel Didier, 1964); Paul Vernires critical notes in Diderots Penses sur
linterprtation de la nature and Le Rve de dAlembert in Diderots uvres
philosophiques (Paris: Garnier, 1956).
Ibid., 15758.
Non, Monsieur, je ne suis point lauteur des Penses
philosophiques. Mes terres nont peut-tre jamais port de si beaux fruits. Julien
Offray de La Mettrie,Rponse un libelle, insr contre lAuteur dans la
Bibliothque Raisonne et dans les Penses Chrtiennes appended to the last
volume of Ouvrage de Pnlope; ou Machiavel en mdecine (Berlin, 174850),
3:36061.
Ibid., 164.
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al. (Baltimore: The
CHAPTER FOUR
1.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Hog, the Hog of Siam, and the Wild Boar
(1755) in Natural History, General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9
vols., 2nd edition (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:504. il faut ne
rien voir dimpossible, sattendre tout, et supposer que tout ce qui peut tre, est.
Les espces ambigues, les productions irrgulires, les tres anomaux cesseront ds-
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
271
lors de nous tonner Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le Cochon, le Cochon
de Siam et le Sanglier (1755) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15
volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 5:10203.
Terme de Mdecine. Trait sur le ftus pendant son sjour dans la matrice.
Embryologie, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie franaise (1762), 606.
Inc., 1972), 92.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the Problem of Species, Forerunners of Darwin:
1959), 94.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Recapitulation (1749) in Natural History,
General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd edition (London:
W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 2:346, 2:35152. Il existe donc une matire
organique anime, universellement rpandue dans toutes les substances animales ou
vgtales, qui sert galement leur nutrition, leur dveloppement et leur
reproductionla reproduction ne se fait que par la mme matire devenue
surabondante au corps de lanimal ou du vgtal; chaque partie du corps de lun ou
de lautre renvoie les molcules organiques quelle ne peut plus admettre: ces
molcules sont absolument analogues chaque partie dont elles sont renvoyes,
puisquelles toient destines nourrir cette partie; ds-lors quand toutes les
molcules renvoyes de tout le corps viennent se rassembler, elles doivent former
un petit corps semblable au premier, puisque chaque molcule est semblable la
partie dont elle a t renvoye; cest ainsi que se fait la reproduction dans toutes les
espcesIl ny a donc point de germes prexistants, point de germes contenus
linfini les uns dans les autres, mais il y a une matire organique toujours active,
toujours prte se mouler, sassimiler et produire des tres semblables ceux
qui la reoivent: les espces danimaux ou de vgtaux ne peuvent donc jamais
spuiser delles-mmes, tant quil subsistera des individus lespce sera toujours
toute neuve, elle lest autant aujourdhui quelle ltoit il y a trois mille ans
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Rcapitulation (1749) in Histoire naturelle,
gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 2:425
26. Arthur O. Lovejoy provides his own translation of this passage in his article,
Buffon and the Problem of Species, Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited
by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1959), 94.
Inc., 1972), 93.
Ibid., 94.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Analogies between Animals and Vegetables in
History of Animals (1749) in Natural History, General and Particular, translated by
William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd edition (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785),
2:14. et quenfin le vivant et lanim, au lieu dtre un degr mtaphysique des
tres, est une proprit physique de la matire. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon,
Comparaison des Animaux & des Vgtaux in Histoire des animaux (1749) in
Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale,
17491767), 2:17.
Inc., 1972), 9495.
272
Notes
10. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Horse (1753) in Natural History, General
and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd edition (London: W.
Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:34445. Il y a dans la Nature un prototype gnral
dans chaque espce sur lequel chaque individu est model, mais qui semble, en se
ralisant, saltrer ou se perfectionner par les circonstances; en sorte que,
relativement de certaines qualits, il y a une variation bizarre en apparence dans la
succession des individus, et en mme temps une constance qui parot admirable dans
lespce entire: le premier animal, le premier cheval, par exemple, a t le modle
extrieur et le moule intrieur sur lequel tous les chevaux qui sont ns, tous ceux qui
existent et tous ceux qui natront ont t forms; mais ce modle, dont nous ne
connoissons que les copies, a p saltrer ou se perfectionner en communiquant sa
forme et se multipliant: lempreinte originaire subsists en son entier dans chaque
individu Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le cheval (1753) in Histoire
naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749
1767), 4:21516.
11. Ibid., 3:345. mais quoiquil y en ait des millions, aucun de ces individus nest
cependant semblable en tout a un autre individu, ni par consquent au modle dont il
porte lempreinte: cette diffrence qui prouve combien la Nature est loigne de rien
faire dabsolu, et combien elle fait nuancer ses ouvrages, se trouve dans lespce
humaine, dans celles de tous les animaux, de tous les vgtaux, de tous les tres en
un mot qui se produisent Ibid., 4:216.
12. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Lion (1761) in Natural History, General and
Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd edition (London: W. Strahan
and T. Cadell, 1785), 5:65. le lion na jamais habit les rgions du nord, le renne
ne sest jamais trouv dans les contres du midi, et il ny a peut-tre aucun animal
dont lespce soit comme celle de lhomme gnralement rpandue sur toute la
surface de la terre; chacun son pays, sa patrie naturelle dans laquelle chacun est
retenu par ncessit physique, chacun est fils de la terre quil habite, et cest dans ce
sens quon doit dire que tel ou tel animal est originaire de tel ou tel climat.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le Lion (1761) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et
particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 9:2.
13. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Camel and Dromedary (1764) in Natural
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 6:12325. Il parot tre originaire
dArabie; car non seulement cest le pays o il est en plus grand nombre, mais cest
aussi celui auquel il est le plus conforme; lArabie est le pays du monde le plus
aride, et o leau est la plus rare; le chameau est le plus sobre des animaux et peut
passer plusieurs jours sans boire; le terrein est presque partout sec et sablonneux; le
chameau a les pieds faits pour marcher dans les sables, et ne peut au contraire se
sotenir dans les terreins humides et glissans; lherbe et les pturges manquant
cette terre, le buf y manque aussi, et le chameau remplace cette bte de somme.
On ne se trompe gure sur le pays naturel des animaux en le jugeant par ces rapports
de conformit; leur vraie patrie est la terre laquelle ils ressemblent, cest--dire,
laquelle leur nature parot stre entirement conforme: surtout lorsque cette mme
nature de lanimal ne se modifie point ailleurs et ne se prte pas linfluence des
autres climats. On a inutilement essay de multiplier les chameaux en Espagne, on
les a vainement transports en Amrique, ils nont russi ni dans lun ni dans lautre
climat, et dans les grandes Indes on nen trouve gure au del de Surate et
Notes
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
273
dOrmus. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le Chameau et le dromadaire (1764)
17491767), 11:21618.
Aristotle, History of Animals: Books I-III, translated by A.L. Peck (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1965), 1.1.486a 1525, pp. 3, 5.
Ibid., 1.1.486b 1520, p. 7.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Ass (1753) in Natural History, General and
and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:402. si cette conformit constante et ce dessein suivi de
lhomme aux quadrupdes, des quadrupdes aux ctacs, des ctacs aux oiseaux,
des oiseaux aux reptiles, des reptiles aux poissonsne semblent pas indiquer quen
crant les animaux, lEtre suprme na voulu employer quune ide, et la varier en
mme temps de toutes les manires possibles, afin que lhomme pt admirer
galement, et la magnificence de lexcution, et la simplicit du dessein. GeorgesLouis Leclerc de Buffon, LAsne (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et
lUnivers, & se mettant la tte de tous les tres crs, il verra avec tonnement
17491767), 1:12.
on voit clairement quil est impossible de donner un systme gnral, une
mthode parfaite, non seulement pour lHistoire Naturelle entire, mais mme pour
une seule de ses branches; car pour faire un systme, un arrangement, en un mot une
mthode gnrale, il faut que tout y soit compris; il faut diviser ce tout en diffrentes
classes, partager ces classes en genres, sous-diviser ces genres en espces, & tout
cela suivant un ordre dans lequel il entre ncessairement de larbitraire. Mais la
Nature marche par des gradations inconnues, & par consquent elle ne peut pas se
prter totalement ces divisions, puisquelle passe dune espce une autre espce,
& souvent dun genre un autre genre, par des nuances imperceptibles; de sorte
quil se trouve un grand nombre despces moyennes & dobjets mi-partis quon ne
sait o placer, & qui drangent ncessairement le projet du systme gnral: cette
vrit est trop importante pour que je ne lappuie pas de tout ce qui peut la rendre
claire & vidente. Ibid., 1:13.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Seals, Walrus, and Manati (1765) in Natural
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 7:32829. Assemblons pour un instant
tous les animaux quadrupdes, faisons-en un groupe, ou plutt formons-en une
troupe dont les intervalles et les rangs reprsentent peu prs la proximit ou
lloignement qui se trouve entre chaque espce; plaons au centre les genres les
plus nombreux, et sur les flancs, sur les ailes ceux qui le sont le moins; resserronsles tous dans le plus petit espace, afin de les mieux voir; et nous trouverons quil
nest pas possible darrondir cette enceinte: Que quoique tous les animaux
quadrupdes tiennent entreux de plus prs quils ne tiennent aux autres tres, il sen
trouve nanmoins en grand nombre qui font des pointes au dehors, et semblent
slancer pour atteindre dautres classes de la Nature; les singes tendent
274
Notes
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
sapprocher de lhomme et sen approchent en effet de trs-prs; les chauve-souris

sont les singes des oiseaux quelles imitent par leur vol; les porc-pics. Les
hrissons par les tuyaux dont ils sont couverts, semblent nous indiquer que les
plumes pourroient appartenir dautres quaux oiseaux; les tatous par leur test
cailleux sapprochent de la tortue et des crustaces; les castors par les cailles de
leur queue ressemblent aux poissons; les fourmillers par leur espce de bec ou de
trompe sans dents et par leur longue langue, nous rappellent encore les oiseaux;
enfin les Phoques, les Morses et les Lamantins font un petit corps part qui forme la
pointe la plus saillante pour arriver aux ctaces. Georges-Louis Leclerc de
Buffon, Les Phoques, les morses et les lamantins (1765) in Histoire naturelle,
gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767),
13:33031.
Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997), 88. Roger cites Premier discours, Histoire, naturelle, gnrale et
particulire (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 1:12.
Inc., 1972), 116.
Quand on voit les mtamorphoses successives de lenveloppe du prototype, quel
quil ait t, approcher un rgne dun autre rgne par des degrs insensibles, et
peupler les confins des deux rgnes (sil est permis de se servir du terme de confins
o il ny a aucune division relle), et peupler, dis-je, les confins des deux rgnes,
dtres incertains, ambigus, dpouills en grande partie des formes, des qualits et
des fonctions de lun, et revtus des formes, des qualits, des fonctions de lautre,
qui ne se sentirait port croire quil ny a jamais eu quun premier tre prototype
de tous les tres? Mais, que cette conjecture philosophique soit admise avec le
docteur Baumann, comme vraie, ou rejete avec M. de Buffon comme fausse, on ne
niera pas quil ne faille lembrasser comme une hypothse essentielle au progrs de
la physique exprimentale Diderot, De linterprtation de la nature, Pense 12,
in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux
(Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 2:16.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Lion (1761) in Natural History, General and
and T. Cadell, 1785), 5:65. les diffrences mmes des espces semblent
dpendre des diffrens climats; les unes ne peuvent se propager que dans les pays
chauds, les autres ne peuvent subsister que dans des climats froids; le lion na jamais
habite les rgions du nord, le renne ne sest jamais trouv dans les contres du midi,
et il ny a peut-tre aucun animal dont lespce soit comme celle de lhomme
gnralement rpandue sur toute la surface de la terre; chacun son pays, sa patrie
naturelle dans laquelle chacun est retenu par ncessit physique, chacun est fils de la
terre quil habite, et cest dans ce sens quon doit dire que tel ou tel animal est
originaire de tel ou tel climat. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le lion (1761) in
17491767), 9:2.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Horse (1753) in Natural History, General
and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd edition (London: W.
Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:34445. en sorte que pour avoir de bon grain,
de belles fleurs, etc. il faut en changer les graines et ne jamais les semer dans le
mme terrein qui les a produits; et de mme, pour avoir de beaux chevaux, de bons
Notes
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
275
chiens, et. il faut donner aux femelles du pays des mles trangers, et
rciproquement aux mles du pays des femelles trangres; sans cela les grains, les
fleurs, les animaux dgnrent, ou plutt prennent une si forte teinture du climat,
que la matire domine sur la forme et semble labtardir: lempreinte reste, mais
dfigure par tous les traits qui ne lui sont pas essentials: en mlant au contraire les
races, et sur-tout en les renouvelant toujours par des races trangres, la forme
semble se perfectionner, et la Nature se relever et donner tout ce quelle peut
produire de meilleuron sait par exprience que des animaux ou des vgtaux
transplants dun climat lointain, souvent dgnrent et quelquefois se
perfectionnent en peu de temps, cest--dire, en un trs petit nombre de gnrations:
il est ais de concevoir que ce qui produit cet effet est la diffrence du climat et de la
nourriture; linfluence de ces deux causes doit la longue rendre ces animaux
exempts ou susceptibles de certaines affections, de certaines maladies; leur
temprament doit changer peu peu; le dveloppement de la forme, qui dpend en
partie de la nourriture et de la qualit des humeurs, doit donc changer aussi dans les
gnrations Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le cheval (1753) in Histoire
1767), 4:21617.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le mouflon et les autres brbis (1764) in Histoire
1767), 9:36364.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le chameau et le dromadaire (1764) in Histoire
1767), 11:22832.
1997), 178.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Lion (1761) in Natural History, General and
and T. Cadell, 1785), 5:6465. Dans lespce humaine linfluence du climat ne se
marque que par des varits assez lgres, parce que cette espce est une, et quelle
est trs-distinctement spare de toutes les autres espces; lhomme, blanc en
Europe, noir en Afrique, jaune en Asia, et rouge en Amrique, nest que le mme
homme teint de la couleur du climat: comme il est fait pour rgner sur la terre, que
le globe entier est son domaine, il semble que sa nature se soit prte toutes les
situations; sous les feux du midi, dans les glaces du nord il vit, il multiplie, il se
trouve partout si anciennement rpandu, quil ne parot affecter aucun climat
particulier. Dans les animaux au contraire, linfluence du climat est plus forte
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le lion (1761) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et
1997), 177. Roger cites from Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Varits (1749) in
17491767), 3:483.
Ibid. Ibid., 3:44647.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, On the Varieties of the Human Species (1749) in
Natural History, General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd
edition (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:20607. Tout concourt donc
prouver que le genre humain nest pas compos despces essentiellement
276
Notes
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
diffrentes entre elles, quau contraire il ny a eu originairement quune seule espce

dhommes, qui stant multiplie et rpandue sur toutes la surface de la terre, a subi
diffrens changemens par linfluence du climat, par la diffrence de la nourriture,
par celle de la manire de vivre, par les maladies pidmiques, et aussi par le
mlange vari linfini des individus plus ou moins ressemblans; que dabord ces
altrations ntoient pas si marques, et ne produisoient que des varits
individuelles; quelles sont ensuite devenues varits de lespce, parce quelles sont
devenues plus gnrales, plus sensibles et plus constantes par laction continue de
ces mmes causes; quelles se sont perptues et quelles se perptuent de
gnration en gnration, comme les difformits ou les maladies des pres et mres
passent leurs enfans; et quenfin, comme elles nont t produites originairement
que par le concours de causes extrieures et accidentelles, quelles nont t
confirmes et rendues constantes que par le temps et laction continue de ces
mmes causes, il est trs probable quelles disparotroient aussi peu peu, et avec le
temps, ou mme quelles deviendroient diffrentes de ce quelles sont aujourdhui,
si ces mmes causes ne subsistoient plus, ou si elles venoient varier dans dautres
circonstances et par dautres combinaisons. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon,
Varits (1749) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris:
Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 3:52930.
De ce qui prcede il suit que dans tout le nouveau continent que nous venons de
parcourir, il ny a quune seule & mme race dhommes, plus ou moins basans.
Les Amricains sortent dune mme souche. Les Europens sortent dune mme
souche. Du nord au midi on apperoit les mmes varits dans lun & lautre
hmisphere. Tout concourt donc prouver que le genre humain nest pas compos
despeces essentiellement diffrentes. La diffrence des blancs aux bruns vient de la
nourriture, des moeurs, des usages, des climats; celle des bruns aux noir a la mme
cause. Il ny a donc eu originairement quune seule race dhommes, qui stant
multiplie & rpandue sur la surface de la terre, a donn la longue toutes les
varits dont nous venons de faire mention; varits qui disparotroient la longue,
si lon pouvoit supposer que les peuples se dplaassent tout--coup, & que les uns
se trouvassent ou ncessairement ou volontairement assujettis aux mmes causes qui
ont agi sur ceux dont ils croient occuper les contres. Denis Diderot, Humaine
espece (Hist. nat.), Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts
et des mtiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond dAlembert (Paris:
Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchtel: S. Faulche, 17511765), 8:348.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The History of Animals (1749) in Natural
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 2:10. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon,
Lhistoire des animaux (1749) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15
volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 2:1011.
and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:40607. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, LAsne (1753)
17491767), 4:38687.
Ibid., 3:411. Ibid., 4:391.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Goat (1755) in Natural History, General and
Notes
37.
38.
39.
40.
277
and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:48990. nous ignorons si le zbre ne produiroit pas avec
le cheval ou lne; si lanimal large queue, auquel on a donn le nom de mouton
de Barbarie, ne produiroit pas avec notre brebis; si le chamois nest pas une chvre
sauvage; sil ne formeroit pas avec nos chvres quelque race intermdiaire; si les
singes diffrent rellement par les espces, ou sils ne font, comme les chiens,
quune seule et mme espce, mais varie par un grand nombre de races diffrentes;
si le chien peut produire avec le renard et le loup; si le cerf produit avec la vache, la
biche avec le dain, etc. Notre ignorance sur tous ces faits est, comme je lai dit,
presque force, les expriences qui pourroient les dcider demandant plus de temps,
de soins et de dpense que la vie et la fortune dun homme ordinaire ne peuvent le
permettre. Jai employ quelques annes faire des tentatives de cette espce: jen
rendrai compte lorsque je parlerai des mulets; mais je conviendrai davance quelles
ne mont fourni que peu de lumires, et que la plupart de ces preuves ont t sans
succs. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, la Chvre et la Chvre dAngora (1755)
17491767), 5:63. Arthur O. Lovejoy provides his own translation of Buffons
passage in his article, Buffon and the Problem of Species, Forerunners of
Press, 1959), 95.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 230. Lovejoy cites Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, De
la Nature, Seconde vue (1765) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15
volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 13:i.
Ne pouroit-on pas expliquer par-l comment de deux seuls individus, la
multiplication des especes les plus dissemblables auroit p sensuivie?
Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organiss (Berlin, 1754), 40.
and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:40001. Sinous choisissons un animal, ou mme le
corps de lhomme pour servir de base nos connoissances, et y rapporter, par la
voie de la comparaison, les autres tres organiss, nous trouverons queil existe en
mme temps un dessein primitif et gnralle corps du cheval, par exemple, qui du
premier coup dil parot si diffrent du corps de lhomme, lorsquon vient le
comparer en dtail et partie par partie, au lieu de surprendre par la diffrence,
ntonne plus que par la ressemblance singulire et presque complte quon y
trouveque lon considre, comme la remarqu M. Daubenton, que le pied dun
cheval, en apparence si diffrent de la main de lhomme, est cependant compos des
mmes os, et que nous avons lextrmit de chacun de nos doigts, le mme osselet
en fer cheval qui termine le pied de cet animal Georges-Louis Leclerc de
Buffon, LAsne (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes
(Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 4:37981. Lovejoy provides his own
translation of Buffons passage in his article, Buffon and the Problem of Species,
Forerunners of Darwin: 1745-1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The
Ibid., 3:402-03. si lon admetque lne soit de la famille du cheval, et quil
nen diffre que parce quil a dgnr, on pourra dire galement que le singe est de
la famille de lhomme, que cest un homme dgnr, que lhomme et le singe ont
eu une origine commune comme le cheval et lne, que chaque famille, tant dans les
278
Notes
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
animaux que dans les vgtaux, na eu quune seule souche, et mme que tous les
animaux sont venus dun seul animal, qui, dans la succession des temps, a produit,
en se perfectionnant et en dgnrant, toutes les races des autres animaux. Ibid.,
4:382. Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 3:40304. Mais non, il est certain, par la rvlation, que tous les animaux ont
galement particip la grace de la cration, que les deux premiers de chaque
espce et de toutes les espces sont sortis tout forms des mains du Crateur, et lon
doit croire quils toient tels alors, peu prs, quils nous sont aujourdhui
reprsents par leurs descendans Ibid., 4:383. Ibid., 98.
Ibid., 3:404. depuis le temps dAristote jusquau ntre, lon na pas v parotre
despces nouvelles, malgr le mouvement rapide qui entrane, amoncelle ou dissipe
les parties de la matire, malgr le nombre infini de combinaisons qui ont d se faire
pendant ces vingt sicles, malgr les accouplemens fortuits ou forcs des animaux
despces loignes ou voisines, dont il na jamais rsult que des individus vicis et
striles, et qui nont p faire souche pour de nouvelles gnrations. Ibid. Ibid., 98.
Ibid., 3:40910. mais quel nombre immense et peut-tre infini de combinaisons
ne faudroit-il pas pour pouvoir seulement supposer que deux animaux, mle et
femelle, dune certaine espce, ont non seulement assez dgnr pour ntre plus
de cette espce, cest--dire, pour ne pouvoir plus produire avec ceux auxquels ils
toient semblables,mais encore dgnr tous deux prcisment au mme point, et
ce point ncessaire pour ne pouvoir produire quensemble! Ibid., 4:38990. Ibid.,
9899.
Ibid., 3:41011. car si quelque espce a t produite par la dgnration dune
autre, si lespce de lne vient de lespce du cheval, cela na p se faire que
successivement et par nuances, il y auroit eu entre le cheval et lne un grand
nombre danimaux intermdiairespourquoi ne verrions-nous pas aujourdhui les
reprsentans, les descendans de ces espces intermdiaires? pourquoi nen est-il
demeur que les deux extrmes? Ibid., 4:39091. Ibid., 99.
Ibid., 3:410. Quoiquon ne puisse donc pas dmontrer que la production dune
espce par la dgnration, soit une chose impossible la Nature, le nombre des
probabilits contraires est si norme, que philosophiquement mme on nen peut
gure douter Ibid., 4:390. Ibid., 99.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the Problem of Species, Forerunners of Darwin:
1959), 100.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Goat (1755) in Natural History, General and
and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:486. Quoique les espces dans les animaux soient toutes
spares par un intervalle que la Nature ne peut franchir, quelques-unes semblent se
rapprocher par un si grand nombre de rapports, quil ne reste, pour ainsi dire, entre
elles que lespace ncessaire pour tirer la ligne de sparation. Georges-Louis
Leclerc de Buffon, La Chvre et la Chvre dAngora (1755) in Histoire naturelle,
gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 5:59.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Rat (1758) in Natural History, General and
and T. Cadell, 1785), 4:27576. Descendant par degrs du grand au petit, du fort
au foible, nous trouverons que la Nature a s tout compenser; quuniquement
attentive la conservation de chaque espce, elle fait profusion dindividus, et se
Notes
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
279
soutient par le nombre dans toutes celles quelle a rduites au petit, ou quelle a
laisses sans forces, sans armes et sans courage: et non seulement elle a voulu que
ces espces infrieures fussent en tat de rsister ou durer par le nombre; mais il
semble quelle ait en mme temps donn des supplmens chacune, en multipliant
les espces voisines. Le rat, la sourisforment autant despces distinctes et
spares Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Le Rat (1758) in Histoire naturelle,
gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 7:278
79.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Second View of Nature (1765) in Natural
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 7:8990. Un individu, de quelque
espce quil soit, nest rien dans lUnivers; cent individus, mille ne sont encore rien:
les espces sont les seuls tres de la Nature; tres perptuels, aussi anciens, aussi
permanens quelle; que pour mieux juger nous ne considrons plus comme une
collection ou une suite dindividus semblables; mais comme un tout indpendant du
nombre, indpendant du temps; un tout toujours vivant, toujours le mme; un tout
qui a t compt pour un dans les ouvrages de la cration, et qui par consquent ne
fait quune unit dans la Natureun jour, un sicle, un ge, toutes les portions du
temps ne font pas partie de sa dure; le temps lui-mme nest relatif quaux
individus, aux tres dont lexistence est fugitive mais celle des espces tant
constante, leur permanence fait la dure, et leur diffrence le nombre. Comptons
donc les espces comme nous lavons fait, donnons-leur chacune un droit gal la
mense de la Nature; elles lui sont toues galement chres, puisqu chacune elle a
donn les moyens dtre, et de durer tout aussi longtemps quelle. Georges-Louis
Leclerc de Buffon, De la nature, Seconde vue (1765) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale
et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 13:i-ii.
1997), 32223.
Ibid., 323. Roger cites LAsne, 4:383.
Stanford University Press, 1997), 459, 672n214.
Ibid., 460, 672n216. Roger cites Le Buf (1753) in 4:470 and Le Chien (1755) in
5:21017.
Diderot, De lInterprtation de la nature, Pense 50, in uvres compltes de
2:46, and Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps
organiss (Berlin, 1754), 14, 1819.
Ibid., 2:47. Ibid., 48-51.
CHAPTER FIVE
1.
chaque degr derreur auroit fait une nouvelle espce; & force dcarts rpts
seroit venue la diversit infinie des animaux que nous voyons aujourdhui
Pierre-Louis de Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organiss (Berlin,
1754), 4041.
280
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Vnus physique (1745), second and third of

unnumbered prefatory pages.
William Harvey, Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt
Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 148, and the English translation, Anatomical Exercitations
concerning the Generation of Living Creatures: To which are added Particular
Discourses, of Births, and of Conceptions, translated by Martin Llewellyn (London:
Octavian Pullen, 1653), 272.
Quun homme noir pouse une femme blanche, il semble que les deux couleurs
soient mles; lenfant nat olivtre, & est mi-parti avec les traits de la mre & ceux
du pre. Pierre-Louis Mordeau de Maupertuis, Vnus physique (1745), 75.
Voyage de Wafer, description de listhme de lAmrique. Ibid., 125n.
Lionel Wafer, A New Voyage and Description of the Isthmus of America (London:
James Kanpton, 1699), 13336.
Dans cet Isthme qui spare la mer du Nord de la mer pacifique, on dit quon trouve
des hommes plus blancs que tous ceux que nous connoissons: leurs cheveux seroient
pris pour de la laine la plus blanche; leurs yeux trop foibles pour la lumiere du jour,
ne souvrent que dans lobscurit de la nuit. Ils sont dans le genre des hommes ce
que sont parmi les oiseaux, les chauve-souris & les hiboux. Quand lastre du jour a
disparu, & laisse la nature dans le deuil & dans le silence; quand tous les autres
habitans de la terre accabls de leurs travaux, ou fatigus de leurs plaisirs, se livrent
au sommeil; le Darien sveille, loue ses Dieux, se rjouit de labsence dune
lumiere insupportable, & vient remplir le vide de la nature. Il coute les cris de la
chouette avec autant de plaisir que le berger de nos contres entend le chant de
lalouette, lorsqu la premiere Aube, hors de la vue de lpervier, elle semble aller
chercher dans la nue le jour qui nest pas encore sur la terre: elle marquee par le
battement de ses ailes, la cadence de ses ramages; elle sleve & se perd dans la nue,
on ne la voit plus, quon lentend encore: ses sons qui nont plus rien de distinct,
inspirent la tendresse & la rverie; ce moment runit la tranquillit de la nuit avec
les plaisirs du jour. Le Soleil parot: il vient rapporter sur la terre le mouvement &
la vie, marquer les heures, & destine les diffrens travaux des hommes. Les Dariens
nont pas attendu ce moment: ils sont dja tous retirs. Pierre-Louis Moreau de
Maupertuis, Vnus physique (1745), 12527.
La nature contient le fonds de toutes ces varits: mais le hasard ou lart les mettent
en uvre. Cest ainsi que ceux dont lindustrie sapplique satisfaire le got des
curieux, sont, pour ainsi dire, crateurs despces nouvelles. Nous voyons parotre
des races de chiens, de pigeons, de serins qui ntoient point auparavant dans la
nature. Ce nont t dabord que des individus fortuits, lart & les gnrations
rptes en ont fait des espces. Le fameux Lyonns cre tous les ans
quelquespece nouvelle, & dtruit celle qui nest plus la mode. Il corrige les
formes, & varie les couleurs: il a invent les especes de lArlequin, du Mopse, &c.
Ibid., 14041.
Larlequin est une varit du petit Danois; mais au lieu que les Danois sont
presque dune seule couleur, les arlequins sont mouchets, les uns blancs & noirs,
les autres blancs & cannels, les autres dautre couleur. Chien Encyclopdie, ou
Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des mtiers, edited by Denis Diderot
and Jean Le Rond dAlembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant;
Neuchtel: S. Faulche, 17511765), 3:329.
Notes
281
10. Pourquoi cet art se borne-t-il aux animaux? Pourquoi ces sultans blass dans des
serrails qui ne renferment que des femmes de toutes les espces connues, ne se fontils pas faire des espces nouvelles? Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Vnus
physique (1745), 141.
11. Un Roi du nord est parvenu lever & embellir sa nation. Ibid., 142.
12. Pour expliquer maintenant tous ces Phnomenes: la production des varits
accidentelles; la succession de ces varits dune gnration lautre; & enfin
ltablissement ou la destruction des espces: voici ce me semble ce quil faudroit
supposer. Ibid., 15354.
13. Le hasard, ou la disette des traits de famille feront quelquefois dautres
assemblages: & lon verra natre de parens noirs un enfant blanc; ou peut-tre mme
un noir, de parens blancs Ibid., 156.
14. Si vous tiez assez gnreux pour menvoyer votre Cosmologie, je vous jurerais
bien, par Newton et par vous, de nen pas tirer de copie, et de vous la renvoyer aprs
lavoir lue. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Lettre Maupertuis, August 10,
1741, in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols.,
edited by M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 54:390. Voltaires letter is cited
by Pierre Brunet, Maupertuis (Paris: A. Blanchard, 1929), 1:128; Jacques Roger,
The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1997), 379 and 652n56; and Maupertuis: Le savant et le
philosophe; Prsentation et extraits, edited by Emile Callot (Paris: Marcel Rivire
et Cie, 1964), 107.
15. et, en vrit, un homme qui a le malheur davoir lu la Cosmologie de Christian
Wolf a besoin de la vtre pour se dpiquer. Ibid. Cited by Jacques Roger, The Life
Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1997), 652n56.
Stanford University Press, 1997), 652n56.
17. Teleology, Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
18. Outre que pour expliquer une machine, on ne sauroit mieux faire, que de proposer
son but, & de montrer comment toutes les pices y servent. Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, Suite de la rponse aux rflexions sur les consquences de quelques
endroits de la philosophie de Descartes (1697) in Opera omnia, 6 vols, edited by
Louis Dutens (Geneva: De Tournes, 1768), 2:252.
19. Si Dieu est Auteur des choses, & sil est souverainement sage, on ne sauroit assez
bien raisonner de la structure de lUnivers, sans y faire entrer les vues de sa sagesse,
comme on ne sauroit assez bien raisonner sur un btiment, sans entrer dans les fins
de lArchitecte. Ibid., 251.
20. Mechanism, Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
22. Mais ne pourrait-on pas dire que dans la combinaison fortuite des productions de la
Nature, comme il ny avait que celles o se trouvaient certains rapports de
convenance, qui pussent subsister, il nest pas merveilleux que cette convenance se
trouve dans toutes les espces qui actuellement existent? Le hasard, dirait-on, avait
produit une multitude innombrable dindividus; un petit nombre se trouvait construit
282
Notes
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
de manire que les parties de lanimal pouvaient satisfaire ses besoins; dans un
autre infiniment plus grand, il ny avait ni convenance, ni ordre: tous ces derniers
ont pri; des animaux sans bouche ne pouvaient pas se perptuer: les seuls qui soient
rests sont ceux o se trouvaient lordre et la convenance; et ces espces, que nous
voyons aujourdhui, ne sont que la plus petite partie de ce quun destin aveugle avait
produit. Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai de cosmologie (1750), cited in
Maupertuis: Le savant et le philosophe; Prsentation et extraits, edited by Emile
Callot (Paris: Marcel Rivire et Cie, 1964), 112- 13.
Rapport, conformit. ces choses l nont point de convenance lune avec lautre.
quelle convenance y a-t-il entre des choses si diffrentes? pour bien discourir des
choses, il en faut observer les convenances & les diffrences. Convenance,
Dictionnaire de LAcadmie franaise (1694), 625.
Convenance, ressemblance, conformit. La langue italienne a un grand rapport a
la langue latine. il y a un grand rapport dhumeurs entre ces deux hommes. le
visage de cet homme a un grand rapport celuy de lautre. ce que vous dites na
aucun rapport ce que vous disiez hier. Rapport, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie
franaise (1694), 281.
Rapport quil y a entre les choses qui sont conformes. Conformit dinclinations.
Conformit de sentiments.
Conformit dhumeurs.
Conformit desprit.
Conformit dArrts, de Traits. Conformit, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie
franaise (1694), 365.
Stanford University Press, 1997), 519. In 687n304, Roger cites Voltaires criticism
in the Bibliothque raisonne, July, August, and September 1752, in uvres
compltes de Voltaire, 52 vols., edited by Louis Moland (Paris: Garnier, 1877
1885), 23:53545.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Elments de la philosophie de Newton, Part 1,
Chapter 1, in uvres compltes de Voltaire, 52 vols., edited by Louis Moland
(Paris: Garnier, 1877-1885), 22:403. Cited by Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in
Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997),
517.
Ibid., 403-04. Ibid.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Review of Charles Bonnets Considrations sur
les corps organiss in Mlanges, April 4, 1764, in uvres de Voltaire avec
prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre,
18291840), 41:43031. Ibid., 521.
avoir affirm que les enfants se forment par attraction dans le ventre de la mre,
que lil gauche attire la jambe droite Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire,
Histoire du docteur Akakia et du natif de Saint-Malo in uvres de Voltaire avec
18291840), 39:477.
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essae de cosmologie in uvres, 4 vols (Lyon:
J.-M. Bruyset, 1756), 1:4243.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Bibliothque raisonne in uvres compltes de
Voltaire, 52 vols., edited by Louis Moland (Paris: Garnier, 18771885), 23:539.
Cited by Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 520.
Notes
283
34. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Histoire du docteur Akakia et du natif de SaintMalo in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols.,
35. Ce discours, rebattu daprs Lucrce, est asez rfut par la sensation donne aux
animaux, et par lintelligence donne lhomme. Comment des combinaisons que
le hasard a produites produiraient-elles cette sensation et cette intelligence
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Athisme, Dictionnaire philosophique in
uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by M.
Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 27:17475.
36. La disposition dune aile de mouche, les organes dun limaon, suffisent pour vous
atterrer. Ibid., 175.
37. La tortue et le rhinocros, et toutes les diffrentes espces, prouvent galement,
dans leurs varits infinies, la mme cause, le mme dessein, le mme but, qui sont
la conservation, la gnration, et la mort. Lunit se trouve dans cette infinie
varit; lcaille et la peau rendent galement tmoignage. Ibid.
38. Taisez-vous donc aussi, puisque vous ne concevez pas son utilit plus que moi
Ibid., 176.
39. Il y en a de venimeux, vous lavez t vous-mme. Ibid.
40. Vous demandez pourquoi le serpent nuit. Et vous, pourquoi avez-vous nui tant de
fois? pourquoi avez-vous t perscuteur, ce qui est le plus grand des crimes pour
un philosophe? Ibid.
41. mais les fripons! que sont-ils? des fripons. Ibid., 177.
42. Fourbe, qui na ni honneur, ni foi, ni probit. Fripon, Dictionnaire de
LAcadmie franaise (1762), 785.
43. Trompeur, qui trompe avec finesse, avec adresse. Fourbe, Dictionnaire de
44. Jacob Ruhe, chirugien Berlin, est dune de ces races. N avec six doigts chaque
main et chaque pied, il tient cette singularit de sa mre Elisabeth Ruhe, qui la
tenait de sa mre Elisabeth Horstmann, de Rostock. Elisabeth Ruhe la transmit
quatre enfants des huit quelle eut de Jean Christian Ruhe, qui navait rien
dextraordinaire aux pieds ni aux mains. Jacob Ruhe, lun de ces enfants
sexdigitaires, pousa Dantzic en 1733 Sophie-Louise de Thngen, qui navait rien
dextraordinaire: il a eu six enfants; deux garons ont t sexdigitaires. Lun deux,
Jacob Ernest, a six doigts au pied gauche et cinq au droit: il avait la main droite un
sixime doigt, quon lui a coup; la gauche il na la place du sixime doigt
quune verrue. Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Lettres (1752), Lettre 14, cited
in Maupertuis: Le savant et le philosophe; Prsentation et extraits, edited by Emile
Callot (Paris: Marcel Rivire et Cie, 1964), 158.
45. Je veux bien croire que ces doigts surnumraires dans leur premire origine ne sont
que des varits accidentelles, dont jai essay de donner la production dans la
Vnus Physique: mais ces varits une fois confirmes par un nombre suffisant de
gnrations o les deux sexes les ont eues, fondent des espces; et cest peut-tre
ainsi que toutes les espces se sont multiplies. Ibid., 15859.
46. Mais si lon voulait regarder la continuation du sexdigitisme comme un effet du
pur hasard, il faut voir quelle est la probabilit que cette varit accidentelle dans un
premier parent ne se rtra pas dans ses descendants.
284
Notes
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
Aprs une recherche que jai faite dans une ville qui a cent mille habitants, jai
trouv deux hommes qui avaient cette singularit. Supposons, ce qui est difficile,
que trois autres me soient chapps; et que sur 20 000 hommes on puisse compter 1
sexdigitaire: la probabilit que son fils ou sa fille ne natra point avec le
sexdigitisme est de 20 000 1: et celle que son fils et son petit-fils ne seront point
sexdigitaires est de 20 000 fois 20 000, ou de 400 000 000 1: enfin, la probabilit
que cette singularit ne se continuerait pas pendant trois gnrations conscutives
serait de 8 000 000 000 000 1; nombres si grands que la certitude des choses les
mieux dmontres en physique napproche pas de ces probabilits. Ibid., 159.
Null hypothesis, Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
David Beeson, Maupertuis: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: The Voltaire
Bentley Glass, Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution in Forerunners of
Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et. al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959), 60.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 72. Glass cites from Maupertuis, Letters (1752), Letter 14.
Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica, de universali naturae systemate, pro gradu
doctoris habita (Erlangen, 1751). Very few copies of the work were published and
the original Latin edition is virtually unattainable today.
On ne fut plus en peine que pour savoir o placer ces magasins inpuisables
dindividus Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des
corps organiss (Berlin, 1754), 10.
& chacun pendant long-tems fut content de ses ides. Ibid.
Ibid., 11.
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organiss
(Berlin, 1754), 14, 1819.
Je crois en voir la ncessit. Jamais on nexpliquera la formation daucun corps
organis, par les seules proprits physiques de la matiere Ibid., 29.
il faudra bien en admettre encore de nouvelles, ou plutt reconnotre les
proprits qui y sont. Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 4041.
Mais chaque lment, en dposant sa forme, & sacumulant au corps quil va
former, dposeroit-il aussi sa perception? Perdroit-il, afoibliroit-il le petit degr de
sentiment quil avoit, ou laugmenteroit-il par son union avec les autres, pour le
profit du tout? Ibid., 48.
mais chez nous il semble que de toutes les perceptions des lmens rassembles,
il en rsulte une perception unique beaucoup plus forte, beaucoup plus parfaite
quaucune des perceptions lmentaires, & qui est peut-tre chacune de ces
perceptions dans le mme raport que le corps organis est llment. Chaque
lment, dans son union avec les autres, ayant confondu sa perception avec les leurs,
& perdu le sentiment particulier du soi, le souvenir de ltat primitif des lmens
nous manque, & notre origine doit tre entierement perdue pour nous. Ibid., 50
51.
Les difficults gnrales et communes aux deux systmes ont t senties par un
homme desprit, qui me parot avoir mieux raisonn que tous ceux qui ont crit
avant lui sur cette matire, je veux parler de lauteur de la Vnus physique, imprim
Notes
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
285
en 1745; ce trait, quoique fort court, rassemble plus dides philosophiques quil
ny en a dans plusieurs gros volumes sur la gnrationcet auteur est le premier qui
ait commenc se rapprocher de la vrit dont on toit plus loin que jamais depuis
quon avoit imagin les ufs et dcouvert les animaux spermatiques. GeorgeLouis Leclerc de Buffon, Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 vols. (Paris:
Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 2:16364. Cited by Pierre Brunet, Maupertuis
(Paris: A. Blanchard, 1929, 2:329, and Bentley Glass, Maupertuis, Pioneer of
Genetics and Evolution, Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859 (Baltimore: The
on ne niera pas quil ne faille lembrasser comme une hypothse essentielle au
progrs de la physique exprimentale, celui de la philosophie rationnelle, la
dcouverte et lexplication des phnomnes qui dpendent de lorganisation.
Denis Diderot, De lInterprtation de la nature, Pense 12, in uvres compltes De
2:16.
du docteur dErlangen, dont louvrage, rempli dides singulires et
neuvesSon objet est le plus grand que lintelligence humaine puisse se
proposerLhypothse du docteur Baumann dveloppera, si lon veut, le mystre le
plus incomprhensible de la natureun sujet dont se sont occups les premiers
hommes dans tous les siclesle fruit dune mditation profonde, la tentative dun
grand philosophe. Ibid., 2:45, 4849.
David Beeson, Maupertuis: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: The Voltaire
Denis Diderot, Je lui demanderai donc si lunivers, ou la collection gnrale de
toutes les molcules sensibles et pensantes, forme un toutil monde, semblable
un grand animal, a une me; que, le monde pouvant tre infini, cette me du monde,
je ne dis pas est, mais peut tre un systme infini de perceptions, et que le monde
peut tre Dieu. Denis Diderot, De lInterprtation de la nature, Pense 50, in
uvres compltes De Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux
(Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 2:48. Cited in David Beeson, Maupertuis: An
Intellectual Biography (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution,
1992), 250.
Notre esprit, aussi born quil est, trouvera-t-il jamais aucun systme o toutes les
consequences saccordentTous nos systmes, mme les plus tendus,
nembrassent quune petite partie du plan qua suivie la suprme Intelligence; nous
ne voyons ni le rapport des parties entrelles, ni leur rapport avec le tout PierreLouis Moreau de Maupertuis, Rponse aux objections de m. Diderot in uvres de
Mr. de Maupertuis, 4 vols. (Lyon: J.-M. Bruyset, 1756), 2:199. Ibid., 250.
Ibid., 251.
Cette manire de raisonner, que M. Diderot appelle lacte de la gnralisation, &
quil regarde comme la pierre de touche des systmes, nest quune espce
danalogie, quon est en droit darrter o lon veut; incapable de prouver ni la
fausset ni la vrit dun systme. Maupertuis, uvres de Mr de Maupertuis, 4
vols. (Lyon: J.-M. Bruyset, 1756), 2:206. Ibid., 251.
Ibid.
286
Notes
CHAPTER SIX
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Chapter 6 on Diderot copyright 2007 from Diderot and the Metamorphosis of

Species by Mary Efrosini Gregory. Reprinted by permission of Routledge, Inc., a
division of Informa plc.
Quand on voit les mtamorphoses successivesapprocher un rgne dun autre
rgne par des degrs insensibles, et peupler les confins des deux rgnesqui ne se
sentirait port croire quil ny a jamais eu quun premier tre prototype de tous les
tres? Diderot, De lInterprtation de la nature, Pense 12, in uvres compltes
de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875
1877), 2:16.
Lester Crocker, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism in
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al, (Baltimore: The
Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderots Early Philosophical Works, translated and
edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing
Company, 1916), 112. Sil ny avait jamais eu dtres informes, vous ne
manqueriez pas de prtendre quil ny en aura jamais, et que je me jette dans des
hypothses chimriques; mais lordre nest pas si parfait, continua Saunderson, quil
ne paraisse encore de temps en temps des productions monstrueuses. Puis, se
tournant en face du ministre, il ajouta: Voyez-moi bien, monsieur Holmes, je nai
point dyeux. Quavions-nous fait Dieu, vous et moi, lun pour avoir cet organe,
lautre pour en tre priv? Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres compltes de
1:310.
Denis Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts (1746), Thought 18, in Diderots Early
Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and
London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 35. Ce nest pas de la main
du mtaphysicien que sont partis les grands coups que lathisme a reus. Les
mditations sublimes de Malebranche et de Descartes taient moins propres
branler le matrialisme quune observation de MalpighiCe nest que dans les
ouvrages de Newton, de Muschenbroek, dHartzoeker et de Nieuwentit, quon a
trouv des preuves satisfaisantes de lexistence dun tre souverainement
intelligent. Denis Diderot, Penses philosophiques (1746), Pense 18, in uvres
Garnier, 18751877), 1:13233.
Ibid. Grce aux travaux de ces grands hommes, le monde nest plus un dieu, cest
une machine qui a ses roues, ses cordes, ses poulies, ses ressorts et ses poids. Ibid.,
1:133.
Denis Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts (1746), Thought 19, in Diderots Early
Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and
London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 35.
cest la
connaissance de la nature quil tait rserv de faire de vrais distes. Denis Diderot,
Penses philosophiques (1746), Pense 19, in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited
by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:133.
Ibid. toutes les observations concourent me dmontrer que la putrfaction
seule ne produit rien dorganis Ibid.
Notes
287
8.
Jouvre les cahiers dun professeur clbre

Denis Diderot, Lettres
philosophiques, Pense 21, in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat
and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:135.
Tous les commentateurs depuis Brire voient dans le professeur clbre D.F.
Rivard, professeur de philosophie au collge de Beauvais. Diderot, Penses
philosophiques in uvres philosophiques, introduced and annotated by Paul
Vernire (Paris: Garnier, 1998), 21, note 2.
Diderot fut en effet son lve et vante plusieurs fois son sens pdagogiqueIl se
fit lintroducteur des mathmatiques luniversit de Paris. Ibid., 2122.
Denis Diderot, Penses philosophiques, Pense 21, in uvres compltes de
1:13536.
Denis Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, in Diderots Early Philosophical
Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open
Court Publishing Company, 1916), 3940. Donc, lesprit doit tre plus tonn de
la dure hypothtique du chaos que de la naissance relle de lunivers. Denis
Diderot, Penses philosophiques, Pense 21, in uvres compltes de Diderot,
edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:136.
Mary Efrosini Gregory, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species (New York and
London: Routledge, 2007), 1951.
si nous remontions la naissance des choses et des temps, et que nous
sentissions la matire se mouvoir et le chaos se dbrouiller, nous rencontrerions une
multitude dtres informes pour quelques tres bien organiss. Denis Diderot,
Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and
Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:309.
Denis Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderots Early Philosophical Works,
Publishing Company, 1916), 11112. Je puis vous demander, par exemple, qui
vous a dit vous, Leibnitz, Clarke et Newton, que dans les premiers instants de
la formation des animaux, les uns ntaient pas sans tte et les autres sans pieds? Je
puis vous soutenir que ceux-ci navaient point destomac, et ceux-l point
dintestins; que tels qui un estomac, un palais et des dents semblaient promettre de
la dure, ont cess par quelque vice du cur ou des poumons; que les monstres se
sont anantis successivement; que toutes les combinaisons vicieuses de la matire
ont disparu, et quil nest rest que celles o le mcanisme nimpliquait aucune
contradiction importante, et qui pouvaient subsister par elles-mmes et se
perptuer. Denis Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres compltes de Diderot,
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16. sed quia multa modis multis

primordia rerum
ex infinito iam tempore percita
plagis
ponderibusque
suis
consuerunt
concita ferri
omnimodisque coire atque omnia
pertemptare,
qucumque inter se possent
but because many first-beginnings

of things in many ways, struck
with blows and carried along by
their own weight from infinite
time up to the present, have been
accustomed to move and to meet
in all manner of ways, and to try
all combinations, whatsoever they
could produce by coming
288
Notes
congressa creare,
propterea fit uti magnum volgata per
vom,
omne genus coctus et motus
experiundo,
tandem conveniant ea qu convecta
repente
magnarum rerum fiunt exordia spe,
terrai maris et cli generique
animantum. Titus Lucretius Carus,
De rerum natura, translated by
W.H.D. Rouse and revised by Martin
Ferguson Smith (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1924,
5.42231, pp. 410, 412.
together, for this reason it comes

to pass that being spread abroad
through a vast time, by attempting
every sort of combination and
motion, at length those come
together which, being suddenly
brought together, often become
the beginnings of great things, of
earth and sea and sky and the
generation of living creatures.
Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum
natura, translated by W.H.D.
Rouse and revised by Martin
Ferguson Smith (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press,
1924), 5.42231, pp. 411, 413.
17. Denis Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by
Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:30911.
18. Denis Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, in Diderots Early Philosophical
Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open
Court Publishing Company, 1916), 112. que devenait le genre humain? il et
t envelopp dans la dpuration gnrale de lunivers; et cet tre orgueilleux qui
sappelle homme, dissous et dispers entre les molcules de la matire, serait rest
peut-tre pour toujours, au nombre des possibles. Denis Diderot, Lettre sur les
aveugles in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice
Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:310.
19. Selon Jean Deprun, dans lintroduction son grand ouvrage sur La Philosophie de
linquitude en France au XVIIIe sicleles hommesvoyant le Dieu paternel et
crateur sloigner deux de plus en plus, ils se sont sentis abandonns; chasss du
centre de lunivers dont ils ntaient plus la fin, ils ont t immergs dans le flux
changeant des phnomnes et dans les enchanements inpuisables de causes et
deffets. Henri Coulet, Diderot et le problme du changement, Recherches sur
20. Ibid., 63. Coulet cites Diderot, Elments de physiologie in uvres compltes, 15
volumes, edited by Roger Lewinter (Paris: Le Club Franais du Livre, 19691973),
13:764.
21. Lester Crocker, The Idea of a Neutral Universe in Diderot Studies 21 (1983):67.
22. Quand on voit les mtamorphoses successives de lenveloppe du prototype, quel
quil ait t, approcher un rgne dun autre rgne par des degrs insensibles, et
peupler les confins des deux rgnes (sil est permis de se servir du terme de confins
o il ny a aucune division relle), et peupler, dis-je, les confins des deux rgnes,
dtres incertains, ambigus, dpouills en grande partie des formes, des qualits et
des fonctions de lun, et revtus des formes, des qualits, des fonctions de lautre,
qui ne se sentirait port croire quil ny a jamais eu quun premier tre prototype
de tous les tres? Denis Diderot, De linterprtation de la nature, Pense 12, in
uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris:
Garnier, 18751877), 2:16.
Notes
289
23. Omnes elementorum perceptiones conspirare, et in unam fortiorem et magis

perfectam perceptionem coalescere videntur. Haec forte ad unamquamque ex aliis
perceptionibus se habet in eadem ratione qua corpus organisatum ad elementum.
Elementum quodvis, post suam cum aliis copulationem, cum suam perceptionem
illarum perceptionibus confudit, et sui conscientiam perdidit primi elementorum
status memoria nulla superest, et nostra nobis origo omnino abdita manet. Denis
Diderot, De linterprtation de la nature, Pense 50, in uvres compltes de
2:4748. The French translation of Maupertuis Inaugural Dissertation in
Metaphysics, entitled, Essai sur la formation des corps organiss (Berlin, 1754),
rendered the passage thus: Mais chez nous, il semble que de toutes les perceptions
des lments rassembls, il en rsulte une perception unique beaucoup plus forte,
beaucoup plus parfaite quaucune des perceptions lmentaires, et qui est peut-tre
chacune de ces perceptions dans le mme rapport que le corps organis llment.
Chaque lment, dans son union avec les autres, ayant confondu sa perception avec
les leurs, et perdu le sentiment particulier du soi, le souvenir de ltat primitif des
lments nous manque, et notre origine doit tre entirement perdu pour nous.
24. Mary Efrosini Gregory, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species (New York and
London: Routledge, 2007), 152.
25. Cest quil a fallu que je fusse tel Diderot, Rve de dAlembert in uvres
Garnier, 18751877), 2:137.
26. Et si tout est un flux gnral, comme le spectacle de lunivers me le montre partout,
que ne produiront point ici et ailleurs la dure et les vicissitudes de quelques
millions de sicles? Ibid.
27. garantissez-vous du sophisme de lphmre Ibid., 2:134.
28. Cest celui dun tre passager qui croit limmortalit des choses. Ibid.
29. Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderots Early Philosophical Works, translated and
edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing
Company, 1916), 113. Je conjecture donc que, dans le commencement o la
matire en fermentation faisait clore lunivers, mes semblables taient fort
communs. Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited
by Jean Asszat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 1:310.
30. Suite indfinie danimalcules dans latome qui fermente, mme suite indfinie
danimalcules dans lautre atome quon appelle la Terre. Qui sait les races
danimaux qui nous ont prcds? Qui sait les races danimaux qui succderont aux
ntres? Tout change, tout passe, il ny a que le tout qui reste. Le monde commence
et finit sans cesse; il est chaque instant son commencement et sa fin; il nen a
jamais eu dautre, et nen aura jamais dautre. Diderot, Rve de dAlembert in
Garnier, 18751877), 2:132.
31. Corps quon regarde comme indivisible, cause de sa petitesse. Dmocrite &
Epicure ont prtendu que le monde toit compos datomes, que les corps se
formoient par la rencontre fortuite des atomes. Atome, Dictionnaire de
32. ATOME se dit aussi de cette petite poussire que lon voit voler en lair aux rayons
du soleil. Ibid.
290
Notes
33. Vous consentez donc que jteigne notre soleil? Denis Diderot, Entretien entre
dAlembert et Diderot in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and
Maurice Touurneux (Paris: Garnier, 18751877), 2:111.
34. Dautant plus volontiers que ce ne sera pas le premier qui se soit teint. Ibid.
35. Denis Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderots Early Philosophical Works,
Publishing Company, 1916), 113. Combien de mondes estropis, manqus, se sont
dissips, se reforment et se dissipent peut-tre chaque instant dans des espaces
loigns, o je ne touche point Denis Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in uvres
Garnier, 18751877), 1:310.
36. William Harvey, Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt
Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 148, and the English translation, Anatomical Exercitations
concerning the Generation of Living Creatures: To which are added Particular
Discourses, of Births, and of Conceptions, translated by Martin Llewellyn (London:
Octavian Pullen, 1653), 272.
37. les molcules qui devaient former les premiers rudiments de mon geomtre
taient parses dans les jeunes et frles machines de lune et lautre Denis
Diderot, Entretien entre dAlembert et Diderot in uvres compltes de Diderot,
38. o le moindre brin ne peut tre cass, rompu., dplac, manquant, sans
consquence facheuse pour le tout, devrait se nouer, sembarrasser encore plus
souvent dans le lieu de sa formation que mes soies sur ma tournette. Diderot, Rve
de dAlembert in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice
39. The French translation of the original Latin is Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis,
Essai sur la formation des corps organiss (Berlin, 1754), 3738.
40. Ibid.
41. Une chambre chaude, tapisse de petits cornets, et sur chacun de ces cornets une
tiquette: guerriers, magistrats, philosophes, potes, cornet de courtisans, cornet de
catins, cornet de rois. Diderot, Rve de dAlembert in uvres compltes de
2:131.
42. Lester Crocker, Diderot and Eighteenth-Century French Transformism in
Forerunners of Darwin: 17451859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al, (Baltimore: The
43. Emita Hill, Materialism and Monsters in Diderots Le Rve de dAlembert,
44. Emita Hill, The Role of Le Monstre in Diderots Thought, Studies on Voltaire
and the Eighteenth Century 97 (1972): 148261.
45. Gerhardt Stenger, Lordre et les monstres dans la pense philosophique, politique
et morale de Diderot in Diderot et la question de la forme (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1999), 13957.
46. Aurlie Suratteau, Les hermaphrodites de Diderot in Diderot et la question de la
forme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 10537.
Notes
291
47. Johan Werner Schmidt, Diderot and Lucretius: the De Rerum Natura and
Lucretius Legacy in Diderots Scientific, Aesthetic and Ethical Thought, Studies
on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 208 (1982): 183294.
48. Christine M. Singh, The Lettre sur les aveugles: Its Debt to Lucretius, Studies in
Eighteenth-Century French Literature Presented to Robert Niklaus, edited by J.H.
Fox, M.H. Waddicor and D.A. Watts (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1975), 23342.
49. Henri Coulet, Diderot et le problme du changement, Recherches sur Diderot et
sur lEncyclopdie 2 (April 1987): 59.
50. Ibid., 63. Coulet cites Diderot, Elments de physiologie in uvres compltes, 15
volumes, edited by Roger Lewinter (Paris: Le Club Franais du Livre, 19691973),
13:764.
51. Mais si lon voulait regarder la continuation du sexdigitisme comme un effet du
pur hasard, il faut voir quelle est la probabilit que cette varit accidentelle dans un
premier parent ne se rtra pas dans ses descendants.
Aprs une recherche que jai faite dans une ville qui a cent mille habitants, jai
trouv deux hommes qui avaient cette singularit. Supposons, ce qui est difficile,
que trois autres me soient chapps; et que sur 20 000 hommes on puisse compter 1
sexdigitaire: la probabilit que son fils ou sa fille ne natra point avec le
sexdigitisme est de 20 000 1: et celle que son fils et son petit-fils ne seront point
sexdigitaires est de 20 000 fois 20 000, ou de 400 000 000 1: enfin, la probabilit
que cette singularit ne se continuerait pas pendant trois gnrations conscutives
serait de 8 000 000 000 000 1; nombres si grands que la certitude des choses les
mieux dmontres en physique napproche pas de ces probabilits. Pierre-Louis
Moreau de Maupertuis, Lettres (1752), Lettre 14, cited in Maupertuis: Le savant et
le philosophe; Prsentation et extraits, edited by Emile Callot (Paris: Marcel
Rivire et Cie, 1964), 159.
52. Bentley Glass, Maupertuis, Pioneer of Genetics and Evolution in Forerunners of
Press, 1959), 5183.
53. Aram Vartanian, Diderot and Maupertuis, Revue internationale de philosophie
14849 (1984): 4666.
54. Michle Duchet, Lanthropologie de Diderot, Anthropologie et histoire au sicle
des Lumires: Buffon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvtius, Diderot (Paris: Maspro,
1971), 40775.
55. Jean Ehrard, Diderot, lEncyclopdie, et lHistoire et thorie de la Terre, Buffon
88 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 13542.
56. Arthur O. Lovejoy, Buffon and the Problem of Species in Forerunners of Darwin,
17451859, edited by Bentley Glass et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1959), 84113.
57. Jacques Roger. Buffon: A Life in Natural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997).
58. Jacques Roger, Diderot et Buffon en 1749, Diderot Studies 4 (1963): 22136.
Stanford University Press, 1997).
60. Aram Vartanian, Buffon et Diderot, Buffon 88 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 11933.
61. Jean E. Perkins, Diderot and La Mettrie, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 10 (1959): 49100.
292
Notes
62. Ann
Thomson,
La
Mettrie et
Diderot,
http://www.sigu7.jussieu.
fr/diderot/travaux/revseance2.htm (Jan. 24, 2006).
63. Ann Thomson, Lunit matrielle de lhomme chez La Mettrie et Diderot,
Colloque International Diderot (1985): 6168.
64. Aram Vartanian, La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: An Intertextual Encounter,
65. Aram Vartanian, Trembleys Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French
Materialism, Journal of the History of Ideas 2 (1950): 25986.
66. Marx W. Wartofsky, Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism,
CHAPTER SEVEN
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in The Social

Contract and Discourses, translated and introduced by G.D.H. Cole (London: J.M.
Dent and Sons, 1913), 177. je le supposerai conform de tout temps, comme je
le vois aujourdhui, marchant deux pieds, se servant de ses mains comme nous
faisons des ntres, portant ses regards sur toute la nature, et mesurant des yeux la
vaste tendue du ciel. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur lorigine et les
fondements de lingalit parmi les hommes in uvres compltes de Jean-Jacques
Rousseau avec les notes de tous les commentateurs (Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:244
45.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in The Discourses
and Other Early Political Writings, edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 192n3(2).
Ibid.
Dent and Sons, 1913), 168. et comment lhomme viendra-t-il bout de se voir tel
que la form la nature, travers tous les changements que la succession des temps
et des choses a d produire dans sa constitution originelle, et de dmler ce quil
tient de son propre fonds davec ce que les circonstances et ses progrs ont ajout ou
chang son tat primitif? Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur lorigine et les
Rousseau avec les notes de tous les commentateurs (Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:229.
Ibid. Semblable la statue de Glaucus, que le temps, la mer et les orages avoient
tellement dfigure quelle ressembloit moins un dieu qu une bte froce, lme
humaine, altre au sein de la socit par mille causes sans cesse renaissantes, par
lacquisition dune multitude de connoissances et derreurs, par les changements
arrivs la constitution des corps, et par le choc continuel des passions, a pour ainsi
dire chang dapparence au point dtre presque mconnoissable; et lon ny
retrouve plus, au lieu dun tre agissant toujours par des principes certains et
invariables, au lieu de cette cleste et majestueuse simplicit dont son auteur lavoit
empreinte, que le difforme contraste de la passion qui croit raisonner, et de
lentendement en dlire. Ibid., 1:22930.
Notes
293
6.
Ibid. Ce quil y a de plus cruel encore cest que tous les progrs de lespce
humaine lloignant sans cesse de son tat primitif Ibid., 1:230.
Ibid., 177. Je nexaminerai pas si, comme le pense Aristote, ses ongles allongs ne
furent point dabord des griffes crochues; sil ntoit point velu comme un ours; et
si, marchant quatre pieds, ses regards dirigs vers la terre, et borns un horizon
de quelques pas, ne marquoient point la fois le caractre et les limites de ses ides.
Je ne pourrois former sur ce sujet que des conjectures vagues et presque
imaginaires. Lanatomie compare a fait encore trop peu de progrs, les
observations des naturalistes sont encore trop incertaines, pour quon puisse tablir
sur de pareils fondements la base dun raisonnement solide Ibid., 1:244.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 19192n3(2). Ibid., 1:34849.
Dent and Sons, 1913), 177. je vois un animal moins fort que les uns, moins
agile que les autres, mais, tout prendre, organis le plus avantageusement de
tous Ibid., 1:245.
lUnivers, & se mettant la tte de tous les tres crez, il verra avec tonnement
17491767), 1:12.
Dent and Sons, 1913), 178. Accoutums ds lenfance aux intempries de lair et
la rigueur des saisons, exercs la fatigue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur
lorigine et les fondements de lingalit parmi les hommes in uvres compltes de
Jean-Jacques Rousseau avec les notes de tous les commentateurs (Paris: Dalibon,
1826), 1:245.
Ibid. La nature en use prcisment avec eux comme la loi de Sparte avec les
enfants des citoyens; elle rend forts et robustes ceux qui sont bien constitus, et fait
prir tous les autres Ibid., 1:246.
Ibid. diffrente en cela de nos socits, o ltat, en rendant les enfants onreux
aux pres, les tue indistinctement avant leur naissance. Ibid.
Ibid., 182. Le cheval, le chat, le taureau, lne mme, ont la plupart une taille plus
haute, tous une constitution plus robuste, plus de vigueur, de force et de courage
dans les forts que dans nos maisons Ibid., 1:253.
Ibid. Il en est ainsi de lhomme mme: en devenant sociable et esclave il devient
foible, craintif, rampant Ibid.
Ibid., 184. Je ne vois dans tout animal quune machine ingnieuse, qui la nature
a donn des sens pour se remonter elle-mme, et pour se garantir, jusqu un certain
point, de tout ce qui tend la dtruire ou la dranger. Japerois prcisment les
mmes choses dans la machine humaine, avec cette diffrence que la nature seule
fait tout dans les oprations de la bte, au lieu que lhomme concourt aux siennes en
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
294
Notes
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
qualit dagent libre. Lun choisit ou rejette par instinct, et lautre par un acte de
libert Ibid., 1:25556.
il doit se ranger lui-mme dans la classe des animaux, auxquels il ressemble par
tout ce quil a de matriel. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Premier discours
(1749) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie
royale, 17491767), 1:12.
Aristotle, History of the Animals, translated by A.L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 1.1.488a510. p. 15.
Le premier pas et le plus difficile que nous ayions faire pour parvenir la
connoissance de nous-mmes, est de reconnotre nettement la nature des deux
substances qui nous composent; dire simplement que lune est intendue,
immatrielle, immortelle, et que lautre est tendue, matrielle et morelle
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Histoire naturelle de lhomme, Chapter 1, in
17491767), 2:430.
Lexistence de notre me nous est dmontre, ou plutt nous ne faisons quun,
cette existence et nous: tre et penser, sont pour nous la mme chose, cette vrit est
intime et plus quintuitive, elle est indpendante de nos sens, de notre imagination,
de notre mmoire, et de toutes nos autres facults relatives. Ibid., 2:432.
Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History, translated by Sarah Lucille
Bonnefoi and edited by L. Pearce Williams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997),
25657.
Dent and Sons, 1913), 169. jai hasard quelques conjecturescar ce nest pas
une lgre entreprisede bien connotre un tat qui nexiste plus, qui na peut-tre
point exist, qui probablement nexistera jamais Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Discours sur lorigine et les fondements de lingalit parmi les hommes in uvres
compltes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau avec les notes de tous les commentateurs
(Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:23031.
Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History, translated by Sarah Lucille
Bonnefoi and edited by L. Pearce Williams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997),
257.
Ibid.
Ibid., 25859.
Otis Fellows, Buffon and Rousseau: Aspects of a Relationship, PMLA 75, no. 3
(June 1960): 184.
Ibid., 190.
Ibid. peut-tre verroit-il clairement que la vertu appartient lhomme sauvage
plus qu lhomme civilis, et que le vice na pris naissance que dans la socit.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Varits dans lespce humaine in Histoire
1767), 3:49293.
Ibid.
Ibid.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 189190n2.
Jean-Jacques
Notes
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
295
Rousseau, Discours sur lorigine et les fondements de lingalit parmi les hommes
in uvres compltes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau avec les notes de tous les
commentateurs (Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:346n. Rousseau cites Buffon, De la nature
de lhomme in Histoire naturelle, 1749 edition, 2:429.
Jean Morel, Recherches sur les sources du Discours de lingalit in Annales de
la Socit Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1909, pp. 179ff.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Note 10, in The
Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, edited and translated by Victor
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 205. On trouve, dit le
traducteur de lHistoire des Voyages dans le royaume de Congo, quantit de ces
grands animaux quon nomme orangs-outangs aux Indes orientales, qui tiennent
comme le milieu entre lespce humaine et les babouins. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
(Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:368n.
quelque ressemblance quil y ait entre lHottentot et le singe, lintervalle qui les
spare est immense, puisqu lintrieur il est rempli par la pense et au dehors par
la parole. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Nomenclature of Monkeys (1776) in
17491767), 14:32.
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 211. je dis que
quand de pareils observateurs affirmeront dun tel animal que cest un homme, et
dun autre que cest une bte, il faudra les en croire Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
(Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:376n.
Je lavoue, si lon ne devoit juger que par la forme, lespce du singe pourroit tre
prise pour une varit dans lespce humainequelque ressemblance quil y ait
entre lHottentot et le singe, lintervalle qui les spare est immense, puisqu
lintrieur il est rempli par la pense et au dehors par la parole. Georges-Louis
Leclerc de Buffon, Nomenclature of Monkeys (1776) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale
et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 14:32.
Lord Monboddo, Of the Origin and Progress of Language, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh,
1774), 1:290.
(June 1960): 192. Mais non: il est certain, par la rvlation, que tous les animaux
ont galement particip la grce de la cration Georges-Louis Leclerc de
Buffon, Lasne (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes
(Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 4:383.
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20607. Dapper
confirme queCette bteest si semblable lhomme, quil est tomb dans lesprit
quelques voyageurs quelle pouvoit tre sortie dune femme et dun singeon
trouve dans la description de ces prtendus monstres des conformits frappantes
avec lespce humaine, et des diffrences moindres que celles quon pourroit
296
Notes
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
assigner dhomme homme. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur lorigine et les

Rousseau avec les notes de tous les commentateurs (Paris: Dalibon, 1826), 1:369n
70n.
(June 1960): 191n21. Fellows cites Arthor O. Lovejoy, Monboddo and Rousseau
in Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), 40 and 51.
Francis Moran III, Of Pongos and Men: Orangs-Outang in Rousseaus Discourse
on Inequality, The Review of Politics 57, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 641.
Ibid., 643. In 643n4 Moran cites Victor Gourevitch, Rousseaus Pure State of
Nature, Interpretation 16 (1988): 2360.
Ibid., 65253.
Benot de Maillet, Telliamed, translated by Albert O. Carozzi (Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1968), 201.
Francis Moran III, Of Pongos and Men: Orangs-Outang in Rousseaus Discourse
on Inequality, The Review of Politics 57, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 657.
Francis Moran III, Between Primates and Primitives: Natual man as the Missing
Link in Rousseaus Decond Discourse, Journal of the History of Ideas 54, no. 1
(January 1993): 38. Moran cites Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and
Foundation of Inequality among Men in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The First and
Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters (New York, 1964), 150.
Ibid. Ibid., 204.
Ibid., 3839.
Jean Starobinski, Rousseau and Buffon in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency
and Obstruction, translated by Arthur Goldhammer and introduced by Robert
Mossisey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 32332.
Ibid., 325.
Ibid., 326.
Ibid.
Ibid., 32627.
Ibid., 327.
Ibid., 329.
Ibid.
Ibid., 330.
Leonard Sorenson, Natural Inequality and Rousseaus Political Philosophy in his
Discourse on Inequality, The Western Political Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December
1990): 763.
Ibid., 764.
Ibid., 784.
David Gauthier, Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 219.
Ibid., 10.
Ibid.
Ibid., 17.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Notes
297
CHAPTER EIGHT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, A Defence of My Uncle, Translated from the

French of M. de Voltaire, Chapter 19 (Of Mountains and Shells) (London: S.
Bladon, 1768), 105. On a beau me dire que le porphyre est fait de pointes doursin,
je le croirai quand je verrai que le marbre blanc est fait de plumes dautruche.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La Dfense de mon oncle (1767), Chaptre 19
(Des montagnes et des coquilles), in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces,
avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 1829
1840), 43:374.
Systme de ceux qui nayant aucun culte particulier, & rejetant toute sorte de
rvlation, croient seulement un souverain Etre. Etre soupconn de disme.
Disme, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie franaise (1762), 488.
Celui ou celle qui reconnot un Dieu, mais qui ne reconnot aucune Religion
rvle. Cest un Diste. Diste, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie franaise (1762),
488.
Deism, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 1, http://dictionary.oed.com (Aug. 21,
2006).
Nous sommes des tres intelligents; or, des tres intelligents ne peuvent avoir t
forms par un tre brut, aveugle, insensible: il y a certainement quelque diffrence
entre les ides de Newton et des crottes de mulet. Lintelligence de Newton venait
donc dune autre intelligence. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Athisme,
Section 2, Dictionnaire philosophique in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces,
1840), 27:17071.
Jai cependant connu des mutins qui disent quil ny a point dintelligence
formatrice, et que le mouvement seul a form par lui-mme tout ce que nous voyons
et tout ce que nous sommes. Ils vous disent hardiment: La combinaison de cet
univers tait possible, puisquelle existe: donc il tait possible que le mouvement
seul larranget. Ibid., 27:172.
La disposition dune aile de mouche, les organes dun limaon, suffisent pour vous
atterrer. Ibid., 27:175.
Mais quand on la regarde attentivement, ce grand fantme svanouit FranoisMarie Arouet de Voltaire, Chane des tres crs, Dictionnaire philosophique in
Cette chane, cette gradation prtendue nexiste pas plus dans les vgtaux et dans
les animaux Ibid., 27:561.
la preuve en est quil y a des espces de plantes et danimaux qui sont dtruites.
Ibid.
Nous navons plus de murex. Ibid.
Il tait dfendu aux Juifs de manger du griffon et de lixion; ces deux espces ont
probablement disparu de ce monde Ibid.
o donc est la chane? Ibid.
il est visible quon en peut dtruire. Les lions, les rhinocros commencent
devenir fort rares. Ibid.
298
Notes
15. Il est probable quil y a eu des races dhommes quon ne retrouve plus. Ibid.,
27:562.
16. Ny a-t-il pas donc visiblement un vide entre le singe et lhomme? Ibid.
17. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA, and London:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 252.
18. Ibid. Ny a-t-il pas visiblement un vide entre le singe et lhomme? nest-il pas ais
dimaginer un animal deux pieds sans plumes Franois-Marie Arouet de
Voltaire, Chane des tres crs, Dictionnaire philosophique in uvres de
Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by M. Beuchot
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 27:562.
19. Ibid. Par-del lhomme, vous logez dans le ciel, divin Platon, une file de
substances clestes Ibid.
20. Ibid. Mais vous, quelle raison avez-vous dy croire? Ibid.
21. Ibid. Quelle gradation, je vous prie, entre vos plantes! la Lune est quarante fois
plus petite que notre globe. Quand vous avez voyag de la Lune dans le vide, vous
trouvez Vnus; elle est environ aussi grosse que la terreO est la gradation
prtendue? Ibid., 27:56263.
22. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Great Chain of Being, Philosophical
Dictionary, edited and translated by Theodore Besterman (London: Penguin Books,
2004), 109. Et puis, comment voulez-vous que dans de grands espaces vides il y
ait une chane qui lie tout? Ibid., 27:563.
23. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA, and London:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 253. mais pourquoi, et comment une existence
infinie? Newton a dmontr le vide, quon navait fait que supposer jusqu lui.
Sil y a du vide dans la nature, le vide peut donc tre hors de la nature. Quelle
ncessit que les tres stendent linfini? que serait-ce que linfini en tendue? Il
ne peut exister non plus quen nombre. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Il faut
prendre un parti, ou le Principe daction (1772) in uvres de Voltaire avec
18291840), 47:7677.
24. Ibid., 365n15. il est dmontr que les corps clestes font leurs rvolutions dans
lespace non rsistant. Tout lespace nest pas rempli. Il ny a donc pas une suite de
corps depuis un atome jusqu la plus recule des toiles; il peut donc y avoir des
intervalles immenses entre les tres sensibles, comme entre les insensibles. On ne
peut donc assurer que lhomme soit ncessairement plac dans un des chanons
attachs lun lautre par une suite non interrompue. Franois-Marie Arouet de
Voltaire, Pome sur le dsastre de Lisbonne (1756) in uvres de Voltaire avec
18291840), 12:19395note a.
25. La chane universelle nest point, comme on la dit, une gradation suivie qui lie
tous les tres. Il y a probablement une distance immense entre lhomme et la brute,
entre lhomme et les substances suprieures; il y a linfini entre Dieu et toutes les
substances. Les globes qui roulent autour de notre soleil nont rien de ces
gradations insensibles, ni dans leur grosseur, ni dans leurs distances, ni dans leurs
satellites. Ibid., 12:19394.
26. La seule difficult qui restait tait de savoir comment il y avait eu de la farine avant
quil y et des hommes. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Questions sur les
Notes
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
299
miracles (1766), Lettre 5, in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements,
notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 42:202.
Bladon, 1768), 10506. I took the liberty of changing the translation so that subtile
is translated as penetrating and cannele, channeled. Les germes sont inutiles:
tout natra de soi-mme. On btit sur cette exprience prtendue un nouvel univers,
comme nous faisions un monde, il y a cent ans, avec la matire subtile, la
globuleuse et la cannele. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La Dfense de mon
oncle (1767), Chaptre 19 (Des montagnes et des coquilles), in uvres de
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 43:37475.
Le Voltaire en plaisantera tant quil voudra, mais lAnguillard a raison; jen crois
mes yeux; je les vois; combien il y en a! comme ils vont! comme ils viennent!
comme ils frtillent! Diderot, Rve de dAlembert in uvres compltes de
2:131.
Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, edited by
Press, 1997), 52229 and 68789, notes 32071.
Ibid.
Leonardo da Vinci, Studies of Fossils and Notes and Drawings on the Motion of
Water in Codex Hammer (ex Leicester), Bill Gates Collection, Seattle, WA.
Nicolaus Steno, De Solido intra Solidum Naturalitur Contento Dissertationis
Prodromus (Florence: Typographia sub signo Stell, 1669). [The Prodromus to a
Dissertation Concerning Solids Naturally Contained within Solids (London: J.
Winter, 1671). English translation.]
Robert Hooke, Discourse of Earthquakes in The Posthumous Works of Robert
Hooke, M.D., ed. Richard Waller (London: S. Smith and B. Walford, 1705), 327.
Antonio Vallisneri, De corpi marini, che su monti si trovano (Domenico Lovisa:
Venice, 1721). [marine bodies found on the mountains]
En lisant une lettre italienne sur les changemens arrivez au globe terrestre,
imprime Paris cette anne (1746)les poissons ptrifiez ne sont, son avis, que
des poissons rares, rejetez de la table des Romains, parce quils ntoient pas frais;
& lgard des coquilles ce sont, dit-il, les plerins de Syrie qui ont rapport dans le
temps des croisades celles des mers du levant quon trouve actuellement ptrifes en
France, en Italie & dans les autres tats de la chrtient; pourquoi na-t-il pas ajout
que ce sont les singes qui ont transport les coquilles au sommet des hautes
montagnes & dans tous les lieux o les hommes ne peuvent habiter, cela net rien
gt & et rendu son explication encore plus vraisemblable. Comment se peut-il
que des personnes claires & qui se piquent mme de philosophie, aient encore des
ides aussi fausses sur ce sujet! Nous ne nous contenterons donc pas davoir dit
quon trouve des coquilles ptrifies dans presque tous les endroits de la terre o
lon a fouill, & davoir rapport les tmoignages des auteurs dHistoire Naturelle;
comme on pourroit les souponner dapercevoir, en ve de quelques systmes, des
coquilles o il ny en a point, nous croyons devoir encore citer les voyageurs qui en
ont remarqu par hasard, & dont les yeux moins exercez nont p reconnotre que
les coquilles entires & bien conserves; leur tmoignage sera peut-tre dune plus
300
Notes
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
grande autorit auprs des gens qui ne sont pas porte de sassurer par eux-mmes
de la vrit des faits, & de ceux qui ne connoissent ni les coquilles, ni les
ptrifications, & qui ntant pas en tat den faire la comparaison, pourroient douter
que les ptrifications fussent en effet de vraies coquilles, & que ces coquilles se
trouvassent entasses par millions dans tous les climats de la terre.
Tout le monde peut voir par ses yeux les bancs de coquilles qui sont dans les
collines des environs de Paris Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon. Histoire
naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767),
1:28182.
Bladon, 1768), 97. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La Dfense de mon oncle
(1767), Chaptre 19 (Des montagnes et des coquilles), in uvres de Voltaire avec
18291840), 43:369.
FLUX se dit aussi De lcoulement des excrmens devenus trop fluides, & signifie,
Dvoiement. Flux, Dictionnaire de LAcadmie franaise (1762), 755.
Bladon, 1768), 9798. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La Dfense de mon
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 43:369.
Ibid., 98. Ibid.
Ibid. Ibid., 43:36970.
Ibid. Ibid., 43:370.
Ibid., 98-99. Ibid.
Ibid., 99. Ibid.
Ibid., 99-100. Ibid., 43:37071.
Ibid., 100. Ibid., 43:371.
Ibid., 100-101. Ibid., 43:37172.
Ibid., 104. Mais jai vu aussi sous vingt pieds de terre des monnaies romaines, des
anneaux de chevaliers, plus de neuf cent milles de Rome, et je nai point dit: Ces
anneaux, ces espces dor et dargent, ont t fabriqus ici. Je nai point dit non
plus: Ces hutres sont nes ici. Jai dit: Des voyageurs ont appport ici des anneaux,
de largent, et des hutres. Ibid., 43:373.
Ibid. Quand je lus, il y a quarante ans, quon avait trouv dans les Alpes des
coquilles de Syrie, je dis, je lavoue, dun ton un peu goguenard, que ces coquilles
avaient t apparemment apportes par des plerins qui revenaient de Jrusalem.
Ibid., 43:37374.
Ibid., 105. On a beau me dire que le porphyre est fait de pointes doursin, je le
croirai quand je verrai que le marbre blanc est fait de plumes dautruche. Ibid.,
43:374.
On trouve dans quelques endroits de ce globe des amas de coquillages; on voit
dans quelques autres des hutres ptrifies: de l on a conclu que, malgr les lois de
la gravitation et celles des fluides, et malgr la profondeur du lit de lOcan, la mer
avait couvert toute la terre il y a quelques millions dannes. Franois-Marie
Arouet de Voltaire, Des singularits de la nature (1768), Chaptre 12 (Des
Notes
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
301
coquilles, et des systmes btis sur des coquilles), in uvres de Voltaire avec
18291840), 44:246.
Mille endroits sont remplis de mille dbris de testaces, de crustaces, de
ptrifications. Mais remarquons, encore une fois, que ce nest presque jamais ni sur
la croupe ni dans les flancs de cette continuit de montagnes dont la surface du
globe est traverse Ibid., 44:249
cest quelques lieues de ces grands corps, cest au milieu des terres, cest dans
des cavernes, dans des lieux o il est trs vraisemblable quil y avait de petits lacs
qui ont disparu, de petites rivires dont le cours est changmais de vritables
corps marins, cest ce que vous ne voyez jamais. Sil y en avait, pourquoi naurait
on jamais vu dos de chiens marins, de requins, de baleines? Ibid., 44:24950.
Je ne nie pas, encore une fois, quon ne rencontre cent milles de la mer quelques
hutres ptrifies, des conques, des univalves, des productions qui ressemblent
parfaitement aux productions marines; mais est-on bien sr que le sol de la terre ne
peut enfanter ces fossiles? La formation des agates arborises ou herborises ne
doit-elle pas nous faire suspendre notre jugement? Un arbre na point produit
lagate qui reprsente parfaitement un arbre; la mer peut aussi navoir point produit
ces coquilles fossiles qui ressemblent des habitations de petits animaux marins.
Ibid., 44:251.
Ny a-t-il pas l de quoi tonner du moins ceux qui affirment que tous les
coquillages quon rencontre dans quelques endroits de la terre y ont t dposs par
la mer? Ibid., 44:253.
Sur ce que jai crit, page 281, au sujet de la Lettre italienne, dans laquelle il est dit
que ce sont les Plerins & autres, qui dans le temps des croisades ont rapport de
Syrie des coquilles que nous trouvons dans le sein de la terre en France, &c. on a
pu trouver, comme je le trouve moi-mme, que je nai pas trait M. de Voltaire
assez srieusement; javoue que jaurois mieux fait de laisser tomber cette opinion
que de la relever par une plaisanterie, dautant que ce nest pas mon ton, & cest
peut-tre la seule qui soit dans mes crits. M. de Voltaire est un homme qui par la
supriorit de ses talens, mrite les plus grands gards. On mapporta cette Lettre
italienne dans le temps mme que je corrigeois la feuille de mon Livre o il en est
question; je ne ls cette Lettre quen partie, imaginant que ctoit louvrage de
quelque Erudit dItalie, qui daprs ses connoissances historiques, navoit suivi que
son prjug, sans consulter la Nature; & ce ne fut quaprs limpression de mon
volume sur la Thorie de la Terre, quon massura que la Lettre toit de M. de
Voltaire; jeus regret alors mes expressions. Voil la vrit, je la dclare autant
pour M. de Voltaire, que pour moi-mme & pour la postrit laquelle je ne
voudrois pas laisser douter de la haute estime que jai toujours eue pour un homme
aussi rare & qui fait tant dhonneur son sicle. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon,
Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire; Supplment, 17 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie
royale, 17741789), 5:28586.
Lautorit de M. de Voltaire ayant fait impression sur quelques personnes, il sen
est trouv qui ont voulu vrifier par eux-mmes si les objections contre les
coquilles, avoient quelque fondement, & je crois devoir donner ici lextrait dun
Mmoire qui ma t envoy & qui me parot t fait que dans cette vue. Ibid.,
5:286.
302
Notes
57. En parcourant diffrentes provinces du Royaume & mme de lItalie, jai vu, dit le
P. Chabenat, des pierres figures de toutes parts, & dans certains endroits en si
grande quantit, & arranges de faon quon ne peut sempcher de croire que ces
parties de la Terre naient autrefois t le lit de la mer. Jai vu des coquillages de
toute espce, & qui sont parfaitement semblables leurs analogues vivans. Jen ai
vu de la mme figure & de la mme grandeur: cette observation ma paru suffisante
pour me persuader que tous ces individus toient de diffrens ges, mais quils
toient de la mme espce. Jai vu des cornes dammon depuis un demi-pouce
jusqu prs de trois pieds de diamtre. Jai vu des ptoncles de toutes grandeurs,
dautres bivalves & des univalves galement. Jai vu outre cela des blemnites, des
champignons de mer, &c.
La forme & la quantit de toutes ces pierres figures, nous prouvent presque
invinciblement quelles toient autrefois des animaux qui vivoient dans la mer. La
coquille sur-tout dont elles sont couvertes, semble ne laisser aucun doute, parce que
dans certaines, elle se trouve aussi luisante, aussi frache & aussi naturelle que dans
les vivans; si elle toit spar du noyau, on ne croiroit pas quelle ft
ptrifieTout ceci sembloit me dire fort intelligiblement que ce pays-ci avoit t
anciennement le lit de la mer, qui par quelque rvolution soudaine, sen est retire &
y a laiss ses productions comme dans beaucoup dautres endroits. Cependant je
suspendois mon jugement cause des objections de M. de Voltaire. Pour y
rpondre, jai voulu joindre lexprience lobservation. Ibid., 5:28688.
58. Le P. Chabenat rapporte ensuite plusieurs expriences pour prouver que les
coquilles qui se trouvent dans le sein de la terre sont de la mme nature que celles de
la mer; je ne les rapporte pas ici, parce quelles napprennent rien de nouveau, &
que personne ne doute de cette identit de nature entre les coquilles fossiles & les
coquilles marines. Enfin le P. Chabenat conclut & termine son Mmoire en disant:
on ne peut donc pas douter que toutes ces coquilles qui se trouvent dans le sein de
la terre, ne soient de vraies coquilles & des dpouilles des animaux de la mer qui
couvroit autrefois toutes ces contres, & par consquent les objections de M. de
Voltaire ne soient mal fondes. Ibid., 5:288.
59. Martin J.S. Rudwick, The Meaning of Fossils: Episodes in the History of
Palaeontology, 2nd ed. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1972), 88. In 99n51 Rudwick cites Francis C. Haber, The Age of the World: Moses
to Darwin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 10708.
60. Shirley A. Roe, Voltaire vs. Needham: Atheism, Materialism, and the Generation
of Life, Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985):65, reprinted in Philosophy,
Religion and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, edited by John
W. Yolton (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1990), 417.
61. La philosophie ayant compris limpossibilit o elle toit dexpliquer
mcaniquement la formation des tres organiss, a imagin heureusement quils
existoient dj en petit, sous la forme de germes, ou de corpuscules organiques. Et
cette ide a produit deux hypothses qui plaisent beaucoup la raison. Charles
Bonnet, Considrations sur les corps organiss, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: M.-M. Rey,
1762), 1:1.
62. Je me contenterai de rappeller lesprit de mes lecteurs ltonnant appareil de
fibres, de membranes, de vaisseaux, de ligamens, de tendons, de muscles, de nerfs,
de veines, dartres etc. qui entrent dans la composition du corps dun animal. Je
les prierai de considrer attentivement la structure, les rapports et le jeu de toutes ces
Notes
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
303
parties. Je leur demanderai ensuite, sils conoivent quun tout aussi compos, aussi
li, aussi harmonique, puisse tre form par le simple concours de molcules mues,
ou diriges, suivant certaines loix nous inconnues. Je les prierai de me dire sils
ne sentent point la ncessit o nous sommes dadmettre que cette admirable
machine a t dabord dessine en petit par la mme main qui a trac le plan de
lunivers. Ibid., 1:85.
nous ne croyons pas que ses Considrations puissent rpandre beaucoup de jour
sur cette grande et tnbreuse question, le dsespoir des philosophes anciens et
modernes; mais elles dclent du moins un esprit trs sage et trs clair. FranoisMarie Arouet de Voltaire, Review of Charles Bonnets Considrations sur les corps
organiss in Gazette littraire de lEurope, April 14, 1764, in uvres compltes de
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 41:427.
Les anciens avaient voulu deviner comme nous les secrets de la nature, mais ils
navaient point de fil pour se guider dans les dtours de ce labyrinthe immense.
Ibid., 41:42728.
On a fini par rester dans le doute; ce qui arrive toujours quand on veut remonter
aux premires causes. Ibid., 41:430.
Lauteur de la Vnus physique a eu recours lattraction; il a prtendu que, dans les
principes fconds de lhomme et de la femme mls ensemble, la jambe gauche du
ftus attire la jambe droite sans se mprendre; quun il attire un il en laissant le
nez entre deux, quun lobe du poumon est attir par lautre lobe, etc. Ibid.,
41:43031.
Il semble quil en faille revenir lancienne opinion que tous les germes furent
forms -la-fois par la main qui arrangea lunivers; que chaque germe contient en lui
tous ceux qui doivent natre de lui, que toute gnration nest quun dveloppement;
et, soit que les germes des animaux soient contenus dans les mles ou dans les
femelles, il est vraisemblable quils existent ds le commencement des choses, ainsi
que la terre, les mers, les lments, les astres. Ibid., 41:43132.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Atheist, Atheism, Philosophical Dictionary,
edited and translated by Theodore Besterman (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 57
58. Ajoutons surtout quil y a moins dathes aujourdhui que jamais, depuis que
les philosophes ont reconnu quil ny a aucun tre vgtant sans germe, aucun
germe sans dessein, etc., et que le bl ne vient point de pourriture. Des gomtres
non philosophes ont rejet les causes finales, mais les vrais philosophes les
admettent; et, comme la dit un auteur connu, un catchiste annonce Dieu aux
enfants, et Newton le dmontre aux sages. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire,
Athisme, Section 4, Dictionnaire philosophique in uvres de Voltaire avec
18291840), 27:189.
Et il est dmontr aujourdhui aux yeux et la raison quil nest ni de vgtal ni
danimal qui nait son germe. On le trouve dans luf dune poule comme dans le
gland dun chne. Une puissance formatrice prside tous ces dveloppements
dun bout de lunivers lautre. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Des
singularits de la nature in uvres compltes de Voltaire avec prfaces,
1840), 44:271.
304
Notes
70. Il y a deux manires de parvenir la notion dun tre qui prside lunivers. La
plus naturelle et la plus parfaite pour les capacits communes, est de considrer non
seulement lordre qui est dans lunivers, mais la fin laquelle chaque chose parat se
rapporter. Voltaire, Trait de mtaphysique, Chaptre 2, in uvres compltes de
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 37:284.
71. On ma ajout que jamais homme un peu instruit na avanc que les espces non
mlanges dgnrassent Ibid., 37:282.
72. Il me semble alors que je suis assez bien fond croire quil en est des hommes
comme des arbres; que les poiriers, les sapins, les chnes, et les abricotiers ne
viennent point dun mme arbre, et que les blancs barbus, les ngres portant laine,
les jaunes portant crins, et les hommes sans barbe, ne viennent pas du mme
homme. Ibid., 37:28283.
73. Toutes ces diffrentes races dhommes produisent ensemble des individus capables
de perptuer, ce quon ne peut pas dire des arbres despces diffrentes; mais y a-t-il
eu un temps o il nexistait quon ou deux individus de chaque espce? cest ce que
nous ignorons compltement. Ibid., 37:283.
74. Il faut ici surtout raisonner de bonne foi, et ne point chercher se tromper soimme; quand on voit une chose qui a toujours le mme effet, qui na uniquement
que cet effet, qui est compose dune infinit dorganes, dans lesquels il y a une
infinit de mouvements qui tous concourent la mme production, il me semble
quon ne peut, sans une secrte rpugnance, nier une cause finale. Le germe de tous
les vgtaux, de tous les animaux, est dans ce cas: ne faut-il pas tre un peu hardi
pour dire que tout cela ne se rapporte aucune fin? Ibid., 37:295.
75. Voici enfin une nouvelle richesse de la nature, une espce qui ne ressemble pas
tant la ntre que les barbets aux lvriers. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire,
Relation touchant un Maure blanc amen dAfrique Paris en 1744 (1744) in
76. Ibid., 38:52224.
77. si nous pensons valoir beaucoup mieux queux, nous nous trompons assez
lourdement. Ibid., 38:524.
78. Quest-ce quun vrai thiste? cest celui qui dit Dieu: Je vous adore, et je vous
sers; cest celui qui dit au Turc, au Chinois, lIndien, et au Russe: Je vous aime.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Thisme, Dictionnaire philosophique (1764),
in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by
M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 32:351.
79. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Theist, Philosophical Dictionary, edited and
translated by Theodore Besterman (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 386. Il a des
frres depuis Pkin jusqu la Cayenne, et il compte tous les sages pour ses frres.
Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Thiste, Dictionnaire philosophique in
80. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, A Defence of My Uncle, Translated from the
French of M. de Voltaire, Chapter 18 (Of Men of Different Colours) (London: S.
Bladon, 1768), 91. Il ne pensait pas que les hutres dAngleterre fussent
engendres des crocodiles du Nil, ni que les girofliers des les Moluques tirassent
leur origine des sapins des Pyrnes. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La
Notes
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
305
Dfense de mon oncle (1767), Chaptre 18 (Des hommes de diffrentes couleurs),
in uvres de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols., edited by
M. Beuchot (Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 43:36566.
Bladon, 1768), 10001. Ne perdez point de vue cette grande vrit que la nature
ne se dment jamais. Toutes les espces restent toujours les mmes. Animaux,
vgtaux, minraux, mtaux, tout est invariable dans cette prodigieuse varit. Tout
conserve son essence. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La Dfense de mon
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 43:37172.
Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1997), 346.
and Philosophy (London: Jacob Loyseau, 1750), 224. Les petits ailerons quils
avoient sous le ventre, & qui, comme leurs nageoires, leur avoient aid se
promener dans la mer, devinrent des pieds, & leur servirent marcher sur la terre.
Benot de Maillet, Telliamed ou Entretiens dun philosophe indien avec un
Ibid., 246. Pour revenir aux diverses espces dhommes, ceux qui ont des queues
peuvent ils tre les fils de ceux qui nen ont point? Comme les singes queue ne
descendent certainement point de ceux qui sont sans queue, ne seroit-il pas naturel
de penser de mme, que les hommes qui naissent avec des queues sont dune espce
diverse de ceux qui nen ont jamais eu? Ibid., 2:174.
qui mapprit que les montagnes et les hommes sont produits par les eaux de la
mer. Il y eut dabord de beaux hommes marins qui ensuite devinrent amphibies.
Leur belle queue fourchue se changea en cuisses et en jambes. Jtais encore tout
plein des Mtamorphoses dOvide, et dun livre o il tait dmontr que la race des
hommes tait btarde dune race de babouns: jaimais autant descendre dun poisson
que dun singe. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, LHomme aux 40 cus in
La grande chaneparat une pice essentielle la machine du monde, comme les
os le sont aux quadrupdes et aux bipdes. Cest autour de leurs fates que
sassemblent les nuages et les neiges, qui de l, se rpandant sans cesse, forment
tous les fleuves et toutes les fontaines, dont on a si longtemps et si faussement
attribu la source la merLes chanes de ces montagnes qui couvrent lun et
lautre hmisphre ont une utilit plus sensible. Elles affermissent la terre; elles
servent larroser; elles renferment leurs bases tous les mtaux, tous les minraux.
Quil soit permis de remarquer cette occasion que toutes les pices de la machine
de ce monde semblent faites lune pour lautre. Franois-Marie Arouet de
Voltaire, Des singularits de la nature in uvres compltes de Voltaire avec
306
Notes
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

18291840), 44:23536.
Le grand Etre qui a form lor et le fer, les arbres, lherbe, lhomme et la fourmi, a
fait locan et les montagnes. Les hommes nont pas t des poissons, comme le dit
Maillet; tout a t probablement ce quil est par des lois immuables. Ibid., 44:241.
Il est arriv aux coquilles la mme chose quaux anguilles: elles ont fait clore des
systmes nouveauxSi la mer a t partout, il y a eu un temps o le monde ntait
peupl que de poissons. Peu peu les nageoires sont devenues des bras; la queue
fourchue, stant allonge, a form des cuisses et des jambes; enfin les poissons sont
devenus des hommes, et tout cela sest fait en consquence des coquilles quon a
dterres. Ces systmes valent bien lhorreur du vide, les formes substantielles, la
matire globuleuse, subtile, cannele, strie, la ngation de lexistence des corps, la
baguette divinatoire de Jacques Aimard, lharmonie prtablie, et le mouvement
perptuel. Ibid., 44:24647.
Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, translated by W.F. Trotter, Brunschvicg numbering system
(New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1910), fragment 693. En voyant laveuglement et
la misre de lhomme, en regardant tout lunivers muet, et lhomme sans lumire,
abandonn lui-mme et comme gar dans ce recoin de lunivers, sans savoir qui
ly a mis, ce quil y est venu faire, ce quil deviendra en mourant, incapable de toute
connaissance, jentre en effroi, comme un homme quon aurait port endormi dans
une le dserte et effroyable et qui sveillerait sans connatre o il est, et sans
moyen den sortir. Blaise Pascal, Penses, in uvres de Blaise Pascal, edited by
Lon Brunschvicg, Pierre Boutroux, and Flix Gazier (Paris: Librairie Hachette &
Cie, 19041914), fragment 693 (Lafuma 198; Sellier 229).
Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976),
353.
Substantial, 3, Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com
(September 1, 2006).
Form, 4a, Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com (September 1,
2006).
Chambers definition is cited in Substantial, 3, Oxford English Dictionary Online,
http://www.oed.com (September 1, 2006).
Globuleux, Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des
mtiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond dAlembert (Paris: Briasson,
David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchtel: S. Faulche, 17511765), 7:715.
Matire subtile, est le nom que les Cartsiens donnent une matire quils
supposent traverser & pntrer les pores de tous les corps, & remplir ces pores de
faon ne laisser aucun vuide ou interstices entreux. Voyez Cartsianisme. Mais
en vain ils ont recours cette machine pour tayer leur sentiment dun plein
absoluil faudroit pour quelle dt remplir les vuides de tous eles autres corps,
quelle ft elle-mme entirement destitue de vuide; cest--dire parfaitement
solide, beaucoup plus solide, par exemple que lor, & par consquent, quelle ft
beaucoup plus pesante que ce mtal, & quelle rsistt davantage (voyez
Rsistance); ce qui ne sauroit saccorder avec les phnomnes. Jean Le Rond
dAlembert, Matire subtile, Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des
sciences, des arts et des mtiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond
dAlembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchtel: S. Faulche,
17511765), 10:191.
Notes
307
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ren Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, translated and annotated by Valentine
Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publisher, 1991), 8687 and 13133.
99. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, A Defence of My Uncle, Translated from the
Bladon, 1768), 10506. I took the liberty of changing the translation so that subtile
is translated as penetrating and cannele, channeled. Les germes sont inutiles:
tout natra de soi-mme. On btit sur cette exprience prtendue un nouvel univers,
comme nous faisions un monde, il y a cent ans, avec la matire subtile, la
globuleuse et la cannele. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, La Dfense de mon
(Paris: Lefvre, 18291840), 43:37475.
100. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, edited by
Press, 1997), 522.
CHAPTER NINE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Publishing Company, 1912), 100. En un mot seroit-il absolument impossible
dapprendre une Langue cet Animal? Je ne le crois pas. Julien Offray de La
Mettrie, LHomme-machine in uvres philosophiques (London: Jean Nourse,
1751), 26.
Avez-vous vu au Jardin du Roi, sous une cage de verre, un orang-outang qui a lair
dun saint Jean qui prche au dsert?Le cardinal de Polignac lui disait un jour:
Parle, et je te baptise. Denis Diderot, Suite de lEntretien in uvres compltes de
2:190.
Philippo Pigafetta, A Reporte of the Kingdome of Congo, a Region of Africa,
translated from the Italian by Abraham Hartwell (London: John Wolfe, 1597), 89.
Samuel Purchas, Purchas his Pilgrimage, or Relatons of the World and the
Religions Observed in all Ages and Places Discovered, from the Creation unto this
Present (London: William Stansby, 1613), 466.
Samuel Purchas, Purchas his Pilgrimes (London: William Stansby, 1625), 2:982.
Francis Moran, Between Primates and Primitives: Natural Man as the Missing Link
in Rousseaus Second Discourse, Journal of the History of Ideas 54, no. 1 (January
1993), 3758.
Franois Leguat, The Voyage of Franois Leguat (1708), edited by Pasfield Oliver,
2 vols (London, 1891), 2:234. Cited by Francis Moran, Between Primates and
308
Notes
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Primitives: Natural Man as the Missing Link in Rousseaus Second Discourse,

Journal of the History of Ideas 54, no. 1 (January 1993), 41.
Daniel Beeckman, A Voyage to and from the Island of Borneo (London, 1718), 37.
Ibid.
Moran cites sources using the following editions: Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus,
6:398; Tyson, Orang-Outang or the Anatomy of a Pygmie compared with that of a
Monkey, an Ape, and a Man (1699), cited in Ashley Montagu, Edward Tyson,
M.D., F.D.S. 1650-1708, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, 20
(1943), 261; Franois Leguat, The Voyage of Franois Leguat (1708), edited by
Pasfield Oliver, 2 vols (London, 1891), 2:234; Daniel Beeckman, A Voyage to and
from the Island of Borneo (London, 1718), 37; William Smith, A New Voyage to
Guinea (1744), in abb Prvost, Histoire gnrale des voyages, 4:240; Benot de
Maillet, Telliamed (1748), translated by Albert O. Carozzi (Chicago, 1968), 201;
and Buffon, Natural History of the Orang-Outangs, or the Pongo and Jocko
(1766) in Natural History: General and Particular, edited by William Smellie, 8
vols (London, 1781), 8:86.
Ibid., 40. Moran cites Edward Tyson, Orang-Outang or the Anatomy of a Pygmie
Compared with that of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man (1699), cited in Ashley
Montagu, Edward Tyson, M.D., F.D.S., 16501708, Memoirs of an American
Philosophical Society, 20 (1943): 244.
Ibid. Moran cites John Green, A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels, 4
vols. (London, 17451747), 2:718.
Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 44. Moran cites Edward Tyson, Orang-Outang or the Anatomy of a Pygmie
compared with that of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man (1699), cited in Ashley
Montagu, Edward Tyson, M.D., F.D.S., 16501708, Memoirs of an American
Philosophical Society, 20 (1943): 257.
Ibid. Ibid.
Singe, Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des
La plpart de ces animaux ont plus de rapport avec lhomme que les autres
quadrupdes, surtout pour les dents, les oreilles, les narines &c. Ils ont des cils dans
les deux paupires, & deux mamelles sur la poitrine. Les femelles ont pour la
plpart des menstrues comme les femmes. Les pis de devant ont beaucoup de
rapport la main de lhomme; les pis de derrire ont aussi la forme dune main, car
les quatre doigts sont plus longs que ceux du pi de devant, & le pouce est long,
gros & fort cart du premier doigt; aussi se servent-ils des pis de derrire comme
de ceux de devant pour saisir & empoigner. Ibid., 15:208.
Il y a plusieurs espces de singes, qui ne diffrent entrelles que par la grandeur;
elles ont beaucoup de rapport lhomme par la face, les oreilles & les ongles. Ibid.
Lhomme des bois, ourang outand bout; cet animal est des Indes orientales; il
ressemble plus lhomme quaucune autre espce de singe; son poil est court &
assez doux. Ibid.
Le pongo (dit en substance Andr Batell, dans les voyages de Purchass, l. VII. c. iij.
p. 974.) a plus de cinq pis: il est de la hauteur dun homme ordinaire, mais deux
fois plus gros. Il a le visage sans poil, & ressemblant celui dun homme, les yeux
assez grands quoiquenfoncs, & des cheveux qui lui couvrent la tte & les
Notes
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
309
paulesCes animaux grimpent sur les arbres pour y passer la nuit: ils sy btissent
mme des espces dabris contre les pluies dont ce pays est inond pendant lt. Ils
ne vivent que de fruits & de plantes: ils couvrent leurs morts de feuilles & de
branches; ce que les Ngres regardent comme une sorte de spulture. Lorsque les
pongos trouvent le matin les feux que les Ngres allument la nuit, en voyageant
travers de ces forts, on les voit sen approcher avec une apparence de plaisir.
Nanmoins, ils nont jamais imagin de les entretenir en y jettant du bois. Aussi les
Ngres assurent-ils que les pongos nont une classe suprieure celle des animaux.
Jaucourt, Pongo, Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et
des mtiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond dAlembert (Paris: Briasson,
Robert Wokler, The Ape Debates in Enlightenment Anthropology, Studies on
Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 192 (1980): 116475.
Ibid., 1168.
Ibid., 1169. Wokler cites Claude Perrault, Suite des mmoires pour servir
lhistoire des animaux (Paris, 1676), 126.
Ibid., 1168. Wokler cites Edward Tyson, Orang-outang, sive, Homo Sylvestris, or,
The anatomy of a Pygmie compared with that of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man
(London, 1699), iii and 55, and also refers the reader to his own article, Wokler,
Tyson and Buffon on the orang-utan, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 155 (1976): 2301- 19.
Publishing Company, 1912), 100. Parmi les Animaux, les uns apprennent parler
& chanter; ils retiennent des airs, & prennent tous les sons, aussi exactement quun
Musicien.
Ibid. Les autres, qui montrent cependant plus desprit, tels que le Singe, nen
peuvent venir bout. Pourquoi cela, si ce nest par un vice des organes de la
parole? Ibid.
Ibid. Mais ce vice est-il tellement de conformation, quon ny puisse apporter
aucun remde? En un mot seroit-il absolument impossible dapprendre une Langue
cet Animal? Je ne le crois pas. Ibid.
Ibid. Cet Animal nous ressemble si fort, que les Naturalistes lont appel Homme
Sauvage, ou Homme des bois. Je le prendois aux mmes conditions des Ecoliers
dAmman; cest--dire, que je voudrois quil ne ft ni trop jeune, ni trop vieux; car
ceux quon nous apporte en Europe, sont communment trop gs. Je choisirois
celui qui auroit la physionomie la plus spirituelle, & qui tiendroit le mieux dans
mille petites oprations, ce quelle mauroit promis. Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 10001. Enfin, ne me trouvant pas digne dtre son Gouverneur, je le
mettrois lEcole de lexcellent Matre que je viens de nommer, ou dun autre aussi
habile, sil en est. Ibid.
Ibid., 101. I took the liberty of changing the translation of singe to ape
everywhere for the purpose of consistency, as La Mettrie did not distinguish
between monkeys and apes. Pourquoi donc lducation des Singes seroit-elle
impossible? Pourquoi ne pourroit-il enfin, force de soins, imiter, lexemple des
sourds, les mouvemens ncessaires pour prononcer? Je nose dcider si les organes
310
Notes
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
de la parole du Singe ne peuvent, quoi quon fasse, rien articuler; mais cette
impossibilit absolue me surprendroit, cause de la grande Analogie du Singe et de
lHomme, & quil nest point dAnimal connu jusqu prsent, dont le dedans & le
dehors lui ressemblent dune manire si frappante. Ibid., 2627.
Ibid., 103. Non seulement je dfie quon me cite aucune exprience vraiment
concluante, qui dcide mon projet impossible & ridicule; mais la similitude de la
structure & des oprations du Singe est telle, que je ne doute presque point, si on
exeroit parfaitement cet Animal, quon ne vnt enfin bout de lui apprendre
prononcer, & par consquent savoir une langue. Alors ce ne seroit plus ni un
Homme Sauvage, ni un Homme manqu: ce seroit un Homme parfait, un petit
Homme de Ville, avec autant dtoffe ou de muscles que nous mmes, pour penser
& profiter de son ducation. Ibid., 28.
Ibid. Des Animaux lHomme, la transition nest pas violente; les vrais
Philosophes en conviendront. Qutoit lHomme, avant linvention des Mots & la
connoissance des Langues? Un Animal de son espce, qui avec beaucoup moins
dinstinct naturel, que les autres, dont alors il ne se croioit pas Roi, ntoit distingu
du Singe & des autres Animaux, que comme le Singe lest lui-mme; je veux dire,
par un physionomie qui annonoit plus de discernementLes Mots, les Langues,
les Loix, les Sciences, les Beaux Arts sont venusOn a dress un Homme, comme
un Animal Ibid., 2829.
Leonora Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine; Animal Soul in
French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), 3.
Ex animalium quibusdam actionibus valde perfectis, suspicamur ea liberum
arbitrium non habere. Ren Descartes, Cogitationes privat, January 1619, in
uvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12 vols. (Paris: L.
Cerf, 18971913), 10:219.
Ibid., 6-7. Rosenfield cites Ren Descartes, Chapter 5 of the Discourse on Method
in The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes, translated by John Veitch
(New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1937), 18990.
Ibid., 7. Ibid., 190.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, A Dissertation on the Nature of Animals (1753)
in Natural History, General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols.,
2nd edition (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:210. Lanimal a deux
manires dtre, ltat de mouvement et ltat de repos, la veille et le sommeil, qui
se succdent alternativement pendant toute la vie; dans le premier tat, tous les
ressorts de la machine animale sont en action; dans le second, il ny en a quune
partie, et cette partie qui est en action pendant le sommeil, est aussi en action
pendant la veille Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Discours sur la nature des
animaux (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris:
Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 4:6.
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essaie de cosmologie in uvres, 4 vols (Lyon:
J.-M. Bruyset, 1756), 1:4243.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, A Dissertation on the Nature of Animals (1753)
in Natural History, General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols.,
2nd edition (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:224. Cette question est
dautant plus difficile rsoudre, qutant par notre nature diffrens des animaux,
lme a part presque tous nos mouvemens, et peut-tre tous, et quil nous est
trs-difficile de distinguer les effets de laction de cette substance spirituelle, de
Notes
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
311
ceux qui sont produits par les seules forces de notre tre matriel: nous ne pouvons
en juger que par analogie et en comparant nos actions les oprations naturelles des
animaux; mais comme cette substance spirituelle na t accorde qu lhomme, et
que ce nest que par elle quil pense et quil rflchit; que lanimal est au contraire
un tre purement matriel, qui ne pense ni ne rflchit, et qui cependant agit et
semble se dterminer, nous ne pouvons pas douter que le principe de la
dtermination du mouvement ne soit dans lanimal un effet purement mchanique,
et absolument dpendant de son organisation. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon,
Discours sur la nature des animaux (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et
Ibid., 2:236. ils ninventent, ils ne perfectionnent rien, ils ne rflchissent par
consquent sur rien, ils ne font jamais que les mmes choses, de la mme faon
Ibid, 4:39.
Ibid., 2:23738. On peut expliquertoutes les actions des animaux, quelque
compliques quelles puissent parotre, sans quil soit besoin de leur accorder, ni la
pense, ni la rflexion, leur sens intrieur suffit pour produire tous leurs
movemens. Ibid., 4:40.
Ibid., 2:225. Le sens intrieur de lanimal est, aussi-bien que ses sens extrieurs,
un organe, un rsultat de mchanique, un sens purement matriel. Ibid., 4:24.
Ibid. Nous avons, comme lanimal, ce sens intrieur matriel, et nous possdons
de plus un sens dune nature suprieure et bien diffrente, qui rside dans la
substance spirituelle qui nous anime et nous conduit. Ibid.
Ibid., 2:249. Cette puissance de rflchir ayant t refuse aux animaux, il est donc
certain quils ne peuvent former dides, et que par consquent leur conscience
dexistence est moins sre et moins tendue que la ntre; car ils ne peuvent avoir
aucune ide du temps, aucune connoissance du pass, aucune notion de lavenir:
leur conscience dexistence est simple, elle dpend uniquement des sensations qui
les affectent actuellement, et consiste dans le sentiment intrieur que ces sensations
produisent. Ibid., 4:5354.
Ibid., 2:251. les animaux nont aucune connoissance du pass, aucune ide du
temps, et que par consquent ils nont pas la mmoire. Ibid., 4:55.
1997), 254. Roger cites from Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Discours sur la
nature des animaux (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15
volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 4:41, 44, 47, 85.
Ibid. Ibid., 4:22.
Ibid., 25859. Ibid., 4:110, and Nomenclature des singes (1766), 14:32
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Nomenclature of Apes (1766) in Natural
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 8:6466. On verra dans lhistoire de
lorang-outang, que si lon ne faisoit attention qu la figure on pourroit galement
regarder cet animal comme le premier des singes ou le dernier des hommes parce
qu lexception de lme, il ne lui manque rien de tout ce que nous avons, et parce
quil diffre moins de lhomme pour le corps, quil ne diffre des autres animaux
auxquels on a donn le mme nom de singe. Lme, la pense, la parole ne
dpendent donc pas de la forme ou de lorganisation du corps; rien ne prouve mieux
que cest un don particulier, et fait lhomme seul, puisque lorang-outang qui ne
parle ni ne pense, nanmoins le corps, les membres, les sens, le cerveau et la langue
312
Notes
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
entirement semblables lhommele Crateur na pas voulu faire pour le corps de

lhomme un modle absolument diffrent de celui de lanimal; il a compris sa
forme, comme celle de tous les animaux dans un plan gnral; mais en mme temps
quil lui a dparti cette forme matrielle semblable celle du singe, il a pntr ce
corps animal de son souffle divin; sil et fait la mme faveur, je ne dis pas au singe,
mais lespce la plus vile, lanimal qui nous parot le plus mal organis, cette
espce seroit bientt devenue la rivale de lhomme; vivifie par lesprit, elle et
prim sur les autres; elle et pens, elle et parl: quelque ressemblance quil y ait
donc entre lHottentot et le singe, lintervalle qui les spare est immense, puisqu
lintrieur il est rempli par la pense et au dehors par la parole. Georges-Louis
Leclerc de Buffon, Nomenclature des singes (1766) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale
et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 14:30, 32.
1997), 259. Roger cites Nomenclature des singes (1766), 14:3132.
Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, The Nomenclature of Apes (1766) in Natural
(London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 8:66. Qui pourra jamais dire en quoi
lorganisation dun imbcile diffre de celle dun autre homme? Georges-Louis
Leclerc de Buffon, Nomenclature des singes (1766) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale
et particulire, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 14:32.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages, Chapter 1, in the
Discourses and other Early Political Writings, edited and translated by Victor
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 252.
Dent and Sons, 1913), 191. Le premier langage de lhomme, le langage le plus
universel, le plus nergique, et le seul dont il eut besoin avant quil fallt persuader
des hommes assembls, est le cri de la nature: Comme ce cri ntoit arrach que par
une sorte dinstinct dans les occasions pressantes, pour implorer du secours dans les
grands dangers ou du soulagement dans les maux violents, il ntoit pas dun grand
usage dans le cours ordinaire de la vie; o rgnent des sentiments plus modrs.
Quand les ides des hommes commencrent stendre et se multiplier, et quil
stabilit entre eux une communication plus troite, ils cherchrent des signes plus
nombreux et un langage plus tendu; ils multiplirent les inflexions de la voix, et y
joignirent les gestes qui, par leur nature, sont plus expressifs, et dont le sens dpend
moins dune dtermination antrieure. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur
lorigine et les fondements de lingalit parmi les hommes in uvres compltes de
1826), 1:267.
Ibid., 192. Dailleurs les ides gnrales ne peuvent sintroduire dans lesprit qu
laide des mots, et lentendement ne les saisit que par des propositions. Cest une
des raisons pourquoi les animaux ne sauroient se former de telles ides ni jamais
acqurir la perfectibilit qui en dpend. Quand un singe va hsiter dune noix
lautre, pense-t-on quil ait lide gnrale de cette sorte de fruit, et quil compare
son archtype ces deux individus? Non, sans doute; mais la vue de lune de ces
noix rappelle sa mmoire les sensations quil a reues de lautre; et ses yeux,
modifis dune certaine manire, annoncent son got la modification quil va
Notes
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
313
recevoir.
Toute ide gnrale est purement intellectuelle; pour peu que
limagination sen mle, lide devient aussitt particulire. Ibid., 1:26970.
Lintermdiaire entre lhomme et les autres animaux, cest le singe. Elments de
physiologie in uvres: Philosophie, edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert
Laffont, 1994), 1:1278.
Denis Diderot, Conversation between DAlembert and Diderot in Rameaus Nephew
and DAlemberts Dream, translated and introduced by Leonard Tancock (London:
Penguin Books, 1966), 15859. Cet animal se meut, sagite, crie; jentends ses cris
travers la coque; il se couvre de duvet; il voit. La pesanteur de sa tte, qui oscille,
porte sans cesse son bec contre la paroi intrieure de sa prison; la voil brise; il en
sort, il marche, il vole, il sirrite, il fuit, il approche, il se plaint, il souffre, il aime, il
dsire, il jouit; il a toutes vos affections; toutes vos actions, il les fait. Prtendrezvous, avec Descartes, que cest une pure machine imitative? Mais les petits enfants
se moqueront de vous, et les philosophes vous rpliqueront que si cest l une
machine, vous en tes une autre. Denis Diderot, Entretiens entre dAlembert et
Diderot in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat and Maurice
Denis Diderot, Sequel to the Conversation in Rameaus Nephew and DAlemberts
Dream, translated and introduced by Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin Books,
1966), 23132. cest quils ont vu dans la basse-cour de larchduc un infme
lapin qui servait de coq une vingtaine de poules infmes qui sen accommodaient;
ils ajouteront quon leur a montr des poulets couverts de poils et provenus de cette
bestialit. Croyez quon sest moqu deux. Denis Diderot, Suite de lEntretien in
Garnier, 18751877), 2:189.
Ibid., 232. Et la question de leur baptme?Ferait un beau charivari en
Sorbonne. Ibid, 190.
Ibid., 233. Avez-vous vu au Jardin du Roi, sous une cage de verre, un orangoutang qui a lair dun saint Jean qui prche au dsert?Oui, je lai vuLe cardinal
de Polignac lui disait un jour: Parle, et je te baptise. Ibid.
Laffont, 1994), 1:1278.
Denis Diderot, Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville in Political Writings,
translated and edited by John Hope Mason and Robert Wokler (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 40. Le Tatien touche lorigine du monde, et
lEuropen touche sa vieillesse. Lintervalle qui le spare de nous est plus grand
que la distance de lenfant qui nait lhomme dcrpit. Denis Diderot, Supplment
au Voyage de Bougainville in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat
CHAPTER TEN
1.
Que si tu te crois autoris mopprimer, parce que tu es plus fort et plus adroit que
moi, ne te plains donc pas quand mon bras vigoureux ouvrira ton sein pour y
314
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
chercher ton cur Denis Diderot, Histoire des deux Indes in uvres: Politique,
edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 3:739 [Guillaume-Thomas
Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des tablissemens et du commerce des
europens dans les deux Indes, Book 11, Chapter 24 (Geneva: Jean-Lonard Pellet,
1780), 3:195].
Franois Bernier, A New Division of the Earth, according to the Different Species or
Races of Men who Inhabit It, translated by T. Bendyshe, in Memoirs Read before
the Anthropological Society of London 1 (18631864): 36064 [Franois Bernier,
Nouvelle division de la Terre, pour les diffrentes espces ou races dhommes qui
lhabitent in Journal des savans, April 24, 1684, 13340].
and T. Cadell, 1785), 3:406. on peut aussi runir en une seule espce deux
successions dindividus qui se reproduisent en se mlant Georges-Louis Leclerc
de Buffon, LAsne (1753) in Histoire naturelle, gnrale et particulire, 15 volumes
(Paris: Imprimerie royale, 17491767), 4:385.
Ibid., 3:407. Lespce ntant donc autre chose quune succession constante
dindividus semblables et qui se reproduisent Ibid., 4:386.
Ibid., 3:406. on peut toujours tirer une ligne de sparation entre deux espces,
cest--dire, entre deux successions dindividus qui se reproduisent et ne peuvent se
mler Ibid., 4:385.
Ibid. chaque espce, chaque succession dindividus qui se reproduisent et ne
peuvent se mler, sera considre part et traite sparment, et nous ne nous
servirons des familles, des genres, des ordres et des classes, pas plus que ne sen sert
la Nature. Ibid., 4:386.
Ibid., 3:408. mais ces diffrences de couleur et de dimension dans la taille
nempchent pas que le Ngre et le Blanc, le Lappon et le Patagon, le gant et le
nain, ne produisent ensemble des individus qui peuvent eux-mmes se reproduire, et
que par consquent ces hommes, si diffrens en apparence, ne soient tous due seule
et mme espce, puisque cette reproduction constante est ce qui constitute lespce.
Ibid., 4:387.
cest la succession constante & le renouvellement noninterrompu de ces
individus qui la constituenton peut toujours tirer une ligne de sparation entre
deux espces, cest--dire entre deux successions dindividus qui se reproduisent &
ne peuvent se mler, comme lon peut aussi runir en une seule espce deux
successions dindividus qui se reproduisent en se mlantLespce ntant donc
autre chose quune succession constante dindividus semblables & qui se
reproduisentM. de Buffon, hist. nat. gen. & part. &c. tom. IV. p. 784 & suiv.
Denis Diderot, Espce (1755), Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des
sciences, des arts et des mtiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond
dAlembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchtel: S. Faulche,
17511765), 5:95657.
Robert Bernasconi, ed., Race (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2001, 15.
Bernasconi advises that the Latin text of 1758 is quoted by T. Bendyshe, The
History of Anthropology, Memoirs Read before the Anthropological Society of
London, vol. 1, 18631864, pp. 42426. An English translation is in Winthrop D.
Jordan White over Black (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), 22021.
Notes
315
10. Carl Linnaeus, Systema natur per regna tria natur, secundum classes, ordines,
genera, species, cum characteribus, differentiis synonymis, locis (Stockholm:
Laurentius Salvius, 1758), 1:20.
11. Ibid., 1:2224.
12. De ce qui prcede il suit que dans tout le nouveau continent que nous venons de
parcourir, il ny a quune seule & mme face dhommes, plus ou moins basans.
Les Amricains sortent dune mme souche. Les Europens sortent dune mme
souche. Du nord au midi on apperoit les mmes varits dans lun & lautre
hmisphere. Tout concourt donc prouver que le genre humain nest pas compos
despces essentiellement diffrentes. La diffrence des blancs aux bruns vient de la
nourriture, des moeurs, des usages, des climats; celle des bruns aux noir a la mme
cause. Il ny a donc eu originairement quune seule race dhommes, qui stant
multiplie & rpandue sur la surface de la terre, a donn la longue toutes les
varits dont nous venons de faire mention Diderot, Humaine espce (Hist.
nat.) (1765), Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des
13. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Of the Degeneration of animals (1766) in
Natural History, General and Particular, translated by William Smellie, 9 vols., 2nd
edition (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1785), 7:39495. sil arrivoit, dis-je,
que lhomme ft contraint dabandonner les climats quil a autrefois envahis pour se
rduire son pays natal, il reprendroit avec le temps ses traits originaux, sa taille
primitive et sa couleur naturelle: le rappel de lhomme son climat amneroit cet
effet, le mlange des races lamneroit aussi et bien plus promptement; le blanc avec
la Noire, ou le Noir avec la Blanche produisent galement un Multre dont la
couleur est brune, cest--dire, mle de blanc et de noir; ce Multre avec un Blanc
produit un second Multre moins brun que le premier; et si ce second Multre sunit
de mme un individu de race blanche, le troisme Multre naura plus quune
nuance lgre de brun qui disparotra tout--fait dans les gnrations suivantes: il ne
faut donc que cent cinquante ou deux cents ans pour laver la peau dun Ngre par
cette voie du mlange avec le sang du Blanc, mais il faudroit peut-tre un assez
grand nombre de sicles pour produire ce mme effet par la seule influence du
climat. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, De la dgnration des animaux (1766)
17491767), 14:313.
14. Ibid., 7:392. et lorsquaprs des sicles couls, des continens traverss et des
gnrations dj dgnres par linfluence des diffrentes terres, il a voulu
shabituer dans les climats extrmes, et peupler les sables du Midi et les glaces du
Nord; les changemens sont devenus si grands et si sensibles, quil y auroit lieu de
croire que le Ngre, le Lappon et le Blanc forment des espces diffrentes, si dun
ct lon ntoit assur quil ny a eu quun seul Homme de cr, et de lautre que ce
Blanc, ce Lappon et ce Ngre, si dissemblans entreux, peuvent cependant sunir
ensemble et propager en commun la grande et unique famille de notre genre
humain Ibid., 14:311.
15. Il me semble alors que je suis assez bien fond croire quil en est des hommes
comme des arbres; que les poiriers, les sapins, les chnes, et les abricotiers ne
viennent point dun mme arbre, et que les blancs barbus, les ngres portant laine,
les jaunes portant crins, et les hommes sans barbe, ne viennent pas du mme
316
Notes
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
homme. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Trait de mtaphysique, Chaptre 2,

in uvres compltes de Voltaire avec prfaces, avertissements, notes, etc., 70 vols.,
Je me demande donc pardon aux Physiciens modernes, si je ne puis admettre les
systemes quils ont si ingniusement imagins. Car je ne suis pas de ceux qui
croient quon avance la Physique en sattachant un systeme malgr quelque
phnomene qui lui est videmment incompatible; & qui, ayant remarqu
quelquendroit do suit ncessairement la ruine de ldifice, achevent cependant de
le btir, & lhabitent avec autant de scurit, que sil toit le plus solide. PierreLouis de Maupertuis, Vnus physique (The Hague, 1745), 9697.
La chymie en a depuis reconnu la ncessit; & les chymistes les plus fameux
aujourdhui, admettent lAttraction, & ltendent plus loin que nont fait les
astronomes. Pourquoi, si cette force existe dans la Nature, naurot-elle pas lieu
dans la formation du corps des animaux? Ibid., 104.
Si les premiers hommes blancs qui en virent des noirs, les avoient trouvs dans les
forts, peut-tre ne leur auroient-ils pas accord le nom dhommes. Mais ceux
quon trouva dans de grandes villes, qui toient gouverns par de sages Reines, qui
faisoient fleurir les Arts & les Sciences, dans des temps o presque tous les autres
peuples toient des barbares, ces Noirs-l, auroient bien pu ne pas vouloir regarder
les Blancs comme leurs frres. Ibid., 11920.
Tous ces peuples que nous venons de parcourir, tant dhommes divers, sont-ils
sortis dune mme mre? Il ne nous est pas permis den douter. Ce qui nous reste
examiner, cest comment dun seul individu, il a pu natre tant despeces si
diffrentes. Je vais hasarder sur cela quelques conjectures. Ibid., 134.
Ces varits, si on les pouvoit suivre, auroient peut-tre leur origine dans
quelquanctre inconnu.
Elles se perpetuent par des gnrations rptes
dindividus qui les ont; & seffacent par des gnrations dindividus qui ne les ont
pas. Mais, ce qui est peut-tre encore plus tonnant, cest aprs une interruption de
ces varits, de les voir reparotre; de voir lenfant qui ne ressemble ni son pere ni
sa mre, natre avec les traits de son ayeul. Ibid., 13839.
La Nature contient le fonds de toutes ces varits: mais le hasard ou lart les
mettent en uvre. Cest ainsi que ceux dont lindustrie sapplique satisfaire le
got des curieux, sont, pour ainsi dire, crateurs despces nouvelles. Nous voyons
parotre des races de chiens, de pigeons, de serins qui ntoient point auparavant
dans la nature. Ce nont t dabord que es individus fortuits; lart & les gnrations
rptes en ont fait des espces. Ibid., 140.
Il me parot donc dmontr que sil nat des noirs de parens blancs, ces naissances
sont incomparablement plus rares que les naissances denfans blancs de parens
noirs. Cela suffiroit peut-tre pour faire penser que le blanc est la couleur des
premiers hommes; & que ce nest que par quelque accident que le noir est devenu
une couleur hrditaire aux grandes familles qui peuplent la Zone torride; parmi
lesquelles cependant la couleur primitive nest pas si parfaitement efface quelle ne
reparoisse quelquefois. Ibid., 165.
Voici enfin une nouvelle richesse de la nature, une espce qui ne ressemble pas
tant la ntre que les barbets aux lvriers. Franois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire,
Relation touchant un Maure blanc amen dAfrique Paris en 1744 (1744) in
Notes
317
24. si nous pensons valoir beaucoup mieux queux, nous nous trompons assez
lourdement. Ibid., 38:524.
25. Ne pouroit-on pas expliquer par-l comment de deux seuls individus, la
multiplication des espces les plus dissemblables auroit pu sensuivie? Elles
nauroient d leur premire origine qu quelques productions fortuites dans
lesquelles les parties lmentaires nauroient pas retenu lordre quelles tenoient
dans les animaux pres & mres: chaque degr derreur auroit fait une nouvelle
espce; & force dcarts rpts seroit venue la diversit infinie des animaux que
nous voyons aujourdhui, qui saccrotra peut-tre encore avec le temps, mais
laquelle peut-tre la suite des sicles napporte que des accroissements
imperceptibles. Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organiss (Berlin,
1754), 4041.
26. Robert Bernasconi, editor, Race (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2001),
11.
27. Le Code Noir, ou recueil ddits, dclarations et arrts, concernant la discipline &
le commerce des esclaves ngres des Isles franaises de lAmrique in Recueils de
rglemens, dits, dclarations et arrts, concernant le commerce, ladministration
de la justice, & la police des colonies franaises de lAmrique, & les engags, avec
la Code Noir et laddition audit code (Paris: Libraires Associs, 1745), 2:81.
28. Ibid., 2:82 - 83.
29. Ibid., 2:8586.
30. Ibid., 2:86.
31. Ibid., 2:92.
32. Ibid., 2:9293.
33. Ibid., 2:95.
34. Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, Persian Letters, Letter 161 (London:
Penguin Books, 2004), 280.
35. On comptait, en 1757, dans la Saint-Domingue franaise, environ trente mille
personnes, et cent mille esclaves ngres ou multres, qui travaillaient aux sucreries,
aux plantations dindigo, de cacao, et qui abrgent leur vie pour flatter nos apptits
nouveaux, en remplissaant nos nouveaux besoins, que nos pres ne connaissaient
pas. Nous allons acheter ces ngres la cte de Guine, la cte dOr, celle
dIvoire. Il y a trente ans quon avait un beau ngre pour cinquante livres; cest
peu prs cinq fois moins quun buf grasNous leur disons quils sont hommes
comme nouset ensuite on les fait travailler comme des btes de somme; on les
nourrit plus mal: sils veulent senfuir, on leur coupe une jambe, et on leur fait
tourner bras larbre des moulins sucre, lorsquon leur a donn une jambe de bois.
Aprs cela nous osons parler du droit des gens! Franois-Marie Arouet de
Voltaire, Essai sur les murs, Chapter 152, in uvres compltes de Voltaire avec
18291840), 17:45051.
36. Cest donc aller directement contre le droit des gens & contre la nature, que de
croire que la religion chrtienne donne ceux qui la professent, un droit de rduire
en servitude ceux qui ne la professent pas, pour travailler plus aisment sa
propagation. Ce fut pourtant cette manire de penser qui encouragea les
destructeurs de lAmrique dans leurs crimes; & ce nest pas la seule fois que lon
se soit servi de la religion contre ses propres maximes, qui nous apprennent que la
qualit de prochain stend sur tout lunivers. Louis de Jaucourt, Esclavage
318
Notes
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
(1755), Encyclopdie, ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des

Trait des ngres. (Commerce dAfrique.) cest lachat des ngres que font les
Europens sur les ctes dAfrique, pour employer ces malheureux dans leurs
colonies en qualit desclaves. Cet achat de ngres, pour les rduire en esclavage,
est un ngoce qui viole la religion, la morale, les lois naturelles, & tous les droits de
la nature humaine. Louis de Jaucourt, Trait des ngres (1765), Encyclopdie,
ou Dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des arts et des mtiers, edited by Denis
Diderot and Jean Le Rond dAlembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant;
Neuchtel: S. Faulche, 17511765), 16:532.
Les rois, les princes, les magistrats ne sont point les propritaires de leurs sujets, ils
ne sont donc pas en droit de disposer de leur libert, & de les vendre pour esclaves.
Ibid.
Dun autre ct, aucun homme na droit de les acheter ou de sen rendre le matre;
les hommes & leur libert ne sont point un objet de commerce; ils ne peuvent tre ni
vendus, ni achets, ni pays aucun prix. Ibid.
Jai vu ces vastes et malheureuses contres qui ne semblent destines qu couvrir
la terre de troupeaux desclaves. A leur vil aspect jai dtourn les yeux de ddain,
dhorreur et de piti; et, voyant la quatrime partie de mes semblables change en
btes pour le service des autres, jai gmi dtre homme. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Julie, ou La Nouvelle Hlose, Lettre 3, A Madame Orbe, in uvres compltes de
1826), 9:18081.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book 1, Chapter 4, in The Social
Dent and Sons, 1913), 9. Puisquaucun homme na une autorit naturelle sur son
semblable, & puisque la force ne produit aucun droit, restent donc les conventions
pour base de toute autorit lgitime parmi les hommes. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Du Contrat social (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey, 1762), 13.
Ibid., 10. Dire quun homme se donne gratuitement, cest dire une chose absurde
& inconcevable; un tel acte est illgitime & nul, par cela seul que celui qui le fait
nest pas dans son bon sens. Dire la mme chose de tout un peuple, cest supposer
un peuple de fous: la folie ne fait pas droitRenoncer sa libert cest renoncer
sa qualit dhomme, aux droits de lhumanit, mme ses devoirsune telle
renonciation est incompatible avec la nature de lhomme, & cest ter toute moralit
ses actions que dter toute libert sa volont. Ibid., 1516.
Ibid., 13. Ainsi, de quelque sens quon envisage les choses, le droit desclavage est
nul, non seulement parce quil est illgitime, mais parce quil est absurde et ne
signifie rien. Ces mots, esclavage, et droit, sont contradictoires; ils sexcluent
mutuellement. Soit dun homme un homme, soit dun homme un peuple, ce
discours sera toujours galement insens: Je fais avec toi une convention toute ta
charge et toute mon profit, que jobserverai tant quil me plaira, et que tu
observeras tant quil me plaira. Ibid., 22.
La libert, est la libert de soi. Denis Diderot, Histoire des deux Indes in uvres:
Politique, edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 3:738 [La
libert, est la proprit de soi. Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Histoire philosophique
Notes
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
319
et politique des tablissemens et du commerce des europens dans les deux Indes,
Book 11, Chapter 24 (Geneva: Jean-Lonard Pellet, 1780), 3:194].
La libert naturelle est le droit que la nature a donn tout homme de disposer de
soi, sa volont. Ibid. [La libert naturelle, est le droit que la nature a donn
tout homme de disposer de soi, sa volont. Ibid.].
Hommes ou dmons, qui que vous soyez, oserez-vous justifier les attentats contre
mon indpendance par le droit du plus fort? Quoi! celui qui veut me rendre esclave
nest point coupable; il use de ses droits. O sont-ils ces droits? Qui leur a donn un
caractre assez sacr pour faire taire les miens? Je tiens de la nature le droit de me
dfendre; elle ne ta pas donc donn celui de mattaquer. Que si tu te crois autoris
mopprimer, parce que tu es plus fort et plus adroit que moi, ne te plains donc pas
quand mon bras vigoureux ouvrira ton sein pour y chercher ton cur Ibid.,
3:739 [Ibid., 3:195].
Mais les ngres sont une espce dhommes ns pour lesclavage. Ils sont borns,
fourbes, mchants; ils conviennent eux-mmes de la supriorit de notre
intelligence, et reconnaissent presque la justice de notre empire. Ibid., 3:740
[Ibid., 3:197].
Les ngres sont borns, parce que lesclavage brise tous les ressorts de lme. Ils
sont mchants, pas assez avec vous. Ils sont fourbes, parce quon ne doit pas la
vrit ses tyrans. Ils reconnaissent la supriorit de notre esprit, parce que nous
avons perptu leur ignorance; la justice de notre empire, parce que nous avons
abus de leur faiblesse. Dans limpossibilit de maintenir notre supriorit par la
force, une criminelle politique sest rejete sur la ruse. Vous tes presque parvenus
leur persuader quils taient une espce singulire, ne pour labjection et la
dpendance, pour le travail et le chtiment. Vous navez rien nglig pour dgrader
ces malheureux, et vous leur reprochez ensuite dtre vils. Ibid. [Ibid.].
Dailleurs, il est aussi absurde quatroce doser avancer que la plupart des
malheureux achets en Afrique sont des criminels. A-t-on peur quon nait pas
assez de mpris pour eux, quon ne les traite pas avec assez de duret? & comment
suppose-t-on quil existe un pays o il se commette tant de crimes, et o cependant
il se fasse si exacte justice Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de
Condorecet, Rflexions sur lesclavage des ngres, Chapter 2 (Neufchatel: Socit
typographique, 1781), 8.
Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, Voyage autour du monde (Paris: Saillant et Nyon,
1771).
Denis Diderot, Supplment to the Voyage of Bougainville in Political Writings,
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 37. Comment explique-t-il le sjour de
certains animaux dans des les spares de tout continent par des intervalles de mer
effrayants? Qui est-ce qui a port l le loup, le renard, le chien, le cerf, le serpent?
Denis Diderot, Supplment au Voyage de Bougainville in uvres compltes de
2:209.
Ibid. Qui sait lhistoire primitive de notre globe? Combien despaces de terre,
maintenant isols, taient autrefois continus? Le seul phnomne sur lequel on
pourrait former quelque conjecture, cest la direction de la masse des eaux qui les a
spars. Ibid.
320
Notes
53. Ibid., 38. A linspection du lieu quelle occupe sur le globe, il nest personne qui
ne se demande qui est-ce qui a plac l des hommes? Quelle communication les
liait autrefois avec le reste de leur espce? Ibid., 2:210.
54. Ibid. et de l tant dusages dune cruaut ncessaire et bizarre, dont la cause
sest perdue dans la nuit des temps, et met les philosophes la torture. Une
observation assez constante, cest que les institutions surnaturelles et divines se
fortifient et sternisent, en se transformant, la longue, en lois civiles et nationales;
et que les institutions civiles et nationales se consacrent, et dgnrent en prceptes
surnaturels et divins. Ibid.
55. Ibid. Ntait-il pas au Paraguay au moment mme de lexpulsion des jsuites?
Ibid.
56. Ibid. ces cruels Spartiates en jaquette noire en usaient avec leurs esclaves
Indiens, comme les Lacdmoniens avec les Ilotes; les avaient condamns un
travail assidu; sabreuvaient de leur sueur, ne leur avaient laiss aucun droit de
proprit; les tenaient sous labrutissement de la superstition; en exigeaient une
vnration profonde; marchaient au milieu deux, un fouet la main, et en
frappaient indistinctement tout ge et tout sexe. Ibid.
57. Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book 15,
Chapter 17, translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and
Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 260.
Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu, De lesprit des loix, Book 15, Chapter
17, in 2 volumes (Edinburgh: G. Hamilton and J. Balfour, 1750), 2:343.
58. Plutarch, Lycurgus in Lives, translated by Bernadotte Perrin, 11 vols. (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 28.14, pp. 1:289, 1:291.
59. Denis Diderot, Supplment to the Voyage of Bougainville in Political Writings,
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 39. Ce sont de bonnes gens qui viennent
vous, et qui vous embrassent en criant Chaoua. Denis Diderot, Supplment au
Voyage de Bougainville in uvres compltes de Diderot, edited by Jean Asszat
60. Ibid., 40. Le Tatien touche lorigine du monde, et lEuropen touche sa
vieillesse. Lintervalle qui le spare de nous est plus grand que la distance de
lenfant qui nat lhomme dcrpit. Ibid., 2:212.
CONCLUSION
1.

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Index
A
Abbadie, Jacques 52
Abolition of slavery
Condorcet and 240
Declaration of the Rights of Man and
the Citizen 13, 251
Diderot and 215, 238244
Encyclopedia and 234236
Jaucourt and 234236
Montesquieu and 4244, 230232
Rousseau and 11, 151153, 165,
236238
Voltaire and 222, 232234
Age of the earth 4, 6, 14, 1922, 25, 29,
31, 167168, 175, 247, 249
Albino Indian 9699
Albino Negro 98100, 110, 187188,
227228
Alembert, Jean Le Rond d 4, 121, 157,
161
Animalcules 10, 12, 26, 79, 91, 113114,
122, 128, 134136, 169, 174,
194, 249
Anthropological metamorphosis, Rousseau and 6, 1011, 16, 143,
157, 159, 166, 247, 249250
Apes, similarity to man
Battell and 4, 197, 200
Beeckman and 198199
Buffon and 34, 78, 87, 154158,
199, 203209
Diderot and 5, 12, 195196, 212
Encyclopedia and 4, 200
Green and 4
335
Jaucourt and 4, 200

La Mettrie and 12, 46, 5758, 61,
195, 199, 201203
Leguat and 198
Lopez and 196
Maillet and 24, 189, 199
Perrault 201
Petty 201
Pigafetta and 196
Prvost and 4
Purchas and 4, 197199
Rousseau and 5, 1112, 156163,
166, 195, 199, 209212, 250
Smith and 199
Tyson and 199, 201
Apes, possibility of speaking
Buffons opposition to 154155,
203209, 212
Cartesians opposition to 1213,
196, 203205, 251
Diderot in favor of 5, 12, 195196,
212214
La Mettrie in favor of 12, 49, 57,
195, 201203
materialists in favor of 1213, 195
196, 209
Perraults opposition to 201
Rousseaus opposition to 12, 209
212
Tysons opposition to 201
Aristotle 12, 7, 14, 34, 48, 75, 88, 90,
94, 111, 146148, 152, 193,
201, 248
Arrangement of parental elements
Diderot and 910, 131132, 138,
141, 244, 249
336
Index
Maupertuis and 17, 57, 94, 97, 100,

110111, 113, 117, 120, 131,
138, 226, 228, 244, 249
Atheism
Diderot and 3, 6, 52, 63, 65, 70, 121,
123129, 139, 222, 247
La Mettrie and 8, 47, 5152, 54, 65,
67, 248
Voltaires opposition to 3, 106107,
168170, 172174, 176177,
184, 186, 194
Atomic motion 34, 8, 10, 1213, 46, 53,
6364, 67, 88, 112, 119121,
124125, 127130, 132, 135,
141, 247250
Attraction 105106, 223
B
Battell, Andrew 4, 197, 200
Beeckman, Daniel 198199
Beeson, David 109, 115116
Belon, Pierre 76
Bergerac, Cyrano de 21
Bernasconi, Robert 219, 229
Bernier, Franois 13, 217218
Biological engineering 212, 214, 226
Birth defects 11, 15, 5657, 6263, 70,
93, 9596, 9899, 108110,
113, 117, 120122, 126, 129,
131, 137, 140141, 226, 249
Black Code (Code Noir) 229231, 233,
245
Blacks 84, 93, 96, 100, 110, 187188,
200, 218224, 227228,
232235, 239240
Boerhaave, Hermann 49
Bonnet, Charles 105, 184185
Bordeu, Thophile de 15, 139
Bowler, Peter J. 2930
Brain size 47
Brins, see Fibers
Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de
All that can be, is 2, 9, 91, 248
animalcules and 79, 91, 113, 134
135, 169
apes and 34, 78, 87, 154158, 199,
203209
The Ass 76, 8590, 158, 218219

The Camel and the Dromedary 75,
8182, 91
Carnivorous Animals 207
chain of beings and 23, 89, 15,
7679, 83, 91, 120, 249
classification and 13, 77
climate and 70, 7375, 7984, 91,
120, 220221
cosmogony and 8, 29, 7374
creationism and 73, 145, 207208,
247
crossbreeding (hybridization) and 5,
82, 8586, 91, 120, 134
degeneration and 8, 1516, 7374,
8083, 8791 120, 133136,
144, 146147, 150152, 163,
220221, 247, 250
Degeneration of Animals 220221
Diderot and 2, 9, 1314, 16, 7273,
7879, 84, 88, 90, 113, 119
120, 122, 130, 133135,
139140, 174175, 219,
248249
Discourse on the Nature of Animals
204205, 207
domestication and 15, 8182, 120,
134, 151, 221
epigenesis and 7071, 90
environment and 70, 73, 75, 80, 82,
91
First Discourse 152
flux and 88
food and 70, 8084, 91
geographical determinism and 74,
82, 120
The Goat 81, 85, 89
God and 8, 73, 7679, 82, 87
genus, family, species and 77
Harvey and 70
The Hog, the Hog of Siam, and the
Wild Boar 69
homologies and 8687, 91, 120, 122,
130
The Horse 7374, 81
interior molding force and 1517,
7274, 79, 9092, 133, 143
Index
land of origin and 7375, 80, 82, 91,
221
legacy of 70, 74, 79
Linnaeus and 3, 13, 15, 77, 187
The Lion 7475, 80
matrix theory and 7780
Maupertuis and 2, 9, 13, 7273, 78
79, 88, 90, 113114, 248
249
mutability of species and 15, 81, 86
91
Natural History, General and Particular 2, 30, 69, 77, 122,
140, 162, 177178, 219220
Needham and 79, 9091
Nomenclature of Apes 207208
on blacks 84
On the Varieties of the Human Species 84
opposition to Voltaire 177178,
181183, 189
organic molecules and 7172, 79,
9091
overlapping physical characteristics
and 3, 89, 14, 7778, 120,
130
pangenesis and 71
perfection of species 8082, 134
preformation, rejection of 70
prototype and 70, 7374, 76, 7881,
8587, 91, 120
Purchas and 198
quadrupeds and 7678
race and 13, 7071, 81, 8385, 87,
218219
racial classification and 13
Recapitulation 71
Rousseau and 8, 11, 17, 143163,
166, 209210, 212, 247, 250
species, definition of 69, 8586, 187,
218219, 244
spontaneous generation and 72, 79,
9091, 113, 134135
Supplement to the Natural History
182
time and 6970, 7274, 7879, 81
82, 8486, 8891
337
Theory of the Earth 14, 28, 177, 182,
189
transformism, denial of 1617, 69
70, 8592
unity of plan and 7576
169, 178, 184
way of life and 8283, 91
C
Cartesianism 1213, 51, 116, 153, 162,
193, 196, 203205, 214, 236,
251
Cassirer, Ernst 48
Chabenat, P. 182183
Chain of beings
Aristotle and 12, 14
Buffon and 23, 89, 15, 7679, 83,
91, 120, 249
continuity and the 12, 8
definition of 12, 5
Diderot and 34, 9, 14, 119, 122,
130, 138, 212, 214
La Mettrie and 4546, 49, 53, 5657,
6061, 66
plenitude and the 12, 8
Rousseau and 145, 147, 150151,
160162
Voltaires opposition to 3, 12, 168,
170172
Chance, random 34, 8, 15, 46, 5354,
59, 6263, 99100, 102103,
107109, 120121, 124125,
133, 139, 168169, 178, 214,
222, 226229, 248
Chaos (chaos) 8, 10, 3738, 46, 6263,
67, 88, 119, 124128, 135,
142, 248
Civilized man, Rousseau and 152, 155,
163164, 243, 250
Climate
Buffon and 70, 7375, 7984, 91,
120, 220221
Diderot and 132134, 214, 220
La Mettrie and 8, 45, 5556, 67, 201,
248
Montesquieu and 7, 3844, 231, 248
338
Index
Code Noir, see Black Code

Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de 157, 161
Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas
de Caritat, marquis de 240
Consciousness (sensibilit)
emergent
Diderot and 9, 115, 119120,
131132, 249
Maupertuis and 9, 111, 114
115, 117, 120, 249
La Mettrie and 4551, 53, 55
57, 63, 67
memory and 9, 11, 51, 90, 107, 112
115, 117, 130132, 137, 141,
153, 168, 206207, 211213,
249
sentiment of existence 164165, 210
Continuity 12, 8
Converts (conversos) 229
Coulet, Henri 43, 129, 139140
Creationism
Buffon and 73, 145, 207208, 247
Voltaire and 6, 12, 104, 167, 174,
184, 189, 247
Crocker, Lester 1415, 53, 61, 65, 67,
121, 129, 139
Crossbreeding (hybridization)
Buffon and 5, 82, 8586, 91, 120,
134
Diderot and 137138, 212213
Maupertuis and 9495, 99, 112113,
222223, 225, 227, 229
Cuna Indians 9699
D
dAlembert, see Alembert, Jean Le Rond
d
Dapper, Olfert 156, 158
Daubenton, Pierre 76
Da Vinci, Leonardo 96, 175176
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen 13, 251
Degeneration 8, 1516, 7374, 8083,
8791 120, 133136, 144,
146147, 150152, 163,
220221, 247, 250
Deism
definition of 167
Diderots period of 52, 65, 121125,
127, 139
Rousseau and 143, 145, 149, 166
Voltaire and 3, 6, 8, 12, 17, 25, 27
28, 104, 106107, 167170,
173174, 176, 180, 184, 186,
188, 194, 250
Democritus 111, 124, 135
Derham, William 52
Descartes, Ren 4749, 51, 112, 153, 173,
193194, 203204, 213
Diderot, Denis 910, 1417, 139141
animals and 56, 121, 127128,
134135, 138
apes and 5, 12, 195196, 212214
arrangement of parental elements
and 910, 131132, 138,
141, 244, 249
atheism and 3, 6, 52, 63, 65, 70, 121,
123129, 139, 222, 247
atomic motion and 119121, 124
125, 127132, 135, 141
biological engineering and 212, 214
Bordeu and 15, 139
Buffon and 2, 9, 1314, 16, 7273,
7879, 84, 88, 90, 113, 119
120, 122, 130, 133135,
139140, 174175, 219,
248249
chain of beings and 34, 9, 14, 119,
122, 130, 138, 212, 214
chance, random and 4, 10, 17, 119
129, 131134, 136, 139141
chaos and 119, 124128, 135, 141
climate and 132134, 214, 220
conscious property of atoms and 6,
910, 120, 129132, 137
138, 141
Conversation between dAlembert
and Diderot 122, 132, 136,
212
crossbreeding (hybridization) and
137138, 212213
DAlemberts Dream 122, 128129,
132134, 136, 157, 174
deistic period 52, 65, 121125, 127,
139
Index
egg and 141
Elements of Physiology 129, 140,
212, 214, 246
emergent consciousness and 9, 115,
119120, 131132, 249
Encyclopedia and 4, 84, 119, 121,
125, 139, 214, 219220
environment and 133, 214
epigenesis and 119120, 136137
fibers (brins) and 121, 129, 137,
140141
final causes, opposition to 3, 129
flux and 4, 119, 121122, 125129,
133136, 139141
food and 120, 132133
fractals and 128, 136
games of chance and 4, 46, 62, 121,
124, 133, 139
geographical determinism 132133
Harvey and 120, 136
heredity and 910, 122, 129, 131,
133, 136137
History of Two Indias, contributions
to 216, 238
homologies and 120, 122, 130
inherited errors and 910, 120, 122,
131, 137138, 140141
La Mettrie and 16, 6266, 119, 139
141
Leibniz and 15, 126, 139
Letter on the Blind 6263, 6566,
121, 125126, 128129, 136
Lucretius and 7, 119, 122124, 127,
139, 141
Maillet and 139
materialism and 24, 6, 9, 12, 16, 52,
65, 70, 78, 90, 123, 139, 141
Maupertuis and 2, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17,
119120, 122, 129132,
136140
mechanism and 126, 129
memory and 910, 130132, 137,
141
monsters and 121122, 126129,
139140
motive property of atoms and 119
121, 124125, 127132, 135,
141
339
mutability of species and 910, 13
15, 7374, 119121, 125,
129137, 139, 141
natural man and 244
Needham and 119, 123, 134135
overlapping physical characteristics
and 14, 120, 122, 130
pantheism (Spinozism) and 121, 123,
139
permutations and 121, 124128, 133,
141
Philosophic Thoughts
condemnation by the Parlement
de Paris 65
Thought 18 52, 65, 121122,
134
Thought 19 123
Thought 21 46, 6263, 123
126, 128
preformation, rejection of 136
probability theory and 10, 14, 119,
121, 124129, 139141
racial classification and 13
Raynal and 238239
Robinet and 15, 139
self-similarity and 128, 135
Sequel to the Conversation 5, 122,
133, 138, 196, 213214
slavery, opposition to 13, 215, 238
244
spontaneous generation and 119,
123, 134135
Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville 215, 241244
symmetry and 128, 135
Thoughts on the Interpretation of
Nature 9, 46, 110, 122, 136,
249
Thought 12 63, 79, 86, 114
115, 119, 129130
Thought 50 115, 130131
time and 34, 10, 119, 121128,
131, 133136, 138139, 141
transformism and 910, 1315, 73
74, 119121, 125, 129137,
139, 141
way of life and 132134
Diodorus of Sicily 224225, 230
340
Index
Domestication 15, 81, 120, 134, 151, 221

Duchet, Michle 16, 140, 239
Duclos, Charles Pinot 157, 161
E
Eddy, John H. 16
Egg and Diderot 141
Ehrard, Jean 16, 39, 42, 140
Embotement (encasement), see Preformation
Encyclopedia 4, 84, 119, 121, 125, 139,
198, 214, 219220
Environment
Buffon 70, 73, 75, 80, 82, 91
Diderot 133, 214
La Mettrie 8, 45, 5556, 64, 67, 201
Maillet 7, 24, 2931, 248
Montesquieu 4043
Rousseau 144, 166
Epicurus 6, 8, 25, 27, 30, 46, 48, 61, 66,
112, 122, 124, 135
Epigenesis
Buffon and 7071, 90
Diderot and 119120, 136137
Maupertuis and 9395, 97100,
104105, 112113, 222223
Voltaires opposition to 168, 184
186
Experimentation 11, 22, 79, 85, 87, 111,
113, 123, 134, 138, 157, 161,
166, 183, 217, 250
Extension 48, 51, 172
F
Farber, Paul Lawrence 16
Fellows, Otis E. 1517, 28, 31, 37, 6970,
72, 79, 155, 157159, 165
Fnelon, Franois de Salignac de la
Mothe- 37, 52
Fibers (brins) 121, 129, 137, 140141
Final causes
Diderots opposition to 3, 129
Maupertuis opposition to 101, 104
105
Voltaires defense of 3, 169170,
186187, 190
Flux
Buffon and 88
Diderot and 4, 119, 121122, 125
129, 133136, 139141
La Mettrie and 46, 6263, 66, 88
Montesquieu 33, 38, 4344
Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bouyer de 6,
19, 25, 3031, 43, 57, 133
134
Food
Buffon and 70, 8084, 91
La Mettrie and 45, 52, 5556, 58, 66
Fossils 4, 14
articles in the Encyclopedia 4
Maillet and 6, 19, 22, 29
Voltaires opposition to 12, 14, 168,
175184
Fractals, Diderot and 128, 136
Free will, Rousseau and 143, 152, 158
159, 166
G
Games of chance 4, 46, 62, 121, 124, 133,
139
Gauthier, David 164165, 210
Gellius, Aulus 34
Generation, spontaneous, see Spontaneous generation
Genus, family, and species 3, 77
Geographical determinism 7, 13, 19, 39,
4243, 74, 82, 120, 132133,
221, 244, 248
Glass, Bentley 1415, 70, 104, 109110,
140
God
Buffon and 3, 73, 7679, 82, 87, 91
Voltaire and 3, 12, 17, 28, 167174,
176, 184, 186188, 191192,
194
Gourevitch, Victor 160
Gregory, Mary Efrosini 14, 119141
H
Haber, Francis 1415
Index
341
Hartsoeker, Nicholas 52, 123

Harvey, William 10, 59, 70, 94, 97, 99,
120, 136, 184185
Hereditary errors
Diderot and 910, 120, 122, 131,
133, 137138, 140141
Maupertuis and 9, 15, 17, 57, 93
100, 108, 110111, 113,
116117
Herodotus 7, 3435, 146, 148, 248
Hill, Emita 139
Hobbes, Thomas 38
Homo duplex 196, 207
Homologies 8687, 91, 120, 122, 130
Hooke, Robert 176
Huygens, Christian 59
Hybridization (crossbreeding)
Buffon and 5, 82, 8586, 91, 120,
134
Diderot and 137138, 212213
222223, 225, 227, 229
I
Imagination 51, 95, 153, 211
Inequality, Rousseau and 5, 1012, 17,
144147, 151153, 160161,
164166
Inheritance
Diderot and 910, 122, 129, 131,
133, 136137
La Mettrie and 8, 45, 5556, 58, 67
Maupertuis and 93, 97 8, 108110
Instinct
203
Rousseau and 150152, 162, 210
211
Interior molding force (moule intrieure)
1517, 7274, 79, 9092,
133, 143 1517, 7274, 79,
9092, 133, 143
Ivory fossils 4
J
Jaucourt, Louis de
article on pongos 4, 200

slavery, opposition to 234236, 244
L
La Mettrie, Julien Offray de
age and 45, 5556, 66
apes and language 12, 49, 57, 195,
201203
atheism and 8, 47, 5152, 54, 65, 67,
248
Boerhaave and 49
brain size and 57, 201203
chain of beings and, 4546, 49, 53,
5657, 6061, 66
climate and 8, 45, 5556, 67, 201,
248
consciousness and 4551, 53, 5557,
63, 67
continuity and 8, 53, 61, 66
Descartes and 4749, 51
Diderot and 16, 6266, 119, 139
141
empiricism and 52
environment and 8, 45, 5556, 64,
67, 201
Epicurus and 6, 25, 30, 46, 48, 53,
61, 6366
extension and 48, 51
final causes, rejection of 64, 67
five senses and 8, 5052, 63, 66
flux and 46, 6263, 66, 88
food and 45, 52, 5556, 58, 66
Harvey and 59
imagination and 51
immortal soul, rejection of 8, 4552,
56, 60, 65
inheritance and 8, 45, 5556, 58, 67
instinct and 5758, 6061, 201203
language and 46, 49, 5758, 61, 64
learning and 45, 5556, 67
Locke and 51
Lucretius and 6, 25, 30, 46, 48, 53,
61, 6366
Maillet and 6, 2527, 6465
Man a Machine 26, 4546, 51, 195,
199, 201
Man a Plant 46, 60
342
materialism and 12, 16, 47, 52, 65
Maupertuis and 45, 5657, 65
memory and 51, 90
monism and 8, 47
monsters and 62
motive property of atoms and 46, 53,
6364, 67
The Natural History of the Soul 45,
47, 49, 5152, 65
Needham and 26
panspermia and 6, 8, 46, 59, 61, 64
Plato and 49
plenitude and 8
random chance and 8, 46, 53, 59,
6264, 67
reliance on physiology 4546, 48
49, 5556, 58, 63, 67
self-organizing power of matter and
4647, 49, 5254, 6061, 64
The System of Epicurus 8, 25, 27, 46,
61, 66
Trembleys polyp and 16, 2627,
5354, 61
Land of origin 7375, 80, 82, 91, 221
Language
Rousseau and 1112, 154157
Learning, La Mettrie and 5, 4547, 53
Least Action, Principle of 28, 105, 108,
205
Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van 185
Leguat, Franois 198
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 15, 30, 51,
53, 58, 76, 101, 106, 126,
139
Le Mascrier, Abb Jean-Baptiste 21
Leroys watch 59
Leucippus 124, 234236, 238239
Liberty 165
Linnaeus, Carolus 3, 13, 15, 61, 77, 153,
187, 219220
Locke, John 30, 48, 51, 111, 162
Lopez, Odoardo 196
Lovejoy, Arthur O. 2, 1416, 69, 71, 86
90, 140, 159, 171172
Loy, J. Robert 3738
Lucretius Carus, Titus 68, 2427, 30,
3536, 53, 61, 6366, 102,
Index
107, 119, 122124, 127, 139,
141, 151, 248
M
Mac, Jean-Baptiste 137
Maillet, Benot de
age of the earth and 6, 1922, 25, 29,
247
apes and 2324, 189
Diderot and 139
environment and 7, 24, 2931, 248
fossils and 6, 19, 22, 29
Lucretius and 2427, 30
mermaids, mermen and 16, 2122,
24, 2728, 31
panspermia and 6, 8, 1516, 2427,
2930, 6465
Telliamed 68, 15, 1922, 24, 26
30, 64, 160, 179, 189190,
247
transformism and 7, 2124, 25, 27,
30, 189191
Voltaires ridicule of 179180, 189
192, 194
Malebranche, Nicolas 48, 51
Malpighi, Marcello 52, 122, 185
Mammoths 4, 121, 175
Materialism
definition of 47
Diderot and 24, 6, 9, 12, 16, 52, 65,
70, 78, 90, 123, 139, 141
La Mettrie and 12, 16, 47, 52, 65
Matrix theory 7780
Maupertuis, Pierre-Louis de 9, 93, 116
117
Albino Indian and 9699
Albino Negro and 98100
animalcules and 113114
attraction and 105106, 223
birth defects and 15, 9596, 98, 110
111, 113, 117
blacks and 93, 96, 100, 110
Buffon and 2, 9, 13, 7273, 7879,
88, 90, 113114, 248249
Cartesianism, against 112, 116
Index
crossbreeding (hybridization) and
9495, 99, 112113, 222
223, 225, 227, 229
Diderot and 2, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17, 119
120, 122, 129132, 136140
Dissertation on the Origin of Blacks
93, 95101, 222223
emergent consciousness and 9, 111,
114115, 117, 120, 249
epigenesis, defense of 9395, 97
100, 104105, 112113,
222223
Essay on Cosmology 93, 101105
Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies 93, 107, 110116
experimentation and 111, 113
final causes, against 101, 104105
Harvey, influence of 94, 97, 99
hereditary errors and 9, 15, 17, 57,
93100, 108, 110111, 113,
116117
homologies and 76
Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics 93, 100, 115, 129130,
137
influence of 110
inherited errors and 93100, 108,
110111, 113, 116117
least action and 28, 105, 108, 205
Letters 93, 106, 108110
Lucretius and 93101, 102, 107
mathematics and 105, 108109, 117
monsters and 95
monogenesis and 13, 222
Needham and 113
null hypothesis and 109, 117
Physical Dissertation on the Origin
of the White Negro 93, 95
101, 222223
Physical Venus 105, 108, 112, 114,
185, 222224
polydactyly and 9, 15, 93, 98, 108
112, 140, 249
preformation, rejection of 9499,
102, 105, 111112, 115, 117
probability theory and 108109, 117
343
race and 9496, 98100, 104, 111,
115116
random chance and 94, 98100,
102103, 107108
Response to the Objections of Mr.
Diderot 116
Ruhe family and 108109, 111, 116
statistical probability of recurrence
of inherited errors 9, 15,
108109, 117, 140, 228, 249
System of Nature 93, 110
traits and 9, 9495, 97, 100, 102,
106, 108110, 113, 117,
129132, 137, 223, 226227
transformism and 85, 94, 9699, 221
104108, 168170, 184185,
187
Mayer, Jean 65
Mechanism, Diderot and 126, 129
Mela, Pomponius 7, 3435, 248
Memory
Diderot and 910, 130132, 137,
141
La Mettrie and 51, 90
Milliken, Stephen F. 16, 69
Molding force, interior moule intrieure)
1517, 7274, 79, 9092,
133, 143 1517, 7274, 79,
9092, 133, 143
Monboddo, Lord 157158
Monism 8, 16, 41, 47, 141, 196
Monogenesis 13, 221222
Monsters 78, 15, 21, 35, 62, 95, 121
122, 126129, 139140, 147,
158, 179, 197, 220, 222223,
225, 227, 236, 248
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat
de 138, 141
climate and 7, 3844, 231, 248
environment and 4043
Fenelon and 37
flux and 33, 38, 4344
Lucretius and 7, 3536
mutability of the physical form and
7, 3335, 248
Persian Letters 7, 3334, 3738,
230, 248
344
Index

234, 243244
Spirit of Laws 7, 38, 43, 231, 234,
248
Troglodytes 7, 3338, 43, 145146,
248
Moran, Francis 17, 159163, 198199
Morel, Jean 156
Motive property of atoms, random 34, 8,
10, 1213, 46, 53, 6364, 67,
88, 112, 119121, 124125,
127130, 132, 135, 141,
247250
Muller, G.-Fr. 177
Musschenbroek, Pieter van 52, 122
Mutability of the physical form
Buffons opposition to 1617, 69
70, 8592
Diderots defense of 910, 1315,
7374, 119121, 125, 129
137, 139, 141
Maillet and 7, 2124, 25, 27, 30,
189191
Maupertuis and 85, 94, 9699, 221
Rousseaus opposition to 8, 1012,
1617, 143145, 148150,
157, 159, 166
167168, 183, 186187,
189190, 192194
N
Natural man, Rousseau and 11, 147, 151
155, 159164, 195, 198,
209210, 237238
Needham, John Turberville 26
Buffon and 79, 9091
Diderot and 119, 123, 134135
La Mettrie and 26
Maupertuis and 113
169, 172174, 184, 190, 194
Newton, Isaac 32, 52, 101102, 105106,
122124, 126127, 132,
167168, 172, 174, 183, 186,
191, 193194, 205
Nieuwentyt, Bernard 52, 123

Null hypothesis 109, 117
O
Oculocutaneous albinism 9799
Organic molecules 2829, 7172, 79, 90
91, 189
Overlapping physical characteristics
Buffon and 3, 89, 14, 7778, 120,
130
Diderot and 14, 120, 122, 130
Ovid 27, 190
P
Panspermia 45
definition 24
La Mettrie and 6, 8, 46, 59, 61, 64
Maillet and 6, 8, 1516, 2427, 29
30, 6465
Voltaires denial of 190
Pantheism, Diderot and 121, 123, 139
Pascal, Voltaires ridicule of 191192
Perfection of species
Buffon and 8082, 134
Rousseau and 11, 145, 151152,
156157, 159, 199, 204, 206,
209, 211212, 250
Perkins, Jean E. 16, 65, 140
Permutations, Diderot and 121, 124128,
133, 141
Perrault, Claude 76, 201
Petty, William 201
Photophobia 9799
Pigafetta, Philippo 196197
Plato 14, 4849, 171, 201
Plenitude 12, 8
Pliny the Elder 7, 21, 24, 31, 3435, 47,
146, 148, 248
Plutarch 234, 243
Polydactyly, Maupertuis and 6, 10, 9395
Polygenesis 13, 222, 228
Powell, James 20
Preformation
Buffons rejection of 70
Diderots rejection of 136
Index
345
Maupertuis rejection of 8586, 9091,

95, 97, 99
Voltaires defense of 168, 184186
Prvost, Antoine-Franois, abb 4, 161,
198
Probability theory
Diderot and 10, 14, 119, 121, 124
129, 139141
Maupertuis and 108109, 117
Rousseau and 10, 144, 146, 148
149, 154, 160
Prototype, Buffon and 70, 7374, 76, 78
81, 8587, 91, 120
Punctum saliens, see Rising point
Purchas, Samuel 4, 158159, 197200,
234236
Pythagoras 111, 117
Q
Quadrupeds, Buffon and 7678
R
Race
as a foil for civilized Europe 13,
161, 215, 240241
Bernier and 13, 217218
Buffon and 13, 7071, 81, 8385,
87, 218219
the Citizen 13, 251
Diderot and 13, 215
Linnaeus and 13, 187, 219220
111, 115116
Montesquieu and 231232
monogenesis 13, 221222
polygenesis 13, 222, 228
slavery 9, 11, 13, 4244, 151153,
165, 215, 222, 230234,
236240
unity of the human 8385, 161, 166,
168, 187, 189, 220, 230, 241,
244
Voltaire and 13, 168, 170171, 187
189
Random chance, see Chance, random
Ray, John 52
Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, abb de 238
239
Redi, Francesco 123, 134, 174
Richebourg, Marguerite 155
Rising point (punctum saliens) 59
Robinet, Jean-Baptiste-Ren 15, 139
Roe, Shirley A. 184
Roger, Jacques 1416, 25, 27, 30, 45, 54,
61, 6465, 69, 72, 74, 79,
8283, 90, 101102, 104,
106, 140, 153154, 174, 189,
194, 207208
Rosenfield, Leonora Cohen 203204
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
anthropological metamorphosis and
6, 1011, 16, 143, 157, 159,
166, 247, 249250
apes and 5, 1112, 156163, 166,
195, 199, 209212, 250
biological transformism, opposition
to 8, 1012, 1617, 143145,
148150, 157, 159, 166
Buffon, influence of 8, 11, 17, 143
163, 166, 209210, 212, 247,
250
Cartesianism and 12, 153
chain of being and 145, 147, 150
151, 160162
childhood and 149, 151, 154155
civilized man and 11, 145147, 152,
155, 160, 163164
Confessions 155
convention and 147, 151, 164
deism and 143, 145, 149, 166
dependence on what others think of
us 165
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 5, 1011, 16, 143144,
153, 156, 161162, 164165,
199, 209210
Domestication and 144, 151, 163
Emile 143, 145, 150, 163
Essay on the Origin of Languages
209
environment 144, 166
free will and 143, 152, 158159, 166
346
Index
inequality, moral and political 11

12, 17, 147, 151152, 160
161, 164166
inequality, natural or physical 17,
147, 152, 164
instinct and 150152, 162, 210211
Julie, or the New Helose 236238
language and 1112, 154157
liberty and 152, 163, 165, 238
Monboddo and 157158
natural man and 11, 147, 151155,
159164, 195, 198, 209210,
237238
perfectibility and 11, 145, 151152,
156157, 159, 199, 204, 206,
209, 211212, 250
probability and 10, 144, 146, 148
149, 154, 160
Purchas and 158159
self-love and 164165
sentiment of existence 164165
slavery, opposition to 151153, 165,
236238
Social Contract 238, 292294
sociological change and 10, 166, 249
Rudwick, Martin J.S. 183184
Ruhe family 108109, 111, 116
S
San Blas Indians 9699
Schmidt, Johan Werner 139
Seguin, Jean-Pierre 65
Self-love 164165
self-similarity, Diderot and 128, 135
Sensibilit, see Consciousness
Sentiment of existence 164165, 210
Sesostris I 224
Severino, Marco Aurelio 76
Siberian mammoths 4, 121, 175, 250
Singh, Christine M. 139
Smith, William 199
Solinus, Gaius Julius 34
Slavery, abolition of
Condorcet and 240
the Citizen 13, 251
Diderot and 13, 215, 238244
Encyclopedia and 234236, 244

Jaucourt and 234236, 244
Montesquieu and 4244, 230234,
243244
Rousseau and 151153, 165, 236
238
Voltaire and 222, 232234
Sloan, Phillip R. 16
Sorenson, Leonard 17, 164
Spallanzani, Lazzaro 173174
Species
Buffons definition of 69, 8586,
187, 218219, 244
Voltaire on 167168, 170172, 176
177, 179, 181, 183, 186189,
192, 195, 228
Spinoza, Benedict de 30, 116, 123, 169
Spitzer, Leo 65
Spontaneous generation
Buffon and 72, 79, 9091, 113, 134
135
Diderot and 119, 123, 134135
168169, 172174, 184
Starobinski, Jean 162164
Stenger, Gerhardt 139
Steno (Niels Stensen) 176
Substantial forms 191193
Suratteau, Aurlie 139
Swammerdam, Jan 76
Symmetry, Diderot and 128, 135
T
Talking apes, possibility of
Buffons opposition to 154155,
203209, 212194
Diderot 195, 212214
La Mettrie 12, 49, 57, 195, 201203
Rousseau 156, 209212
Teleology 101, 104
Thales 124
Thomson, Ann 16, 140
Thucydides 34
Time
Buffon and 6970, 7274, 7879,
8182, 8486, 8891
Index
347
Diderot and 34, 10, 119, 121128,

131, 133136, 138139, 141
Titus-Livy, 34
Traits, Maupertuis and 9, 9495, 97, 100,
102, 106, 108110, 113, 117,
129132, 137, 223, 226227
Transformism, biological
Buffons opposition to 1617, 69
70, 8592
Diderots defense of 910, 1315,
7374, 119121, 125, 129
137, 139, 141
Maillet and 7, 2124, 25, 27, 30,
189191
Maupertuis and 85, 94, 9699, 221
Rousseaus opposition to 8, 1012,
1617, 143145, 148150,
157, 159, 166
167168, 183, 186187,
189190, 192194
Trembleys polyp 16, 2627, 5354, 61,
140
Tripartite soul 4950, 193
Troglodytes 7, 3338, 43, 145146, 220,
248
Tyson, Edward 198199, 201
U
Unity of the human race 8385, 161, 166,
168, 187, 189, 220, 230, 241,
244
Unity of plan 7576
Ussher, James 2021
V
Vallisneri, Antonio 176, 185
Vartanian, Aram 16, 5152, 54, 6566,
140
Vernire, Paul 34, 37, 65, 123
Versini, Laurent 239
Virgil 63
Vital forces 223
Vital laws 223
Voltaire, Franois-Marie Arouet de
ABC 174
age of the earth and 167168, 175
184
Age of Louis XIV 174
albino Negro and 187188
animalcules, denial of 169, 174175,
194
atheism, opposition to 3, 106107,
168170, 172174, 176177,
184, 186, 194
Bonnet, defense of 184185
Buffon, opposition to 25, 2829,
169, 178, 184
chain of beings, opposition to 3, 12,
168, 170172
creationism and 6, 12, 104, 167, 174,
184, 189, 247
Defense of My Uncle 167, 173, 178,
180, 189, 194
deism and 3, 6, 8, 12, 17, 25, 2728,
104, 106107, 167170,
173174, 176, 180, 184, 186,
188, 194, 250
Descartes, ridicule of 173174, 193
194
Dialogues of Euhemerus 175
Diderot, opposition to 34, 168169,
172, 174175
epigenesis, opposition to 168, 184
186
Essay on Morals 233234
final causes and 3, 169170, 186
187, 190
fossils, opposition to 12, 14, 168,
175184
God and 3, 12, 17, 28, 167174, 176,
184, 186188, 191192, 194
Harvey, opposition to 184185
La Henriade 63, 125
History of Doctor Akakia and the
Native of Saint-Malo 106
Maillet, ridicule of 179180, 189
192, 194
The Man of Forty Ecus 27, 189190
Maupertuis, opposition to 28, 101,
104108, 168170, 184185,
187
348
Index
Needham, opposition to 25, 2728,
169, 172174, 184, 190, 194
On the Changes that Have Taken
Place on Earth and on Petrifications that are Pretended
to Still BearWitness 177178
on blacks 187188
on species 167168, 170172, 176
177, 179, 181, 183, 186189,
192, 195, 228
panspermia, denial of 190
Pascal, ridicule of 191192
Philosophical Dictionary articles on
atheism 106108, 168170, 186
chain of beings 170172
soul 193
theism 188
Poem on the Lisbon Disaster 172
polygenesis and 13, 222, 228
preformation, defense of 168, 184
186
Questions on the Encyclopedia 174
175
Questions on Miracles 172174
race and 13, 168, 170171, 187189
random chance, opposition to 3, 12,
167170, 176, 186, 194
Report concerning a White Moor
brought from Africa to Paris
in 1744 187188, 228
science, opposition to 12, 17, 168
169, 172186, 189, 193194,
250
Singularities of Nature 180181,
186, 190194
The Snails of Reverend Father
Dung-beetle-monger 174
Summary of the Age of Louis XV 174
Spallanzani and 173174
spontaneous generation, opposition
to 12, 28, 168169, 172175,
184, 194
Supplement to the Age of Louis XIV
174
transformism, opposition to 89, 12,
167168, 183, 186187,
189190, 192194
Travels of Scarmentado 232233

Treatise on Metaphysics 186187,
222
We Must Take Sides, or the Principle
of Action 172
Von Wolf, Johann Christian 101
W
Wafer, Lionel 9699
Wartofsky, Marx W. 16, 140141
Way of life
Buffon and 8283, 91
Diderot 132134
Wokler, Robert 200201
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GregoryMary9781433103735:PaulsonDD.

EVOLUTIONISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT

MARY EFROSINI GREGORY received her B.A. and M.A. in French

Mary Efrosini Gregory

This book examines how eight eighteenth-century French

Mary Efrosini Gregory

EVOLUTIONISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT

MARY EFROSINI GREGORY received her B.A. and M.A. in French

Mary Efrosini Gregory

This book examines how eight eighteenth-century French

Mary Efrosini Gregory

Currents in Comparative Romance

New York y Washington, D.C./Baltimore y Bern

Mary Efrosini Gregory

New York y Washington, D.C./Baltimore y Bern

Conclusion .................................................................................................. 247

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the chain of beings as a conception

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

infinity,4 In both cases progression to infinity is impossible,5 and for that

That year Buffon also criticized Linnaeus efforts to categorize living

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Maillet, Montesquieu, La Mettrie, Buffon, Maupertuis, Diderot, Rousseau,

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Chapter Three examines the thought of the physician Julien Offray de La

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

ment as to biological transformism, which he denied, but rather, a scathing

WHAT CRITICS HAVE WRITTEN ON

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

exception is Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species, which demonstrates

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

advocate of biological transformism: Otis Fellows, Buffon and Rousseau:

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Intermediary species between men and fish (mermen and mermaids)

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

powers of Trembleys polyp, and so he found Maillet useful because he

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

As an exponent of the retreating-ocean theory, he assumed that when life

Nevertheless, Maillet gave the eighteenth century a lot to think about,

those Troglodytes of former timeswere more like animals than men.1

Montesquieus writing captures the impermanence and mutability of the

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Troglodyte is derived from the Greek, , from , hole

The geographer said: The Troglodytes, owning no domestic goods, can

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Montesquieu portrays these herdsman idyllically: In the evenings, as the

The memory of Fnelon constantly remains here. It is the Btique of Telemachus

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

In The Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu continues to explore flux and

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

perimentation, and observation. He collates observations of nations in many

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Shackleton goes on to say:

In summation, Montesquieu painted a universe that is in continual flux:

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought

Therefore, what is stated to be a treatise on the soul in the works title, is

authority of the ancients who acknowledged that all matter is conscious. He

Evolutionism in Eighteenth-Century French Thought